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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the career of Sir Garnet Wolseley from his 
appointment as Assistant Adjutant General in 1871 to his retirement from the post as Commander- 
in-Chief of the British Army at the end of 1900. Throughout the period Wolseley was the leader of 
the 'reform school', which strove to turn the British Army into an efficient fighting machine 
capable of waging war successfully anywhere in the world. 
The thesis begins with an examination of why Wolseley chose the path of an army 
reformer and examines the areas in which he believed reform was most urgently needed. The 
Secretary of State for War, Cardwell, had instituted a series of reforms which fundamentally 
reorganised the British Army. Despite its flaws Wolseley defended the Cardwell system, in 
particular short service and the creation of the Army Reserve, and his efforts to make it function 
are examined in detail. Wolseley faced major obstacles in his battle to modernise the army, 
especially from the conservatism of the Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Cambridge, and from 
the ignorance and parsimony of politicians. Controversially, he attempted to enlist the support of 
public opinion. Wolseley's interests extended beyond military reform to imperial and home 
defence, and his opinions in this area are analysed. In 1895 he was appointed Commander-in- 
Chief, a post whose authority had been weakened by recent reform. He was a disappointment in 
this position and did little to further the cause of reform, and the reasons for this failure are fully 
examined. Wolseley was blamed for the early reverses of the Boer War and the degree of his guilt 
is assessed. 
The thesis will conclude that Wolseley could have made a vast contribution to army reform 
had he not faced virtually insurmountable obstacles. Nevertheless he was the leading reformer at 
the War Office, and in the different political and social climate after the Boer War, his successors 
were able to build the British Expeditionary Force of 1914 on the ground Wolseley had prepared. 
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Garnet Wolseley was without doubt one of the most successful and best-known colonial 
commanders of the Victorian age. His active fighting career covered many of the small wars of 
imperial expansion: from Burma, China, and India in the east, to Canada in the west, but most of 
all in Africa. Historians have tended to concentrate on this part of Wolseley's career and to ignore 
the post-1885 period of his life. His first biographers, Sir Frederick Maurice and Sir George 
Arthur, did cover Wolseley's entire life but it is obvious that they felt that the time he spent as a 
commander was more important than the period he served at the War Office. Later authors such as 
Joseph Lehmann, Byron Farwell, and Leigh Maxwell have concentrated on Wolseley as a 
commander. Lehmann devoted only 18 of 392 pages to Wolseley's career after the Gordon Relief 
expedition, and Maxwell and Farwell did not even get so far. ' 
Historians who have written on Wolseley's period at the War Office have tended to 
dismiss its value. Adrian Preston published three of Wolseley's campaign diaries with long critical 
introductions analysing Wolseley's career. To him Wolseley's post-1885 career 'in spite of the 
nominal importance of his successive appointments, was one steady process of disillusionment and 
decline, the long, slow denouement of his active career'. Brian Bond, in his survey of the 
Victorian Staff College, entitled the chapter covering the last quarter of the nineteenth century, 
"The Staff College in the Wolseley Era"; which suggests some recognition of the important role 
Wolseley played in the reform of the British Army. Other historians of the period such as Edward 
Spiers, Ramsay Skelley and Gwyn Harries-Jenkins have examined particular aspects of the British 
Army and paid tribute to Wolseley's work without really focusing on what he fought for and the 
degree of success he achieved. 2 
1 Sir F. Maurice & Sir G. Arthur, The Life of Lord Wolseley, (London, 1924); J. Lehmann, All Sir Garnet, 
(London, 1964); L. Maxwell, The Ashanti Ring, (London, 1985); B. Farwell, Eminent Victorian Soldiers, 
(London 1986) 
2 A. Preston, In Relief of Gordon, (London 1967); The South African Diary of Sir Garnet Wolseley 1875, 
(Cape Town 1971); The South African Journals of Sir Garnet Wolseley 1879-80, (Cape Town 1973); B. 
Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College 1854-1914, (London 1972); E. Spiers, The Army and 
Society 1815-1914, (London 1980); The Late Victorian Army 1868-1902, (Manchester 1992); A. Ramsay 
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Wolseley's commentary on his own career is unfortunately fragmentary. He completed 
and published two volumes of The Story of a Soldier's Life before his death in 1913. The second 
volume brought Wolseley's career up to the end of the Ashanti War. Notes exist for later volumes 
but only reach 1885. Wolseley had every intention of completing his autobiography, ending the 
second volume with the words: 'But should my narrative interest the general reader, it will be a 
pleasure to continue it to the date when I gladly bid good-bye to the War Office and ceased to be 
the nominal Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Land Forces'. 3 
Preston has argued that 'It has been the fault of Wolseley's biographers to claim for him 
too much rather than to appraise him for what he did, or, perhaps more importantly, for what he 
was unable to do'. 4 This thesis therefore aims to fill a major gap in the literature of the late 
Victorian British Army: an analysis of Wolseley's career at the War Office in order to ascertain 
what precisely he was trying to achieve and to what extent he succeeded. Why Wolseley was 
thankful to retire from the army at the end of 1900 needs examination. It is not enough to argue, 
as Preston has, that the Second Boer War had demonstrated that Wolseley had been a failure at the 
War Office and that he had been fighting for 'the unrestricted trial of a terminal experiment in 
defence organisation that the conditions and requirements of international politics rendered 
increasingly obsolete'. It is necessary to balance such an opinion with the views of 
contemporaries; for example, General Ellison, writing after the First World War, argued that, 
'Nothing is more certain than that it was Lord Wolseley, and Lord Wolseley alone, who conceived 
the idea of an Expeditionary Force and, when he became Commander-in-Chief he gave effect to 
the idea after lesser men had done all in their power to obscure the vital point at issue'. 5 
The aim of this thesis is to examine Wolseley's career at the War Office from his 
appointment as Assistant Adjutant General in 1871 to his retirement from the post as Commander- 
in-Chief of the British Army at the end of 1900 in the light of these opinions. It will argue that 
Skelley, The Victorian Army at Home, (London 1977); G. Harries-Jenkins, The Army in Victorian Society, 
(London 1977) 
3 G. J. Wolseley, Story of a Soldier's Life, 2 Vols. (London 1903); notes for autobiography, WPP SLL, 
Hove Central Library 
4 Preston, 1875, p5 
5 Preston, 1875, p6; Ellison quoted in J. Dunlop, The Development of the British Army, (London 1938) 
p15-16 
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while it is an exaggeration to call Wolseley the 'father of the modern British Army'. Wolseley's 
contribution to the modernisation and professionalisation of the army during this period was vast 
and wide-ranging. Throughout the period Wolseley claimed to be the leader of the 'reform school' 
which strove to turn the British Army into an efficient fighting machine capable of waging war 
successfully anywhere in the world at short notice. It was to be a professional army, one in which 
the officers could make a career and advance on merit. In this area Wolseley revealed himself as a 
man of his time: groups such as lawyers, civil engineers, and architects were forming professional 
bodies to regulate standards. The Government was active in this respect too; in 1870 the civil 
service was reformed to ensure entry and promotion by merit. 
Wolseley was absent in Canada while Cardwell was instituting his reforms of the 
organisation of the British Army against the vociferous opposition of the Commander-in-Chief, the 
Duke of Cambridge, a large body of the officer corps, and a section of Parliament. Despite his 
absence at the inception of the system that would remain in place throughout his career at the War 
Office and beyond, Wolseley had an important role to play in the Cardwell system: he and his 
colleagues had to make it function smoothly, they had to turn theory into practice. Wolseley has 
quite correctly been identified as the greatest defender of Cardwell's work despite its inherent 
faults. Wolseley struggled to make the system function despite parsimonious governments, the 
opposition of his superior, the Duke of Cambridge, and the criticisms of the greatest rival to his 
reputation as the foremost Victorian commander and reformer, Frederick Roberts. 
Wolseley was not an original thinker; he did not have a grand scheme of reforms to turn 
the British Army into the fighting force he wanted. He was content to operate within the structure 
established by Cardwell, to struggle to ensure its intentions were carried out fully, and to suggest 
improvements where necessary. It is not intended to provide a survey of the Cardwell system since 
such information can be found elsewhere, but instead to concentrate on what aspects Wolseley 
placed the greatest importance and to comment on the degree of success he achieved. For 
example, Wolseley believed that the creation of the Army Reserve was the raison d' etre of the 
Cardwell system and that the system of short service, which has received the most attention from 
later historians, had to be made a success in order to create and maintain such a reserve. 
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Wolseley's interests in military matters were wide-ranging. He was concerned with every 
aspect of the army from its organisation for war, to the training and education of the rank and file. 
He fought to improve the standards of the staff officers both by supporting the expanding Staff 
College at Camberley, and by advocating a system of selection for staff appointments and senior 
regimental commands. Beyond the work of his earlier career, The Soldier's Pocket Book for Field 
Service, and his entry for the 1872 Wellington Prize, Wolseley demonstrated little interest in the 
field of tactics. Nevertheless he remained abreast of developments in the area and was often an 
enthusiastic supporter of innovations such as machine guns and mounted infantry. Wolseley was 
also determined that such tactical developments should be taught and practised by the army and 
this struggle to prepare the British Army for warfare on a modern battlefield forms an important 
theme in Wolseley's career. 
Wolseley was also interested in the realm of strategy and foreign policy. The late Victorian 
period has been seen by many as the period of relentless imperial expansion by successive 
governments with increasingly enthusiastic public support. Wolseley was almost certainly the first 
soldier to realise the extent of the problems caused by this expansion. It will be argued that while 
Wolseley himself took part in many of these small wars of colonial expansion and called himself a 
'Jingo', he realised that the British Army was not sufficiently large to defend the whole Empire. 
Earlier than anyone he called for a definition to be made of the purposes for which the army 
existed and for a list of priorities to be established. The so-called 'Stanhope Memorandum' on 8 
December 1888 went some of the way towards meeting Wolseley's demands, but it will be argued 
that Wolseley wanted a far more thorough survey to be made of British defence requirements and 
capabilities. 
The opposition of the Duke of Cambridge to the Cardwell reforms has already been 
mentioned in passing. For most of Wolseley's career at the War Office, his identification with the 
reform school put him into opposition with the Duke whose conservatism was an anathema to 
Wolseley. As a cousin of the Queen the Duke found a ready body of supporters in the Court; 
Wolseley, without well-born connections, had no such advantage. Therefore Wolseley utilised the 
power of the press, which had become interested in military matters since Russell's despatches 
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from the Crimea, and the public, more of whom were receiving the vote as the franchise was 
extended both in 1868 and 1884. It will be demonstrated that Wolseley achieved some successes 
through his courting of publicity but also that this publicity nearly ended his career before he was 
really established as an army reformer. 
Wolseley's tenure of the office as Commander-in-Chief between 1895 and 1900 has been 
seen as a period of disillusionment and disappointment. The reasons for this will be analysed in 
order to establish whether this opinion is true or not, and what new obstacles Wolseley faced now 
that he was rid of the Duke of Cambridge, and question whether in 1895 Wolseley was fit for the 
job. Finally Wolseley's role in the preparations for the Second Boer War will be examined to 
redress the opinion voiced by the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, that Wolseley 
had largely failed to carry out the tasks assigned to him. 
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Chapter 1- The Making of the Army Reformer 
This chapter will look at the type of man Wolseley was, and will examine the motivations 
behind his pursuit of a career and reputation as an army reformer, and analyse what aspects of the 
British Army Wolseley thought most needed urgent reform. The chapter will then look at the 
obstacles Wolseley faced in the cause of army reform, both from military men and from his 
political masters, and from society in general, and how he attempted to overcome these problems. 
It will be seen that Wolseley was very much a man of his times, influenced by the opinions held by 
many Victorians on subjects such as race, patriotism, and the Irish question. He was also a man 
who brought to the War Office a depth of practical experience: before joining the War Office staff 
in 1871 he had already served in Burma, India, China, and Canada, and had visited the United 
States during the Civil War there. Once at the War Office he continued to add to his practical 
experience of warfare with service in West and South Africa, Egypt, the Sudan, and Cyprus. 
Wolseley's background provided a number of clues to the future army reformer and 
commander. He came from an Anglo-Irish background: his great-great-grandfather had fought in 
Ireland with King William III and had been awarded with land for his services. His father had 
served in Wellington's army and died when Wolseley was seven, leaving his family of seven 
children, (Garnet was the eldest) to survive on his army pension. Wolseley spent his early youth in 
genteel poverty near Dublin. The family could not afford to purchase Wolseley a commission but, 
after a great deal of persuasion the Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Wellington, made Wolseley 
an ensign in the 12th Foot. Wolseley realised immediately that his best opportunity for 
advancement lay in active service. He therefore sought early transfer to the 80th Foot, which was 
on active service in Burma. ' 
Two aspects of Wolseley's early life stand out as exerting a strong influence on the older 
man. The first was the period he had spent in Ireland, and the second was his poverty. Wolseley's 
upbringing in Ireland had left him with a poor impression of the Irish, whom he despised for their 
1 Lehmann, p13-15 
13 
religion and their poverty. Although he viewed Ireland as a fruitful source of recruits for the 
British Army and recognised the value of the Irish soldiery, he was angered by the agitation in 
Ireland for Home Rule and viewed it as unpatriotic. He shared the general sense of outrage after 
the Phoenix Park murders but was quick to emphasise the role of the Royal Irish Regiment at the 
battle of Tel-el-Kebir in order to help the government defuse the highly volatile situation in 
Ireland. Despite this political gesture Wolseley, earlier in the same year, voiced his suspicions of 
Irish loyalty to Britain; in his memoranda on the proposed Channel tunnel he wrote of the danger 
to its security by Fenian-inspired treachery. 2 
When Gladstone proposed to grant Home Rule to Ireland Wolseley was outraged. He 
described it as 'the silliest and most villainous proposal ever before put before the English people 
in a cloud of lies... If ever the loyal people of Ireland are driven to fight, I shall be glad to lead 
them'. 3 At that time he was Commander-in-Chief in Ireland and in his correspondence with the 
Duke of Cambridge he suggested that Home Rule had little support in Ireland: 'I think Home Rule 
as it was understood for the last five or six years is little thought of now'. Nevertheless the Ulster 
Protestants were disquieted by the second Home Rule Bill then before Parliament and in April 
1893 Wolseley warned the Duke 'Ulster is determined to resist, & will fight a outrance if at any 
future time she be cut off from England'. He went on to say that 'if ever our troops are brought 
into collision with the loyalists of Ulster & blood is shed, it will shake the whole foundations upon 
which our army rests to such an extent, that I feel our army will never be the same again'. 4 It 
appears likely that had Wolseley lived to see the passing of the Home Rule Bill he would have 
been an outspoken supporter of the officers leading the Curragh mutiny. 
Wolseley's dislike of the Irish was only part of his general dislike of all foreigners. He saw 
himself as a patriot, proud to be British and to state that he hated all foreigners and considered 
2 Wolseley to Queen Victoria, 14 Sept. 1882, G. E. Buckle & A. C. Benson, (eds. ) The Letters ueen 
Vi oria, (London, 1930-2) Vol. 3,2nd series, p340-1; memo. on the Channel Tunnel, Wolseley, 16 June 
1882, W033/39 
3 Wolseley to Maurice, incomplete and undated but probably 1893, Maurice Papers, Liddell Hart Centre, 
2/2/18 
4 Wolseley to Cambridge, 1 Jan. & 23 April 1893, Duke of Cambridge Papers, Royal Archives, Vic. Add. 
Mss. E/l/12892,12945 
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himself a 'Jingo' .5 Apart from his exploits on the battlefield Wolseley expressed these beliefs most 
clearly through his statements on military education. This was a subject close to Victorian hearts; 
the 1870 Education Act had made primary education compulsory but had not included physical 
education in the list of scholastic requirements. Wolseley and others feared that the compulsory 
period of military service imposed on their manhood by France and Germany might result in a 
physically stronger race. This might place Britain, with her voluntary system of army enlistment, 
at a possible disadvantage on the battlefield in the future unless the youth of Britain were trained 
physically from an early age and imbued with a spirit of patriotism. Therefore while drawing back 
from supporting the idea of conscription in Britain, Wolseley gave his support to the establishment 
of cadet corps, which trained youths along military lines, and to the Volunteers, Militia, and 
Yeomanry, who gave civilians a further taste of military discipline. 6 
This concept of patriotism coupled with the period of rapid imperial expansion led to a 
belief in the superiority of the white man and his right to rule over the so-called lesser 'coloured' 
races. Wolseley shared the racism of his contemporaries arguing that the 'negro is a cowardly, 
lazy fellow' who needed guidance from a 'superior' race. Of the tribes encountered during his 
fighting career Wolseley held some admiration only for the Ashanti and the Zulus, both of whom 
had organised military systems, had challenged British rule, fought well, and could be deemed 
'martial races'. Not all Victorians shared these views. In 1879 Wolseley abandoned a plan to use 
the Swazis against the Zulus on the grounds that 'I have to think of the howling Societies at home 
who have sympathy with all black men whilst they care nothing for the miseries inflicted on their 
own kith and kin who have the misfortune to be located near these interesting niggers'. Later that 
year, once the publicity had died down after the capture of Cetewayo, Wolseley felt free to launch 
the Swazis on the stronghold of Sekukuni in a brief and successful campaign which led to the 
slaughter of many Swazis but few British soldiers.? 
5 Journal, 16 Aug. 1878, W0147/6; Wolseley to Lady Wolseley, 20 March 1880, WPP LW/P6 
6 For example, The Times, 20 Jan. 1887; 1 June 1889; 4 Dec. 1896; 12 Jan. 1898; G. J. Wolseley, 'War and 
Civilisation' in U. S. M. (May 1897); G. J. Wolseley, 'The Army' in T. H. Ward, (ed. ) The Reign of Quee 
Victoria, (London, 1987) pp155-225 
7 G. J. Wolseley, 'The Negro as a Soldier', in Fortnightly Review, Dec. 1888; L. James, The Rise n Fall 
th., ý iih Empire, (London, 1994) p194; British losses in the final battle for the Fighting Kopje were _Qf 
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The absence of parental influence to secure good positions within the army and the lack of 
financial resources to purchase them forced Wolseley to seek advancement through bravery in 
action. He was later quoted as saying, 'There is only one way for a young man to get on in the 
army. He must try to get killed in every way he possibly can' "8 Wolseley's early career 
demonstrated the validity of this statement; he was at the forefront of many charges in Burma, the 
Crimea, the Indian Mutiny, and in China. He was wounded several times and lost the sight of his 
right eye in the Crimea. He was rapidly promoted for his bravery, and his promotion to major was 
delayed only because he had not served the requisite six years in the army necessary for 
advancement to that rank. Further successful active service led to Wolseley's promotion to the 
rank of Major-General in 1868, only 16 years after joining the British Army. 
Wolseley never forgot that he had advanced solely through his own abilities and without 
the patronage of the royal court, of Horse Guards, or of any powerful army officer. He retained a 
life-long dislike for officers who through their social standing could obtain positions he coveted. 
Because of his rapid advancement through active service Wolseley came to equate advancement 
with success and to fear that failure in the field might weaken his position at the War Office. For 
example, he commanded the Gordon Relief expedition while still Adjutant General and wrote to 
his wife: 
What a host of enemies I have! Do you suppose it is only the usual number that a 
successful General has, or is there something about me that makes men bear me 
ill-will? I believe there are many who would rejoice if this expedition failed, 
because its failure would be mine. 9 
Wolseley's career as an army commander was ended by this expedition but there appears to be no 
evidence that its failure affected his position in the War Office. 
Wolseley's fear of failure was to some extent influenced by his own financial situation. He 
had no private means and was wholly dependent on his army pay and on fees received for his 
articles. In 1883 Wolseley's financial situation was somewhat relieved by the grant that 
accompanied his elevation to a peerage. His correspondence with Gladstone at the time 
seven dead and 37 wounded; the Swazis lost approximately 600. Major G. Tylden, 'The Sekukuni Campaign 
of November-December 1879' in J. S. A. H. R., Vol. XXIX, (1951) pp129-35 
8 Quoted in H. How, 'Lord Wolseley', in The ranMagazine, Vol. III, (May 1892) pp443-61 
9 Wolseley to Lady Wolseley, 15 Jan. 1885, WPP LW/P11 
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demonstrates his financial worries. He had no sons to provide for and therefore the peerage would 
disappear with his death. Rather than receive the annuity for two lives which normally 
accompanied a peerage, Wolseley wanted to receive the money in a lump sum. He pressed for 
£35,000 but Gladstone fixed the sum at £30,000.10 In 1895 Wolseley asked Sir John Ardagh to 
evaluate his chances of being made Commander-in-Chief because 'I am very poor. If I am not to 
be employed I shall have many servants to discharge, horses and carriages to sell etc. and all this 
is a serious matter'. The Duke of Cambridge had been a rich man whose pay as Commander-in- 
Chief allowed him to employ four aides-de-camp and a private secretary. The government took the 
opportunity of Wolseley's appointment to make a saving by reducing the number of aides-de-camp 
by two; the Duke had been paid £10,932 and Wolseley was to be paid £9,200. Since the 
entertaining requirement remained the same Wolseley was highly disappointed with this reduction 
in pay. 11 
Patronage was a feature of Victorian life; Wolseley resented his lack of a patron for his 
own career, and used what patronage he could give to advance the careers of those men who he 
believed were fit for promotion. His resentment of his own position is clear from an extract from 
his South African journal: 
Throughout my life I have always felt myself heavily weighted in the race for 
power, and I often think, if I had had for my father a Lord Chancellor, as 
Chelmsford had, instead of being a poor Major in a marching Regiment, what 
could now have been my position! How many times in my life might not the 
authorities have pushed me on. 12 
On his campaigns Wolseley was sometimes asked to take proteges of some influential personage 
and was often disappointed with their performance. The Prince of Wales had urged Wolseley to 
take Colonel Stanley Clarke with him to the Sudan; in a letter to the Duke of Cambridge Wolseley 
described Clarke as 'a charming man in society, but useless in the field in every way'. Hartington 
had pressed Wolseley to take General Sir Charles Wilson and Wolseley wrote of 
him that 'the 
10 Wolseley to Gladstone, 10 Feb. 1883; Wolseley to Gladstone, 22 April 1883; Gladstone memo. 23 April 
1883; all in Gladstone Papers, British Museum, BM 44479,44480,44767 
11 Wolseley to Ardagh, 5 July 1895, Ardagh Papers, PRO30/40/2; Memo. on pay of the Commander-in- 
Chief, Lansdowne, 4 Nov. 1895, CAB37/40 
12 Journal, 28 Dec. 1879, WO147/7 
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realities of war which he had seen for the first time in his life, had somewhat shaken his nerve'. 13 
Only Frederick Burnaby, a friend of the Prince of Wales, impressed Wolseley with his bravery in 
the Sudan. 
The so-called 'Wolseley Ring' developed out of two features of Victorian military life: the 
use of patronage by the Duke of Cambridge and other senior officers, and the method of 
promotion to senior ranks in the army by seniority rather than selection. More will be said later of 
Wolseley's opinions on the quality of staff and senior regimental officers. Bereft of a patron 
himself, Wolseley sought to set himself up as a competitor to the Duke of Cambridge by creating a 
circle of proteges whose ability Wolseley cultivated and whom in turn would be of use in 
promoting the interests of their chief. There were several qualifications for membership of the 
ring, such as loyalty to Wolseley, intellect, bravery, and experience of war. 14 Having a powerful 
father was certainly not a qualification, as Wolseley replied to Colonel Mansell-Pleydell who had 
written to Wolseley in 1882 asking for his assistance in advancing his son's career: 'Were Ito 
recommend for promotion every officer whose father thinks he deserves reward, all but orphans 
would be Field Marshals'. 15 Wolseley had selected Mansell-Pleydell's son for the mounted 
infantry in Egypt but did not feel that this obliged him to advance the man's career any further. 
The subject of the Wolseley Ring while Wolseley was a commander has been covered 
elsewhere and little more needs to be said than to quote Wolseley's opinions on the subject and the 
reaction from the Duke. 16 Wolseley strongly believed that a commander must have faith in his 
tools in order to conduct a successful campaign, and he told Archibald Forbes: 
13 Colonel Stanley Clarke appealed to the Prince of Wales for some reward for his services in the Sudan. 
Wolseley refused to sanction any such reward. Ponsonby to Smith, 10 Oct. 1885; Wolseley to Smith, 13 
Oct. 1885; Smith to Ponsonby, 14 Oct. 1885, W. H. Smith Papers P. R. O. WO110/1; Wolseley to 
Cambridge, 11 May 1885, RA E/1/11181 ; Wolseley to Hartington, 28 Jan. 1885, Devonshire Papers, 
Chatsworth 340.1649 
14 Out of the membership of the ring McNeil, Wood, Dr Anthony Hume, Buller, and Gifford were all 
holders of the Victorial Cross. It can be argued that one of the many reasons why Wolseley disliked the 
Duke of Cambridge was that the Duke had held a divisional command in the Crimea but after witnessing the 
battle at Alma had done his best to return home. Although the Duke was eventually invalided home after 
contracting typhoid fever the rumours of cowardice remained and Wolseley never 
forgot this. I. F. W. 
Beckett, 'Wolseley and the Ring', Soldiers of the Queen, No. 69, (June 1992) pp 14-25; G. St Aubyn, The 
RDYal gorge, (London 1963) pp70-88; Journal, 11 July 1875, WO 147/5 
15 Wolseley to Mansell-Pleydell, 21 Dec. 1882, WPP PLB1 
16 For more on the subject of patronage see I. Harvie, "'The Wolseley Ring": a Case-Study in the Exercise 
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I know these men of mine and they know me. I selected them originally because of 
my discernment of character, not at the behest of interest or from the dictates of 
nepotism. We have worked long together; their familiarity with my methods and 
my just reliance on them relieves me of half the burden of command. 17 
This trust could sometimes be misplaced. For example, Redvers Buller caused a serious delay on 
the Gordon Relief expedition by failing to order a sufficient quantity of coal for the steamers, or 
enough camels. Wolseley concluded that Buller would 'make a much better fighting General than a 
Staff Officer', but he would be disappointed in this respect in 1899. William Butler proved 
difficult to handle in the Sudan in 1884 and Wolseley wrote to his wife: 'I shall have to drop him 
from my list except for a big war where I could make him a Brigadier-General and see what he 
would be worth in that position'. Indeed Butler appears to have been so temperamental that 
Wolseley wrote to him in 1886, when Butler was serving in the British Army in Egypt under 
General Stephenson, that Butler's despatches bordered on insubordination and that 'you must learn 
to work in a team before you can drive one'. 18 
The Duke of Cambridge criticised Wolseley's selections for his staff on the grounds not 
only that they overrode the principle of seniority but also that the circle was too narrow. He wrote 
to Wolseley in March 1885: 
You will be obliged to take some who have not seen much active service so far, 
for the best reason in the world that our wars of late have not been numerous, and 
that the same officers have generally been employed; consequently your area of 
choice becomes somewhat limited. 19 
Wolseley replied that 'I think I may say that I have always endeavoured to bring forward new 
untried men: I have certainly done so on this campaign and have not been happy in the selections 
made'. Wolseley went on to describe the performance of these men, 15 of whom he listed; of the 
eight tried under fire, two, Henry Brackenbury and Butler, had done well; Colonel Talbot, Ewart 
and Gough reasonably; and Wilson, Boscawen and Clarke badly. Of the seven not tried under fire, 
17 A. Forbes, Souvenirs of Some Continents, (London, 1885), p171-2; also in A. Forbes, 'Wolseley: A 
Character Sketch', The English Illustrated Magazine, Vol. II, (May 1885) pp519-23 
18 Journal, 9 Jan. 1885, W0147/8; Wolseley to Lady Wolseley, 23 Dec. 1884 WPP LW/P10; Wolseley to 
Butler, 13 May 1886, WPP PLB1; Journal, 22 Aug. 1884, W0147/7 
19 Cambridge to Wolseley, 6 March 1885, W. Verner, The Military Life of H. R. H. George Duke of 
m ri , 
(London 1905) p296 
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only Dormer, Henbon, Purvie and Blundell did well. Some comments were quite caustic such as 
that on Colonel White of the Essex Regiment - 'not fit to be a corporal'. 20 
Wolseley's patronage extended beyond the field to affect the careers of his proteges while 
he was at the War Office. Wolseley felt that Evelyn Wood lacked the brain power to be a 
commander in war but nevertheless the two men formed a fruitful partnership while Wolseley was 
at the War Office and Wood held the Aldershot command. Wolseley was instrumental in securing 
Henry Brackenbury's promotion to major-general in 1885 and his position in the Intelligence 
Department. He was then disappointed when Brackenbury adopted the Indian point of view of the 
defence of India while serving there, though they later worked well together when Brackenbury 
was Director of Ordnance and Wolseley was Commander-in-Chief. He encouraged some young 
men, such as J. Adye and E. S. E. Childers, who had served under him in the field, to enter the 
Staff College in order to gain the theoretical knowledge necessary for a staff officer. Wolseley also 
advised Ardagh to get some regimental experience in India in 1892 before returning to Britain 
where Wolseley hoped to secure for him the appointment as head of the Intelligence Department. 21 
Intellect was a quality admired by Wolseley and J. F. Maurice was one of the most 
intellectual members of the ring. Maurice won the 1872 Wellington Prize, beating Wolseley and 
others in a strong field, and joined the teaching staff at Sandhurst. He served with Wolseley on all 
his major campaigns, and as the author of the official history of the 1882 campaign ably defended 
Wolseley from his critics and took his part wholeheartedly in the argument with Hamley. In fact 
Maurice has not unjustly been called the 'pen of Wolseley', and his writings on army reform 
backed up Wolseley's own opinions. 22 Although Wolseley valued intellect he recognised that 
without experience it had little value in the field particularly in senior staff posts. He admired 
Edward Hamley's writings on tactics and his value as a educator but was disappointed by his 
performance in Egypt. Maurice described the problem in a review of A. I. Shand's Life Q Sir E. 
Hamle for the United Services Magazine: Wolseley found that 'Sir E. Hamley with all his 
20 Wolseley to Cambridge, 4 April 1885, RA E/1/11123 
21 Brackenbury to Wolseley, 13 Aug. 1885, WPP; Wolseley to Ardagh, 19 July 1892, Ardagh Papers 
PRO30/40/2 
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theoretical knowledge of war, had completely lost touch of the practical workings of large bodies 
of men, and that he was always so full of his own importance, that he could not be trusted to carry 
out orders that he received'. This is why in his despatches Wolseley gave a more prominent place 
to the role played by Archibald Alison than to Hamley's. In later years Hamley and Wolseley 
served the same interests; both emphasised the vital subject of home defence and Hamley's 
abilities as a public speaker must have helped Wolseley in this area. 23 
There can be little doubt that personal ambition was a major motivation behind Wolseley's 
choice of a career as an army reformer. Nevertheless it is unfair to accuse Wolseley as Adrian 
Preston has of exploiting 'the cause of reform in his own rather than the nation's best interests. 
Wolseley's experience of war both before and after he joined the War Office staff provided ample 
evidence that the British Army was in urgent need of reform in many areas. Wolseley brought to 
the War Office a depth of practical experience in the field equalled by none of his colleagues. He 
had witnessed at first hand in the trenches before Sebastopol in the winter of 1854-5 the depths to 
which the army could decline. His campaign and command experience highlighted for him the 
weaknesses of the army, the areas in which urgent reform was most needed, and the direction 
these reforms should take. 
Wolseley's enthusiasm for short service stemmed from his period in Canada during the 
1860s. His observation of the training of Confederate troops during the American Civil War, 25 and 
his own position as Commandant of the La Prairie cadet school near Montreal convinced Wolseley 
that short service was workable: only a short period of military training was necessary to turn a 
raw recruit into an adequately trained soldier. Then after a short period of service in the colours 
the trained man could be surrendered to the Army Reserve. Wolseley saw the existence of this 
Reserve as vital to forestall a repeat of the tragedy of the Crimean War when no reserves were 
23 J. F. Maurice, 'Critics and Campaigning', in Fortnightly Review, (July 1888); 'Sir E. Hamley and Lord 
Wolseley', in U. S. M. Vol. 9, (1895); A. I. Shand, The Life of General Sir Edward Bruce Hamley, 
(Edinburgh 1895) 
24 Preston, 1875, p73 
25 G. J. Wolseley, 'A Month's Visit to Confederate Headquarters', in Blackwoods, Vol. XCIII, No. 568, 
(Jan. 1863) pp1-29; 'General Lee', in Macmillans, Vol. 55, (March 1887) pp321-31; 'An English View of 
the Civil War', in North American Review, Vol. CXLIX, Nos. 391-7, (June-Dec. 1889); J. Luvaacs, The 
Military Te acy of the Civil War, (Chicago 1959) 
21 
available and the government despatched barely trained recruits, which Lord Raglan could not use, 
as replacements. 26 This period of training the Canadian militia also convinced Wolseley that the 
auxiliary forces could play a more active role in the organisation of the army. Wolseley had 
limited contact with the auxiliary forces while at the War Office: he served briefly as Inspector- 
General of the Auxiliary Forces in 1875, but beyond that appointment his interest was confined to 
giving them encouragement through his speeches to various corps, and to giving them a role in the 
scheme of mobilisation for home defence. 
During his career as a commander Wolseley was made fully aware of the defects of the 
short service system particularly with reference to the youth of the majority of the rank and file 
and NCOs. It is somewhat ironic that the man who would spend his career at the War Office 
justifying and defending short service should, as a commander in the field, resort to using picked 
men for his rank and file. He attempted to justify his conduct in a letter to the Duke of Cambridge 
from the Gold Coast: 
The proposals I put forward relative to the formation of battalions for this service 
were based upon the belief that our Infantry at present - so unlike what it was in 
days gone by - being so largely composed of growing lads, was unfitted for the 
fatigues of a tropical campaign, it would be necessary to draft into any whole 
battalion selected for the work so many volunteers from other corps, that 
regimental spirit... would be swamped. 27 
In this case Wolseley had requested that the third British battalion on standby for despatch to the 
Gold Coast should be composed of eight companies selected one from each of the next eight 
battalions on the roster, rather than the next complete battalion on the list. The conditions on the 
Gold Coast were unique; the bush was so thick that it was necessary to alter the ratio of officers to 
men to 1: 20, and experienced men were needed to fight in what amounted to near darkness. On 
this occasion Wolseley did not get the battalion composed according to his instructions; his 
solution was to use the more experienced 42nd Regiment before the 23rd Regiment even though 
the 23rd was higher on the list. Wolseley again acted against the rules in South Africa, when he 
26 For example, Wolseley to Maurice, 20 Sept. 1887, in Life -Qf 
Wolselev, (London, 1924) p226 
27 Wolseley to Cambridge, 3 Sept. 1873, Verner, p67 
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did not disembark the Royal Marines sent out as reinforcements after Isandhlwana because he did 
not need them. The Duke of Cambridge was furious with Wolseley on both occasions. 28 
The controversy over the use of picked men reached its peak over the formation of the 
Camel Corps for the Gordon Relief expedition. Wolseley proposed to create this unique force by 
taking 40 men from each Guards regiment, and from two battalions of the Rifle Brigade, and 100 
Royal Marines. The Duke was appalled because the creation of this special force would cripple the 
cavalry and the Guards by denying them their best men. He was shocked by the idea of mounting 
Guards regiments on camels and it must be admitted that Wolseley did find some humour in the 
situation. 29 The Queen, probably prompted by the Duke, also entered into the dispute, writing to 
the Secretary of State for War, Lord Hartington, that she 'believed that the principle of breaking 
up regiments had been condemned as unsound'. Hartington replied that the principle was only 
unsound when used to bring battalions destined for foreign service up to full strength. The 
formation of the Camel Corps was a different case because it was a specially formed corps and 
there was no other way in which the cavalry at home could have been used. Wolseley remained 
unrepentant about the Camel Corps despite the fact that the experiment of asking cavalrymen to 
fight dismounted in the infantry formation of the square had been proved wrong when the square 
broke at the battle of Abu Klea. In the notes for his autobiography Wolseley advised future 
commanders 'I beg of you to select all ranks for any such dangerous venture according to the plan 
adopted for raising the Camel Corps that fought at Abu Klea and Gubat'. 30 
The transport and supply system had broken down completely in the Crimea, leading to a 
35 % decline in the fighting strength of the army. Although the government immediately instituted 
a series of reforms designed to remedy the situation, Wolseley argued in later years that these 
reforms had not gone far enough. 31 His main concern centred on the inadequacy of the nucleus of 
28 Cambridge to Wolseley, 6 Feb. 1874 & 18 Aug. 1879, Verner, p85 & 166 
29 Hartington to Wolseley, 19 Sept. 1884, Life of Wolseley, p182; Cambridge to Wolseley, 19 Sept. 1884, 
Verner, p266; Wolseley to Lady Wolseley, 1 Dec. 1884, WPP LW/P10; Lord Gleichen agreed with 
Wolseley on the humour of the situation, see Lord E. Gleichen, With the Camel Corps Jp The Nile, 
(London, 1888) 
30 Queen to Hartington, 22 Sept. 1884, Buckle, Vol. 3,2nd series, p540; Wolseley on the performance of 
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31 In December 1854 the responsibility for supply and transport was transferred from the Treasury to the 
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regimental transport permitted by the reforms. Wolseley wanted a greater number of men trained 
in the complexities of transport and supply so that local resources at the seat of a war could be 
utilised fully. He recognised the difficulties in the way of the maintenance of a large body of 
transport: the army could be called upon to fight anywhere in the world in differing climates and 
across various terrains. Nevertheless, Wolseley highlighted one area of transport the army 
generally ignored: the Franco-Prussian War had proved the vital role railways could play in the 
rapid concentration of troops at the front. The lack of rolling stock and trained engine drivers 
caused a delay to Wolseley's advance inland along the railway adjacent to the Sweetwater Canal 
from the base at Ismailia during the 1882 campaign. Two years later the situation was no better as 
delays beset the proposal to build a railway from Suakin to Berber in the Sudan. Wolseley also 
perceived the vital role of railways in home defence and devoted much attention to the subject, as 
is shown by his collection of pamphlets on the subject to be found in his collection of private 
papers. 32 
The morale of the army became more important as the average age of the soldier fell 
under short service. Wolseley had been horrified to discover in the Crimea that few soldiers had 
ever seen Lord Raglan, and many did not even know the name of their Commander-in-Chief. The 
soldiers also felt abandoned by their officers who appeared to know little of their suffering and to 
care even less. When in Canada, Wolseley filled a gap in military literature with the production of 
The Soldier's Pocket Book for Field Service, which is full of instructions to officers on how to 
treat the rank and file, and basic advice on areas such as cooking, hygiene, and elementary first 
aid. As a commander in the field Wolseley made every possible provision for the welfare of his 
men, realising that without the men a commander could do nothing. This concern was particularly 
evident in the Ashanti campaign on the notoriously unhealthy Gold Coast. His actions were 
rewarded with the phrase adopted in the home army of 'All Sir Garnet' to signify that all was in 
order. Later in the War Office Wolseley continued to care for the welfare of the rank and file, 
munitions, field equipment, and clothing was transferred to the War Office; the Land Transport Corps raised 
during the war was retained in peace under the name of the Military Train; and a limited amount of 
regimental transport was permitted. C. Barnett, Britain and Her Army, (London, 1970) p288-90 
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fighting for the introduction of a more practical fighting dress, and for improvements in medical 
facilities. The Queen strenuously opposed the introduction of khaki, but warmly supported 
Wolseley's campaign for the improvement of medical care. 
A trained army well-equipped and supplied could only fight well if its staff and senior 
regimental officers were fit for the job. Wolseley clearly believed that the quality of staff officers 
was in need of urgent improvement. For example, he sent home two-thirds of the generals who 
had served under Lord Chelmsford during the Zulu War, informing the Duke of Cambridge that 
'for the want of good leaders here, I am forced to give command of the column I am about to 
operate with to officers holding the rank of only Lieutenant-Colonel'. 33 Cardwell had hoped to 
introduce selection for all ranks above major but had been forced to back down because of the 
Duke's preference for promotion by seniority. The eventual compromise of 'seniority tempered by 
selection'34 which eventually evolved into seniority tempered by rare rejections did not satisfy 
Wolseley, who would continue to press for selection while at the War Office. Wolseley's personal 
solution as a commander was to appoint the men he wanted to important commands. In 1879 
Wolseley held onto Lieutenant-Colonel Baker Russell, who was under orders for India, for long 
enough for him to command the assault on Sekukuni's Town. Wolseley recommended that Wood's 
temporary rank of major-general in the Zulu War should be made permanent but the Duke resisted 
this. Wolseley wanted George Colley, who had served with Wolseley on the Gold Coast, to be 
appointed his second-in-command and possible successor in case of a mishap although the senior 
general on the spot was Major-General Clifford. The Duke settled the dispute by confirming 
Clifford as Wolseley's deputy because 'no army could stand these sorts of preferences without 
entirely dampening the energies of senior officers'. Wolseley's somewhat caustic reply was that he 
'naturally assumed it would be the object of the Government that the ablest and most fitting man 
should succeed me'. 35 In other words the Commander-in-Chief was acutely aware of the need to 
33 Wolseley to Cambridge, 18 July 1879, Verner, p162 
34 14 July 1871, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. CCVII 
35 Cambridge to Wolseley, 12 Aug. 1879; Wolseley to Cambridge, 28 Sept. 1879, both in Verner, pp164 & 
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maintain morale among senior officers, and Wolseley was equally aware of the requirement for 
efficient officers in the field. 
Wolseley hoped to solve the problem of the inadequacies of staff officers by encouraging 
senior officers to take a deeper interest in military education. Wolseley wrote in the United 
Services Magazine that 'experience does not compensate for lack of knowledge in strategy and 
tactics, a knowledge which is to be learnt only from the careful study of military history', and that 
'war is a science, and as such has its principles, and rules deduced from those principles quite as 
surely as every other science'. 36 He felt that the Staff College was the ideal place to supply this 
knowledge and demonstrated his support for Staff College graduates while a commander by 
writing to the Duke in December 1884, 'my idea is to give every Staff College officer and 
everyone strongly recommended by a good commanding officer a chance in a subordinate position 
of showing what he can do and what he is worth'. 37 Many of the staff in the Ashanti campaign and 
six of the 22 special service officers were Staff College graduates, as were 34 staff officers in 
Egypt, and 20 on the Gordon Relief expedition. Certainly Wolseley seems to have appealed to 
Staff College graduates; in his memoirs Ian Hamilton wrote 'had I gone to the Staff College I 
should probably have gravitated towards the Wolseley Ring'. 38 Instead Hamilton became an aide- 
de-camp to Roberts and moved towards Roberts's point of view on the army. 
A successful army also needed to be well organised along a system prepared before an 
expedition was despatched. Even after the creation of the mobilisation scheme in 1875, and its 
overhaul by Hugh Childers, the Egyptian campaign in 1882 showed that the British Army was still 
incapable of despatching a well-organised expedition abroad. Troops were called upon from 
Britain, Malta, Gibraltar, Cyprus, Aden and India, and there was a partial mobilisation of the 
Army Reserve. Wolseley wrote to his wife after Tel-el-Kebir, 'I hope the English people will be 
pleased: they can never know the difficulties an English commander has to struggle against with an 
army hastily thrown together without cohesion between its component parts and no organised 
36 G. J. Wolseley, 'The Study of War' in U. S. M., Vol. 2, (March 1891), pp481-93; G. J. Wolseley, 'War' in 
Fortnightly Review, Vol. XLV, No. 265, (Jan. 1889) pp1-17 
37 Wolseley to Cambridge, 11 Dec. 1884, in Verner, p273 
38 Bond, Staff College, p127; I. Hamilton, Listening for the Drums, (London, 1944), p150 
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transport'. 39 As Adjutant General Wolseley would supervise the drawing up of realistic and 
workable mobilisation schemes. 
The provision of accurate intelligence was also vital for success in the field. Despite the 
establishment of the Intelligence Department in 1873 under Major-General Sir Patrick 
MacDougall, the provision of intelligence in many areas, particularly the Gold Coast and the 
Sudan, was woefully inadequate. 40 Wolseley tried to remedy this situation by installing his protege 
Brackenbury as head of the Intelligence Department in 1886. 
Wolseley's experiences during the Indian Mutiny provided few lessons of value to his 
career as an army reformer. The Mutiny did, however, colour Wolseley's attitude towards India, 
which remained unchanged for the remainder of his career. In the first place Wolseley despised 
the officers of the East India Company and described them as useless. Based on this experience he 
fought against proposals put forward by Frederick Roberts and Sir Charles Dilke for a split of the 
British Army into two separate bodies: one recruited on long service for India and the colonies; 
and the other recruited on short service for home defence. Wolseley strongly believed that any 
lengthened period of service in a hot climate such as India seriously undermined the health and 
efficiency of the private soldier. He also put little value on the fighting abilities of the native 
soldier and, like many Victorians, never fully trusted their loyalty. This distrust forced the 
government to send more British battalions to India whenever the military authorities there 
perceived a need for an increase rather than to augment on a large scale the establishment of the 
native army. Wolseley's opinions on the effect the increases to the Indian establishment had on the 
efficiency of the home army and the validity of such increases will be discussed in later chapters. 
It is worthwhile to discuss here an argument that has been put forward by the defenders of 
Roberts that Wolseley's attitude towards India was coloured by a hankering after the supreme 
command there. In 1879 Wolseley wrote to the Secretary of State for India, Lord Salisbury, that 
he was interested in being appointed Commander-in-Chief in India: 
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I believe that great reforms are possible in the Indian army, and I should like to 
carry them out before I turn into a cut and dry old general to who [sic] reforms are 
an abomination. All the young school of soldiers are well aware that considerable 
reforms are required in our home army also, but as I am known to hold these 
views I can never hope for any great military position in England under the 
existing regime at the Horse Guards. My only opening therefore is in India. 4' 
The choice of country in which Wolseley could reform the army was of less importance than the 
opportunity to do so. A year later Wolseley was appointed Quartermaster General and was soon 
convinced that he was destined to hold further high appointments at the War Office. Therefore the 
necessity of going to India to gain the opportunity to reform the army disappeared. Consequently 
when, in 1890, the question was raised of sending Wolseley to India to succeed Roberts was 
mooted, Wolseley declined the appointment, preferring to take the command in Ireland and to 
await the retirement of the Duke of Cambridge. 42 
Another lesson Wolseley learnt from his experiences in the field which would have a great 
effect on his career at the War Office was that politicians should not be trusted. The government 
set up a Royal Commission to investigate conditions in the Crimea after the outcry raised 
following the despatches in The Times by W. H. Russell. It placed the blame on the shoulders of 
the Quartermaster General Sir Richard Airey of whom Wolseley said, 'no man knew our army 
better in every sense'. 43 The fickleness of governments and the public towards their military 
commanders continued throughout the period. It was a feature of the Victorian public and 
politicians to heap honours on their successful commanders and then to ditch them totally when a 
mistake was made, and Chelmsford and Buller were two notable examples of this practice. 
Wolseley himself was a little more fortunate; he received many honours for his successful 
campaigns, skilfully manoeuvred the blame for the failure to rescue Gordon onto the Gladstone 
government, but was rather less successful in his defence of his conduct in the months preceding 
the outbreak of the Second Boer War. This last case will be examined in a later chapter. 
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In 1871 Wolseley returned to Britain to take up the appointment as Assistant Adjutant 
General. Wolseley soon discovered the obstacles lying in the path of army reform. In the first 
place there was the Duke of Cambridge who has been described as 'a thorough-going 
representative of the old school, and for more than twenty years was destined to impose the weight 
of his authority against all change. 44 Then there were the politicians with their inexperience of 
military requirements and their apparently overriding concern with party politics and financial 
retrenchment. Furthermore the public was largely ignorant of military affairs and showed little 
willingness to be educated on the subject. 
The Duke had good reason to be suspicious of Wolseley's radicalism when the latter 
joined the War Office. In the Soldier's Pocket Book Wolseley had made the radical suggestion, 
'Let us sink as far as possible the respective titles of officers, sergeants, and privates, merging 
them into one great professional cognomen of soldier... Let us give up the phrase "officer and 
gentleman", substituting that of "soldier" for it... ' . 
45 Wolseley then added to his reputation by 
publishing his wholehearted espousal of the cause of army reform in an article for Macmillan's in 
1871. The Duke tried to avert the inevitable clash between the two opposing points of view by 
keeping Wolseley away from the War Office as much as possible. Wolseley was sent first to 
command the expedition against the Ashanti in 1873-4, then to Natal in 1875 to impose a new 
constitution on the colonists; in 1876 he was seconded to the Indian Council in London; and finally 
in 1878 he was appointed Governor-General of Britain's latest acquisition, Cyprus. This last 
appointment was made by the Disraeli government without prior reference to the Duke of 
Cambridge. 
In his Cyprus journal Wolseley wrote of the Duke, 'He doesn't love me, but I flatter 
myself I enjoy what is to me more valued than his affection, namely his 
fear' . 
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for his autobiography Wolseley gave what he believed to be the reason why he was not sent to 
India: the Duke's 
dislike for me was so great at that time that, whilst he was very anxious to get me 
away from Army Head Quarters, he feared to give me any high post abroad, lest it 
should add to my influence in the Army, and make me so powerful that I might 
possibly oust him from his own position which he had come to regard as 
permanently his. 47 
Wolseley may have been exaggerating his own position; at that time Wolseley was viewed 
primarily as a successful commander and few outside the War Office had much idea of the debates 
within on the subject of army reform. 
Late Victorian politics witnessed the growth of democracy as the franchise was slowly 
extended and as the population became more educated and articulate. Wolseley was no supporter 
of democracy. He complained in a letter to Ardagh in 1892 that "'Jaw" is now King, and the man 
who can flatter the crowd most effectively is he who obtains the privilege of being its well paid 
servant'. 48 In 1890 he wrote to his wife that longed for the time when 'the licence of democracy 
and socialism will be conquered by the sword, and succeeded by a cruel military despotism... A 
new Cromwell will clear the country of these frothing talkers, and soldiers will rule. Would that 
my lot could have been cast in such an era. This should not be interpreted as a demonstration of 
Caesarist tendencies on Wolseley's behalf, but more as a cry of desperation from a man who could 
see how the British Army could be improved yet found his efforts thwarted by party political 
requirements, Treasury control, and the inexperience and inefficiency of his political superiors. 
Wolseley tended to judge the worth of his political masters by their willingness to listen to 
the advice proffered by the military experts, particularly himself, and by their espousal of Britain's 
position in the world. On the latter point Disraeli came in for praise for his aggressive policy of 
imperial expansion, but Gladstone did not. Wolseley never forgave Gladstone for submitting to the 
Boers in 1881 nor for his refusal to despatch an expedition to rescue Gordon until too late, and 
commented with relief on Gladstone's retirement: 'The arch traitor Mr. Gladstone has reached the 
47 Notes for Autobiography, WPP SSL8 
48 Wolseley to Ardagh, 19 July 1892, Ardagh Papers, PRO30/40/2 
49 Wolseley to Lady Wolseley, 1 Nov. 1890, quoted in Spiers, Late Victorian Army, p155 
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end of his ignoble career; "an extinct volcano" that can no longer vomit forth destruction to his 
country' . 
50 
Wolseley served under nine different Secretaries of State for War, only one of whom, 
Colonel Stanley, had any military experience. 51 He wrote of Cardwell that 'no British War 
Minister ever responded more readily to demands made upon him by his military advisers'. 52 He 
granted a qualified approval to Childers who 'was a very keen Army Reformer, but first of all he 
was a devoted follower of Mr. Gladstone'. 53 He praised both W. H. Smith and particularly Edward 
Stanhope for the hard work they had put into reforming the army, and was grateful to Hartington 
for the support he had given Wolseley during the difficult months of the Gordon Relief Expedition. 
Colonel Stanley had also been helpful, on one occasion he rewrote in his own handwriting 
Wolseley's list of staff officers for Cyprus so as not to arouse the Duke's suspicions of Wolseley's 
intentions. 54 Wolseley was far more critical of Secretaries of State who paid him little attention: he 
noted in his journal that 'H. R. H. seems now under Mr. Hardy's regime to do what he likes with 
the Army'. But Wolseley reserved his strongest criticisms for Lord Lansdowne, whom he blamed 
for the early reverses suffered during the Second Boer War: 'I have to deal in Lansdowne with a 
man of the smallest mind and who is surprisingly ignorant on every point connected with soldiers 
and with war' . 
55 
It will be seen throughout this thesis that virtually all of Wolseley's proposals on army 
reform involved an increase in army expenditure. This was to prove to be the greatest barrier in 
the battle for an efficient and effective British Army. Arnold-Forster claimed that 'It will be time 
enough to put the blame on the public when the public has been asked to sanction an increase [of 
expenditure] and has refused'. 56 Arnold-Forster missed the vital point: by the time the Estimates 
50 Wolseley to Lady Wolseley, 23 March 1880, WPP LW/P6; Wolseley to Cambridge, 1 June 1896 in J. 
Wilson, CB: A Life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, (London 1973) p210 
51 Stanley had served for seven years in the Grenadier Guards. 
52 Wolseley, Stor , Vol. 
II, p240 
53 WPP SSL10 
54 Wolseley to Smith, 9 Jan. 1887, in Viscount Chilston, W. H. Smith, (London 1965) p233; Brackenbury to 
Stanhope, 9 April 1892, Stanhope Papers, Kent Record Office, 0259; Ellis to Hartington, 2 March 1885, 
Devonshire Papers 340.1675; Journal, 19 July 1878, W0147/6 
55 Journal, 11 July 1875, WO147/5; Wolseley to George Wolseley, 1 Dec. 1899, Wolseley Papers, Duke 
University 
56 H. O. Arnold-Forster, Army Letters, (London 1898) p42 
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reached Parliament they had been subjected to strict scrutiny and reduction by civilian financial 
officials both within the War Office and in the Treasury. This is why Wolseley gave evidence to 
the Stephens Commission arguing that the Commander-in-Chief should be empowered to make an 
annual statement to Parliament on the state of the army. He would have the opportunity to present 
in public any financial requirements of the army not met by the Estimates and allow Parliament to 
decide whether to believe the Commander-in-Chief or the Secretary of State. This would, 
however, not have been in sympathy with the procedures of a parliamentary democracy, which 
was one of the reasons why Wolseley raged against the machinations of party politics. 57 
This chapter has argued that Wolseley was a highly ambitious man with an individualistic 
approach to military affairs. He saw a genuine need for reforms in the British Army and his 
personal ambition for high office led him to pursue a career as an army reformer. He countered 
the Duke of Cambridge's influence by building up his own ring of supporters and secured for them 
important appointments where they could further the cause of reform. Wolseley held strong 
opinions on individuals and his comments were usually uncharitable unless the individual under 
scrutiny met with Wolseley's criteria for approval: loyalty to Wolseley and a readiness to accept 
his advice. The various obstacles in the path of army reform have been identified and this thesis 
will examine how Wolseley sought to overcome them. One major barrier against army reform was 
the apathy of the general public: the army was unpopular in society and the military viewed with 
suspicion. Therefore Wolseley would appeal directly to the public in order to further his own 
career as a reformer, to benefit the army by improving its status in society, and to win the public's 
support for military expenditure. These appeals will be the subject of the following chapter. 
57 The subject of civil-military relations is complex, and has been covered in W. S. Hamer, The Britis 
Ah Arrmy r; v; i-1Vlilitarv Relations 1885-1905 (Oxford 1970) a 
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Chapter 2- The Public Critic 
This chapter will demonstrate how Wolseley attempted to manipulate public opinion for his 
own ends and for the benefit of the British Army. He did this through writing articles for a number 
of public journals and by making speeches which were then widely reported in the press. The 
chapter will argue that Wolseley's cultivation of the public had a number of motives: he wished to 
strengthen his own position at the expense of the Duke of Cambridge; he recognised the need to 
explain the recent reforms to the public to ensure their continuation and further development; he 
also wanted public support to pressurise the government into granting funds for essential 
expenditure to improve the army's efficiency. 
This public airing of military matters led to a great deal of controversy caused not only by 
what Wolseley actually said but also by the fact that he said anything at all. The Duke was 
consistently forced onto the defensive against Wolseley's reforming zeal. Wolseley recognised the 
threat he posed to the Duke: 'He is always afraid that I shall adopt some public method of 
ventilating my views, and he feels that they are so commonplace, and based on common sense, so 
practical that he could not resist them: public opinion would force him to accept them'. I The 
government was appalled at Wolseley's shameless use of opportunities to give speeches at 
banquets, in which he appeared to criticise government policy. This latter point is best 
demonstrated by the invasion scare of 1887-8 which Wolseley deliberately manufactured because, 
although he was genuinely convinced of Britain's vulnerability to invasion, he wanted to stir up 
public concern to such a degree so as to force the government into further examination of the 
question. This topic will be touched on only briefly here but will be analysed in greater detail in a 
later chapter. 2 The long term effect of voicing the army's problems in public is hard to assess but 
an attempt will be made to contrast the public view of the army with that of the navy, and to 
establish which branch of the service was more successful in mobilising public opinion and why. 
Serving army officers were not totally restricted from speaking in public but they were 
1 Journal, 19 July 1878, WO147/6 
2 See chapter 7. 
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supposed to speak on a limited number of subjects. It was quite acceptable, for instance. to write 
about a visit to a foreign army: Wolseley wrote an article for Blackwood's Magazine on his visit to 
General Lee's headquarters. Campaign histories were acceptable, and two members of Wolseley's 
'Ring', Butler and Brackenbury were particularly active in this respect. Wolseley himself wrote a 
campaign history of the 1860 war with China. Biographies were deemed another suitable subject 
for serving officers: while Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, Wolseley wrote the Life Qf the Duke 
Q Marlborough, and a biography of Napoleon. 3 Men like Sir Patrick MacDougall and Sir John 
Adye wrote many articles for the periodicals on various aspects of the army; these encountered no 
criticism because they were seen by the public as the individual views of the officers concerned 
and not an official viewpoint which might be confused with the often differing opinions of the 
Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Cambridge. 
One of Wolseley's most provocative articles, 'Our Military Requirements', for 
Macmillan's Magazine in 1871, drew little comment at the time because, although Wolseley was at 
headquarters, he was not yet seen by the public as the leader of the reform school. Nevertheless 
the article contained statements and suggestions which, had Wolseley written it later in his career, 
would have caused an uproar within the War Office and government. For example he publicised 
the lack of a government policy on defence, and called the MPs 'clap-trap orators'. He voiced the 
opinion, often to be repeated later with more effect, that Britain was open to invasion and that 
London was undefended. Taken as a whole the article represents the nearest Wolseley ever got to 
putting his own individual reform programme into words and before the public. The public 
ignored it because his name was known only as the commander of an unimportant campaign in 
Canada. Wolseley himself recognised this, and an element of his determination to succeed in his 
later campaigns stemmed from the fact that 'I should then have the ear of the public sufficiently to 
ensure the reforms I advocated being carried out' .4 
Wolseley wrote to the Queen in 1885 'No Government, Whig or Tory, has the honesty to 
3 Wolseley, 'Visit to Confederate Headquarters'; G. J. Wolseley, Narrative Qf the War in China, (London, 
1862); G. J. Wolseley, The Life Q the Duke Q Marlborough. 1650-1702 (London, 1894); G. J. Wolseley, 
TTh D lin and FQ Napoleon, (London, 1895) 
4 Wolseley, 'Our Military Requirements' ; Journal, 24 May 1879, WO 147/7 
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tell the people the truth and take them into their confidence on army and navy matters' .5 That was 
Wolseley's justification for criticising the government in public. He found support for this opinion 
from an unusual quarter: in the 1890s Arnold-Forster was often critical of Wolseley and the army 
system he supported, but admitted that 'there will be no real interest taken in the question of army 
reform in the House of Commons until the general public outside the House of Commons shows 
that it was in earnest, and insists upon something being done'. 6 This suggests that Wolseley was 
right to put his case in public, though he was arguably less correct in the methods he used. 
To a limited degree Wolseley did accept the Queen's and Duke's arguments that such 
public airing of differences could damage the army. For example, while in South Africa in 1880 
he began writing an article on promotion which he himself recognised as too plainspoken for 
publication and therefore abandoned. Indeed, he had already published an article on military staffs 
anonymously. He also deprecated the attempts of other members of his 'Ring' to speak on military 
affairs: he felt that Baker Russell should not have written a letter to the Daily News about the 
conduct of the Zulu War, and in 1885 when describing Wood as a third-rate general listed his 
manipulation of the press as one of his faults.? 
Once Wolseley was appointed Quartermaster-General in 1880 his situation changed. He 
was now a senior officer at the Horse Guards subject to the discipline of his superior the Duke. 
The Duke took his role as Commander-in-Chief of the British Army very seriously: he was the 
principal adviser to the Secretary of State for War and he was the person who it was assumed 
would be the spokesman for the military on all controversial aspects of reform. But there is little 
doubt that the Duke was not in tune with the army reforms forced on the army by Cardwell and 
shortly to be further developed by the new Secretary of State Childers, whereas Wolseley was. 
Therefore Wolseley would attempt to justify his public utterances on the grounds that, 'Were I to 
hold other language in public, or to be entirely silent, on what my experience tells me are points of 
vital importance to the State, I should not feel that I was acting honestly by the Army or by my 
5 Wolseley to Queen, 22 March 1885, quoted in Buckle, Vol. 3,2nd series, p632 
6 H. O. Arnold-Forster, The War Office. The Army. and the Empire, (London, 1900) p3 
7 G. J. Wolseley, 'Military Staff Systems Abroad and in England', Macmillans, Vol. XXXVII, (Feb. 1878) 
pp323-335, authorship confirmed by The Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals, Toronto, (1966); Journal, 
11 Jan. 1880; 2 March 1880, WO 147/7; Journal, 22 Aug. 1884, WO147/8 
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country which pays me'. 8 The Duke on the other hand felt strongly that if an officer opposed the 
Duke's own views then he was insubordinate, but power and the public's readiness to listen were 
of no real consequence if an officer voiced the Duke's own opinions. 
At no point does this become clearer than when considering the different treatment meted 
out by the Duke to Roberts. Roberts returned to England in November 1880 as the victor of the 
Second Afghan War and, as a result, was invited to address a large illustrious body at the Mansion 
House on 14 February 1881. Here the Duke, in introducing Roberts to his audience, which 
included Wolseley, gave Roberts leave to speak the truth about the state of the army as he saw it. 
Like Wolseley, Roberts made clear his reasons for speaking: 'it will not be possible to avoid 
treading upon debatable ground... [but] I am actuated simply by a sincere and honest desire to 
place my countrymen in possession of the truth about their army... '. Roberts went on to make 
several points which demonstrated that his views were at variance with those of the government: 
he claimed that the linking and localisation of regiments was contrary to esprit de corps; that men 
were being moved from one regiment to another with little or no concern for their personal 
wishes; and that the Second Afghan War had demonstrated that the army needed men not boys. He 
further made clear his opinion 'that we are sacrificing our army to obtain a reserve', and spoke in 
favour of creating two armies, one for long service abroad, and a short service quasi-militia for 
home service and the production of a reserve. 9 
All these views were in direct contradiction to the spirit and substance of the Cardwell 
reforms and the ongoing Childers reforms. No controversy arose from these public statements and 
no known reprimand was given to Roberts by the Duke of Cambridge. Criticism must, however, 
have come from some quarter, probably the government, because Roberts felt obliged to explain 
and amplify his views in an article in the November 1882 issue of Nineteenth Century. He wrote 
'it never occurred to me that the old system of long service could be reverted to... What I desired 
to show was, that no trial, however lengthened, could be satisfactory, unless due consideration 
were given to the results of practical experience in the field. ' 10 Roberts also gave a definition of 
8 Wolseley to Cambridge, Jan. 1889, quoted in Life of Wolseley, p230 
9I Tim , 
15 Feb. 1881 
10 F. Roberts, 'The Present State of the Army', Nineteenth Century, Vol. XII, No. 69, (Nov. 1882), pp633- 
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what he considered to be an 'old' soldier as 'a man of between five and twelve years' service, and 
admitted that once a man was over 30 years old he was of little good as a private soldier. Wolseley 
would certainly have agreed with this definition, but at the War Office, he was concerned with the 
problem of how to obtain enough recruits, whilst Roberts, in India, was concerned only about how 
to use them. 
The difference between the official treatment of Roberts, who returned to India to become 
the Commander-in-Chief there, and that accorded to Wolseley's article 'Long and Short Service' 
in the March 1881 issue of Nineteenth Century, is very marked. In this article Wolseley, it must 
be said, set out to be deliberately controversial. He started his article by saying that 'all armies and 
navies are naturally conservative in their tendencies, and consequently view with great suspicion 
any changes effected by a Liberal Goverment'. After contrasting the failing of the long service 
system and outlining the benefits of short service he made a spirited attack on regimental officers, 
'in endeavouring to account for the dislike with which short service is generally viewed in the 
army, the fact that it adds very considerably to the daily work of regimental officers must not be 
forgotten'. Now these officers must become instructors as in the German Army and 'many hours 
of idleness daily, the long periods of leave, must be abandoned'. Wolseley admitted that the need 
for volunteers from a number of regiments to make one up to full strength for active service was a 
problem but voiced the hope that once the Reserve was fully established the problem would 
disappear because volunteers would be called upon from it and not from regiments of the line. " 
The author of an article in the May 1881 issue of Blackwood's Magazine contrasted 
Roberts's speech with Wolseley's article and with a degree of truth suggested that 'Sir Frederick 
looks at the point from within, Sir Garnet views it from without, the profession, and it must be 
said that if the army hangs on the words of Sir Frederick with delight... the words of Sir Garnet are 
nevertheless more likely to prevail'. 12 Furthermore this author and others suggested that 
Wolseley's real crime was less his defence of a flawed system but that he 'treats the profession to 
46 
11 G. J. Wolseley, 'Long and Short Service', Nineteenth Century, Vol. IX, No. 49 (March 1881), pp558-72 
12 C. Raleigh Chichester, 'Short Service & its Supporters', Blackwood's Magazine, Vol. CXXIX, No. 787, 
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which he has the honour of belonging with very considerable scorn'. Perhaps Wolseley saw some 
truth in the idea that he was a soldier mixing with politicians on reform whereas Roberts was 
speaking from direct and very recent practical experience, and therefore Wolseley deliberately 
exaggerated his opinion of the regimental officers in his despatches from Egypt in 1882. This 
apparent irony was not lost on the author of an article in July 1883 who gleefully repeated 
Wolseley's statement that 'had he not known of what stuff the regimental officers were made, he 
would not have attempted to attack Tel-el- Kebir as he did', and wanted to know at what point 
Wolseley had changed his mind. 13 It is, however, unlikely that Wolseley had actually changed his 
opinions. The point which Wolseley was consistently trying to make was that regimental officers 
in times of peace were idle but when given a concrete aim on active service they then worked very 
hard. In other words Wolseley wanted to see the professionalism displayed on active service 
continued in barracks at home. 
In 1880 the Liberal party returned to office and Childers was appointed Secretary of State 
for War. He was determined to complete the Cardwell reforms by establishing, among other 
things, linked battalions and localisation; Wolseley was seen as an ideal ally. The conservatives in 
the House of Lords had been so vociferous in opposition to the Cardwell reforms that it had been 
necessary to abolish purchase by an Order-in-Council. Childers wanted to ensure that his reforms 
would not encounter the same rough passage and therefore asked Gladstone to seek the Queen's 
permission to raise Wolseley to a peerage so that he could act as the government spokesman for 
army reform in the House of Lords. In March 1881 Gladstone asked the Queen to make Wolseley 
a peer. He had no doubt that it would prove a controversial request: in conversation with his 
private secretary Edward Hamilton, Gladstone described the proposal as 'a nasty pill for Her'. It 
was one which the Queen was not prepared to swallow without a fight. There was a precedent for 
Gladstone's action: in 1870 he had asked the Queen to make Sir William Mansfield a peer, Lord 
Sandhurst, specifically to assist in the process of army reform, and she had done so. 14 
13 W. E. Montague, 'Red-Hot Reform', Blackwood's Magazine, Vol. CXXXIV, No. 813, (July 1883), 
pp66-87. Authorship confirmed by the Wellesley Index. 
14 Diary, 3 March 1881, quoted in D. W. R. Bahlman, (ed. ), The Diary Qf Sir Edward Walter Hamilton, 
Vol. 1, p 112; Notes for autobiography, WPP SSL8 
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There were two main arguments against raising Wolseley to the peerage: firstly, the Duke 
did not want Wolseley in the House of Lords at all; and, secondly, there was the danger that by 
making the Quartermaster General a peer it might become a political office. The Duke based his 
opposition to Wolseley on the charge that Wolseley was insubordinate, and that his use of the press 
and his public speeches were undermining the Duke's role as head of the army. If Wolseley were 
admitted to the House of Lords, where the Duke sat and spoke as the Commander-in-Chief, who 
could predict what mischief Wolseley could get up to when speaking to such a body? The matter 
did not simply stop with the threat of Wolseley himself, but extended into a general dispute over 
who was actually the head of the British Army. The Queen's private secretary, Ponsonby, wrote to 
Childers that the Queen accepted without question the Duke's charge that Wolseley was 
insubordinate. Gladstone received a similar missive and described it to Earl Granville, the Foreign 
Secretary, as 'a "no surrender" - "non possumus" - nail the colours to the mast, break the bridges 
and burn the boats, letter! ' 15 On 4 March 1881 Childers replied that he had 'watched Sir Garnet 
Wolseley's conduct narrowly since I became Secretary of State' and had found 'his behaviour has 
been most becoming both to myself as the Head of the Department, and to his Royal Highness as 
his immediate superior. On the same day he further pointed out to Gladstone when forwarding 
Ponsonby's letter and his own reply that 'if His Royal Highness had any complaint against a 
subordinate officer to which he wished Her Majesty's attention to be drawn, he should have 
submitted the matter to me. He had not done so but had made use of his connection with the 
Royal Family. Therefore Childers concluded, and would do so again later in the year, that the 
differences between the Duke and Wolseley rested on personal grounds and that the charge of 
insubordination had no foundation. 
On the question of whether Wolseley should continue serving as Quartermaster General 
while a peer Childers had little sympathy for the position of the Duke and the Queen. He reported 
to Gladstone on 7 March that he had warned the Duke that the imposition of such a condition 
would be 'a very dangerous precedent... as it would mean that no Peer could 
be employed at Head 
15 Gladstone to Granville, 5 March 1881, Gladstone Papers, BM 44173 
16 Childers to Ponsonby, 4 March 1881, Childers Papers, Royal Commonwealth Library, 5/21; Childers to 
Gladstone, 4 March 1881,5/22 
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Quarters'. 17 Gladstone made the same point in a memorandum to the Cabinet in which he pointed 
out that many senior officers were rewarded with peerages for services rendered and that to forbid 
them to hold high positions at the War Office would have the effect of dangerously reducing the 
size of the pool from which such appointments could be made. The Queen, while refusing to take 
a step that might politicise the army, was prepared to accept that the government needed support in 
the House of Lords and therefore suggested that Sir Neville Chamberlain might be a suitable man 
to assist the government. 18 
The real point of contention was that if Wolseley were admitted to the House of Lords and 
remained in the office of Quartermaster General, the members of the Lords and the public would 
be in a position to judge for themselves the opposing positions on army reform held by a senior 
officer and the Commander-in-Chief. The Duke was naturally very concerned that the public 
might side with Wolseley against him. The matter dragged on into May leading Edward Hamilton 
to conclude that the whole proposal had been a mistake 'and it is worth considering whether the 
admission of a mistake would not be better than pursuing a matter which the Sovereign strongly 
disapproves, which the Army would resent, and which the House of Lords would not welcome'. 19 
Gladstone was deeply committed to the peerage question and even threatened to resign if the 
Queen refused to accept his recommendation. Granville urged caution over the use of this threat 
because more serious issues might arise in the future 'and threats of resignation ought not to be 
frequent'. 20 
The depth of Wolseley's commitment to army reform and his recognition of the 
importance of mobilising the public are at no point clearer than when considering the proposal he 
put forward after the government had all but abandoned the chance of making him a peer. On 
hearing of the postponement of the matter, due to the need for the government to concentrate its 
attention on the Land War in Ireland, Wolseley indicated to Childers that he was prepared to 
resign as Quartermaster General, a post he felt was 'a sinecure' with little real power or use since 
17 Childers to Gladstone, 7 March 1881,5/25 
18 Memo. for the Cabinet, Gladstone, 24 March 1881, BM44765; Hamilton Diary, 3 April 1881, p124 
19 Hamilton Diary, 26 May 1881, p141 
20 Granville to Gladstone, 27 April 1881, BM 44173 
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the changes of 1871-2, and accept a peerage and the position of Governor-General of Gibraltar in 
succession to Lord Charles Napier, in order to be free to support the government in the House of 
Lords. 21 This proposal was declined on the grounds that Wolseley had not realised that Napier still 
had another year to serve in Gibraltar, and that such a posting would effectively end Wolseley's 
career as an active fighting general. Rather than send Wolseley to Gibraltar, Childers suggested to 
Gladstone that John Morley might be promoted from his existing position as Under Secretary for 
War, and a seat found for Wolseley to replace him. 22 With his attention distracted by Ireland 
Gladstone preferred to let the matter rest as it was. Nevertheless the proposal demonstrated that 
Wolseley was prepared to abandon his attempts to reform the army from within the War Office 
and instead to concentrate his attention on publicising the cause of reform in the House of Lords 
where he would get more publicity. He believed that if he held such a minor position as that of 
Gibraltar the Duke would have less ground for complaint. 
The result of the successful thwarting of the government's proposal by the Duke and 
Queen was that when in September 1881 Wolseley's name was put forward as the successor to 
Charles Ellice as Adjutant General, the government was prepared to fight. As Edward Hamilton 
noted in his diary, 
Mr. G. thinks that where there are personal objections and recommendations only; 
much weight may be given to reason, or even unreason of the Sovereign; but 
when there are reasons of public policy closely involved, then he holds that for a 
Prime Minister to give way is an abandonment of duty and a commencement of 
the process of sapping the constitution. 23 
That 'reasons of public policy' were involved there can be little doubt. One method of securing a 
slowing down of the reform process was for the Duke to surround himself with like minded 
conservatives in high office. Childers, in replying to the Duke's refusal to accept Wolseley as 
Adjutant General, pointed out that the two last appointments to the War Office, of Deputy 
Adjutants General of the Royal Artillery and of the Royal Engineers, had both been given to men 
of the old school opposed to short service. 24 Again the Duke mobilised the Royal Family to his 
21 Wolseley to Childers, 23 Aug. 1881, Childers Papers, 5/37 
22 Childers to Gladstone, 28 Aug. 1881,5/40; Childers to Gladstone, 4 Sept. 1881,5/42; Childers to 
Gladstone, 12 Sept. 1881,5/47 
23 Hamilton diary, 28 Sept. 1881, p171-2 
24 Childers to Cambridge, 13 Sept. 1881, Childers Papers, 5/48. The men were Maj. -Gen. Sir C. G. 
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defence. The Queen was, at least to begin with, willing to throw her weight behind the Duke and, 
when the Duke threatened resignation over the issue, the Prince of Wales gave him his 
wholehearted support. 25 
The Duke fought hard to oppose Wolseley's appointment. He put forward the argument 
that Wolseley was not the best qualified for the post and proposed Sir Lintorn Simmons instead. 
Simmons was unacceptable to the government because he had allied himself with the conservative 
officers by pressing for retrograde measures while sitting on the Airey Committee. The Duke 
argued that the new Adjutant General should be a man he could trust and said of Wolseley that 'I 
could never feel that confidence in him, which is essential in the interests of the Public Service as 
well as to my own comfort and even usefulness as a public officer, should exist between the 
Commander-in-Chief and his right hand man the Adjutant General'. Childers could only repeat the 
arguments put forward earlier 'that the Adjutant General should be an officer known to the Army 
to be of the new, and not of the old school'. 26 
The Duke complained to the Queen that Wolseley's use of the press would be a danger to 
himself, the Duke, and to the army because it would become politicised. The Queen sympathised 
with this argument and she closely questioned every visiting Cabinet Minister in order to find a 
solution to the problem which would be acceptable to both the Duke and the government. Sir 
William Harcourt, the Home Secretary, wrote to Gladstone from Balmoral that 'She is quite 
conscious that the Duke has put himself out of court by the ground he has taken up and the reasons 
he has given for his objection to Sir Garnet's appointment'. Gladstone replied to Harcourt that the 
Queen was making things worse 'by multiplying channels of communication'. One suggestion was 
taken seriously, that Roberts should become Quartermaster General and Wolseley Adjutant 
General in order to have representatives of both schools in the War Office. 27 
Arburthnot, R. A. and Col. Sir J. Stokes, R. E. 
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Two further points remained to be cleared up: firstly, the exact role of the Adjutant 
General and the Commander-in-Chief, and secondly, Wolseley's habit of speaking in public. The 
first point was only raised because of an article in The Times in early November announcing 
Wolseley's appointment as Adjutant General and hinting strongly that there would be a change in 
the relationship between the Adjutant General and the Commander-in-Chief giving the former 
more power. 28 There was no foundation for such an announcement and, after an agitated 
correspondence with the Queen, the government was forced to issue the official appointment of 
Wolseley as Adjutant General accompanied by a disclaimer denying that any change in the roles 
was planned. 
The Queen remained unhappy that the Duke had been forced to accept Wolseley as 
Adjutant General. In 1885 she wrote to the new Secretary of State, W. H. Smith, that she was 
surprised to read in the press that Wolseley was returning from the Sudan to his post at the War 
Office. Smith replied that although the statement in the press had been unauthorised this was 
indeed the case; Smith had to submit to the 'undertaking upon which I am told he was appointed to 
the command in Egypt, viz., that he should be at liberty to return to the Horse Guards'. Therefore 
there were no grounds on which Wolseley could be removed from office legitimately. 29 
The question of public speaking and writing was less easy to solve satisfactorily. When 
Wolseley's peerage had been under discussion the Duke had sought an assurance from Wolseley 
that he would not speak in public, citing the case of Lord Tenterden who as P. U. S. had never 
taken his seat in the House. Wolseley's reply on that occasion was indicative of his whole 
approach: 
the case was in no way analogous: he could not speak without taking a party 
side... with me it was different, for I should speak only upon military subjects, 
which were entirely removed from the sphere of politics. That if I spoke in favour 
of breechloaders and supposing His Royal Highness did not approve of them, it 
could only be the expression of two opinions upon a professional matter, and that 
no scandal could possibly arise from any such difference of opinion ... 
30 
The Duke disagreed, probably fearing that the voicing of any difference of professional opinion in 
28 The Tim , 10 
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public might lead to his opinion being disregarded with fearful consequences for his authority as 
the Commander-in-Chief. Before his appointment as Adjutant General Childers was forced to 
exact from Wolseley a promise that he would not 'write articles in the press or magazines, or 
make speeches on military affairs opposed to the Duke's views'. 3 1 This was an oral assurance and 
did not satisfy the Duke who asked Childers to demand that Wolseley should put his promise in 
writing. Time would show that Wolseley had absolutely no intention of obeying this injunction; in 
fact, his future position could best be described as in accordance with the promise he had made to 
Childers in April 'that he would be as reticent on subjects in which he differed from His Royal 
Highness as the Duke is on subjects in which he differs from the Government' . 
32 
If Wolseley was to be denied a public platform on which to air his views on military 
affairs there remained one further forum in which he was shortly to become entitled to speak. In 
September 1882 Wolseley was given a peerage 'for distinguished services in the field' after the 
campaign in Egypt. At first he appeared to be more concerned with the pension which should 
accompany it rather than with the potentially powerful position he now held of being in the public 
eye as the commander of a successful campaign, and of being a member of the House of Lords 
where he could speak openly. No records have been found to suggest that the Duke ordered 
Wolseley not to take up his seat but the fact that Wolseley did not take it up until reluctantly forced 
to do so in 1888, in order to defend himself against an personal attack made by Lord Salisbury, 
suggests that some such order must have been made. 
Wolseley had been given permission as Adjutant General to make after dinner speeches 
and he made use of this apparent freedom to the full. In July 1883 Hartington reprimanded him for 
his speech in Dublin in which The Times had reported that Wolseley had called for Irish regiments 
to be commanded by Irish officers. The government feared that this statement could be 
manipulated by Irish nationalists for their own ends. Wolseley replied that he had thought that 
' what I had said would tend to strengthen the hands of the government, and it certainly never 
occurred to me that it could in any way react upon the discipline of the army. Wolseley had not 
31 Childers to Gladstone, 12 Nov. 1881, Childers Papers, 5/117 
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sought to make a political statement, he continued to say that in his opinion Scottish regiments 
should be commanded by Scots and Welsh by the Welsh. 33 
In July 1887 Wolseley incurred Stanhope's displeasure with his speech on the 
administration of the War Office. Wolseley tried to reassure Stanhope that this was not a personal 
attack on Stanhope's tenure of office but an attempt to bring about an improvement in existing 
unsatisfactory practices: 'Unless public opinion is with us in our endeavour to bring about a better 
system, we can hope for no improvement. It is only be taking the public into our confidence we 
can secure public opinion. Hence my humble attempt to point out some of our most glaring red- 
tapisms'. 34 Wolseley was referring to the excessive centralisation within the War Office, a defect 
which the Hartington Commission would later attempt to remedy. 
In April 1888 Wolseley surpassed himself with the controversy which arose from his 
speech after a dinner given to the industrialist Sir John Pender. In the course of this speech he 
said: 
The answer to the question why the Army and Navy are not as strong as they 
ought to be is to be found in the system of our Government by party - that curse of 
modern England which is sapping and undermining the foundations of our 
country, which is depriving our statesmen of the manly honesty which was once 
their characteristic. What do we see when any new Administration comes into 
office? What directly takes place? It is the same with all Parties. The first thing is 
the endeavour made by the Minister in Office to obtain some clap-trap reputation 
by cutting down the expenses of the Army and Navy. 35 
Wolseley's speech had been made in response to a speech by the Under Secretary of State for 
War, Brodrick, at Guildford in which he had claimed that the responsibility for an efficient army 
rested firmly with the military authorities. 36 At Sir John Pender's dinner Wolseley replied that they 
could take no such responsibility so long as they were starved of men and money. 
Stanhope demanded an explanation from the Duke and asked him to reprimand Wolseley. 
The Duke did so in a letter he later quoted from to the House of Lords. Wolseley replied to this 
that he did not realise 
that any exception could be taken by Her Majesty's Government to an officer like 
33 Wolseley to Hartington, 6 July 1883, Devonshire Papers, 340.1368 
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myself, who does not hold a political appointment, expressing his views in the 
most open way upon what he conceives to be the great faults of our constitution. I 
made no attack of any sort or kind upon the Government now in office, nor upon 
any member of it. I attributed our shortcomings to the vicious system of party 
government ... 
37 
Although the Duke was forced to give Wolseley a written reprimand, in private he told Wolseley 
that although he should not have said what he did, he agreed broadly with his remarks. 
Salisbury made a strong attack on Wolseley for abusing his powers as Adjutant General by 
stirring up trouble and ended his speech to the House of Lords 'If he thinks his duty forces him to 
make such statements as these, let him come down here and make them, and we will answer 
them'. 38 Wolseley wrote to Salisbury that he had been disturbed by Salisbury's personal attack on 
him and that 'had I known of your intention, I should not have failed to have been in my place in 
the House of Lords'. Wolseley duly came to the Lords and, after having assured the government 
that he was not speaking of any one government or minister but in general, but of the system as a 
whole, he added his justification for his speech: 
Experience tells me... that it is absolutely impossible for any Secretary of State for 
War to obtain for the Army all that it requires, unless the English people are at his 
back - unless public opinion supports him.. . Panic is the offspring of ignorance. For the people to realise their danger, and the power of meeting it, is, in my 
opinion, the first step towards doing all that is required. 39 
Wolseley placed great trust in the people and unlike Salisbury did not believe that by publicising 
the dangers to the country he was weakening it any further because 'there is no deficiency or weak 
point in our defences which is not well known to the Military and Naval Authorities of every great 
foreign nation as it is to ourselves... '. 
Now apparently welcomed by Lord Salisbury into the House of Lords, Wolseley soon 
allied himself with the Duke of Cambridge to take part in a debate on a motion proposed by the 
Earl of Wemyss on 29 June 1888 that the House welcomed the government's recent proposals to 
secure the defences of the country and of the Empire. It must be noted, however, that the 
government only made these proposals under pressure after Wolseley and the Duke had made it 
publicly known that Britain was vulnerable to invasion. This debate provides a relatively rare 
37 Wolseley to Cambridge, 27 April 1888, Devonshire Papers, 0314 
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example of public co-operation between Wolseley and the Duke against the government of the 
day. Wolseley spoke before the Duke, repeating the often-quoted allegation of 'the possibility of 
100,000 men being landed on our shores in a very short time from across the Channel for the 
purpose of capturing London'. 40 This was in direct contrast to the assurance given by the First 
Lord of the Admiralty, Lord George Hamilton, in the House of Commons, that the Admiralty 
would have adequate notice of any threat of invasion because of the great naval preparations 
France would need to make. It is not intended to go into the details of this argument here because 
it will be dealt with in a later chapter, but it is sufficient to say that this speech publicised 
fundamental differences between the views on home defence held by the Admiralty and the War 
Office. The Duke allowed Wolseley to cover the technical side of the question and restricted 
himself to a plea to the government to formulate a statement of the military requirements of the 
Empire for which the military authorities could then make adequate contingency plans. This was in 
itself a controversial request and one which governments of both parties consistently strove to 
avoid carrying out. 
Salisbury obviously repented of his invitation to Wolseley to speak in the House of Lords 
because by the time Wolseley became the Commander-in-Chief in 1895 he was not welcome in the 
Lords. The situation had altered in two ways: firstly, for the first time since the reorganisation of 
1870-1 the Secretary of State for War sat in the Lords; and secondly, the government was under 
pressure from outside as well as from within Parliament to make its position clear on the use of 
professional military advisers. Lord Lansdowne's appointment as the Secretary of State appeared 
to suggest that the government had a military adviser already present in the Lords and that, in 
consequence, Wolseley's intervention in army debates would not be necessary. This was not the 
case, however, because Lansdowne had never served as a soldier. He had served as the P. U. S. in 
the War Office under Cardwell, but his most recent contact with military affairs had come from 
his contact with military advisers while Viceroy of India. Therefore he had little experience of the 
reformed British Army at home. 
40 Wolseley to House of Lords, 29 June 1888, Hr, Third Series, Vol. CCCXXVII; Stanhope would 
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Outside Parliament opinion was growing among civilian army reformers that the 
government needed professional advice on all decisions relating to military affairs. In a letter to 
Gladstone, Salisbury, the Duke of Devonshire, Arthur Balfour, and Joseph Chamberlain on 12 
February 1894, Dilke, George Chesney, Arnold-Forster, and Spenser Wilkinson attempted to 
reconcile constitutional government with 'a system of defence... shaped with a view to war' which 
called upon the government not only to tell Parliament what the preparations were but 'who are 
the professional advisers upon whose judgement the Government relies'. The offices of the First 
Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for War should be amalgamated, and one officer 
per service should be appointed as professional advisers to the Cabinet. 41 Wolseley had himself 
made a very similar suggestion in his evidence to the Hartington Commission, and the 
commissioners' reaction had been to suppress the evidence. 42 
Within Parliament, supporters of professionals were active. In a debate on the strength and 
organisation of home defence in 1900 the Earl of Rosebery noted that 'there has not been one 
single sentence from the noble Viscount the Commander-in-Chief assuring us that we were amply 
prepared for all contingencies ... I should be more satisfied, my Lords, with one single speech from 
the noble Viscount than with a thousand speeches to the Primrose League [by Salisbury]... ' . 
43 
Lansdowne's reply made two points: firstly, that all his recent speeches on the militia and the 
Volunteers had been based, often textually, on the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief; and 
secondly, that to bring him into the House of Lords would be 'to turn your Commander-in-Chief 
into something like a political partisan'. Salisbury in his turn made what was probably closest to 
the true position of the government: 'Now it is obvious that if Lord Wolseley could be called upon 
to do that, he must do it with the admission that he was entitled, if he liked, to say he did not 
approve of the plans of Lord Lansdowne' . 
44 In other words, Salisbury feared a repeat of the 
debate over home defence when it was clear that the professional advisers differed from the 
41 Quoted in S. Gwyn & G. M. Tuckwell, The Life of Sir Charles Dilke, (London, 1917), Vol. II, pp416-9 
42 Hamer, p52; Wolseley's evidence to the Hartington Commission can be found in his private papers. WPP 
MEM/3; For further information on the position of professional advisers in government committees see F. A. 
Johnson, Defence By Committee, (London, 1960) 
43 Rosebery to House of Lords, 27 July 1900, Hansard, Fourth Series, Vol. LXXXVI 
44 Lansdowne to House of Lords, ibid.; Salisbury to House of Lords, ibid. 
48 
parliamentarians. That Wolseley would have used the House of Lords to voice his differences 
there can be little doubt. In the first place he would have publicised his differences with the 
government over the need to send reinforcements to Natal before the negotiations with the Boers 
broke down. Furthermore, Wolseley would have publicised the iniquitous position the 
Commander-in-Chief filled in the War Office since the Order-in-Council of 1895: he did so only 
after his retirement, in a speech in March 1901. 
Apart from occasional direct attacks on the government, such as the speech at Sir John 
Pender's dinner, Wolseley rarely provoked the government into making a response. Yet he was 
never loath to make unsubtle hints that parsimonious governments were much to blame for the 
weakness of the British Army and the deficiencies in the defences of the Empire. What he resented 
most was that not only did the government ignore the advice of its military advisers, but that they 
would publicly question the truth of their statements on the state of the defences, and furthermore 
dispute the right of these officers to tell the public the truth. Wolseley was prepared to risk 
unpopularity with the government and make public the fact that the army was too small to fulfil all 
its obligations and also the glaring deficiencies in its equipment. In 1888 Wolseley was unjustly 
accused of writing a scaremongering article in the Daily Telegraph which claimed that the British 
Army had the worst field guns in the world. Wolseley had been pressing Stanhope on this point for 
some time but he was not the author of this article. He did however publicly admit the shortage of 
equipment; in 1887 he wrote that if two army corps were despatched abroad and the existing 
garrison in Ireland retained, there would be only 24 field guns left in England. 45 In 1889 Wolseley 
told the 20th Middlesex Volunteers that although the Volunteers were now about to get the new 
magazine rifle, the extra half million rifles needed for stores would not be available because the 
government would not spend the money. He described his ongoing battles with the civilian 
officials in the War Office in these terms: 'as we are said to be a poor country whenever military 
or naval matters are concerned, whenever I ask for anything I always feel like a poor relation 
when he asks his rich friend to help him'. 46 
45 Wolseley, 'The Army', 
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On other occasions Wolseley publicly voiced his belief that the government was downright 
treacherous in its neglect of vital national defences. It was foolish not to prepare for war on the 
sole ground that Britain had no offensive intentions towards other powers. During the Eastern 
Crisis of 1877-8 Wolseley wrote in despair that 'some of our ablest men who have been in power 
have lately told us emphatically, even when war is hanging in the balance, that it will be high time 
to prepare for war when it has been declared. An army could not be created in a day. nor could 
fixed defences. When he was in Liverpool in 1887 to unveil a statue to General Earle, Wolseley 
told his audience that he was appalled to see that the Liverpool docks had no defences against 
foreign attack: 'he thought to himself how undefended all that wealth was and what an immense 
temptation it would be in the event of war'. He was convinced that Britain was vulnerable to 
invasion and felt it was his duty to tell the public of their vulnerability in order to pressurise the 
government into rectifying the situation. This subject will be covered further in a later chapter. 48 
Despite his promise not to conflict in public with the Duke of Cambridge, Wolseley did 
make statements in public on matters which fell properly into the Commander-in-Chief's compass. 
Wolseley was convinced that short service was popular within the army and an aim of the reform 
had been 'that of removing the unpopularity of the army with the classes from which we must look 
for recruits'. Furthermore he cited in February 1890 the case of the Foot Guards where the 
numbers had a few years before fallen sharply 'so the period of service with the colours was 
reduced to three years, and with the best results. The brigade filled up to its establishment within a 
few months'. 49 A critic in Blackwood's Magazine in 1884 wrote that Wolseley may be constantly 
preaching the success of short service in terms of quantity but was concealing from the public the 
drop in the quality of these recruits in terms of their height and chest measurements. This was 
undoubtedly true but Wolseley did in fact admit in public his concern about the inexperience of 
NCOs, arguing in public and in private that their rates of pay and terms of service should be 
increased in order to encourage them to re-enlist rather than join the Reserve immediately on the 
47 G. J. Wolseley, 'England as a Military Power in 1854 and in 1878', Nineteenth Century, Vol. III, No. 13, 
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expiration of their term of service in the colours. For example in the article quoted above he had 
voiced this opinion but pointed out that 'to enable this to be done, a solid increase to the pay of the 
private soldier is indispensable. Without such increase we can never hope to compete for the best 
men in the open labour market'. He had previously expanded this point in a speech to 
undergraduates in Oxford; he wanted to be able to draw recruits from 'the same class of men as 
those from whom the police were drawn. The matter was simply one of £. s. d. '. so 
Throughout his career Wolseley dismissed the usefulness of training men in parade ground 
manoeuvres which would have no place on the modern battlefield. The Duke of Cambridge 
thoroughly enjoyed the public parades and failed to understand how the new weapons had altered 
the nature of modern warfare. Wolseley's views received publicity even when apparently made to 
a private body; for example his comments on Colonel Brackenbury's paper to the Royal United 
Services Institute were reported in The Times. On this occasion Wolseley was in direct 
contradiction to the established War Office statements on drill: 'in drill as generally taught in 
nearly all armies, and certainly in ours, the order of what he thought should be the method of 
training was reversed. Drill taught the theory of what war ought to be, Wolseley wanted to take 
the 'actual circumstances of battle from the time of the first shot being fired, find out the duties 
required of the men in action, and then work back from that point to instruct the soldiers'. 
Wolseley's opinions had some effect; he could report to the North London Rifle Corps in February 
1889 that the new drill book was excellent 'if it were read carefully and between the lines', and 
was very similar to the French and German drill books. sl 
Wolseley was a constant advocate of selection for officers and he made his views public in 
the full knowledge that the Duke was equally firmly wedded to the current practice of promotion 
by seniority. In his speech to the Institution of Civil Engineers on 5 December 1882 Wolseley 
contrasted the quality of the officers who had recently held commands in the Egyptian campaign 
with those who had landed in the Crimea in 1854. He believed that the great improvement in the 
quality of staff officers was due to the fact that since 1854 Britain had been involved in many small 
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wars 'and we had been able to eliminate [sic] the good officers from the bad and to select the best 
men'. Furthermore professionalism had finally been rewarded; whereas in the Crimea no officer 
of the Engineers or Artillery held the command of a brigade or division, in Egypt twelve of the 25 
staff at headquarters and a number of higher commands had been filled by officers from the 
Engineers and Artillery. 52 Queen Victoria was outraged because she believed that all the officers 
in her army were good and, like the Duke, refused to countenance the idea that officers should be 
appointed by selection. Wolseley's reply began with a typical defence that 'the newspaper reports 
of my speech. . . were very poor and inaccurate' . 
53 Because Wolseley did not prepare his speeches 
in advance there is no way of telling exactly what he said on this and many other occasions. 
Wolseley did, however, attempt to justify his comments, re-stating that formerly 'the most highly- 
educated - in a military and scientific point of view' had been excluded from higher commands. 
The defence of being misquoted could not be used in connection with Wolseley's articles. 
Stanhope asked the Duke for his opinion as to whether he thought that the Adjutant General should 
write these articles on military matters. The Duke replied that he did not. This question arose 
because of Wolseley's series of articles in the Fortnightly Review in 1888-89 which were generally 
uncontroversial. The main complaint related to the article 'War', where Wolseley had written 
again on the benefits of 'battle training' and not mindless irrelevant drill. Another row erupted 
over a series of articles on the British Army that Wolseley wrote in 1890 for an American journal, 
Harper's Magazine. Again Wolseley covered the same ground as in earlier articles, appealing for 
better pay, more practical uniforms, the need for a Secretary of State who knew something about 
the army, etc. The very fact that these articles were appearing in the United States aroused the 
Duke of Cambridge's fury because he believed that the Americans might take them as a statement 
of future reforms which would shortly take place within the British Army. He complained to 
Ponsonby about one article that it 'contains doctrines and views I deeply regret and highly 
reprobate'. The Duke asked Ponsonby to get the Queen to write a letter of reprimand to Wolseley 
to be sent either through Stanhope or the Duke. Ponsonby's reply was that the Queen would write 
52 Thg, Time ,5 
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the letter if the Duke told her what to say. The Duke wanted the Queen to tell Wolseley 'not to 
publish anything or even to speak as seldom as possible on Army matters'. 54 The Queen wrote to 
Wolseley and thereafter he wrote only for the less public United Services Magazine. 
If the Duke and the various Secretaries of State objected so much to the content of 
Wolseley's articles then it appears surprising that the Duke and Stanhope should have sanctioned 
Wolseley's contribution on the British Army to the book, The Reign Q Queen Victoria, edited by 
T. H. Ward. This was a book specifically produced to celebrate the Queen's Jubilee in 1887, and it 
would be expected that every contribution to it should have received official sanction. 
In his article Wolseley covered the same ground he had been over before: the lack of 
artillery in Britain; better training for the men and more military education for officers; and 
increased pay. The Volunteers were praised for their patriotism and an appeal made for 
compulsory physical education in schools. He criticised the government for its lack of policy and 
claimed that 'the party politician, with his dreams of universal peace, of general disarmament, and 
international courts of arbitration' was responsible for the ills of the army. By comparing the 
performance of the British Army in the various wars of the reign Wolseley showed how the 
Cardwell reforms had led to great improvements. On future policy he repeated his appeal for the 
selection of officers for higher commands, called for localisation to be extended to the cavalry, 
and wrote that the artillery should be divided into battalions and the field artillery entirely 
separated from the garrison. In other words, Wolseley used this opportunity to publish his 
programme for further army reform. 55 
The fact that the Duke did not stop the publication of this article calls into question the 
extent to which the Duke really objected to or differed from Wolseley's opinions. It seems more 
likely that the main objection lay in the fact that Wolseley wrote articles without official 
permission, which called into question the degree to which Wolseley felt subordinate to the 
Commander-in-Chief. There were occasions when the Duke publicly supported Wolseley, 
particularly in appeals for more men and money. In private, as has been seen during the row over 
54 Cambridge to Ponsonby, 7 Feb. 1890; Ponsonby to Cambridge, 13 Feb. 1890; Cambridge to Ponsonby, 
17 Feb. 1890, Buckle, Vol. 1,3rd series, pp563-71 
55 Wolseley, 'War' 
53 
the speech at Sir John Pender's dinner, he actually welcomed Wolseley's comments. He would 
never accept Wolseley's opinions on drill or selection, but over the period appears to have become 
reconciled to other reforms such as the continuation of short service. In fact, the Duke so 
appreciated Wolseley's services as Adjutant General that he willingly accepted Stanhope's 
suggestion in November 1887 that Wolseley's tenure of office should be extended for another 
year; Wolseley actually remained Adjutant General till 1890.56 Therefore one must conclude that 
had Wolseley submitted his articles for scrutiny before publication much of the controversy which 
surrounded them would never occurred. 
There were some subjects on which Wolseley spoke to which the Duke certainly had no 
objection. One of the most important was the Volunteer movement. This formed one link between 
the minority of the population in the still unpopular Regular Army and the majority of the 
population and was for this reason emphasised by Wolseley. In his numerous speeches to various 
Volunteer regiments in the 1880s and 1890s Wolseley paid frequent tribute to the Volunteer 
movement describing it as 'spontaneous movement of the people to supply a want that our 
Government had not the courage to provide against'. Wolseley outlined the aims of the Volunteer 
movement. For example in December 1887 he acknowledged that the two great Volunteer reviews 
of that year had impressed him and others that the Volunteers had learnt their basic drill very well, 
and now urged them to learn the higher duties of soldiering such as the use of outposts and 
bivouacs. In the same speech he promised that on the publication of the new mobilisation plan the 
following year the Volunteers would gain a clear view of what their exact duties would be at time 
of war. But Wolseley also stressed that the Volunteers could not be compared to the Regulars in 
one very fundamental point of military conduct; their shooting record was appalling. The public 
often gained the wrong impression that the Volunteers shot very well because they looked only at 
the results of a few first-class shots at the annual shooting meeting at Wimbledon whereas 'military 
efficiency lay in having a large proportion of average shots in a regiment'. Nowhere he told 
another audience later, had this point been demonstrated better than at Omdurman where the sheer 
firepower from British rifles had ensured that no Dervish had got closer than 5-600 yards to the 
56 Stanhope to Cambridge, 9 Nov. 1887, in Verner, p351 
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British line. Wolseley did accept that the root of the problem lay in the shortage, particularly for 
the London regiments, of shooting ranges. He welcomed with enthusiasm the opening of a range 
paid for and built by the City of Nottingham Corporation and given free of charge to the 
Nottingham Robin Hood Volunteer Regiment, and he hoped that this patriotic example would be 
followed by other city corporations. 57 
Wolseley praised other aspects of the Volunteer movement. By setting up cyclist corps, a 
corps of signalling and a medical corps they could, in the event of invasion, release a considerable 
number of regular troops. However, Wolseley met with some criticism for what appeared to be his 
over-enthusiastic promotion of the usefulness of the Volunteers. In his first address as 
Commander-in-Chief to the Royal United Services Institute when chairing a discussion on the 
Volunteers by Colonel E. J. A. Balfour, Wolseley said 'we have to take them as they are... If a man 
has a gap in his fence and cannot afford to have an iron gate, he must be prepared to put up with a 
wooden one. That is the way in which we must look at the Volunteer force. '58 In an article in 
Nineteenth Century Lonsdale Hale took Wolseley to task for this, urging Wolseley to make it 
clearer in his public speeches the difference between 'Very good' and 'Very good for Volunteers', 
because he felt that both the public and the Volunteers themselves though Wolseley meant the 
former whereas the latter was the true picture 59 In other words Wolseley must make clearer the 
difference between the semi-trained mass of Volunteers and the highly-trained small body of 
Regulars so that the public did not get a false feeling of security. 
Since it seemed that not enough money could be found to pay the Regulars a decent wage 
and encourage the recruitment of educated men, the Volunteer movement was seen by Wolseley to 
have a role to play in encouraging educated men to undertake some form of military training. To 
this end he chided his undergraduate audience in Oxford asking them 'was it creditable to that 
great and ancient University, once the Head Quarters of the Royal Army of England, that men 
enough to maintain even one small battalion of Volunteers could not 
be found there? ' According to 
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the report of the speech in The Times most of Wolseley's speech had been punctuated by cheers 
but there appears to have been a notable period of silence at this point. After the speech the Master 
of Balliol, Benjamin Jowett, wrote to Wolseley apologising for the uproar his speech had caused, 
and this may have been why. 60 Wolseley repeated this appeal for educated men to have military 
training when addressing the Inns of Court Regiment whose numbers had fallen off drastically in 
the recent years. At that time there were only four companies whereas in the early days of the 
Volunteer movement there had been six. 61 
Jowett had invited Wolseley to speak in Oxford specifically on the subject of military 
service on the grounds that the 'army is unpopular because it represents a set of influences 
opposed to popular government. It would be otherwise if the army and navy would be regarded as 
the two great public schools of England. ' Wolseley took up this challenge demonstrating that 
because of the large number of annual recruits to the Regulars and the Auxiliaries 
that was their great military school, which contained about 617,000 pupils.. . As 
regarded numbers, it must, therefore, be allowed that theirs was indeed the 
greatest of the national schools, and when they came to consider what it was they 
taught their pupils, he believed its importance as an educational factor would be 
still more fully acknowledged. 62 
Throughout his career Wolseley had believed that compulsory physical training in schools was 
essential for the good of the nation. In an article written in 1871 Wolseley suggested that 'now that 
the education of the people is to be provided for nationally, a drill-sergeant ought to be maintained 
in every parish'. The government never took up this suggestion but other bodies did. When 
present at Southwark in June 1889 for the inaugural formation of a cadet corps Wolseley expanded 
on what he had told his audience in Oxford: 'he pointed out the moral as well as the physical 
advantages which would result from the training of lads from the alleys and gutters in that district'. 
The boys would learn 'habits of order, tidiness, regularity, and attention to minor details, besides 
improving the duty of implicit obedience and respect for superiors'. In a later speech when 
Commander-in-Chief he praised the establishment of Boys Brigades as a further means of giving 
60 The Tim , 13 
May 1889; Jowett to Wolseley, 17 May 1889, WPP 
61 Timgý, 9 Dec. 1895 
62 Jowett to Wolseley, 17 Feb. 1889, WPP; The Times, 13 May 1889 
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some form of physical training to the population. 63 
With his concern for the physical well-being of the nation and the need to provide an 
adequate number of recruits for the army it may be thought that Wolseley would be in favour of 
conscription. However, he told a debating society at University College, London that conscription 
was unnecessary in Britain for two reasons; firstly, because at that time an adequate number of 
recruits was forthcoming; and secondly, a large army was not necessary 'as long as this country 
was surrounded by the silver streak of sea, neither bridged over nor tunnelled under by a band of 
speculators'. 64 Nevertheless after his retirement Wolseley did voice the view that unless Britain 
paid her army 'the current rate of wages obtained by able-bodied men in the labour market' as the 
only other voluntary army in the world did, i. e. the United State Army, then conscription might 
become necessary. This statement was contained in a letter from Wolseley to the National Service 
League for the first issue of its journal. 65 At no time did Wolseley suggest that conscription was a 
viable military prospect in the foreseeable future, he did, however, frequently voice the somewhat 
Social Darwinian view that the nation with the best physical training, which conscription gave the 
European powers, 'must, after a certain number of generations, become a better race, - better both 
morally and physically - than the nation which allows its young men to adopt any mode of life they 
wish to - no matter how unhealthy it may be'. 
66 
In a retrospective article on Wolseley's career by "Nemo" in the Contemporary Review 
the author, while criticising Wolseley's habit of making 'impulsive speeches', concluded that he 
had had little choice, 'after a lifetime spent in appeals to the statesmen to take the nation into their 
confidence, [Wolseley] had seized the bull by the horns, and had himself appealed to the 
nation... ' . 
67 The question remains of whether Wolseley's appeals to the public had had any effect. 
Some civilian army reformers believed they had done; for example, Amery praised Wolseley 
for 
helping 'to awaken the national consciousness out of the self-satisfied full-bellied drowsiness in 
63 'Our Military Requirements' ; The Times, 1 June 1889; The Times, 4 Dec. 1896 
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which it had so long rested'. 68 Both Charles Dilke and Spenser Wilkinson paid tribute to 
Wolseley's efforts. Dilke in The British Army quoted extensively from Wolseley's speeches while 
not always agreeing with his opinions. Spenser Wilkinson, either alone or in collaboration with 
Dilke, wrote many books on the question of imperial defence admitting that their interest had been 
aroused by Wolseley's public speeches. The fact that these books reached a wide audience shows 
something about the success of Wolseley's appeals to the public. 
The practical effect of the awakening of the nation's consciousness is less easy to gauge. 
The speech at Sir John Pender's dinner and the subsequent parliamentary debates had contributed 
to an invasion scare in 1887-8. The government was forced for once to listen to the military and 
naval experts and to the public. The Navy, however, was the main beneficiary of the scare. 
Charles Beresford, as Fourth Naval Lord, acted like Wolseley in appealing directly to the public, 
and ignoring the First Naval Lord and the First Lord of the Admiralty. Beresford also 
corresponded with Wolseley on Britain's vulnerability to invasion. Both believed in this but, 
whereas Beresford wanted a vast increase made to the Navy which he felt would secure Britain's 
shores, Wolseley felt that a force of 150,000 could always get through and that therefore Britain 
needed a larger, more efficient army. At the same time Wolseley believed that 'if it were 
impossible for both the services to be perfect, he would infinitely prefer to see perfection on the 
sea than to see it on land'. 69 Without a large navy a larger enemy force could land and then Britain 
would have no option but to surrender. The invasion scare led to the formation of the Volunteer 
Home Defence Association. The Navy in contrast got a huge building programme sanctioned by 
the 1889 Naval Defence Act. The Navy retained its public advantage: the Navy League was 
established in December 1894 and quickly set up branches throughout Britain, whereas the army 
had no such equivalent until the shock of the Boer War and the threat of German power led to the 
formation of the National Service League in 1902. 
Therefore it appears that Wolseley did not stimulate public opinion to the extent to which 
he had hoped, and various explanations can be given for this. Firstly, the British public while 
68 Amery, Tim History, Vol. II, p24 
69 Jbg Times, 28 Feb. 1883 
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interested in the reasons for military disasters such as Isandhlwana and the failure to relieve 
Gordon, were too ready to feel great satisfaction at success in India or in Egypt. Secondly. the 
government responded to the public appeals of the military experts by calling on them to justify 
existing expenditure and then doing its best to deny them a platform to do so. Lord Randolph 
Churchill was particularly vocal on this subject in a long speech at Wolverhampton in June 1887.70 
Lastly, the arguments were not presented coherently, for example Arnold-Forster complained that 
Wolseley 'has expressed so many opinions on so many occasions, and in support of such 
apparently conflicting conclusions, that it could not be difficult to find a dictum of his on any side 
of any question'. 71 He was exaggerating because, as this chapter has shown, Wolseley held most 
of the same opinions while Commander-in-Chief as he had done at the start of his career as an 
army reformer. Nevertheless, Arnold-Forster did have a point; in 1887 Dilke wrote to Wolseley 
asking 'if there is any speech or anything published of yours in which you have [given] "counsels 
of perfection", i. e. things that might be done if the public was willing to spend the money that 
really might be spent'. 72 Wolseley had never done so nor did he in the future. Therefore the 
remainder of this thesis will examine Wolseley's opinions on every aspect of military affairs, seek 
to establish what the 'counsels of perfection' might have been, and whether they would have been 
of real benefit to the British Army if put into practice. 
70 wig Times, 4 June 1887 
71 Arnold-Forster, Army Letters. p145-6 
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Chapter 3- The Manpower Question 
The following three chapters will cover Wolseley's period at the War Office before his 
appointment as Commander-in-Chief in 1895. He served first as Quartermaster General, then as 
Adjutant General, and finally left the War Office at the end of 1890 to serve as Commander-in- 
Chief in Ireland. During this period Wolseley made a significant contribution to the cause of army 
reform. The Secretary of State for War in the 1868-1874 Liberal government, Edward Cardwell, 
introduced a series of reforms of the army which have subsequently borne his name. ' Briefly, the 
civil-military relationship between the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-Chief was altered, 
bringing the latter under the authority of the former; the system of the purchase of commissions in 
the army was abolished; short service was introduced; an Army Reserve was set up; and work was 
begun on the reorganisation of the regiments on a territorial basis, together with the linking of 
battalions. It is not intended to go into any great detail on these reforms, as this has been done 
elsewhere. 2 
These chapters will cover three areas of major importance: the manpower question, the 
Army Reserve, and the drive towards making the British Army modern, effective, and efficient on 
the battlefield. Wolseley played an important role in all these areas. He defended the principle of 
short service, and the first of these chapters will examine Wolseley's opinions on the subject, and 
his attempts to solve the recurring manpower crises in the British Army. Wolseley supported the 
establishment of the Army Reserve, and the second of these chapters will consider why he did so, 
and for what purpose Wolseley believed the Reserve existed, how it should be built up, 
maintained, and used. The third of these chapters will analyse Wolseley's opinions on the variety 
of topics which can be gathered together under the heading of the drive towards a modern army. 
The chapter will cover Wolseley's views on every aspect of Britain's military organisation, from 
1 For convenience the various reforms made by Cardwell have been referred to in this and later chapters as 
the 'Cardwell system'. 
2 For example in Hamer; AN. . Tucker, 'Army and Society in England, 1870-1900: a reassessment of the 
Cardwell Reforms' in Journal of British Studies, Vol. 2, (May 1963) pp110-41; B. Bond, Lord Cardwell's 
Reforý' The Effect of Short Service and Localisation upon the British Army 1868-1894, Unpublished MA 
thesis, University of London, (1962); E. Moses, The Cardwell Reforms, unpublished PhD thesis, University 
of London, (1969) 
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the training and equipment of the soldiers, to the higher staff organisation, and his approach to the 
question of whether a Chief of Staff should be introduced into the British Army. 
* 
Wolseley bore no responsibility for the origins of the Cardwell system, since he was 
absent in Canada until August 1871. He was, however, directly involved in the localisation 
scheme, serving on the relevant committee, under the presidency of General Sir Patrick 
MacDougall, which issued its final report in 1872. Wolseley has been identified by contemporary 
and later commentators as the great defender of the short service system. In a letter to Randolph 
Churchill complaining that his review of the evidence given to the 1892 Wantage Commission, 
which had examined the short service system, was not to be published, Roberts summed up his 
opinion of Wolseley on the subject of short service: 
'He has all along been the firmest supporter of a short service army, and when 
certain failures have become indefensible, he makes desperate attempts to shift the 
responsibility from himself and the system, at one time to the military authorities, 
at another to the Secretaries of State; and would wish people to believe that, if he 
had been allowed to have his own way, matters would now be very different. '3 
This chapter will examine how Wolseley came to have such a reputation and will question whether 
Wolseley really believed as deeply in the short service system as has been generally assumed. 
At first it may be worthwhile to make a few points on what the Cardwell system was, and 
why it was set up, before turning to the main question of Wolseley's opinions of it. The Army 
Enlistment Act of 1870 introduced a short service system whereby soldiers enlisted for six years in 
the colours and six in the newly-established Army Reserve. This period of service was later altered 
by Childers to seven years in the colours and five in the Army Reserve. From the government's 
viewpoint three main reasons stood out for the formation of this system: firstly, economy; 
secondly, to improve recruitment; and, thirdly, to improve the ability of the army to fight 
anywhere in the world at short notice. Economy was to be achieved by short service through the 
consequent reduction of the number of soldiers serving for 21 years to pension. Cardwell also 
managed, in the event, a short-lived economy by recalling a number of battalions from remote 
colonies of limited strategic value. Recruitment was a major problem throughout the nineteenth 
3 Roberts to Churchill, 24 May 1892, Roberts Papers, N. A. M. 7101-23-100/3 
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century and government advisers suggested that long service in inhospitable climates such as India 
and most of the colonies was unpopular and that the introduction of short service might stimulate 
recruitment. In the light of the British performances in the early wars of Queen Victoria's reign, 
particularly in the Crimea, there was little doubt that the British Army was inefficient and 
struggled to defeat even under-equipped opponents. Furthermore it was unsupported, once the 
main body of soldiers had been despatched on a campaign the capability for reinforcement or even 
the replacement of casualties was severely limited. The Army Reserve was set up to remedy this 
defect. 
The government had been influenced in its reforms by the example of the all-conquering 
Prussian Army, whose unexpected successes in the wars of German Unification over the long 
service Austrian and French armies had sent a shock wave through the war departments of 
Europe. The main lesson appeared to be that success was dependent on the possession of a highly 
efficient small body of fighting men forming the nucleus of an army organised on a territorial basis 
that would be expanded in times of need by the influx of trained former soldiers serving in the 
Army Reserve. The twin advantages of the system were economy and efficiency. Cardwell was 
quick to note the likely benefits of the new system of short service. In 1870 he wrote to the Queen 
that in 1868 it would have required 27 battalions to send 20,000 men abroad leaving only 19 
battalions at home, whereas, on the distribution of 1870,24 battalions with 5,000 reservists would 
furnish the same number of men, leaving 43 battalions at home. 4 Therefore the establishment of 
the Army Reserve was vital to Britain's ability to wage war in the future. 
Any discussion of Wolseley's opinions on the Cardwell system should be considered under 
two headings: why did he support the system on its introduction, and why did he continue to press 
for its retention against the growing evidence that it was a failure? There can be no doubt that the 
Cardwell system needed defending: its opponents were outspoken, and the various aspects of it 
were examined by the plethora of committees which met during this periods But it will be argued 
4 16 May 1870, Hr, Vol. CCI; Cardwell to the Queen, 19 July 1870, Cardwell Papers, PRO30/48/2 
5 For example: Committee on the Organisation of the Land Forces, c. 712 (1873) XVIII; Committee on 
Recruiting, Maj. -Gen. Taylor, 1875, W033/32; Committee on Boy Enlistment, Taylor, 1876, W033/29; 
Committee on Brigade Depots, 1878, W033/32; Committee on Inducements for Recruitment, Viscount 
Bury, 1878, W033/32; Committee on Conditions of Service as affected by Short Service, Lieut. -Gen. 
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that Wolseley was not as uncritical of the system as previously thought, but faced the dichotomy of 
having to defend it in public while criticising and attempting to improve it in private. 
The reasons why Wolseley supported the Cardwell system on its introduction are perhaps 
obvious. His early experiences in the field had convinced him that the British Army was badly 
organised and led, and the ranks filled by old inefficient soldiers. The army could fight abroad for 
any length of time only with the greatest difficulty since drafts and reinforcements were hard to 
find. Therefore Wolseley was understandably enthusiastic about the introduction of a system which 
he, along with its authors, believed would solve all the existing problems. Short service would 
improve recruitment and enhance the quality of the men enlisting. The establishment of the Army 
Reserve would ensure that no army abroad would struggle unsupported as had the British Army in 
the Crimea. Localisation would stimulate recruitment and be the first major step towards an 
organisation for war. 6 In his article of 1871 on the subject of army reform, Wolseley was 
uncritical of the Cardwell system, but he did suspect that the government might not provide the 
funds to ensure its functioning, and he did voice his support for a definition of the purposes for 
which the army existed. 
Apart from a genuine belief in the validity of the Cardwell system, there was another 
reason for Wolseley's support which also provides the key to why he continued to defend the 
system even when its defects had become apparent - Wolseley's need to establish an identity for 
himself at the War Office. The previous two chapters have argued that Wolseley felt the need to 
establish a reputation to provide himself with an identity separate from the circle of mainly 
aristocratic officers whose careers were fostered by the Duke or by members of the Royal Court. 
This he achieved by becoming known as an army reformer, and securing political support for his 
career advancement. Therefore Wolseley found it difficult to criticise the Cardwell system in 
Armstrong, c. 2817 (1878); Committee on the Effect of Short Service on the preparedness for War of the 
Army, Lord Cadogan, 1879, W033/33; Committee on the Reorganisation of the Army, Lord Airey, c. 2791 
(1881) XXI; Committee on the Formation of Territorial Regiments, Ellice, c. 2793 (1881) XX; Committee to 
Consider the Terms and Conditions of Service in the Army, Lord Wantage, c. 6582 (1892) XIX. 
6 The 1872 Localisation Act linked two battalions, one serving abroad and one at home. The home battalion 
was to be allocated to a brigade district with a depot centre for recruitment and training. It would provide its 
linked battalion abroad with drafts and periodically replace it. In 1881 this system was completed by joining 
the linked battalions as double battalions, giving them territorial names instead of numbers, and attaching 
two Militia battalions to each depot. 
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public, he could only attempt to make it function, and make proposals for the remedy of defects 
and improvements in the privacy of the War Office. 
By 1880 cracks were apparent in the Cardwell system. The requirement to fight two wars 
simultaneously, in Afghanistan and South Africa, had placed an unforeseen strain on the army, 
and evidence was accumulating to show that the short service soldiers were not as efficient as their 
predecessors. The conservative officers had successfully appealed for a re-examination of the 
Cardwell system and this led to the Airey Committee on the organisation of the army. Wolseley 
sprang to the defence of the Cardwell system, arguing that it had not received a fair trial and that 
blame for its failures should be placed with the politicians who had failed to provide the funds to 
raise the establishments of the home battalions and depots to compensate for the despatch abroad 
of both battalions of a regiment. Wolseley would continue to put forward these two arguments 
throughout the period. 
The failures of the Cardwell system when faced with the demands of two wars 
simultaneously should have come as no surprise to Wolseley because the system had an inherent 
fault: it was inelastic, and could work only so long as parity was maintained between the number 
of battalions at home and abroad. In 1892 Wolseley wrote to Campbell-Bannerman arguing that 
this balance was 'the principle upon which Mr Cardwell organised the army' .2 The Cardwell 
system had been heavily influenced by the continental example and did not pay sufficient attention 
to Britain's unique requirements as an imperial power. There is little evidence to provide a definite 
view of Wolseley's opinions on this subject. He cannot be identified as a great student of the 
Prussian army system and certainly never wrote on the subject, but nor did he argue that Britain's 
Empire required the introduction of a unique army organisation. Britain had been involved in 
numerous small wars during the first half of Queen Victoria's reign and, despite the Liberal 
abhorrence of foreign commitments, there was every likelihood that small imperial wars would 
continue to place demands on the British Army. Furthermore, virtually wherever the British Army 
went to war in this period, it left a small garrison behind to safeguard the security of its new 
interest. 
7 Wolseley to Campbell-Bannerman, 6 Dec. 1892, Campbell-Bannerman Papers, BM 41233 
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The question remains: why did Wolseley strenuously defend this faulty system after the 
Airey Committee and the two wars had provided the evidence to demonstrate its weaknesses? The 
reason lies in Wolseley's position at the time: in 1880 he had only just broken into the senior ranks 
at the War Office with his appointment as Quartermaster General, and needed to continue to be 
known as an army reformer in order to further his career. In addition a new challenger had 
appeared on the scene. As the victor of the Second Afghan War, Roberts's opinions were listened 
to and, since he served in India, he came to epitomise Indian opinion on army matters. As Roberts 
showed that his sympathies lay with the Duke of Cambridge, Wolseley was forced to present an 
even more determined defence of short service than he might have done if his rivals were less 
illustrious. 
In his defence of the Cardwell system Wolseley had to supply the answers to four basic 
questions: could the short service system supply India with trained soldiers for a sufficient period 
for them to become seasoned men? were short service soldiers as capable of fighting campaigns as 
their long service predecessors had been? did the home army have too many young men to allow it 
to function as a separate entity from the army stationed in India? and could the increased number 
of recruits be found? 
The problems encountered in maintaining an army in India capable of service in a hostile 
climate provided the main threat to short service and one which Wolseley clearly recognised and 
accepted. He faced a dilemma: he was prepared to defend short service against all comers if the 
alternative was to be a return to the old system of long service to pension, but he was also ready to 
propose schemes for extending the term of short service when necessary, particularly with 
reference to service in India. Wolseley accepted that six years' service in the colours was too short 
a period for valuable Indian service. It was generally accepted that the soldier could not 
be sent 
abroad until he had spent one year in training. Depending on when 
he enlisted, and because the 
trooping season was only once a year, this could remove at least one year and maybe two 
from the 
time he could spend in India; once there he would serve three or four years 
before being returned 
to Britain to enter into Reserve service. Even before the deficiencies of short service were made 
public after the Afghan war, primarily 
in Roberts's Mansion House speech in February 1881, 
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Wolseley was reconsidering the terms of service which should be adopted. Lord Cadogan's 
committee had suggested that the authorities in India should be allowed to re-engage 25 % of the 
short service men after their initial period of six years' colour service was completed. Wolseley, 
then serving on the India Council, supported this proposal. Indeed, he was prepared to see an 
overall extension of the terms of service to allow for eight years in India and six in the Reserve at 
home, and furthermore to see men sent to India only after they had completed three years' service 
at home. It may be that Wolseley was ready to make this suggestion because the Cadogan 
committee had been in favour of the retention of short service and in fact had been prepared to 
recommend that 'until the Reserve is produced, the Committee are of opinion that short service 
must be worked as a rigid system'. 8 Wolseley's proposal, which seems extraordinary in the light 
of his usual statements on short service, can be better understood when remembering that the 
Cadogan committee was a departmental one. The more public Airey Committee would provide a 
greater challenge. 
The Airey Committee, which was composed of what Wolseley called 'Wellington's men', 
in other words those of the old school he despised, recommended enlistment for eight years' 
colour service. This was perhaps unsurprising given the views of men including Wolseley that six 
years did not provide India with a sufficient number of well-trained physically mature men. It was 
the committee's other recommendations which caused more controversy. By proposing the 
abolition of the linked battalions system and the amalgamation of the brigade depots into larger 
depots serving more regiments, the Airey committee called for an abolition of the main tenets of 
the Cardwell system. 9 Childers bravely ignored these recommendations. He did increase service in 
the colours to seven years, the half way point between the Cardwell six years and the eight years 
proposed by the Airey committee. Far from abolishing the linked battalion system Childers 
completed Cardwell's work, followed the recommendations of the 1872 MacDougall Committee 
on localisation and worked towards the territorial reorganisation of regiments including the 
controversial task of renaming them. 
8 Memorandum of suggestions of securing the best troops for India at the smallest cost, 8 Dec. 1876, WOP 
W35; Report of the Cadogan Committee 
9 Report of the Airey Committee 
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Once the Airey Committee had made its recommendations Wolseley was forced back onto 
the defensive. In direct contradiction to his 1876 proposal, Wolseley announced in 1880 that he 
was opposed to extending service to 13 or 14 years because 'if you so increase the period of 
service, you will create an idea that the soldier who has given you the best years of his life should 
be allowed to serve on until he has earned a pension'. Now firmly established in the War Office he 
was hostile to India's demands, claiming (correctly) that service of eight years in India would 
seriously injure the formation of the Reserve unless the Secretary of State was prepared to allow 
more men at home to join the Reserve after three years in the colours. 10 Five years later Wolseley 
had changed his mind again, and this time he was in favour of allowing privates to serve for eight 
years in India. This extension of service would reduce the number of recruits required annually, 
and would reduce the demand for drafts which had reached a critical point because the balance of 
the battalions at home and abroad had become disrupted to the tune of 83 abroad supported by 67 
at home. 11 
Whereas Roberts was quite prepared to make public his proposal for two armies, one in 
India recruited on long service, and the other a short service army at home to create a Reserve, 
Wolseley was not. In a letter to Dilke, Wolseley stated that 'I would keep every British soldier sent 
to India there for eight years... I would compensate the Army Reserve for the loss this would 
entail by discharging double the number at home after three years' service'. 12 In practice this 
proposal did amount to a proposal for the establishment of two armies even though he felt that the 
concept of a separate army for India was quite unacceptable. Wolseley had served for only a few 
years in India during the Mutiny but he had drawn conclusions from the conduct of the East India 
Company Army which he would not alter throughout his career. Dilke reported on Wolseley's 
opinions by saying that Wolseley believed that the East India Company Army had been 'the worst 
and most dangerous body of men who were ever had under arms. ' 
13 Wolseley continued to wage 
war on the East India Company Army long after it had been amalgamated with the 
British Army in 
10 Memorandum on army organisation, 16 Oct. 1880, WPP, W/W 1/1 
11 Memorandum on an increase to the army, 12 Nov. 1885, WPP, W/MEM/1 
12 Wolseley to Dilke, 19 Nov. 1887, Dilke Papers, BM 43914 
13 Ibid. 
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India, particularly whenever he felt that there was a danger that politicians might take Roberts's 
calls for two armies seriously. For example in a letter to his brother George, Wolseley urged him 
to write an article contrasting the quality of the men serving in India then with what it had been 
previously. Wolseley believed that the improvement in the quality of men in India stemmed from 
the fact that before men had served for eight or ten years in India while wanting to come home, 
whereas now they could come home after only four years if the terms of short service enlistment 
were adhered to. 14 
Dilke concluded his summary of the opinions of Wolseley and Roberts as follows: 'Both 
Lord Wolseley and Sir F. Roberts ask for shorter service at home, longer service in India; and, 
though Lord Wolseley shrinks from the words "a separate army", and Sir F. Roberts from the 
words "an Indian army", they both recognise the necessity for accepting certain facts'. 15 Both 
Wolseley and Roberts certainly did accept the 'certain facts' that the existing short service system 
could not provide for the type of army Britain needed. There the agreement ended, and it is 
perhaps because no agreement seemed possible either among military circles or political ones as to 
the priorities of the British Army that successive British governments were forced to resort to 
various short term expedients to prop up a faulty system. It will be argued in a later chapter, that 
until a government found the courage to present an overview of British imperial interests, neither 
the appropriate size of the British Army nor its organisation could be settled. 
Wolseley denied in public that the short service soldier was weaker than his long service 
predecessor. It was claimed that he said 'I do not like the old soldier; I do not believe in him. 
Whenever I have had work to do, I have always taken young soldiers. This was manifestly 
untrue. In 1875, on inspecting the men garrisoning Natal he commented that they needed another 
year's good feeding before they would be mature enough to go on active service. In 1879 when 
told of his appointment to succeed Chelmsford in South Africa during the Zulu War, Wolseley 
requested that a detachment of Marines or Guards should be sent out in the knowledge that the 
young troops in South Africa had not performed as well as expected. During the Gordon Relief 
14 Wolseley to George Wolseley, 21 Feb. 1895, Duke University 
15 C. Dilke, The British Army, (London 1888), p239 
16 Quoted in Arnold-Forster, Army Letters, p148 
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campaign Wolseley wrote to the Duke of Cambridge explaining his proposal to form a Camel 
Corps: 'The young soldiers under twenty three years of age will not be able to withstand the hard 
work which will fall upon all ranks after Wady Halfa is left behind' . 
17 
Yet despite contriving to use the older soldiers on his campaigns Wolseley continued to 
defend the principle of the young short service soldier. The events of the two wars in South 
Africa, the Zulu War and the First Boer War cast doubt on the efficiency of these men. Wolseley 
attempted to conceal the weaknesses of the short service soldiers and to emphasise any good 
points. For example when the veteran news correspondent W. H. Russell wrote unfavourably on 
the quality of the short service troops in South Africa during the Zulu War in the Army and Navy 
Gazette; Wolseley arranged for him to go home. 18 Commenting on the same campaign to his 
friend Maurice, Wolseley claimed that in a letter from Chelmsford to Childers, the former had 
said that 'he would be glad to have such seasoned soldiers [as those coming from India] although 
no troops could have fought better than the young soldiers comprising the battalions he had 
already with him'. 19 The Duke of Cambridge spoke out for the long service soldiers when he told 
Wolseley that the best regiments in South Africa were the 13th and 57th which were composed of 
long service troops. Furthermore, the Duke cast doubt on the stamina of the two short service 
battalions fighting in South Africa, the 58th and 60th, which suffered heavily at Laing's Nek and 
at the Ingogo. In response to this criticism Wolseley was relieved to be able to state, in his 
autobiography, that the troops who had fled Majuba Hill during the First Boer War had been 
seasoned long service troops fresh from service in India. 20 
It must be remembered when considering the early performances of the short service 
troops that the Cardwell system had already been breached. Cardwell had anticipated that when 
troops were to be sent on active service they would be strengthened by reservists rejoining the 
ranks. In 1878 the threat of a major war with Russia to protect British interests in Constantinople 
17 Journal, 19 Aug. 1875, W0147/5; journal, 28 May 1879, W0147/7; Wolseley to Cambridge, 13 Sept. 
1884, in Verner, p266 
18 Journal, W0147/7 
19 Wolseley to Maurice, 1881, Maurice Papers, 2/2/29. Contrast with letters quoted in J. P. C. Laband (ed. ), 
T r, ý ChelmcfQrd's Zululand Campaign 1878-1879, (Stroud 1994) 
20 Cambridge to Wolseley, 26 Aug. 1879, in Verner, p166; WPP SSL8 
69 
and the Mediterranean had resulted in the calling up of the Army Reserve. This meant, for reasons 
to be discussed in the next chapter, that it was, if not actually impossible, then certainly highly 
undesirable to recall the reserves when the Zulu and Afghan wars broke out in the following year. 
Therefore the British Army had to fight two largish wars without its planned influx of trained men, 
and its performance suffered accordingly. 
A major point of controversy surrounding the performance of the short service troops 
concerned their youth. Wolseley had recognised this problem as a commander in the field and had 
taken steps on most his campaigns to ensure that the brunt of the fighting was undertaken by 
picked men. This was a temporary expedient that could be used in campaigns of a limited duration 
but could not be applied for major wars. Wolseley was therefore concerned to find some method 
by which the home army could be filled with a sufficient number of efficient men so as to enable it 
to send drafts to India and to be an effective fighting body in case of need. This was a problem 
which, had Cardwell's system been maintained as Cardwell had envisaged, would never have 
arisen. During his speech to the House of Commons on the Army Enlistment Bill, Cardwell had 
said, 'I hope the day will never come when this country will lose confidence in the old soldier. We 
have no intention of driving him from the British Army. We regard him as the centre and the pivot 
of the service; but we wish to have the young soldier combined with him'. 21 But in 1878 it was 
decided that all future enlistments for the infantry of the line would be exclusively for short 
service. The result was that the average age of soldiers on the establishment fell. 
In an article written in 1878 Wolseley claimed that in 1863 the average age of recruits had 
been 20 years and 3 months, and that in 1877 it had been 20 years and 7 months. 22 This suggested 
that the recruits attracted to the army under the short service system should be no less adequate 
fighting soldiers than their forbearers. The article ignored the fact that under short service the 
recruits and freshly-trained soldiers formed a far higher proportion of the establishment of the 
army as a whole than under long service when the inexperience of the young troops could be 
hidden behind the ranks of the seasoned soldiers. Wolseley was, however, ready to accept that the 
21 16 May 1870, Hansard, Vol. CCI 
22 Wolseley, 'Long and Short Service' 
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figures he had quoted were probably not the exact truth since it was impossible for recruiting 
officers to confirm the age a recruit had given on enlistment because 'our population is so 
migratory that recruits are seldom enlisted in the parishes they were born in'. 23 In the 1890s more 
accurate figures were kept of the age of the soldiers on the establishment and these clearly 










1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 
20.9 22.2 24.4 24.7 21.7 20.0 
0.93 0.92 1.0 0.75 0.73 0.76 
27.0 38.6 37.3 26.5 29.2 29.0 
33.5 37.0 35.2 39.7 34.6 30.8 
14.9 17.6 17.0 16.5 15.1 14.0 
14.1 18.3 19.6 19.5 16.3 14.7 
33.0 37.0 43.7 44.9 41.8 38.8 
27.7 31.6 35.2 35.9 33.3 31.2 
Table 3.1. Table showing the percentage of the home army on the establishment under the age of 20. WO 114/1-5 
Though publicly ready to defend the fighting qualities of the young short service soldier 
Wolseley, in private, was prepared to admit that the youth of the home army constituted a serious 
problem. The evidence of the extent of this problem is not hard to find. Wolseley was forced to 
agree with Sir Arthur Ponsonby when Ponsonby wrote to him in 1880 expressing his alarm that 
more troops could not be sent to Ireland to quash the Land War because too great a proportion of 
the soldiers on the home establishment were either too young for active service or not yet fully 
trained. 24 In 1884 the Duke of Cambridge wrote to Hartington drawing attention to a 
memorandum written by Wolseley on 20 October 1883 which had pointed out that 26.5 % of the 
cavalry and 42.8 % of the infantry were under one year's service. These men could not be used in 
time of war nor could they be sent to India as drafts. Some battalions could barely function at all, 
like the Northamptonshire and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. 25 Proposals to remedy this 
situation at least in the short term will be discussed below. 
23 Wolseley, 'England as a Military Power' 
24 Ponsonby to Wolseley, 30 Oct. 1880, WPP 
25 Memorandum on establishment, 20 Oct. 1883, W033; Cambridge to Hartington, 11 Dec. 1884, in 
Verner, p319 
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Before turning to an analysis of the attempts to remedy the situation it is necessary to 
consider what Wolseley thought was the ideal age of the soldier and how this contrasted with the 
opinions of other military men. He accepted the general principle that no soldier should be sent 
abroad until either he was over 20 years of age, or had served for at least one year. This created a 
difficulty because the most common age for enlistment was 18 or 19. At this age a prospective 
recruit had usually finished his apprenticeship and was considering his career options. Determining 
on a minimum enlistment age of 20, as was done in Germany, would merely exacerbate the 
problems of recruitment because by that age most men would have settled in a trade and be 
unlikely to want to leave it. Wolseley accepted this, and indeed welcomed it, although he did 
suggest that for the sake of maintaining an effective army in India efforts should be made to recruit 
men of 22 or 23 years of age. How Wolseley proposed to attract these older men to the army was 
never developed fully. It appears unlikely that older men would enlist, except in periods of severe 
economic depression, since no advantage would come to them on account of their age. Those who 
did enlist would probably be those men who Wolseley did not want in the army in any case; those 
who would qualify as 'specials', the category for those men below the very basic physical 
requirements for enlistment, or undesirables who would fill the military prisons and lower the tone 
of the army, which would give exactly the opposite impression of service in the army to the one 
Wolseley wanted to portray. 
Wolseley was hostile to the idea, propounded chiefly by Roberts and the 'Indian school', 
that privates could serve for twelve years and be efficient. He maintained dogmatically that 'as a 
rule, the private soldier after the first few years of his second engagement is of little use for active 
work in the field' . 
26 The Indian school produced statistics to prove that this was not the case but 
Wolseley dismissed them, preferring to rely on the impressions he had formed during the Indian 
Mutiny, and in the early wars of his career on the usefulness of the older soldier. Wolseley's 
determination to uphold the principles of short service at any cost made a solution to the debate on 
the ideal age and period of service harder to achieve. In August 1879 the Duke of Cambridge had 
written to Wolseley expressing his hope that the Airey Committee, then sitting, might be able to 
26 Wolseley, 'The Army'; Memorandum on securing the best troops for India... 8 Dec. 1876 WOP W35 
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find a 'happy medium' between the youthful short service soldier and the older long service man. 
The Duke believed that the most valuable years of a soldier's service were between the fourth and 
twelfth year. 27 Wood considered that in an ideal army 75 % of the soldiers should be of between 20 
and 22 years of age. Buller, on the other hand, sided with the Duke rather than with his patron 
Wolseley, and argued that 28 was the ideal age for a private. 28 Wood's preference was perhaps the 
most feasible and had Cardwell's proposals on the matter not been ignored would have been the 
case. It is therefore a sign of Wolseley's dogmatism and belief in the correctness of his opinions 
against evidence to the contrary or the arguments of others that he did not adopt this idea. Had he 
done so Wolseley would have found it easier to defend the principle of short service since the 25 
of the army recruited under long service would have provided a core of seasoned men around 
which the short service majority could have been trained. 
Wolseley recognised the fact that the short service soldier would be more efficient if 
commanded by an experienced non-commissioned officer. The problem was that the introduction 
of short service increased the turnover of NCOs. Despite the fact that provisions existed in the 
Enlistment Acts for NCOs to re-engage for a second term relatively few were willing to do so 
since there appeared to be no advantage to be gained from such an action. Wolseley therefore 
pressed for an increase of pay for NCOs and for the granting of certain privileges which he hoped 
would encourage more good men to accept promotion and to continue their service for a further 
term. One aspect of Wolseley's opposition to allowing a private to serve for 12 years in the 
colours was the fear that pressure would then build up to allow the man to extend to 21 years and 
pension which would counter Cardwell's argument for economy in this area. Wolseley, however, 
saw NCOs in a different light: their experience should be utilised and he was prepared to advocate 
steps to encourage them to serve on till pension. On this point Wolseley was in agreement with 
Roberts who stated that at the age of 31, after 12 years' service, the NCO was just entering his 
prime. 29 Governments accepted these arguments and during the period made various 
improvements to the status of the NCO. These arguably failed. General John Adye pointed out in 
27 Cambridge to Wolseley, 26 Aug. 1879, RA E/1/7184 
28 Arnold-Forster, Army Letters, p 147 
29 The Times, 14 Feb. 1881 
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an article in 1892 that in 1871 19% of NCOs were under 20 years of age, 49% between 20 and 
30, and 32 % over 30; in 1891 the corresponding figures were 15.8 %, 74.8 % and 9.4 %. 30 The last 
figures show that Wolseley had failed to encourage NCOs to serve on till pension and the 
continuing youth of the NCOs did nothing to help the defence of the short service system. 
The efficiency of the short service army in the field and at home was one test of the 
Cardwell system, the level of recruitment was another. Wolseley was sure, like so many others, 
that recruitment would benefit from the introduction of short service, but the evidence for this is 
open to dispute. The short service system demanded a greater number of recruits than had long 
service. Cardwell had estimated the number to be 30,000 a year and the Airey Committee's report 
raised this figure upwards to 36,000. In addition to this, should the depots be expanded or new 
battalions raised by other means, an even greater number of recruits would be called for. 
Various factors governed recruitment, some of which Wolseley could attempt to control, 
and some of which were beyond his reach. He could exert no control over the direction society 
was taking during the latter half of the nineteenth century. The 1870 Education Act provided free 
elementary education which led to an increase in literacy and greater independent thought among 
the lower classes. This independence was encouraged by the 1884 Representation of the People 
Act which enfranchised a number of agricultural labourers; after the Act two-thirds of the adult 
male population was entitled to vote. The army competed with the railways and police force for 
recruits. In particular, the police force offered the same terms as the army, free lodging, uniform, 
a fixed term of service, but paid far better than the army. In 1891 the Metropolitan Police even 
went on strike for more pay, a concept impossible for soldiers governed by the Mutiny Act. 
Archibald Forbes provided perhaps the best description of the problems faced by the army: 
This is an era of agitation, upheaval, restlessness, strikes, caprice... When the 
whole community of labour is a-quivering with St Vitus's dance, how can you 
expect free and eligible recruiting into a professional army whose critical 
requirement is an engagement for a period of some duration, or certain steadiness 
in the ranks of that army. 31 
30 J. Adye, 'In Defence of Short Service', Nineteenth Century, Vol. XXXII, No. 187, (Sept. 1892), pp 357- 
69 
31 A. Forbes, 'The Recruiting Problem', Nineteenth Century, Vol. XXIX, No. 169, (March 1891), pp 398- 
404 
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Wolseley was no advocate of democracy, and saw that the growth of organised labour and the 
greater opportunities offered to the working man outside the army would make it difficult to 
maintain a steady flow of recruits. Therefore steps had to be taken to make army service more 
popular and socially acceptable. 
One direction in which Wolseley directed his energy was towards raising the army's 
profile in society in the hope that this would make army service more popular and socially 
acceptable. The army abroad had a high profile: Kipling's short stories popularised the army 
stationed in India, and newspaper correspondents accompanying expeditions wrote enthusiastic 
passages eulogising the performance of the British soldiers and their commanders. The home army 
had a lower profile, and localisation, bringing the army to the people, was one way in which 
Wolseley hoped to raise its status. Under localisation each regiment was given a local identity 
centred on its depot and it was hoped that this would make the regiment appeal to the local 
manhood of the district and encourage them to enlist. In 1890 Wolseley claimed that localisation 
had benefited recruitment, claiming that county regiments had little problem in this area, 'it is 
nondescript regts such as the "Scottish Fusiliers", the "Gordon Highlanders", the "Royal Irish 
Fusiliers" which have the most difficulty in obtaining recruits'. 32 Wolseley was probably correct in 
this assessment; in 1874 local districts supplied 83.8% of recruits, and the remainder came from 
special recruiting districts set up in large towns. However, localisation was not adapted during this 
period to cope with the effects of rural depopulation and by 1898 the proportion of recruits 
enlisting in their local district had fallen to 63.3 %. This is also illustrated by the case of the 79th 
Scottish Regiment, one of the 'nondescript regiments, ' 60% of whose recruits in 1892 came from 
Whitechapel. 33 This should have come as no surprise to Wolseley since, as von Sosnosky, an 
Austrian captain, pointed out at the time, and Professor Bond more recently, localisation had 
'neither a territorial nor tactical character'. It ignored the fact 'that the great majority of recruits 
32 Memorandum on recruitment, 9 Dec. 1890, W030/132 
33 Spiers, i . are Victorian 
Army, p 21 
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came from the industrial north, whereas most of the great barracks... were in the south of 
England'. 34The effect localisation had on tactical training will be examined in a later chapter. 
During the 1870 debates on the Army Enlistment Act, Lord Strathnairn argued against 
short service on the grounds that 'no pension and uncertain civil employment are the future of the 
short service soldier and render him unmilitary'. 35 Wolseley was well aware of the dangers posed 
to recruitment by threat of later unemployment and his awareness was shared by others. In 
Germany and France strenuous efforts had been made to ensure that a reserved number of civil 
posts in government departments were open only to former soldiers. In 1876 a Select Committee 
of the House of Commons met to discuss proposals to establish the same system in Britain. In 1881 
Childers reported to Gladstone that the establishment of such a system was possible but had met 
with Treasury objections, and that an Order in Council was necessary to enforce the system. 36 In 
January 1887 Wolseley wrote to Brodrick, the Financial Secretary, asking that all public offices 
which could be filled by NCOs and privates should be tabulated and classified, and that a 
committee should sit to fill each vacancy as it occurred. He flattered Brodrick by claiming that 
'your name will be blessed to the third and fourth generation in the Army if you can accomplish 
for us what so many have attempted but given up in despair... ' . 
37 Brodrick was successful: he 
reported to Salisbury a few months later that the Metropolitan Police had promised to take 500 
reservists and 2,300 time-expired soldiers, the Post Office would employ 300 telegraphists, and 
the prison service agreed that 66 % of prison warders would in future be former soldiers. 38 
Although no system of a committee enforcing the provisions of an Order in Council had been 
established, as Wolseley had wanted, this was a step in the right direction. 
34 T. von Sosnosky, England's Danger: the Future of Army Reform, (London 1901) p 84; B. Bond, 'The 
Effects of the Cardwell Reforms on Army Organisation 1874-1904', J. R. U. S. I., Vol. CV. No. 620, (Nov. 
1960) pp515-24; B. Bond, Recruiting the Victorian Army, 1870-1892' in Victorian Studies, Vol. V, (1962) 
pp331-8 
35 Quoted in Marquis of Anglesey, A History of the British Cavalry 1816-1919, Vol. 3, (London 1982), p 32 
36 Childers to Gladstone, 8 Nov. 1881, quoted in S. Childers, Life and Correspondence of the Rt. Hon. 
Huh E hil r, (London 1901) Vol. 1, p 281 
37 Wolseley to Brodrick, 8 Jan. 1887, Brodrick papers PRO30/67/1; The Treasury was reluctant to give 
financial aid directly to soldiers on leaving the ranks; between 1886 and 1891 a private association spent 
£400,000 in assisting ex-soldiers in finding employment. During the same period the Government donated 
£ 1000. 
38 Brodrick to Salisbury, 6 April 1887, Salisbury Papers 
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Another method adopted to save the soldier from future penury was the introduction of 
deferred pay. This meant the withholding of 2d a day of the soldier's pay which after seven years' 
service would be given to him as a lump sum of £21 in order to enable him to set himself up in 
civil life. It had been proposed by Major-General Taylor's Committee in 1875 and was introduced 
in 1876. Initially Wolseley had supported the introduction of deferred pay because of the financial 
benefit to the soldier on leaving the army, but later he was less enthusiastic. This was because he 
and others began to see deferred pay as a hindrance to re-engagement, particularly if the soldier 
had left the colours for a short period and then wanted to re-engage. The exact figures for 
fraudulent enlistment, often by former soldiers who had accepted and spent their deferred pay and 
later enlisted in another regiment, are not available but Wolseley, when Adjutant General, was 
concerned about this growing crime. Nevertheless, a later chapter will show that when the 
proposal was made to abolish deferred pay when Wolseley was Commander-in-Chief, he spoke 
out in its defence. 
The extent to which the threat of future unemployment and paupery affected recruitment is 
unquantifiable. What is provable is that it was an exaggerated danger. For example, in 1887 a 
Return on the number of reservists and pensioners in workhouses in Scotland noted that only six 
reservists and 113 pensioners had spent an average of more than six months per year in the 
workhouses, and that 32 workhouses had never cared for any. The Wantage Committee also found 
that 75 % of reservists questioned were in regular employment. 39 But exaggerated or not the 
perception of future penury may have had an effect on recruitment and was a problem capable of 
solution which was why Wolseley proposed steps in this direction. 
Conditions within the army also had an impact upon recruitment. Skelley has provided 
ample statistics to prove that conditions in the army were poor, for example, the death rate from 
infectious diseases ran at double the rate in the army compared with civil life. 40 It has to be said 
that Wolseley appears to have been relatively unconcerned about the actual conditions soldiers 
faced in the barracks, and the amount of stoppages deducted from their pay. He did appeal for less 
39 Return of the number of Reservists and Pensioners in Workhouses in Scotland, 26 Oct. 1887, 
WO32/6505; Appendix XXX of the Report of the Wantage Committee, (1892) 
40 Skelley, pp23-7 
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drunkenness in the army but was not as great an advocate of temperance as Roberts in India. Part 
of the reason for this may lie in the fact that Wolseley spent most of his career either campaigning, 
or in the War Office, and therefore did not have the close contact with soldiers at home that those 
in command of regiments or districts had. He did, however, praise Wood's efforts, made while in 
command of the Eastern District after 1885, to improve soldiers' conditions, claiming that 'I have 
always believed in trusting the British soldier'. 41 There is little evidence to suggest in what areas 
this trust was supposed to lie. 
Wolseley was caught in the dilemma of wanting to grant more independence of action to 
an individual soldier on the battlefield, while at the same time treating him like a component of a 
machine when it came to his terms of service. He suggested that 'nothing tends more to popularise 
a regiment than the feeling that if a man wants to do so, he can go into the Army Reserve to 
complete his term of enlistment. The more elastic we make our contact with the soldier, the more 
willing are men to enlist'. 42 On one level this was true: the option of three years' service with the 
colours and nine in reserve or vice versa could benefit recruitment; but on the other hand the 
ability of the Secretary of State to determine when a man should enter the Reserve, not necessarily 
with the soldier's agreement, could have exactly the opposite effect. Wolseley did not believe that 
the soldier cared much about his terms of enlistment on recruitment. Roberts believed the 
opposite: during his speech at Mansion House he argued that the military authorities should not get 
men to enlist of their own free will and then 'deal with them as though they were mere machines'. 
During this speech and in his subsequent articles in The Nineteenth Century Roberts drew 
attention to various anomalies in the system which reacted against recruitment: for example, in 
1880 soldiers in India willing to re-engage had discovered that there was no guarantee that they 
would continue to serve in their battalion, but were liable to be transferred, without consultation, 
to a 'foreign' battalion. 43 This anomaly was rectified, but as will be seen in the next chapter, the 
41 E. Wood, From Midshipman to Field Marshal, (London 1906) Vol. 2, p 186 
42 Memorandum on Army Expenditure, 20 Aug. 1887, W033/48 
43 The Times, 14 Feb. 1881; Roberts, 'Present State of Army'; 'Free Trade in the Army', Nineteenth 
entua, Vol. XV, No. 88, (June 1884) pp633-46 
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same problem re-emerged over the question of whether the men of the Army Reserve would serve 
with their former battalion or a strange one on their recall to the colours. 
Excluding stoppages the average soldier was paid a shilling a day. Wolseley mounted a 
strong campaign to demonstrate that this paltry figure could not possibly attract any but the poorest 
recruits. In response to W. H. Smith's alarm at the state of the army he had a curt response: 
I quite realise all you say about the difficulty of obtaining men for the Army, but if 
more men are required in the interests of the nation, it is - if I may presume to say 
so - the duty of the Govt to find the men. Everything is to be had if you will pay 
the market price for it, and men are no exception to this rule. We continue to offer 
boys' wages ... 
44 
He argued persistently for a 50% increase in the basic level of pay as the absolute minimum. 
Wolseley compared the wages offered by another army recruited on voluntary enlistment: the 
United States Army. In his evidence to the Wantage Committee he pointed out that American 
soldiers were paid ls. 9d. a day and received free rations. Wolseley also noted that, far from 
being an expensive army to maintain, a point of criticism from many quarters and relevant to 
different areas of military policy, the British Army was cheap. It spent £85 12s. 81/2d. per man in 
contrast to the figure of £238 per man spent in the United States. He argued that it was pointless to 
do as governments did and compare British military expenditure with French and German since 
the systems and tasks were completely different. 45 
Economy was a major factor in governing why the basic pay of the soldier was not raised 
to market values during this period; trade was another. In 1875 Wolseley noted that with pay at 
that level 'there is no chance of our small peace standing army interfering with trade'. 46 The 
44 Wolseley to W. H. Smith, 27 Dec. 1885, WPP PLB1/57 
45 Evidence to the Wantage Committee, Q. 4430-8; memorandum on establishments, 20 Oct. 1883, 
W033/41 
46 Memorandum on our Army Reserve, 15 Jan. 1875, WOP W37; in 1890 the War Office attempted to 
establish a correlation 
between recruitment and unemployment. The conclusions were tenuous because 
factors such as local variations were not taken into account. Spiers, 
Army and Society, p44 
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figures below show the truth of this: 
Average wages of an agricultural labourer in Ireland: 1870 1881 1886 1894 
7s. 9d. 8s. 9d. 9s. 3d. 10s. 
Weekly wage of a carpenter in 1894: Dublin Belfast Glasgow London 
34s. 34s. 10'/2d 
. 36s. 39s. 7d. 
Table 3.2. Taken from A. L. Bowley, Wages and Incomes in the United Kingdom since 1860, (Cambridge, 
1937), pp50-52 
Ireland was the poorest area of the United Kingdom and, like the next poorest, Scotland, provided 
a disproportionate number of recruits. Irish recruitment will be discussed below, but here it is only 
necessary to comment on the fact that if agricultural workers in Ireland could earn more each 
week than soldiers could, it is unsurprising that there were periodic difficulties in recruitment. The 
figures on carpenters have been included because Wolseley was eager to recruit from the artisan 
class, which he believed was more intelligent than the class of from which most recruits came, the 
poorest and most ill-educated. Whereas Wolseley wanted to improve the quality of the men 
enlisting, some politicians argued against an increase of pay on the grounds that if pay was 
increased 'then you would get among the skilled labour class, whose loss to the community would 
be greatly heavier than that of the loafers & idlers whom we at present get & make men of'. 47 
Ireland provided a disproportionate number of recruits for the British Army; it has been 
estimated that in 1871 4.38 % of all eligible Irishmen joined the British Army in contrast to only 
2.09% of all eligible Englishmen. 48 Wolseley came from an Anglo-Irish background and would 
frequently refer to his 'knowledge of Ireland and Irish ways'. Wolseley was aware that the short 
service system could provide a unique problem for Ireland: the presence of a large number of men 
who had received military training in the British Army might at any time in the future, if political 
tensions reached a breaking point, lead to these men utilising their military skills against the British 
Army in Ireland. Therefore Wolseley appealed particularly for assistance to be made in finding 
civil employment for Irish army reservists to prevent them from being seduced by the 'rebel 
forces'. He lent his weight to an appeal for better treatment of Irishmen in the army after reading a 
47 Campbell-Bannerman to Knox, 2 Jan. 1899, Campbell-Bannerman Papers, BM 41221 
48 E. A. Muenger, The British Military Dilemma in Irelan d, (Kansas 1991) p68 
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letter in an Irish newspaper from a ex-soldier who had encountered great difficulties in re- 
engaging for a second term. 49 
The British Army needed Irish recruits in order to maintain its establishment but during 
this period the number of Irishmen enlisting was falling. Irish recruitment had begun to fall in the 
1850s as Irish emigration to the United States increased but a slump in emigration between 1875 
and 1880 led to a peak in enlistment in the army. The apparent opportunity of achieving Home 
Rule led to another drop in Irish enlistment. In 1893 the Chief Secretary for Ireland, John Morley, 
wrote to Wolseley, then Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, drawing attention to the fact that 'the 
number of Irish NCOs and men has gone down from 237/1000 20 years ago to 135/1000 today' "50 
Beyond urging measures to ensure the good treatment of Irish soldiers and reservists Wolseley had 
no suggestions as to the means to be adopted to reverse this trend. Irish recruitment appeared to be 
largely dependent on government policy and beyond the control of Wolseley or others at the War 
Office. Therefore Irish recruitment continued to fall so that by the turn of the century Irishmen 
formed only 13 % of the army; a fall of 8% since 1881. 
Wolseley wrote in a memorandum in 1886 that 'nothing can be more injurious to the 
successful working of any military system than an annually recurring variation in military 
establishments'. 51 The figures in Appendix IV show precisely the variations in recruitment and 
establishments during this period. Wolseley argued that if the Cardwell system was to function as 
its creator had intended, the military authorities at the War Office should be allowed to estimate 
the demands of future years in terms of recruitment and expenditure and plan accordingly. 
Wolseley must have envied the system in operation in Germany whereby the army received its 
budget subject to review only every seven years, through the Septennial Law, rather than every 
year as in Britain. To some extent the ability of the War Office to make plans was limited because, 
as Wolseley consistently mentioned, no government or politician until Stanhope in 1888, was 
prepared to outline the purposes for which the army existed. Wolseley's attempts to bring about 
such a statement will be discussed in a later chapter. Nevertheless, certain fluctuations in the 
49 Wolseley to Buller, 28 May 1892, W032/6689 
50 Morley to Wolseley, 13 April 1893, WPP 
51 Memo on increases to the Army, 24 Jan. 1886, WPP W/MEM/1 
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demand for recruits could be predicted: for example, the threat of a major war with Russia in 
1877-8 had led to an abnormal recruitment level and consequently to an abnormal level of 
discharges into the Army Reserve six years later. Yet neither Wolseley nor any of his colleagues 
predicted this seemingly obvious future difficulty at the time. Indeed the Secretary of State in late 
1885, W. H. Smith, was astonished to be told that if all the time-expired men who were eligible to 
be discharged into the Reserve were to go then there would be no cadres for India in the 1886 
trooping season. He proposed to take the unprecedented step of embodying the Militia to serve at 
home, freeing men to go to India. Wolseley's response, with the sanction of the Duke of 
Cambridge, was a suggestion that 10,000 Chinese could be raised in Hong Kong to serve in India, 
and that volunteers could be raised in Britain to serve in the ranks of the regular army for a period 
of six or twelve months. 52 In the event none of these drastic proposals were adopted. 
The evidence of the period demonstrates that the home army was consistently placed under 
severe strain by the requirement to send drafts to India and the colonies, and to Egypt after 1882. 
Wolseley disagreed with the arguments put forward by men like Roberts who stated that the 
system had broken down. Wolseley had his own argument to put forward which he did in a letter 
to Arthur Haliburton in 1891 as the Wantage Committee was about to meet: 
It cannot be repeated too often or be too strenuously drummed into the heads of 
outsiders, that it is not Mr. Cardwell's system that has broken down, but that all 
our present difficulties and misfortunes have arisen and are at present directly 
attributable to the fact that his system has been glaringly and most injudiciously 
departed from. 53 
Cardwell had designed the system so that if both battalions were abroad the regimental depot 
would have its establishment raised to provide future drafts for them. No government had carried 
out this policy and Wolseley identified the failure to do so as the most glaring departure from the 
Cardwell system. He argued that if this policy had been followed as intended the War Office 
would not have been forced to adopt the series of temporary and unsatisfactory expedients made 
during this period. 
52 Smith to Wolseley, 26 Dec. 1885; Wolseley to Smith, 27 Dec. 1885, both WPP 
53 Wolseley to Haliburton, 1891, quoted in Life of Wolseley, p 262. Arthur Haliburton was a member of the 
Wantage Committee. 
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These temporary expedients fall into seven categories: shortening the terms of service; 
moving men to the Reserve early; bounties; withdrawing battalions from colonies; extending the 
area in which the Home Army served; recruiting non-British nationals; and reducing or raising the 
required height and chest measurements of recruits. None were either entirely successful or 
desirable. Whenever a shorter term of enlistment with the colours was offered pressure on the 
establishment was eased but it merely exacerbated the problem in the longer term since three years 
later this pressure would be worse when the men recruited for three years all joined the Reserve at 
the same time. For example, Wolseley applauded the success of the scheme which reduced the 
term of service in the Foot Guards to three years when the Guards had encountered serious 
difficulties in recruitment. Whilst the scheme was successful in that the men came forward for 
enlistment Wolseley appears to have ignored the longer term effect: three years was deemed barely 
sufficient to train a soldier and the more rapid turnover of barely-trained men would necessarily 
have an adverse effect on the efficiency of the Foot Guards in time of war. Similarly, moving men 
to the Reserve early merely reduced the average age of soldiers in the Home Army further, and 
made it less efficient. 
It is doubtful whether Wolseley would have been able to make the Cardwell system 
function even if the finance had been available for the expansion of depots, since the problem of 
the home establishment was not merely numerical but was also a question of quality. Perhaps the 
most common method of increasing or decreasing recruitment as required was the use of varying 
height and chest measurements. The result was, as the Inspector General for Recruiting wrote in 
1877, that little attention seemed to be paid to the future efficiency of these recruits. 54 Wolseley 
was personally attacked on this subject. An article in Blackwood's Magazine all but accused 
Wolseley of deliberately misleading the public. The anonymous author suggested that Wolseley 
announced the success of the short service system solely on the grounds that the figures of the 
number of recruits demonstrated that it was more popular than long service, and concealed from 
the public the poor quality of many of the recruits and the increasing number of 'special 
54 Report of the Inspector-General of Recruiting, c. 1945, XIX, (1878) 
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enlistments', which increased during the 1890s from 18% to 36%. 55 Wolseley really had no 
adequate defence to these criticisms: the number of soldiers being invalided out of the army before 
their term of colour service was over was increasing, so that as many as 48 % of recruits fell into 
this category. 
Wolseley faced a great challenge to his defence of the short service system when called 
upon to give evidence to the Wantage Committee in 1891. It was generally accepted by most, 
though not by Wolseley, that the system had received a fair trial and must be re-examined and 
subjected to improvements where necessary. As a result Stanhope set up the Wantage Committee 
to undertake a thorough examination of the terms and conditions of service in the army. The news 
of this committee bolstered the hopes of the opponents of short service: for example, in a flurry of 
letters from India, Roberts tried to drum up support for an extension of the terms of service. 
Roberts wrote to the Assistant Military Secretary at the War Office, Lieutenant-General J. H. 
Gordon that 'There can be no manner of doubt that the root of the whole question of recruiting for 
the British Army lies in India'. 56 Unfortunately for Roberts there was considerable doubt. Both 
Buller and Brackenbury wrote to Roberts arguing that however desirable it might be to extend the 
length of service in the colours and to increase the average age of soldiers, the recruitment climate 
dictated against this. The Wantage Committee provided perhaps the most severe put-down for 
Roberts by declining even to consider the efficiency of the army in India. 
The dismissal of Roberts's opinions left the way open for Wolseley to conduct a review of 
the short service system and the efficiency of the home battalions on his terms. Indeed in his 
review of the evidence presented to the committee Roberts quite rightly pointed out that Wolseley 
and Buller had presented their evidence with the determination to defend the cause of the existing 
system and to allow only minor revisions to it. 57 The main concern of the Wantage Committee was 
to form an opinion on the efficiency of the home battalions. In this they were hampered by the 
lack of statistical evidence from those who claimed that the battalions were inefficient. Wolseley 
55 P. D. Trotter, 'Lord Wolseley's "Men"', Blackwoods, Vol. CXXXV, No. 821, (March 1884), pp 394-9. 
Authorship confirmed by the Wellesley Index. 
56 Roberts to Gordon, 10 Aug. 1891, Roberts Papers, N. A. M. 7101-23-82; Brackenbury to Roberts, 26 
Sept. 1891,7101-23-11 
57 Roberts to the Duke of Cambridge, 16 Aug. 1891, NAM 7101-23-100/3 
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was singled out for praise in this respect in the summary of the committee's report for having at 
least presented 'a tolerably consecutive story', to illustrate his statements. Wolseley was forced to 
agree with the other witnesses on the overall inefficiency of the home battalions in saying that 'I 
do not know a single battalion outside the Guards fit to go into the field and fight against any 
European nation' but added the crucial rider omitted by most other witnesses that this was of no 
consequence 'provided a thoroughly efficient Reserve of about 80,000 men is maintained'. 58 The 
truth of this rider will be examined in the following chapter. Wolseley, his colleagues and the 
members of the committee were, however, unanimous in saying that the home battalions were 
inefficient in carrying out the task of providing drafts for their foreign battalions. 
It was in this area that Wolseley perceived the need for the greatest adjustment or change. 
It was generally agreed that the Cardwell system of equality of battalions abroad and at home 
would neither be restored nor, even if it was, subsequently maintained. Wolseley made another 
attempt to uphold the system by suggesting that either battalions should be withdrawn from foreign 
stations, or the size of the army should be increased by the 12 battalions necessary to restore the 
balance. 59 The first was a solution already tried and was at best a temporary one, the second was 
costly. Therefore some alternative was necessary and Wolseley offered a suggestion. He made the 
often but inaccurately quoted statement that 'if these drafts are maintained for the battalions 
abroad, the battalions at home will be like a lemon when all the juice is squeezed out of it, they 
will be of little fighting use'. To counter this he proposed that a system should be set up whereby 
battalions in danger of having to send a large number of drafts abroad in the near future should be 
allowed to recruit over establishment in order, maintain at least the numerical efficiency of the 
1\- 
battalion. 60 
In his evidence Wolseley maintained that 'the home Army ought always to be the nursery 
for the Army abroad, and for the first line which is the Reserve' and that 'I would regard the home 
battalions as large depots'. Therefore he did not share to the same degree the concern of the 
58 Summary of the evidence given to the Wantage Committee, W033/52 
59 Evidence by Wolseley, Q. 8516,4547,8643 
60 Ibid. Q. 4379-81. Wolseley is commonly quoted as having referred to the home battalions as 'squeezed 
lemons'. 
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regimental officers that the recruits coming forward were of too low a standard for hard work. 
Wolseley argued that a few years' training was sufficient to build up the physique of even the 
special enlistments, and that since the home battalions were a 'nursery' the physique of the recruits 
on enlistment was of minor importance. 61 Nevertheless he repeated his calls for an increase in pay. 
He suggested that 'a small increase of ld. or 2d. a-day would not do; the day for tinkering at this 
question is past and gone, you must substantially add to the pay of the soldier if you wish to have 
an efficient Army on a voluntary principle'. Unlike other witnesses he did not propose a further 
reduction in stoppages: far from it, Wolseley wanted an overall increase of pay of 6d. for the 
home army and of ls. to those serving abroad out of which the soldier would pay for everything 
except his outer clothing. He remained in favour of deferred pay because of the need to maintain a 
large Reserve. 62 
The Wantage Committee embarked on its proceedings with the hope that it could draw up 
a workable system while maintaining the principle of short service. The evidence it had heard 
painted an alarming picture of the state of the home army, but the committee was apparently 
incapable of suggesting any radical reworking of the existing system that might remedy the 
defects. Instead the report of the committee proved to be disappointing: far from the far-reaching 
revision of the Cardwell system that had been hoped for by many military men, it merely proposed 
minor alterations. Deferred pay was to be replaced by a gratuity of £1 for each year of service; in 
the meetings of the War Office Council to discuss the report, senior officers like Buller and Wood, 
who had given evidence against deferred pay, were forced under pressure from Stanhope to retract 
their statements. As a result deferred pay was not abolished till 1898. Against Wolseley's wishes a 
recommendation was made for the abolition of all stoppages and for the modification of the 
clothing regulations. The committee did support Wolseley, however, in calling for an increase in 
pay up to the market rate for unskilled labour. The War Office Council, though, argued that 'it is 
considered that an increase of battalions is more important than an increase to soldiers' pay. It was 
61 Ibid. Q. 4674,4454 
62 Ibid. Q. 4467-74 
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not considered that an increase would get either more, or a different class of men'. 63 The result 
was that little was done at once and Wolseley, once he became Commander-in-Chief of the British 
Army in 1895, was forced to readdress most of the questions considered by the Wantage 
Committee and to press again for an increase to the number of battalions and for increased pay to 
stimulate recruitment. This will be considered in a later chapter. 
The Wantage Committee was unanimously in favour of the retention of the short service 
system yet it made few concrete suggestions as to how the working of the system could be 
improved. Indeed, given the social and political climate of the age it is difficult to see what 
alternatives could have been adopted. So long as the ideas of an Army Reserve were upheld and 
the principle of one army serving anywhere in the world was maintained, neither long service nor 
a separate army for India could be given serious consideration. The only alternative was 
conscription. This would eradicate the problems caused by unpredictable recruitment and provide 
a ready number of soldiers to serve wherever in the world they might be needed. Looking at the 
European countries with conscription Wolseley saw another advantage, 
This improves the physique of their people to a very considerable extent, shields 
them from the serious plague of panic, and strengthens the self-reliance of the 
Nation. Are we too cowardly and too ease-loving a people to pay this personal 
tax? I would not believe it. M 
This is apparently the only occasion on which Wolseley came close to calling for conscription, 
which was seen as totally unacceptable within political circles and found little favour in military 
ones before the Boer War. He was more frequently prepared to call for compulsory physical 
education in schools to compensate for the poor living conditions in the large urban areas. 65 It was 
not until the Boer War had shown the public the appalling physical state of the men of the country 
that action was taken on this in the 1902 Education Act. 
The evidence supplied to the Wantage Committee demonstrated without question that the 
Cardwell system had failed to improve the efficiency of the army, nor had it achieved any 
63 Meetings of the War Office Council, 4,19 March and 1 Nov. 1892, WO163/4b; Summary of the 
Recommendations of Lord Wantage's Committee and of the discussions thereon at various War Office 
meetings, W033/52 
64 Notes for autobiography, WPP SSL8 
65 For example Wolseley's numerous addresses to Volunteer and Militia units which were then reproduced in 
ThQ Ti-MO. 
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economy. The British Army was as inefficient and as expensive as it had been before Cardwell 
came to office. Yet Wolseley continued to defend the system, and Arnold-Forster made a good 
point when he claimed that 'Sir Garnet Wolseley, in common with some others, seems to be of 
opinion that the failure is rendered less important by proving that, after all is said and done, things 
were just as bad twenty or thirty years ago'. 66 The reasons why Wolseley continued to defend the 
system can be identified as threefold: his belief that his career depended on it; the lack of any 
politically, socially, financially, and militarily acceptable alternative; and his continued belief that 
the system had never been allowed to function as intended. Wolseley identified two major reasons 
why the system could not work as well as it might: one was the conservative figure of the Duke of 
Cambridge, who was never totally reconciled to the system, and the other was government 
parsimony. The first problem was solved by the Duke's retirement in 1895 and the appointment of 
Wolseley to the position of Commander-in-Chief. The second was one that would continue to 
challenge Wolseley after 1895 and his efforts to achieve a workable army system then will be 
examined in a later chapter. 
66 I. O. Arnold-Forster, 'A Civilian's Answer to Sir Garnet Wolseley', Nineteenth Century, Vol. IX, No. 
52, (June 1881) pp905-16 
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Chapter 4- The Army Reserve 
Recent historiography has tended to ignore the subject of the Army Reserve. While it has 
been accepted that the creation of the Reserve was the reason behind the introduction of short 
service, the Reserve has then been relegated to a minor position in surveys of the Cardwell 
reforms rather than treated as a subject calling for detailed examination. When the Army Reserve 
has been discussed, its purpose has often been misunderstood. This chapter will not attempt to 
examine the whole subject of the Army Reserve but will focus on what Wolseley thought of the 
Reserve and how he attempted to put his ideas into practice. 
Wolseley stands out as a figure who had a firm idea of the purpose of the Army Reserve. 
He believed that it formed an essential role in the organisation of a modern British Army, and held 
strong ideas on how it should best achieve its functions. He ascribed such an important role to the 
Reserve that his belief in its necessity caused him to accept, albeit reluctantly, the damage to the 
efficiency of the home army that would be caused by the maintenance of such a Reserve. This 
chapter will examine why Wolseley believed in the need to build up a Reserve, the size of Reserve 
he wanted, and how he envisaged its organisation, training and functions. Wolseley occupied such 
positions during the period under discussion as to make him a figure whose opinions it was 
impossible for contemporaries to ignore; not only did he hold high positions within the War 
Office, which enabled him to take part in all important decision-making processes on the subject of 
the Army Reserve, but also, as a commander in the field, first in 1878 when he was to have been 
second-in-command to Lord Napier for an expedition against Russia during the Eastern Crisis, and 
later when reservists joined the battalions under his command in Egypt and the Sudan. As a field 
commander in Egypt in 1882 Wolseley could comment on the usefulness of the reservist once 
recalled to the colours, something no other general of the period was in a position to do until the 
Boer War in 1899. 
In his numerous articles in various publications Wolseley made public what he believed 
were the reasons for the establishment of the Army Reserve. He reminded the public that in the 
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pre-Crimean War era `the commonly accepted idea with us was that a standing army should be 
maintained so that, if we went to war, it should be lh force to take the field - that we should trust 
to luck, or to the plans of the moment, to keep the ranks full whilst hostilities lasted. ' Wolseley 
argued that the events of the Crimean War had demonstrated that once the resources of the 
standing army had been exhausted the only option open to the military authorities was to despatch 
untrained recruits to the seat of the war. The War Office learnt its lesson and a Reserve force was 
created in 1859, and a further Reserve in 1867. These Reserves were largely a failure - by 1870 
they contained only 2,000 men instead of the intended 20,000. Wolseley argued that it was only 
'the Franco-Prussian war [which] taught us the absolute necessity for the creation of a trustworthy 
Army Reserve of well-trained men in the full vigour of their manhood'. I The result was the 
establishment of the Army Reserve under the terms of the 1870 Army Enlistment Act, whereby 
henceforward a soldier would serve for six years in the colours and six in the Army Reserve. 
These facts are not open to dispute; the perceived functions of the Army Reserve are more 
controversial. The Reserve formed a vital role in Wolseley's picture of the ideal British Army. He 
stated that for financial as well as organisational reasons 'the maintenance of an army strong 
enough to meet our military requirements is only possible by having about two-thirds of it in a 
reserve employed in civil life' .2 Wolseley's opinion was that the 
home battalions should be little 
more than training schools for the battalions abroad. Far from deprecating this development as an 
apparently inevitable consequence of the Cardwell reforms, Wolseley applauded it. When he told 
the Wantage Committee in 1891 that 'I do not know a single battalion outside the Guards fit to go 
into the field and fight against any European nation', Wolseley was not admitting that the army 
system was a failure but rather he was drawing attention to the fact that he believed that the 
creation of the Army Reserve had been a success. 3 
In his speech to the House of Commons during the debates on the Army Enlistment Bill, 
Cardwell stated that 'the object of the Bill is to have a Reserve Force; not... trained in the Militia, 
but trained in the Army, by the Army, and for the Army, and constituting in the moment of 
1 Wolseley, 'The Army'; Barnett, p295 
2 Wolseley, 'England as a Military Power... ' 
3 Evidence by Wolseley to the Wantage Committee, Q. 8516 
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emergency a Reserve upon which the Army may rely'. 4 In such an emergency the Reserve would 
bring the small peace time cadres up to their war establishment. Wolseley took this to mean that 
the Army Reserve was to be a body of trained men temporarily released from service with the 
colours after having been fully trained, who would, in the event of the standing army becoming 
involved in a major war either abroad or in defence against invasion, be a reservoir from which 
the battalions earmarked for action could be brought up to their war establishment. This would 
enable untrained men, and those soldiers too young to serve abroad, to remain behind in the 
regimental depot until they reached the age or standard to enable them to take their place in the 
fighting line. In this way the Reserve was to be a substitute for a portion of the home army. It was 
also to be a supplement: the Reserve would provide the men to replace the casualties of war. But 
was Wolseley correct in his assessment? 
There is some strong evidence to demonstrate the correctness of Wolseley's opinions. In 
the debates over the proposed recall of the Army Reserve in 1878 during the Eastern Crisis 
Disraeli said 
Unfortunately, the name for this Force is not a very felicitous one; it is called the 
Reserve Force, and it is called the Militia Reserve Force. But the world associates 
with the word Reserves some resource that is left to the last, that is only to be 
appealed to in great emergency, and is to be the ultimate means by which you can 
effect your purpose... It is not the last resource, but it is the first resource under 
our system. 5 
The Secretary of State for War Gathorne Hardy endorsed this statement. Further evidence is 
provided by the report of the Wantage Committee in 1891. The report defined the purposes of the 
Army Reserve as: firstly, to raise units from peace establishment to war establishment; secondly, 
to take the place of soldiers who were too young to be sent abroad or were still recruits; thirdly, to 
replace the medically unfit; and lastly, to 'retain sufficient men in reserve in the second line to fill 
up the casualties occurring at the front, until such time as the men left behind as recruits, or as 
immature, have become sufficiently trained or physically developed to take their place in the 
fighting line'. 6 
4 Han ard, 16 May 1870, Vol. CCI 
5H "r, 8 April 1878, Vol. CCXXXIX 
6 Report of the Wantage Committee, para. 98, 
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Many influential figures disagreed with Wolseley's opinions. The general public, whose 
opinions were ably directed by Dilke and Arnold-Forster, assumed that the Army Reserve was 
meant to be a reserve in the true sense of the word, rather than a substitute for the inefficient men 
in the army. ' It may be argued that the controversy over the purpose of the Reserve arose because 
there was a general confusion between intention and requirement. The establishment of the Army 
Reserve provides the strongest point in the argument that the Cardwell reforms were a pale 
imitation of the German military system and unsuited to British military requirements. Wolseley's 
definition of the Army Reserve as a reservoir for filling up home battalions in the case of a major 
war would not have caused dispute had it not been for the fact that apart from 1878 and, arguably, 
1885, Britain was in little danger of becoming involved in an expedition abroad against a first-class 
military power. Instead Britain was destined to fight a number of 'small wars' for which the home 
battalions needed strengthening, but there was no means by which this could be done under the 
terms of the Army Enlistment Act. 
The Duke of Cambridge and Roberts emphasised this flaw in the Cardwell system. Both 
were in favour of long service, but the Duke was prepared to make proposals as to the means by 
which battalions despatched for small wars could be efficient under the short service system. He 
faced two major problems: in the first place, as battalions rose up the roster for foreign service 
they increased their establishments by recruiting. This increased the number of inefficient men in 
each battalion. Secondly, as the last chapter showed, an increasing number of regiments had both 
battalions abroad, and the government refused permission for the regimental depots to be increased 
in size in compensation. Wolseley lent his support to all the Duke of Cambridge's efforts to secure 
increases in the size of the establishment of the army. He was well aware that the home army was 
too small to undertake its manifold responsibilities but he was equally adamant that this was a 
question quite separate from that of the functions of the Army Reserve. Wolseley never doubted 
that the Army Reserve was primarily a substitute for and secondly a supplement to the home army. 
It was only after he became Commander-in-Chief that Wolseley seriously considered the question 
7 Arnold-Forster, Army Letters, p107; Dilke, British Army, p43 
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of the requirements for small wars. The arguments put forward then will be discussed in a later 
chapter. 
It is now necessary to question whether the Reserve could actually fulfil Wolseley's 
definition of its functions. In other words, could the Army Reserve bring the home battalions up to 
war strength and at the same time have enough men left over to act as a general reserve for the 
whole fighting army? The key to the question was the size of the Army Reserve. In 1871 Cardwell 
had told Parliament that with an estimated number of 32,000 recruits per year the Reserve should 
reach 60,000 men by 1883.8 It is obvious from the table below that this proved to be an impossible 
target. 
Date Army Reserve 1870 Army Reserve 18829 Total Reserves 
1874 7,376 31,046 
1879 15,085 37,512 
1884 34,589 43,185 
1889 47,301 3,040 53,195 
1894 71,507 8,842 80,530 
1899 62,034 16,764 78,833 
Table 4.1 - Return of the Army Reserve on I January - Taken from General Annual Returns of the British 
Army, c. 1323,2731,4570,6196,7885,9426 
In order to prove the detractors of the short service system wrong Wolseley had to ensure that the 
Reserve reached the largest size possible so that it would be large enough to fulfil the functions he 
had ascribed to it. 
The first problem to overcome was caused by the fact that the number of men transferred 
from the colours into the Reserve was to a large degree dependent on the number of recruits 
entering the army, therefore as recruitment fluctuated so did the size of the Reserve. This link 
became evident early in the life of the Army Reserve. In 1873 Cardwell was forced to admit to the 
Queen that 'the Army Reserve has not been completed during the year now drawing to a close, on 
account of the falling off in recruiting during a portion of the year... '. In 1875 Cardwell 
complained to Campbell-Bannerman that the military authorities had the tendency to check 
8 Bond, 'Recruiting the Victorian Army' 
9 This Reserve dates from 1882 when the terms of enlistment were altered to seven years in the colours and 
five in the Army Reserve. 
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recruiting when the army was over establishment, instead of passing trained men to the Reserve. 
Wolseley had already made this point in a memorandum written earlier that year arguing that 
I would recommend it should be an established rule that in every arm of the 
Service all men found each month in excess of the establishment of that arm, 
should be allowed to enter the Reserve monthly, irrespective of whether other 
arms were or were not below their respective establishments. 10 
The intention behind this recommendation was good: the conservative elements within the army 
did try to retain as many experienced men as possible in the ranks rather than recruit 
inexperienced men or send the best to the Reserve. However, Wolseley's proposal was also a 
reflection of a major fault in military affairs during this time: it showed a lack of long-term 
planning. No yearly plan was drawn up in the various units of the army to establish whether an 
excess one month or year might not become a deficit in the following month or year. This fault is 
evident on examination of the General Annual Returns of the Army which shows that the 
establishment of the army swung periodically between being in excess and in deficit. 
There were conservative elements in all branches of the army who objected to the 
introduction of short service and the establishment of the Reserve and the cavalry stands out for 
particular consideration. Wolseley drew the attention of the Duke of Cambridge to this in a 
memorandum at the end of 1885: 
If the return of the Army Reserve men in the Cavalry Regiments is examined it 
will be seen that it is by no means satisfactory. Whilst nearly every Infantry 
Regiment has now a considerable number of men borne as supernumeraries but in 
the Army Reserve, there is only one Cavalry Regiment of the Line that, in the 
event of its being ordered on active service, could embark in an efficient condition 
and up to war strength' 
The commanding officers of cavalry regiments were particularly inclined to check recruiting when 
they were over establishment instead of sending trained men to the Reserve. Wolseley understood 
the reason for this state of affairs: 
There is a sort of superstition that a Reserve man, especially of the Cavalry, is of 
little use as a soldier when he rejoins his regiment for service... But even if he 
were not first rate, still he must be far better than the man who will leave his 
regiment for the sake of £1 bounty money. 11 
10 Cardwell to Queen, 6 Dec. 1873, Cardwell Papers, PRO30/48/5; Cardwell to Campbell-Bannerman, 23 
June 1875, Campbell-Bannerman Papers, BM 41212; memo. by Wolseley, 15 Jan. 1875, WOP W37 
11 Memo. by Wolseley on the Cavalry Reserve, 28 Dec. 1885, Smith Papers, WO 110/6 
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This last point played on the fears of the Duke of Cambridge. Throughout his service as a 
commander Wolseley had had to contend with the Duke's objections to his practice of taking 
volunteers from other regiments to strengthen the battalions he was commanding on active service. 
Even the Duke had to admit that Wolseley had a point: in 1884 he had been forced to acquiesce to 
Wolseley's formation of the Camel Corps in the Sudan because he could not supply Wolseley with 
regiments of fully trained and efficient cavalry. Wolseley also went behind his superior's back and 
sent his memorandum to the Secretary of State W. H. Smith so that the Duke could not suppress 
the memorandum in order to maintain the conservative nature of the cavalry. A year later Smith 
did indeed take action, informing Wolseley that he intended that future practice should be to send 
surplus men to the Reserve rather than to check recruiting. 12 
Developments outside Wolseley's control also acted against the rapid increase in the size 
of the Army Reserve. The Indian military authorities demanded more soldiers and as the Indian 
establishment grew in this period so did the demand for drafts from the home battalions. 
Consequently there was an increase in the number of re-engagements to meet the demand for 
experienced men and a shortfall in the number of soldiers transferred to the Reserve. The problem 
was also worsened by the need to retain a significant garrison in Egypt which also needed drafts 
from home to maintain its establishment. One solution to these difficulties, supported by Wolseley, 
was the increase in the number of three-year enlistments. This served, in particular, to increase 
both the recruitment and the Reserve of the Foot Guards. Nevertheless, the addition of a 
significant number of soldiers with what was generally accepted to be the minimum period of 
training created a problem of its own with reference to the Reserve: these soldiers would need 
further training while in the Reserve to maintain their efficiency, and this will be discussed later in 
this chapter. 
By the time the Wantage Committee met in 1891 to examine the questions of the 
organisation and efficiency of the home army, the Army Reserve had reached a significant size 
and should have been capable of fulfilling its role. Wolseley defined this role in a letter to the 
Duke of Cambridge in which he said that 'there is no Line Battalion fit for service, but neither is 
12 Wolseley to Smith, 30 Dec. 1885, Smith Papers, WO 110/3; Smith to Wolseley, 28 Dec. 1886, WO 110/6 
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there a German Battalion under arms at this moment fit for war. The fighting line of every nation 
is in Reserve'. 13 The figures initially appear to bear out Wolseley's statement: on the eve of the 
Wantage Committee in 1891, the total home establishment of all arms was 104,591 men; the total 
Army Reserve was 59,216. Of the home establishment 79,639 men were deemed effective, in 
other words aged 20 or over and had been in training for at least a year. Therefore a total of 
24,952 soldiers or 23.8 % of the home establishment would have to be replaced by men from the 
Army Reserve, leaving a total of 34,264 soldiers to act as a reserve to replace the casualties of 
war. This seemed to be an improvement on the situation during the Crimean War, but it must be 
remembered that these figures assume an even number of effectives in each battalion, 14 that no 
drafts would be sent to any battalions abroad other than to those at the front, and that the war 
would be of short duration so that the Reserve would not be used up replacing casualties and 
acting as a reserve and reinforcement to the battalions at war before an equivalent number of men 
had reached the age and standard of efficiency to be sent abroad. Wolseley knew only too well that 
the efficiency of the home battalions was decreasing in this period due to the factors described in 
the previous chapter. He also knew that the situation was unlikely to improve, and that as a result 
claims would be made that the creation of the Army Reserve had not solved problem of supplying 
an expeditionary force with reinforcements and replacements. Wolseley would therefore have to 
ensure that the men of the Army Reserve would be fit to take their places in the ranks on their 
recall to the colours. 
In his speech at Mansion House in 1881 Roberts argued against short service and the 
Army Reserve on the grounds that 'I take leave to doubt whether we can always depend on 
securing the services of the reserve we are slowly forming... ' . 
15 This was a fear shared by 
Wolseley and other supporters of the Cardwell system, but it proved to be groundless. The Army 
Reserve was mobilised on three occasions before the outbreak of the Boer War in 1899 with the 
following results: 
13 Wolseley to Cambridge, 25 June 1891, in Verner, p365 
14 The Infantry and Garrison Artillery were the branches of the army shortest on effectives. 
15 mimes, 14 February 1881 
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Date Reason Summoned Replied Medically Joined regt. 
unfit 
3 April 1878 Russo-Turkish 14,154 13,684 747 12,935 
War 
25 July 1882 Egypt 11,649 11,032 449 10,583 
20 April 1885 India 2,492 2,309 138 2,171 
Table 4.2 Mobilisation of the Army Reserve - taken from General Annual Returns of the British Army. 
These figures show that the response to the recall to the colours was on each occasion over 90%, 
demonstrating that in this area the Army Reserve was a successful organisation. In addition to this, 
volunteers were called for from the Army Reserve for service abroad on four other occasions, and 
there was a general call-up of reservists for training with the new magazine rifle in 1890 and 1891; 
these topics will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Having established that the men in the Army Reserve would return to the colours when 
recalled it is now necessary to examine their usefulness once recalled. It must be admitted that the 
evidence is fragmentary. For example, Maurice made no reference to the Reserve in his official 
history of the Egyptian campaign, beyond noting the day of its mobilisation; nor did Wolseley 
mention the reservists in his despatches. In his article 'The Army' in 1887 Wolseley claimed that 
on the subject of the conduct of the Army Reserve men when recalled 'the result was most 
satisfactory'. In his evidence to the Wantage Committee the Duke of Cambridge stated that 'the 
Reserve called out in 1882 behaved most admirably, and we were surprised how little they lost.... 
In contrast, the anonymous author of an article in Blackwoods Magazine on the campaign in Egypt 
in 1882 took the opposite view; 'the infinity of trouble the Reserve men caused their officers, and 
the evil influence their conduct exerted on the younger soldiers, have been established beyond 
controversy'. 16 
It is worthwhile, however, to distinguish between the fighting qualities of the reservists 
and their conduct in the ranks. On the question of their fighting abilities it is known that 1,000 
men from the Army Reserve took part in the battle of Tel-el-Kebir which suggests that this number 
of soldiers at least were highly efficient. 17 Indeed the number of highly efficient men may well be 
16 Wolseley, 'The Army' ; evidence of the Duke of Cambridge to the Wantage Committee, Q. 2238-9; W. E. 
Montague, 'The Late Campaign' in Blackwoods, Vol. CXXXII, No. 805, (Nov. 1882) pp654-74. 
Authorship confirmed by the Wellesley Index. 
17 Ham, 26 Oct. 1882, Vol. CCLXXIV 
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greater when one takes into consideration the fact that many reservists, particularly from the 
technical branches, would have served only on the lines of communication. In 1897 a report was 
drawn up on the efficiency of men of the Army Reserve in 1882,1885, and 1895. It included 
comments made in January 1883 by Wolseley and other commanding officers on the Army 
Reserve. The conclusions were that Wolseley and the majority of the commanding officers 
believed that although the reservist was less amenable to discipline he was efficient at his drill and 
had retained his powers of endurance on marches. The problem of discipline was worsened when 
the reserve men were sent to serve in different regiments from those with which they had 
originally served. 18 Wolseley was aware of this possible difficulty and his opinions on the subject 
will be examined later. 
A large British garrison was retained in Egypt after the campaign to maintain law and 
order in the absence of an Egyptian Army. The service of a number of Reserve men was required 
and this created difficulties. In December 1882 the Duke of Cambridge wrote to the Secretary of 
State for War, Lord Hartington, that 'whilst active service lasts, the Reserve men understand the 
necessity for their presence; when peaceful occupation ensues, they become discontented and 
disturbed at not being allowed to return to their ordinary civil avocations'. 19 Wolseley could not 
comment on this state of affairs since he had already returned to Britain but there seems little 
reason to doubt that the reservists were worried that their employment might not be kept open for 
them if their return was delayed much longer. 
Notwithstanding the effectiveness of the Reserve during the Egyptian campaign, there was 
still a question mark over the extent to which the efficiency of soldiers would be adversely affected 
by service in the Reserve. It must be remembered that the Reserve called out in 1882 had been 
absent from the ranks for less than two years. This question was of particular important with 
reference to the branches requiring specialised skills such as the artillery, the engineers, and the 
cavalry. Haliburton, while P. U. S., became convinced of the arguments of men like Wolseley, 
asserting that a trained field gunner remained efficient for five years after leaving the colours, and 
18 Report on the Efficiency of Men in the Army Reserve, 1897, W033/57 
19 Cambridge to Hartington, 22 Dec. 1882 in Verner, p304 
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a driver for three. 20 This suggested that there was no reason to doubt the efficiency of these men 
should they be recalled to the colours, and consequently no excuse for the Royal Horse Artillery 
and the Field Artillery to remain, as they did, frequently over establishment. 
Wolseley argued against the 'superstition in the minds of our Cavalry officers that Cavalry 
soldiers under five years' service are worth very little'. He made the point that in the much 
admired German and Austrian cavalry regiments the soldier served for only three years before 
being passed to the Reserve. Furthermore Wolseley was convinced that a cavalry soldier was of 
little use after ten years' service because he had lost his nerve. Moreover, because the cavalry 
soldier frequently sought employment looking after horses after leaving the colours his efficiency 
in the area of horsemastership was usually unimpaired. Once recalled to the colours, though his 
knowledge of cavalry drill might be rusty, he was still able to release soldiers from jobs such as 
grooms or drivers without any retraining. 21 This belief was backed up by a report by the 
commander of the Ist Brigade, Ist Division, 1st Army Corps, Lord Methuen in September 1895. 
He stated that the result of the mobilisation of this cavalry brigade had shown that the reservists 
were 'a good stamp of man, nearly all being in some permanent employ... '. The drivers and 
gunners had not forgotten anything and few were insubordinate. 22 Again it must be remembered 
that Methuen was referring to men who had only recently been transferred to the Reserve. 
The Wantage Committee showed that it was not totally convinced by Wolseley's 
arguments. It reported that: 
Important evidence has been given before the Committee, tending to show that the 
Cavalry soldier transferred to the Reserve deteriorates rapidly in knowledge of his 
Cavalry duties, and that, after a comparatively short time, he becomes unfit to 
resume his place in the ranks without some preliminary training, though he may 
still remain fit for duties in the Transport service. 
The committee also pointed out that there was a limit to the numbers required for transport and 
therefore recommended the extension of service in the cavalry to nine years with the colours and 
20 A. Haliburton, The British Army, (London, 1892) p15 
21 The reserves in the German and Austrian armies were regularly called up for training. Regular training 
might have maintained a cavalry soldier's ability to ride in a charge, but Wolseley would have argued that 
the additional responsibilities that might have been taken on by a cavalry reservist, such as a wife and 
children, might have made him less reckless in action. Memo. by Wolseley, 28 Dec. 1885, WO 110/3 
22 Report on the mobilisation of ist Brigade, Ist Division, I Army Corps, Methuen, 6 Sept. 1895, W033/55 
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three in the Reserve. 23 In his evidence to the committee Wolseley did admit that the cavalry 
reserve was not as useful as that of the infantry but nonetheless repeated his claim that a sufficient 
number of drivers would be required so as to make the Cavalry Reserve a worthwhile institution. 
Since he himself provided the figure of 31 drivers per regiment it has to be said that doubt must be 
placed on the effectiveness of the cavalry reserve and that strong arguments did exist to suggest 
that the cavalry should have been treated separately from other branches of the army and the 
extension of service in the colours recommended by the Wantage Committee acted upon. 24 
The Egyptian campaign provides the only accurate assessment of the usefulness for war of 
the Army Reserve men since on the other occasions when the Reserve was mobilised it was not 
needed. Wolseley was aware that the Army Reserve might not function in war as well as intended 
in the future because the increasing number of three year enlistments and longer service in the 
Reserve meant that the reservist was not as experienced as he might be. For this reason Wolseley 
frequently urged that the Army Reserve should be called out regularly for training. 
Under the law establishing the Army Reserve the Secretary of State for War had the power 
to call out the Reserve for 12 whole days or 20 drills a year. This was never put into practice and 
the Army Reserve was not trained except for small numbers of men who volunteered to take part 
in the autumn manoeuvres. The 1878 Airey Committee recommended that the Reserve should be 
called up for a month at a time 'provided that the whole amount of training did not exceed the 
aggregate 12 days for every year of his reserve service'. The Committee believed that training was 
only necessary for men in the third and fourth year of their reserve service. 25 These 
recommendations were not put into practice. 
Until 1882 the men of the Army Reserve had to present themselves to the paying officers 
four times a year and would only receive their reserve pay once it had been proved that they were 
effective. The system was altered in 1882 so that the reservists were now paid by Post Office 
orders and were seen only by the medical and military officers once a year. Wolseley and the 
23 Wantage Committee, para. 122-3 
24 Evidence of Wolseley to the Wantage Committee, Q. 4595 
25 Report of the Airey Committee, para. 248 
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Duke of Cambridge were alarmed by this development and Wolseley wrote to the Under Secretary 
of State, the Earl of Morley that: 
His Royal Highness is of opinion that an inspection of the Army Reserve men by a 
military officer every three months, and an annual inspection by an Army 
Surgeon, would be the very smallest amount of inspection that we could depend 
upon to serve the objects for which the Reserve exists, and that this should be 
regarded as a temporary measure, for as soon as it reaches its normal size, His 
Royal Highness would urge most strongly that regulations be issued for insuring 
that every Reserve man undergoes some amount of periodical drill and of 
musketry instruction. 26 
As Wolseley repeated in 1883 the annual medical inspection, which cost £6000 a year, was money 
well spent since it ensured that all men receiving Reserve pay were efficient. 27 The effectiveness 
of this is demonstrated by looking at the fall in the number of men rejected as medically unfit 
between the call out in 1878 before the annual medical inspection had been set up and that of 
1882. 
The two principal objections to the regular training of the Reserve were cost, and the 
attitude of employers to the Army Reserve. Childers had been bombarded by a series of 
memoranda from Wolseley on the subject of training, and in 1882 he set up a committee under 
Wolseley's presidency to examine the means by which reservists could receive some form of 
annual training. The sittings of this committee began in June 1882 but were interrupted by 
Wolseley's trip to Egypt, and reconvened in February 1883. The committee's principal concern 
was to cause the least inconvenience to the reservist so that his employment would not be affected. 
To this end the reservist was to be given a free year to settle down in civilian life before being 
asked to select one of four systems of training for the remainder of his service with the Reserve. 
The options open to the reservist were: enrolment as supernumerary members of the Volunteers 
and qualifying as efficients therein; joining the headquarters of a regimental district or regular 
battalion for eight consecutive days' training; and joining a Militia battalion and training with it. 
For cavalrymen and Royal Horse Artillerymen there was the additional option of joining 
26 Memo. on the training of the Army Reserve, 14 April 1882, WPP W/MEM/l; the subject was also 
brought up at a meeting at the War Office on 26 May 1882, W032/8711 
27 Wolseley to Ralph Thompson, 14 May 1883, WO32/8713 
101 
Yeomanry regiments. 28 These options formed the basis of all discussions on the training of the 
Reserve for the remainder of the century. 
Progress on the issue was slow. Throughout 1883 memoranda were passed between 
Wolseley, Hartington, the Surveyor General, and the Duke of Cambridge on the subject of annual 
medical inspections. The result was that four districts in England, two in Scotland and one in 
Ireland were called out for medical inspection in January 1884.29 In January 1884 Wolseley drew 
the attention of the P. U. S. to the fact that the question of the training of the Reserve had not yet 
been settled. Wolseley pointed out that the actuaries' report on the proposals of his committee had 
concluded that for 1884 the cost of training would be £34,356 and that when the Reserve reached 
its estimated maximum size training would cost £83,014 annually, figures which Wolseley 
described as a 'small price to pay for efficiency'. 30 By 1887 the proposals as to how the Reserve 
was to be trained had been narrowed down to the first of Wolseley's committee's 
recommendations: training with the Volunteers. Finance was the key question; should the 
reservists receive the capitation grant or not? Wolseley had no doubt that 'the capitation grant 
would indeed be a cheap rate to pay for maintaining our Reserve men in a condition of efficiency' 
The Financial Secretary, Brodrick, disputed this, arguing that adding 20,000 reservists to the 
Volunteers would mean that the Volunteers would still be within their establishment but would cost 
an additional sum of £40,000 a year, which he doubted was the cheapest method of training the 
Reserve. 31 Wolseley was still convinced that the experiment was worth trying. 
During the 1880s the Lee-Metford magazine rifle was gradually being introduced within 
the Army. At the end of 1889 Wolseley wrote to Stanhope pointing out that it would be necessary 
to call out the Army Reserve for training with the new rifle because 'an Army Reserve untrained 
in its use, would be of small value for the purposes for which it is maintained. This is a matter of 
28 Report of the Committee on the Training of the First Class Army Reserve, 7 Feb. 1883, WOP W45 
29 Memos. on the Army Reserve, 6 July 1883; 14 August 1883; 6 October 1883; 31 October 1883. All WPP 
W/MEM/1 
30 Estimate as to the cost of annual training of the First Class Army Reserve, 5 Jan. 1884, WOP W45; 
memo. on the cost of training the Army Reserve, 3 Jan. 1884, 
WPP W/MEM/1 
31 Wolseley to Lord Harris, 17 August 1887; Brodrick to Harris, 22 August 1887; Wolseley to Harris, 13 
Sept. 1887. All W032/8715 
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pressing national importance'. 32 Stanhope agreed and in 1890-1 14,965 men were called up for 
training for three days; in 1891-2 the remainder were trained. Throughout the 1890s reserve men 
were called up regularly for musketry drill with the new rifle, but, rather oddly, no target practice 
was included in the training. 
The evidence given to the Wantage Committee by the senior military men shows that they 
were unanimous in their desire that the Reserve should be trained. The Duke of Cambridge said 'I 
think the Reserve are a very fine body of men, but as we never see them, we do not know whether 
they are qualified to take their places in the ranks'. Buller repeated the arguments given above that 
the Reserve should be permitted to train with the Militia, the Volunteers, or with their own 
regiments. Whereas Buller would have been satisfied if the men in the Reserve trained for six days 
per annum Wolseley was adamant that the period should remain the same as in the existing 
regulations, i. e. twelve days. He wanted this period to be consecutive and, as he had 
recommended before, either with the auxiliary forces or with the regulars. The Wantage 
Committee reported in favour of periodical training of the Army Reserve 'without which no 
Reserve can fairly be said to be efficient'. 33 
Beyond the question of cost, the chief factor limiting the use and training of the Army 
Reserve was the attitude of the employers. Wolseley was aware that this was a major limitation. In 
an article in 1878 he referred to the fact that a few years earlier the Reserve had responded well to 
being called out for drill but 'it was then found that in many instances the men who responded to 
the call... lost their situations in civil life, being discharged there and then by their unpatriotic 
employers, who said they would not have servants subject to such a liability'. 34 This danger was 
considerably greater in 1878 when the Army Reserve was called out during the Eastern Crisis. In 
response to a question asked in the House of Commons the Secretary of State for War Colonel 
Stanley replied that 'I believe that, in a very large number of instances, the men have had their 
employment kept open for them'. A month later the Under Secretary of State Viscount Bury was 
forced to admit that it was too early to tell how many had lost their jobs because of their reserve 
32 Memo. on Army Estimates, 16 Dec. 1889, W033/39 
33 Wantage Committee, para. 98. Underlining as in the report. 
34 Wolseley, 'England as a Military Power' 
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service but it was known that only 1 .5% of those called up had been unemployed at the time. 
35 No 
accurate figures were ever drawn up, probably because the majority of reservists had been 
working as labourers whose employment was in any case mainly seasonal. In 1886, when 
Wolseley was again urging that the reservists should receive some form of annual training if only 
in the Volunteers corps, Campbell-Bannerman again raised the spectre of the unsympathetic 
employer. To this Wolseley replied that the men in the Volunteers were also in steady employment 
yet managed to qualify annually as efficients and to attend the annual general inspection on Easter 
Monday. 36 This argument had a strong degree of truth in it, yet the government was still shy of 
causing the slightest amount of inconvenience to the employers. 
Concern over the attitudes of employers to men in the Army Reserve also coloured the 
terms under which the Reserve could be recalled for service. The Reserve had been constituted as 
a force only to be called out in the event of war or emergency by Royal Proclamation. The foreign 
policy of the period made it increasingly unlikely that Britain would be drawn into a major war. 
Instead the resources of the British Army were expended in a number of small wars. These wars, 
despite placing a great strain on the army at home, were not great national emergencies and 
therefore the experienced soldiers in the Army Reserve could not be recalled for service. For this 
reason the terms governing the use of the Reserve were subjected to re-examination. Professor 
Bond has suggested that 'gradually during this period there was a subtle change of opinion as to 
the purpose of the Reserve... 1.37 Just whose opinion was changed needs exploration. A. V. Tucker 
has argued that making the Reserve liable for service in imperial campaigns was advocated by 
Wolseley, Buller, and Haliburton. 38 Wolseley's opinions on the subject will be investigated and it 
will become apparent that they were not fixed. 
The common practice for small wars was to bring the units marked for service on a given 
expedition up to their full effective establishment by taking volunteers from other units, and by 
calling for volunteers from the Army Reserve. Wolseley was adept at combining both methods 
35 Hansar , 
22 July 1878, Vol. CCXLI; 6 August 1878, Vol. CCXLII 
36 Memo. on training the Army Reserve, Wolseley, 29 Jan. 1886; reply by Campbell-Bannerman, 21 May 
1886; response by Wolseley, 25 May 1886. All W032/8715 
37 Bond, 'Lord Cardwell's Reforms... ' ; Bond, 'Effect of Cardwell Reforms' 
38 Tucker, 'Army and Society' 
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with success. In 1879 he took 905 volunteers from the Army Reserve with him when he went to 
South Africa to assume command from Lord Chelmsford during the Zulu War. In 1881 a further 
900 volunteers offered their services during the first Boer War. In August 1884 Wolseley was 
again instrumental in securing the services of 1,791 volunteers to serve in the Sudan during the 
Khartoum expedition, and a further 2,077 served at Suakin the following year. 39 
Wolseley believed that the use of volunteers had been very successful and was content to 
see the practice continued. In 1881 the Financial Secretary Campbell-Bannerman put forward a 
proposal that would make men in the Army Reserve liable for recall to the colours for small wars 
during the first year of their Reserve service. (In 1881 Campbell-Bannerman appeared not to have 
considered the attitude of the employers unlike in 1886 as referred to above). This proposal met 
with the strong approval of the Adjutant General, Ellice, and the Duke of Cambridge. Both these 
men harboured strong objections to the practice of using volunteers from other units and believed 
that there was no guarantee that a sufficient number of volunteers from the Army Reserve would 
always be available in the future. Wolseley argued strongly against Campbell-Bannerman's 
proposal. He did not believe that the time had come for such a definite move away from the spirit 
of Cardwell's reforms. He argued that as the Reserve was still increasing in size its development 
should not be hampered. Making the Reserve men liable for service in small wars would damage 
their chances of gaining employment which might strengthen the arguments behind the demand for 
longer service in the ranks. Wolseley wanted the practice of calling for volunteers continued and 
in this he was supported by the Surveyor-General of Ordnance, General Adye. 40 
The Wantage Committee heard evidence on the question of using the Reserve for small 
wars. The Duke of Cambridge outlined the reasons why the question was under discussion: 'it was 
the intention that the battalions on the higher strength should be ready to take the field for small 
wars without calling on the Reservist, but by building up the higher establishments so rapidly we 
have filled them completely with boys as a rule... '. Wolseley claimed that the 'eight battalions of 
the First Army Corps are not supposed to be independent of being strengthened by the Reserve'. 
39 Haliburton, appendix 1 
40 Memo. by Campbell-Bannerman, 9 Feb. 1881; memo. by Ellice, 14 Feb. 1881; memo. by Wolseley, 17 
Feb. 1881; memo. by Adye, 18 Feb. 1881; all W032/8709 
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He spoke in favour of giving the government the power to call out at least 10,000 to 20,000 men 
from the Reserve 'although the reason for doing so might not amount to a "great national 
emergency". ' In other words these men should be available for small wars. This statement 
provides just about the only evidence that Wolseley was seriously considering the alteration of the 
terms of service for the Army Reserve. The committee admitted that it could not suggest any 
method by which the Army Reserve could be used for small wars. It shied away from 
recommending that the men in the Reserve should be liable for service during the first period of 
Reserve service, but did suggest that a list should be drawn up of men willing to volunteer to 
return to the colours in the case of a small war. 41 In other words it ignored Wolseley's evidence on 
this point and supported his earlier statements on the subject. 
Despite the failure of the Wantage Committee to produce any concrete suggestions on the 
means of finding troops for small wars, while Wolseley was absent in Ireland the question of 
calling out the Army Reserve for small wars was continually under discussion. In 1892 Stanhope 
suggested making reservists liable for service for small wars during the first six months of their 
Reserve service and paying them more to compensate for this liability. Buller reported that the 
Duke of Cambridge was not in favour of such a proposal. Extra pay, he thought, would 
discourage the Reserve man from seeking employment, and in any case he believed that a call for 
volunteers from the Army Reserve would always achieve the numbers required. However, the 
Duke did want an amendment to be made to the Reserve Forces Act in order to allow the 
Secretary of State to request volunteers without recourse to a Royal Proclamation, which could 
only be issued when Parliament was sitting. Stanhope refused to countenance any amendment of 
the Act and in this he was supported by his successor as Secretary of State for War, Campbell- 
Bannerman. 42 The debate would be renewed when Wolseley became Commander-in-Chief. 
Wolseley believed that the Army Reserve filled a vital role in Britain's new military 
system: it would be both a substitute and a supplement for the home army. This chapter has 
41 Evidence to the Wantage Committee: Duke of Cambridge, Q. 2022; Wolseley, Q. 8679; report of the 
Wantage Committee, para. 102 
42 Memo. by Stanhope on calling out the Reserves for small wars, June 1892; memo. by Buller, 21 July 
1892; reply by Stanhope, 21 July 1892; memo. by Campbell-Bannerman, 20 October 1892. All WO32/8718 
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described the difficulties Wolseley faced when attempting to create such a Reserve. His struggle 
for manpower described in the previous chapter reacted unfavourably on the Reserve, forcing it to 
become more of a substitute and less of a supplement to the home army. In addition, Wolseley 
fought a battle for funds for the regular training of the Army Reserve so that it would be capable 
of replacing in time of war, those soldiers in the home battalions deemed inefficient with trained 
former soldiers. An added complexity was that the terms under which the Reserve could be used 
had been designed with reference to the German model, the need to fight a major European war 
rather than the unique British requirement of small imperial wars. The Wantage Committee had 
been in favour of the existence of the Army Reserve, but had failed to make any concrete 
proposals on how it should be best maintained and utilised. Therefore the finance, manpower, 
purpose and use of the Army Reserve had still not been settled before Wolseley became 
Commander-in-Chief, and the continuation of the debates on these topics will be covered in a later 
chapter. 
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Chapter 5- Wolseley's Drive towards a Modern Army 
The previous two chapters have analysed Wolseley's approach to the manpower question 
and the Army Reserve within the framework of the Cardwell system. This chapter will consider 
Wolseley's role in the drive to create a modern British Army capable of fighting a well-armed 
enemy in Europe or in the Empire. It will examine Wolseley's response to the technological 
advances of his day when the improvements in the methods of manufacture provided armaments 
with greater ranges and accuracy. These new weapons called for a reconsideration of tactics and 
the methods of training and clothing the soldier for war. Greater firepower also called into 
question traditional values, such as the future of the arme blanche on the modern battlefield, and 
led to the search for innovations in tactics and equipment, such as the development of the machine 
gun and the birth of the mounted infantry. 
Beyond the training and arming of the soldier Wolseley was also concerned with the 
command of these men. Society was changing during the period with the growth of professions 
whose governing bodies defined strict standards of attainment. Wolseley wanted the army to 
become a profession for its officers: they would have to meet certain standards on entry and prove 
their abilities before promotion to a higher rank. Furthermore Wolseley wanted the officers to 
pursue a more professional outlook on their work; to consider their duties more seriously than 
their status, and to concentrate their efforts on educating themselves and the men under their 
command in all things military. Wolseley's efforts in these directions will be examined. The 
greater responsibilities held by officers of field or staff rank led Wolseley to press for the 
operation of a policy of selection to ensure that the best men reached the top of their profession. 
This brought Wolseley into conflict with the conservatives who fought to retain the existing system 
of promotion by seniority. 
Wolseley also took part in the debates on the higher organisation for war: as Adjutant 
General he assumed responsibility for the production of mobilisation plans. The complexity of the 
task of preparing the British Army for war led to the proposal made by the Hartington 
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Commission that the German model of a Chief of Staff should be introduced into the British Army. 
Wolseley's response to this proposal will be analysed. 
In his drive for a modern army Wolseley naturally faced the opposition of the Duke of 
Cambridge. Again Wolseley attempted to mobilise the public to support his views. He used Sir 
Charles Dilke as a mouthpiece in 1888 when he was quoted in Dilke's book as saying that he: 
Thinks that our army is clumsily and badly organised, drilled on an obsolete 
system, and dressed in ridiculous and theatrical costumes, that its tactical 
instruction is far below what it should be, and that a large proportion of the 
superior officers are not fully competent to command in modern war. 
In addition Dilke drew attention to Wolseley's demand for a force of at least two army corps to be 
ready with its regimental transport and complete quota of auxiliary services for offensive 
operations abroad operating on a previously worked out plan of mobilisation. ' It will become clear 
that the Duke's opposition to change in many vital areas meant that during this period Wolseley 
could do little more than prepare the ground for the time when, he hoped, he would head the army 
and be in a position to create his model of a modern British Army. 
The technological developments of the breech-loading rifle, magazine rifle, breech-loading 
artillery, and smokeless powder all combined to institute a major reconsideration of tactics. It must 
be admitted that Wolseley's interest in tactics was transitory. His writings on the subject were 
limited to his entry for the Wellington Prize essay competition in 1872 and what he wrote in the 
various editions of the Soldier's Pocket Book. He was not an innovator in this area, leaving such 
work to men like Robert Home and George Henderson. He did, however, concentrate on two 
subjects of major importance: musketry and the size of the tactical fighting unit. The longer ranges 
over which modern rifles could be fired called for an increase in the skill on the part of the soldier 
and hence for more musketry training. During 1881 Wolseley was a member of the Musketry 
Committee assembled under the chairmanship of General Lysons. This committee recommended 
that every recruit should receive one recruits' course and one trained soldiers' course in musketry 
before being sent abroad. A soldier would fire 300 rounds in his first year and 200 rounds in 
subsequent years. The companies should be trained annually and the results published. At a 
I Dilke, British Army, p140; cf. Wolseley to Dilke, 19 Nov. 1887, Dilke Papers BM 43914 
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meeting at the War Office it was decided that these proposals would be too expensive to put into 
effect and the number of rounds to be fired was consequently halved. 2 In his comments on a 
lecture given to the United Services Institute in 1878 by Lieutenant F. J. Graves, Wolseley argued 
that 'the days when men prodded one another with bayonets are past and gone; and I think you 
should look at the rifle as a thing that shoots, and not as a thing with a bayonet at the end for the 
purpose of killing with'. 3 Wolseley admitted in his numerous speeches to Volunteer units that 
space and cost were major obstacles to the improvement of musketry within the army. He argued 
against the promotion of the skilled marksmanship of a few men in order to win prizes at the 
annual Wimbledon rifle competition and urged greater emphasis to be placed on the training of a 
battalion to have a higher average of good shots in its ranks. Furthermore shooting at fixed targets 
was of limited value; Wolseley argued that men should practise shooting over unknown ranges and 
at moving targets. 4 There is little doubt that the British Army did not shoot well; reports after the 
First Boer War and the Egyptian campaign drew attention to this. 
Wolseley's command in the Ashanti war in 1873-4 taught him a vital lesson that was 
equally applicable to all theatres of war: when in contact with the enemy, soldiers tended to form 
into small groups. In the case of the Ashanti war the small groups had evolved naturally from the 
difficulties caused by fighting in thick bush, but Wolseley argued that in any case the development 
of breech loaders required the adaptation of tactics from close order to open order. As on the Gold 
Coast, this would require more officers. This theory assumed vital importance in the debate in 
1877 on the tactical organisation of a battalion. The German Army operated on the system of four 
large companies per battalion while the British Army still retained the old system of eight and 
therefore the War Office reconsidered the advantages of each system. Wolseley was adamant that 
the German model should not be adopted in this area without very serious consideration. He was 
in favour of the retention of the eight company system on the grounds that 'the maximum strength 
2 Report of the Committee on Musketry Instruction, 22 Sept. 1891 W033/37; War Office meeting, 18 Jan. 
1882, W0163/3 
3 
_I R. U. 
S. I. Vol. 22,1878, pp120-54; The bayonet was an indispensable weapon for hand to hand fighting, 
as Wolseley knew from his experiences in the Crimea, India and China. The British Army continued to 
emphasise the role of the bayonet before and during the First World War despite the evidence from that war 
showing that firepower killed far more of the enemy. 
4 For example, The Times 25 Jan. 1886,20 Jan. 1887,28 Jan. 1889 
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of the company can in fact be almost mathematically determined by the physical laws controlling 
the powers of the human sight and voice. He pressed for an increase in the number of junior 
officers per battalion so that no fighting unit should contain more than 100 men, the number 
Wolseley believed was the maximum one man could control. In the event Britain retained her eight 
company system since there was no overwhelming evidence against it. As the Adjutant General 
Ellice dryly pointed out the whole debate had arisen as a means of placing a company under a 
major and therefore 'simplifying certain questions as regards the promotion and retirement of 
officers'. The debate was revived briefly in 1889; however, Wolseley again managed to convince 
the Duke of Cambridge of the value of small tactical units. s 
The increase in the skill required to operate modern armaments and the shift towards open 
order on the battlefield placed greater stress on the intelligence of the individual soldier. Wolseley 
had largely failed, for reasons enumerated in an earlier chapter, to encourage better educated men 
to enlist in the army. Consequently, although the nature of modern warfare had changed 
significantly, the raw material, the men, had not. Nevertheless Wolseley fought to modernise the 
drill taught to these men from the dregs of society. As early as 1871 Wolseley wrote that 'it is by 
no means desirable that his individual intelligence should be stifled by the process [of discipline], 
for of all things it is essential that he should possess sufficient common sense to tell him when, and 
how, he should in front of the enemy make use of the rules he has learnt'. 6 
The Duke tended to judge the quality of the army on its ability to perform the complicated 
manoeuvres required for the public parades in Hyde Park. Wolseley disagreed: in a letter written 
to the Duke in 1883 Wolseley argued that 'our military training is too much sacrificed to show 
parade movements, and that the soldier can be better disciplined, both in body and in mind, by 
being taught the duties and evolutions he must practice before an enemy, than by parade 
movements only possible in peace... ' .7 In 
fact, Dilke noted that Wolseley publicly pronounced the 
drill book infantry Field Exercises 'to be as bad as it can well be'. 8 In September 1887 Wolseley 
5 Memo. by Wolseley on the company system, 6 March 1877; memo by Ellice, 8 March 1877, both in 
W033134; the British Army switched to the four company system of organisation in 1913. 
6 Wolseley, our Military Requirements' 
7 Wolseley to Cambridge, June 1883, RA E/1/10445 
8 Dilke, The British Army, p246 
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wrote to the Duke presenting arguments for a new drill book. He wanted to establish a committee 
with himself as president to compare the British drill book with those of the French and German 
armies. He proposed that the members should be men with recent experience of war, and 
nominated Alison, Buller, Wood, Colonel G. Villiers, Colonel Swaine, and the two military 
attaches from Paris and Berlin. The Duke did not grant Wolseley his committee but a new drill 
book was produced in early 1889. In a speech reported in The Times in February 1889 Wolseley 
said of it that 'if it were read carefully and between the lines, it must be admitted that troops 
trained in accordance with the rules and regulations there laid down would be fit to meet the 
troops of any country in the world'. Nevertheless in private Wolseley complained to the Duke of 
Connaught that 'there can be no doubt that the new Drill Book is somewhat too minute' and that it 
still contained antiquities. 9 
In a letter to the Duke of Connaught in 1889 Wolseley stated that 'my notion of a good 
Battalion is one that can shoot well, so that it may be able to kill its enemies: that is thoroughly 
practised in outpost duties, night marches and in the tactical combinations of modern battles'. 10 
There were many obstacles in the battle to achieve this ideal. Broadly speaking they were the 
conservative tendencies of the Duke of Cambridge, the organisation of the army, space, and 
expense. For example, the Duke allegedly objected to the practising of night marches on the 
grounds that it would tire out the cavalry horses. " Wolseley had little time for such petty 
objections and encouraged his followers to implement their own training schemes within their 
commands. For example, Wood was urged to extend his system of company training to the level 
of the battalion first in the Eastern Command based at Colchester, and later at Aldershot. Wolseley 
hoped that Wood's example would be copied in other stations across Britain. Wood began this task 
in 1889 and extended the system to the training of brigades as well and then to the handling of 
forces of all arms. 12 
9 The Times, 22 Feb. 1889; Wolseley to Connaught, 30 Sept. 1889, WPP PLB/1 
10 Wolseley to Connaught, 30 Sept. 1889, WPP PLB/1 
11 Wood, Midshipman, Vol. 2 p200-1 
12 Ibid. p 198 
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Wolseley was hampered in his drive towards an improved system of field training by the 
organisation of the army. The army was not only spread across the Empire but was also 
fragmented into small bodies of men within the United Kingdom. Although Britain was divided 
into 66 military districts, within these districts battalions were often divided into even smaller units 
and distributed in garrisons in towns. Work was under way to concentrate the army in larger 
garrisons but the work was hampered by the concern felt by the Home Secretary that the army 
might be less available for the enforcement of law and order if concentrated in garrisons. 13 
Therefore it was vital to hold regular manoeuvres and field days to train these men to operate in 
large bodies. 
Possibly the two most vital points affecting the tactical training of the army were space and 
expense. Until the government purchased a large tract of land on Salisbury Plain in 1898 for 
military purposes the ground available for military manoeuvres was limited mainly to Aldershot 
and the Curragh. Apart from these areas the War Office depended on the willingness of 
landowners to permit their land to be used for military exercises. Wolseley was given the 
opportunity to witness for himself the value of large-scale manoeuvres both in 1871 and in 1872. 
He acted at the former as the Chief of the Staff to General Sir Charles Staveley and at the latter on 
the staff of General Sir John Michael. It was quickly apparent that many lessons could be learnt 
from the exercises; in 1871 the Duke of Cambridge wrote to Cardwell that the infantry had 
exposed themselves too much to direct fire, that they were bad at using the ground for 
concealment, and that the outpost duties were weak. 14 Wolseley wrote an article for Blackwood's 
Magazine on the 1872 manoeuvres which suggested that he had seen an improvement since the 
previous year particularly in the performance of the cavalry. He concluded that 'it is impossible to 
estimate in money, or even to describe fully in words, the advantages occurring to the combatants 
of our army from these manoeuvres'. 15 The government did not agree with Wolseley's assessment 
13 Bury to Smith, 4& 16 Nov. 1885, Smith Papers, WO110/1. Viscount Bury, the Under Secretary, was the 
president of the committee on concentration. 
14 Cambridge to Cardwell, late 1871, in Verner, p55 
15 G. J. Wolseley, 'Our Autumn Manoeuvres' in Blackwoods Magazine, Vol. CXII, No. 685, Nov. 1872, 
pp627-44 
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and, apart from the 1873 Cannock Chase cavalry manoeuvres, subsequently refused to sanction 
the sums required in the Estimates for large-scale manoeuvres. 16 
Consequently the military authorities had to content themselves with small scale 
manoeuvres, few of which were a combination of all arms. While Commander-in-Chief in Ireland 
Wolseley had the opportunity of holding manoeuvres and seeing for himself what had been learnt 
by the army over the 20 years since the last large-scale manoeuvres. He reported to the Duke of 
Cambridge in 1892 that 'our manoeuvres here [Dublin] and at the Curragh have been somewhat 
depressing to me as yet, for they have displayed a sad want of tactical knowledge and military 
instinct on the part of all the Commanding Officers of Battalions and the Majors of Batteries'. The 
cavalry command broke up over distances; the artillery generally lost 'many guns during the 
action from want of tactical handling' ; and the infantry attacks were 'absurd in conception and 
futile in execution'. He was considerably more heartened by the successful manoeuvres held in 
Cork the same month though he still felt that the commanding officers were weak in tactical 
knowledge. '7 Reports of other exercises, for example the manoeuvres of all arms held in 
Hampshire in 1891, tended to agree with Wolseley's assessment of the tactical abilities of the 
British Army. 18 These increased the pressure on the government to find the facilities and the 
finance for large-scale manoeuvres. 
As Quartermaster General and then Adjutant General Wolseley was not directly involved 
in the procurement of equipment, which remained the province of the Ordnance Department. He 
was, however, interested in obtaining the most modern equipment for the British Army. Three 
developments in weaponry stand out for consideration: the introduction of the magazine rifle; the 
increasing interest shown in the function of machine guns; and the shift from muzzle-loading to 
16 For details of other manoeuvres see Bond, Staff College; in a speech at Hammersmith in December 1891 
Stanhope presented additional reasons against the holding of manoeuvres: 
The limited amount of unenclosed ground, and the difficulty of finding a time of year when 
it could be attempted without unduly interfering with the ordinary work of our industrial 
population, of calling from their regular employment a number of Reserve men, and of 
withdrawing from the trade of the country a large amount of transport, and even the use of 
certain railways, would constitute, to my mind, such formidable obstacles, that any 
Government would hesitate to propose its adoption. 
Haliburton, p8 
17 Wolseley to Cambridge, 18 & 21 Aug. 1892 in Verner, p378-9 
18 Report of the autumn manoeuvres in Hampshire, 20 Nov. 1891, W0279/1 
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breech-loading artillery. Wolseley contributed his opinions to the first two developments but 
showed very little interest in the technical aspects of artillery guns. 
Wolseley was not a member of the committee which had met since 1883 to decide whether 
the magazine of the new Martini-Henry rifle should be detachable or fixed but he did ensure that 
his ally Wood was on it. Both Wolseley and Wood were in favour of detachable magazines but the 
committee recommended a permanent magazine with Wood dissenting. In the event the 
manufacturers had the final say by demonstrating that the manufacture of detachable magazines 
was both cheaper and easier. 19 
Wolseley's attitude towards the development of machine guns is worthy of consideration. 
In his contribution on the army to the essays edited by T. H. Ward for Queen Victoria's Jubilee in 
1887 Wolseley wrote 'For years past many have striven in vain to introduce machine guns into our 
army; they were always met with the argument, "The Germans don't think anything of them"'. 20 
While it is true that the War Office probably paid too much attention to developments in the 
German Army rather than concentrating on the unique requirements of the British Army, 
Wolseley's statement was unduly censorious of the Ordnance Department. In 1883 Wolseley 
announced that he understood the value of machine guns and believed they 'will take the place of 
considerable bodies of men' on the battlefield. 21 Nevertheless he was equally aware that the 
technology of machine guns had not yet reached the stage when they could be depended upon. 
Two Gatlings were used at Ulundi in 1879 but it was not until 1881 that various models available 
from Gatling, Nordenfelt and Gardner were subjected to trials at Shoeburyness. Wolseley was 
supplied with Gardner guns on the Khartoum expedition and the army borrowed six Gardner guns 
from the Navy when equipping the 1885 Suakin expedition. Wolseley was not favourably 
impressed by their reliability writing to the Surveyor-General of Ordnance in August 1885 that the 
Gardner had jammed at a critical moment during the battle of Abu Klea and that 'unless a better 
19 Wood, p186 
20 Wolseley, 'The Army' 
21 Wolseley's comments as chairman for a lecture by Col. C. B. Brackenbury 'The Latest Developments of 
the Tactics of the Three Arms', J. R. U. S. I. Vol. 27, (1883) 
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machine gun is to be had, I could not recommend any large expenditure at present upon such an 
arm'. 22 
From this memorandum it is clear that Wolseley had accepted that the machine gun was a 
weapon of the future once its technical failings had been corrected. He went on to make further 
suggestions as to the requirements for machine guns, such as being sighted for up to 3,000 yards, 
and detailed proposals on the weight and type of carriage. He pressed for the introduction of two 
machine guns into every cavalry and infantry brigade, giving a total of 14 guns per Army Corps. 
Unlike many of his colleagues in the artillery-dominated War Office, Wolseley had no doubt that 
the machine gun was primarily an infantry weapon and that to leave it with the artillery would be 
to fall into the same trap as the French in 1870 when machine guns had been hopelessly 
outranged. The pace of the debate over the arm to which the machine gun should be allocated 
increased by 1887 with the manufacture of the lighter Maxim gun. The gun itself weighed 401b. 
and therefore could be handled by an infantry machine gun team in battle, but it was still fixed to a 
carriage weighing four hundredweight which limited its full manoeuvrability. The Maxim gun was 
technically superior to its predecessors both in range and rapidity of fire, and was less prone to 
jamming. Therefore Wolseley campaigned for the purchase of a quantity of them. He achieved 
limited success: the utility of machine guns as an infantry weapon was accepted but their cost 
meant that although each battalion was supposed to have one gun for instructional purposes by 
1890, even in 1894 most soldiers were being trained on the outdated Nordenfelt and Gardner 
guns. 23 
Another innovation in which Wolseley showed great interest was the development of 
mounted infantry. Again the War Office looked abroad to see what other armies in Europe were 
doing and concluded that mounted infantry was an unnecessary luxury. 24 However, Wolseley had 
seen mounted infantry in action during the American Civil War and believed it had a role to play 
in the British Army during colonial campaigns. He was quite correct in his assessment: companies 
22 Report on the recent experiments with machine guns, 21 March 1881 WOP W41; Wolseley to Surveyor 
General of Ordnance, 27 Aug. 1885, WPP W/MEM/1; Precis of the history of machine guns, Nov. 1886, 
W032/8901; J. Ellis, The Social History of the Machine Gun, (New York 1975) p57. 
23 Ellis, p57-64 
24 Report by Lieut. G. F. Browne, Intelligence Department, 21 Nov. 1881, W033/37 
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were raised in South Africa for both the Zulu and Boer Wars, and Wolseley himself raised a 
mounted infantry column in Egypt in 1882. In Egypt the column was commanded by Captain 
Hallam Parr using men from the King's Royal Rifles and the South Staffordshire Regiment which 
had acted as mounted infantry in South Africa. Additional men were found from the Berkshire 
Regiment and the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, bringing the total up to 90 of all ranks. 25 
The mounted infantry proved invaluable for the purposes of scouting close to enemy lines over 
terrain unsuitable for regular cavalry. 
The debate turned towards the question of the maintenance of mounted infantry cadres in 
peace. At first the War Office opposed such proposals. Colonel Bower had written a drill book for 
mounted infantry in the early 1870s but the War Office had first lost it and then decided against 
publishing it at public expense. 26 The War Office was also alarmed by the idea, proposed by a few 
men, that the days of the arme blanche were numbered. Wolseley sought to soothe these fears: in 
1883 he stated on the subject of the cavalry that 'their principal metier is to fight on horseback, 
and I hope they will never be converted into bad infantry', and in 1886 '1 believe that the cavalry 
soldier ought to be taught to fight on foot when it becomes necessary to make him do so, but in my 
opinion to make him do so except in an emergency is a waste of power'. 27 Wolseley's opinions 
were accepted and attention was focused on how to raise the cadres. At first Wolseley in 1881 had 
spoken in favour of organising mounted infantry only when needed, in other words only in time of 
war. But he did agree with the Duke of Cambridge that 'whilst entirely objecting to the creation of 
Mounted infantry Regiments, I strongly advocate a certain number of men in all Battalions, say 
one Company, being at all times kept available for Mounted Infantry duties in the several 
Battalions of the Army'. 28 Wolseley perceived the main limitations on the provision of mounted 
infantry to be the size of the army and the cost of maintaining the horses necessary to train the 
infantry to ride. He felt that unless 5-10,000 men were added to the establishment the provision of 
an arm only to be used on some colonial campaigns would be seriously detrimental to the 
25 Report on the Mounted Infantry in Egypt, 16 Nov. 1882, WOP W20 
26 2 July 1877, Hr, Vol. CCXXXV 
27 L. j I. Vol. 27, (1883) pp439-84; J. R. U. S. I. Vol. 30, (1886), pp695-738 
28 War office meeting, 30 Dec. 1881, W0163/3; Cambridge to Hartington, 22 Dec. 1882, in Verner, p306 
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functioning of the already over-stretched infantry as a whole. 29 All the same he encouraged 
promoters of mounted infantry to press for funds to train a number of men from each infantry 
company to ride. He met with some degree of success: in 1898 a mounted infantry drill book was 
produced by Major E. Hutton which specified the composition of a mounted infantry force on the 
basis of one company per infantry battalion and two in each cavalry brigade. Unfortunately little 
had been done in this direction before the outbreak of the Boer War in 1899. 
Since the size of the army and cost were the two major obstacles in the way of the 
provision of mounted infantry, Wolseley explored other avenues from which the men could come. 
In 1881 he drew attention to the deplorable state of the Yeomanry, which was badly under strength 
and poorly trained. Wolseley saw this body of troops as ideal for conversion into mounted 
infantry. He believed that given the strictly limited amount of time available for training, the 
Yeomanry could not possibly function as regular cavalry but could be trained to use guns rather 
than swords. 30 The Duke of Cambridge objected to this proposal, writing to Wolseley in 1890 'I 
am fully prepared to do all in my power to induce the present Yeomanry Regiments to attend more 
to their carbines than to their swords, but don't attempt to make mounted infantry of them; that 
would destroy the force and completely take the heart out of them'. 31 As a result the Yeomanry 
remained an unsatisfactory arm of the British Army till the end of the century. 
Wolseley not only deplored the reluctance of the War Office to accept innovations but also 
waged a private war against the existing scheme for the manufacture and supply of approved 
equipment. The Khartoum expedition had revealed serious failures in the quality of the equipment 
given to the troops such as defective cartridges, saddlery, swords, and bayonets. The 
Superintendent of the Royal Laboratory at Woolwich was forced to admit that the 2.5" shells were 
often faulty. Wolseley called for an enquiry to be made into the Woolwich system, claiming that 
29 JRUSI. Vol. 27,1883; In a memorandum to the Duke on 25 November 1889 Wolseley wrote that if 
more horses could be obtained they should be given to the cavalry because 'The mounted infantry would 
degenerate into bad cavalry if they were permanently given horses'. He thought that infantry soldiers could 
learn to ride and care for horse during the winter months when the cavalrymen were on furlough. RA 
E/1/12509 
30 War office meeting, 30 Dec. 1881 
31 Cambridge to Wolseley 26 Nov. 1890, in Verner p363; B. Bond, 'Doctrine and Training in the British 
Cavalry' in M. Howard (ed. ) The Theory and Practice of War (London 1965) 
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the system had not improved since he had complained, back in 1870, of the use of perished wood 
in the manufacture of gun carriages. The Surveyor-General of Ordnance tried to calm Wolseley by 
suggesting that the faulty shells had been an isolated incident. Wolseley replied with other 
examples: the star shells for the 7pr. gun were larger than the calibre of the gun; many of the 2.5 
shells were empty; a large number of cartridges jammed; and many bayonets and swords were 
made of such poor material that they twisted when first used. He also drew attention to the 
unwillingness of Woolwich to consider new equipment such as breech-loading artillery, Nordenfelt 
machine guns and the Scott's sights for guns. The Government became involved in the dispute and 
set up a Royal Commission on Warlike Stores under the presidency of Sir James Stephen. 32 
Wolseley's experience of fighting in hot climates led him to campaign for a more practical 
service dress. In 1873-4 he had succeeded in clothing the men under his command for operations 
on the Gold Coast in cooler uniforms. After the Second Afghan War India had begun the process 
of introducing khaki uniforms for field service, but the British Army lagged behind. In 1881 Mr 
Wharton asked Childers in the House of Commons whether the reinforcements about to be sent out 
to the Boer War were to be dressed 'in their present conspicuous uniforms and accoutrements' or 
whether they would be clothed in 'a neutral colour'. Childers replied that the Duke of Cambridge 
was against any change in the colour of the uniforms. 33 This opposition to change was repeated by 
the Duke in a speech at the Mansion House in 1883: 
I should be sorry to see the day when the English Army is no longer in red. I am 
not one of those who think it is at all desirable to hide ourselves too much. I must 
say I think the soldier had better be taught not to hide himself, but to go gallantly 
to the front. In action the man who does that has a much better chance of 
succeeding than the man who hides himself. 34 
Wolseley did not believe that the ability to conceal himself would make any difference to the 
soldier's willingness to fight but neutral coloured uniforms would prevent unnecessary casualties 
through being conspicuous, and reduce the likelihood of heatstroke. 
32 Superintendent Royal Laboratory Woolwich to Director of Artillery, 25 Feb. 1886; Wolseley to Surveyor 
General of Ordnance, 2 March & 22 April 1886, all in W032/7068; Royal Commission on Warlike Stores, 
(1887) XVI, (1888) XXV 
33 18 Feb. 1881 Hansard, Vol. CCLVIII 
34 Skelley, p62 
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Wolseley was the president of the Colour Committee which in 1882 recommended the 
introduction of grey for service dress and the retention of red or the traditional regimental colours 
for full dress. 35 The committee was also in favour of the replacement of white accoutrements with 
umber. The Egyptian campaign, fought in the heat of summer, lent an urgency to the question. 
Wolseley found an ally in the Duke of Connaught who wrote to the Duke of Cambridge that 
The clothing supplied to the men - viz., red serges and blue serge trousers - was 
thoroughly inappropriate to this climate, and the men suffer terribly from the want 
of a cooler and more comfortable dress. Khaki is the only sensible fighting dress 
for our men, and had they been dressed in it like the troops from India, it would 
have been an inestimable boost to all. 36 
Indeed the campaign history shows that the British Army suffered more casualties from heat stroke 
than from enemy action. The Queen's Private Secretary Sir Henry Ponsonby reported to Wolseley 
that 'the Queen thinks the Khakee clothing hideous and hopes she may never see it in England'. 
Ponsonby himself argued rather oddly that he felt that khaki was more visible than red. 37 
Wolseley was deeply concerned to make the officer corps of the British Army both a 
profession and professional. He dismissed complaints from officers about the effects of the short 
service system on the army in an article in The Nineteenth Century. He claimed that the reforms 
were unpopular solely because they added to the daily work of the regimental officer: 
'Henceforward the mode of life of the regimental officer will have to be very different from what 
it used to be; many hours of idleness daily, the long periods of leave, must be abandoned; he must 
make up his mind to the constant drudgery of teaching his own men'. 38 In other words the officer 
must adopt a more professional approach to his work. This is the reason why, in 1886, Wolseley 
opposed the proposal of the Duke of Cambridge to abolish garrison instructors, telling the 
Secretary of State for War, W. H. Smith, that it was essential that the officers trained their own 
men so that both became educated in the art of war. 39 He campaigned for an improvement in the 
35 Report of the Colour Committee, 25 July 1882, WOP W45. The Colour Committee reported in favour of 
grey rather than khaki solely on the grounds that a khaki dye had not been developed for serge. This problem 
was soon overcome and the introduction of khaki made into selected battalions abroad and at home. cf. 
Hartington to Ponsonby, 9 March 1883, Devonshire Papers, 340.1338 
36 Duke of Connaught to Cambridge, 20 Sept. 1882 in Verner p251 
37 Ponsonby to Wolseley, 16 & 19 Jan. 1884, WPP 
38 Wolseley, 'Long and Short Service' 
39 Wolseley to Smith, 30 Nov. 1886, WPP PLB/1 
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pay of officers so as to encourage more men from the middle classes to take commissions. For 
example, it has been noted that Winston Churchill earned the equivalent of two years' pay as a 
subaltern in royalties in the few months after the publication of his book The Malakand Field 
Force. The Queen also shared Wolseley's alarm at the cost of being an officer, particularly in the 
Guards and cavalry regiments, where a private income was essential for survival. 40 
Wolseley may have criticised the regimental officer for being idle in peace, but he was 
favourably impressed by his performance in war. He told the Institution of Civil Engineers in 
December 1882 that in Egypt 'we had splendid soldiers commanded by splendid regimental 
officers'. He was criticised for this apparent change of heart by W. E. Montague in an article in 
Blackwoods Magazine the following year. 41 However, in a private letter written in 1887 Wolseley 
expanded his views on officers: 
The British officer is never, or at least very rarely, a loafer, as he is supposed to 
be by those who talk easily about the emptiness of life in the garrison at home. He 
is not lazy, but is far too intelligent to spend his time upon nothing but pipe-clay 
and hurdy-gurdy parades. Give him a chance of interesting himself in the training 
and welfare of the men, and he will work as hard as anyone. I never knew any 
body of men work harder than the regimental officers who were with me on the 
Nile. Why? because they had something worth working for. 42 
This belief added emphasis towards Wolseley's campaign for fewer parades and for more practical 
soldiering such as an increase in the number of field days and manoeuvres. 
The state of the officer corps caused much concern in the aftermath of the abolition of 
purchase. To make the army a profession Wolseley believed that it had to have fixed standards for 
entry to officer training at Sandhurst and Woolwich, regular promotion by merit, and an even 
stricter system of selection to field and staff rank. 43 The most immediate effect of the abolition of 
purchase was a stagnation in the rate of promotion. Wolseley did give evidence to the 1876 Royal 
Commission on Army Promotion and Retirement, and to the 1878 Committee on the Reserve of 
Officers but he appears to have held no strong convictions on the length of time an officer should 
40 Anglesey, Vol. 3 pp9O & 100 
41 The Times, 5 Dec. 1882; W. E. Montague, 'Red-Hot Reform' in Blackwoods Magazine, Vol. CXXXIV, 
No. 813, July 1883 pp66-87. Authorship confirmed by the Wellesley Ibex 
42 Private letter from Wolseley, 10 Jan. 1887 in Life of Wolseley, p229 
43 For more information on the entry to and education provided by Sandhurst and Woolwich see 
Harries- 
Jenkins, chapters 2&4 
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spend in each rank nor on the ideal age of an officer of a given rank. He was in favour of a 
reserve of officers because he shared the Duke of Cambridge's concern that, should a major xar 
break out, there would be an insufficient number of officers to supervise the Reserves and the new 
recruits. Wolseley was, however, extremely interested in the methods of promotion to rank of field 
and staff officer and it was in this area he concentrated most of his efforts towards making the 
British Army a professional body. 
The battle to introduce selection for the higher ranks was perhaps Wolseley's hardest and 
longest fought. He faced the opposition of the Duke of Cambridge who was quoted in 1875 as 
claiming that 'a man who will stick to his regiment will learn his profession in that regiment much 
better than in any college' . 
44 Wolseley himself never attended the Staff College at Camberley. His 
contribution to its increasing importance was strictly limited to pushing forward able instructors 
such as Maurice, Henderson, Clery, and Hildyard for appointments there, and to employing as 
many graduates as he could on his campaigns and encouraging young officers to sit the entry 
examination. Wolseley also faced the difficulty of how to make promotion by selection an 
impartial process which would not lead to accusations of favouritism and cause discontent within 
the officer corps from those officers passed over for promotion. 
The existing system was broadly speaking one of promotion by seniority tempered by 
rejection. Wolseley claimed that this enabled too many mediocre officers to command regiments 
and then virtually automatically be promoted to higher commands. As early as 1872 Wolseley 
made public his unease; in an article for Blackwoods Magazine he wrote on the autumn 
manoeuvres that 
Judging from our selections made for our operations of both years, a stranger 
would be led to think that England was not rich in talented generals... With a few 
brilliant exceptions, it will be generally admitted that the great majority of generals 
and brigadiers employed this year were not men to whose care the lives of soldiers 
could be entrusted in war. 45 
Long service and position on the Army List were no substitution for talent. In a letter to 
Hartington written from the Sudan Wolseley complained that 'I can never persuade the Duke of 
44 Anglesey, p 110 
45 Wolseley, 'Our Autumn Manoeuvres' 
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Cambridge how few really good officers there are', and cited the example of Charles Wilson who 
assumed command of the force on the final advance to Khartoum on the grounds of seniority alone 
despite his inexperience of actual combat. 46 In his private correspondence he responded to 
personal appeals for advancement by disputing the idea that any officer had a right to promotion. 
He told Buller in 1893 that promotion by selection must begin at least at promotion to colonel, 
because once a man had become a commanding officer he would expect promotion to Major- 
General which would place him in an important command in the field should war break out. 47 
Therefore it was necessary to ensure that those men promoted to regimental command should have 
the ability to go further in the army. 
Even had Wolseley ever managed to persuade the Duke of Cambridge of the necessity for 
promotion by selection, he would still have had to devise a system by which the process would be 
impartial. It must be remembered that Wolseley faced constant criticism that he had surrounded 
himself with a 'ring' of men who relied on him for further advancement and frequently supported 
his opinions. There is little doubt that an impartial system would be hard to establish. 48 The 
veteran war correspondent W. H. Russell wrote to Wolseley in 1885 pointing out that 'in a 
hierarchy, as military commands must be, seniority cannot be got rid of'. 49 This alluded to the 
problem of what to do with the superseded officer who could not remain in the regiment where a 
junior officer had been promoted over his head, would be subjected to compulsory retirement, and 
would complain loudly of his ill-treatment. There was also the further problem of how to compare 
the value of officers serving in England with those stationed abroad or in India. Similarly only a 
limited number of officers had experience of war and there was apparently no way, in the absence 
of annual manoeuvres, for comparing officers in peace time. 
Wolseley wrote to his bother Richard in November 1886 that 'we live in an era of 
selection' and in 1893 he appealed to Campbell-Bannerman on similar lines 'Will you lift us out 
46 Wolseley to Hartington, 28 Jan. 1885, Devonshire Papers 340.1649 
47 Wolseley to Buller, 1893, quoted in Life of Wolseley, p263; Wolseley to Buller, 13 May 1893, 
W032/6297 
48 The Civil Service had established entry and promotion by examination in 1870. The army was in a 
different position because it was more difficult to assess the officers serving all over the Empire under 
different conditions. 
49 W. H. Russell to Wolseley, 17 Aug. 1885, WPP 
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of the slough of Seniority Promotion?... The young school want to make the Army a real 
profession, in which the best men, made by their own exertions, rise to the top, as do lawyers, 
doctors, civil engineers, etc. ' . 
50 The establishment of the Promotion Board in 1890 went some way 
towards achieving this aim. The P. U. S. Ralph Thompson described it as 'a sort of advisory Board 
to H. R. H. to enable him to select the proper officers to recommend for promotion'. 51 The Duke of 
Cambridge naturally assumed that the establishment of the Board was a criticism of his choices and 
strongly remonstrated with Stanhope for insisting that Wolseley should be a member of the Board. 
Stanhope replied that he believed Wolseley's opinions essential to the Promotion Board not only 
because Stanhope himself generally held a high regard for Wolseley's opinions on many issues, 
but also because Wolseley had campaigned for so long for improvement in the promotion process 
that it was inconceivable to omit him as a member of such a Board. 52 
The workings of the Promotion Board satisfied few people. There was still a great deal of 
evidence that the Duke of Cambridge's selections were approved without serious consideration of 
alternative candidates. Isolated in Ireland, Wolseley could do little to counteract the Duke's 
influence. He urged Campbell-Bannerman to pay more attention to the recommendations of the 
Board. For example in 1894 the Board recommended that the next colonels of artillery should be 
Alleyne and Maurice but Wolseley had heard privately that the Duke had said that he did 'not care 
a D--- for the Promotion Board and that Colonel Hamers shall certainly be promoted'. A year later 
another crisis arose which demonstrated Wolseley's influence; his friend Wood was appointed to 
the Shorncliffe command after the Promotion Board had recommended Colonel Carrington for the 
post. Buller was so outraged that he actually threatened to resign as Adjutant General over the 
matter. 53 The failings of the Promotion Board to ensure the promotion of those officers it had 
recommended for advancement demonstrated the strength of personal preference over impartial 
analysis of the ability of any given applicant for promotion. A later chapter will show that 
50 Wolseley to Richard Wolseley, 17 Nov. 1886, WPP 163/v; Wolseley to Campbell-Bannerman, 1893, in 
Life of Wow, p264 
51 R. Thompson to Campbell-Bannerman, BM 41230 
52 Stanhope to Cambridge, 30 June 1890, RA E11112619 
53 Wolseley to Campbell-Bannerman, 9 Feb. 1894, BM 41233; Thompson to Campbell-Bannerman, 1 Jan. 
1895, BM 41230 
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Wolseley was at least as good as the Duke of Cambridge in abusing his power as Commander-in- 
Chief to secure the promotion of his allies. 
Wolseley had another weapon in his arsenal for the battle to achieve selection in the army: 
the cost of the General Officers' List. The government was willing to give Wolseley support in this 
area. In 1880 Childers was prepared to reduce the General Officers' List from 385 to between 140 
and 160 generals. In 1886 Wolseley congratulated W. H. Smith on his willingness to reduce the 
number of majors and lieutenant-colonels on the regimental establishment confident that this would 
pave the way for selection. In August 1887 in a memorandum on army expenditure Wolseley 
called for a further culling of the General Officers' List to 63, which was the number employed at 
the time, with a reserve of seven generals in case of ill health or incompetence. 54 Stanhope 
responded favourably to Wolseley's ideas and outlined the advantages of the scheme for the 
Queen: 
Selection will be introduced, not in the difficult form of choosing individuals out 
of a large number for merit, but in the simpler form of asking when a Major- 
General's command becomes vacant, who is the best qualified to fill it?... The 
result of this scheme will be that all general officers will have been selected on the 
ground of their fitness to hold a General Officer's appointment, which has not 
hitherto been the case, and the General Officers' list will contain a number of men 
specially qualified for employment in time of emergency. 
The number of general officers was reduced to 100 and the scheme came into effect on 31 
December 1890.55 It was a victory for Wolseley: although he had failed to introduce selection into 
the lower ranks of the army, he had won the support of the government for his opinions on the 
higher officers on the ground of cost. These 100 staff officers were intended to be the picked men 
of the army; their performance in the Boer War will be discussed in a later chapter. 
One vital function of the War Office was to prepare the army for war and it was in this 
area that Britain lagged behind the armies on the continent. Dilke stated that 'the fundamental 
54 Wolseley to Smith, 24 March 1886, WO 110/8; Wolseley memo. on army expenditure, 20 Aug. 1887, 
W033/48 
55 Wolseley to Stanhope, Stanhope Papers, 0314; Stanhope to Queen, 25 June 1889,0250/3; Stanhope 
memo. for the Cabinet, 27 June 1889, CAB37/25; Wolseley was determined to cut the number of staff 
officers for another reason: cost. He wrote to the Duke on 30 August 1887 that the War Office was under 
extreme pressure to reduce expenditure, and that it was essential to cut down on 'all superfluous staff 
officers, so that we may 
have more to spend upon the realities of the army'. i. e. men and horses. RA 
E/1/11865 
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requirement is, of course, that the necessities of war shall be aimed at, and that the system shall 
involve a minimum of change in the passage from peace to war'. 56 The fruition of this requirement 
was fraught with difficulties: there was the fundamental problem caused by the organisation of the 
army itself with units spread across the Empire; there was the unwillingness of the government to 
provide the funds for training on a scale sufficient to test the abilities of the staff officers, or to 
spend on the requisites of war; and, there was the lack of a body of men within the British Army 
to oversee all the preparations for war, corresponding to the Chief of the Staff's Department in 
other countries, particularly Germany. 
When he became Adjutant General Wolseley inherited the 1875 mobilisation plan. This 
scheme had envisaged the distribution of all military units in Britain into eight Army Corps. 57 It 
was never seen as a practicable document since there were not enough men to form these corps 
and was ignored during the mobilisation for the Egyptian campaign. Largely because of his 
concern over home defence, Wolseley set a team to work on a new and feasible mobilisation 
scheme. Brackenbury began the work in 1886, and his work was completed with a series of 
memoranda by Ardagh in 1888. These laid down the framework of two Army Corps and a cavalry 
brigade which could be sent abroad on offensive operations on which all the details could be 
worked out. One deficit which quickly became apparent was the lack of horses for the second 
Army Corps. This situation was improved by the scheme for the registration of horses set up under 
the provisions of the National Defence Act of 1888. Wolseley also set about improving the 
Intelligence Department by sending Brackenbury there and pressing for more men and money to 
be allocated to it. 58 
One detail Wolseley devoted much attention to was the question of transport for the army 
in the field. His experiences in the Crimea where the Commissariat Department had been totally 
inadequate in its provision of supplies to the army at the front convinced him that decentralisation 
to the level of regimental transport was the solution to the problem. The government looked 
56 S. Wilkinson & C. Dilke, Imperial Defence, (London 1892) p201 
57 Mobilisation scheme, 25 Jan. & 18 Nov. 1875, W033/27 
58 Memo on the mobilisation of one Army Corps, Brackenbury, 29 Sept. & 14 Oct. 1886, WOP W19; 
memo on the defence of 
England, Ardagh, 17 April 1888, WOP W18 &6 July 1888, WOP W19 
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askance at Wolseley's proposals; it was intent on building up the Army Service Corps as the 
central transport body of the army in the field, and balked at the cost of maintaining regimental 
transport in peace. Wolseley argued that contrary to popular belief European armies also kept up 
regimental transport in time of peace, even Germany. He found an ally in the Duke of Cambridge 
and used his name freely in his correspondence with Hartington, for example, 'I know H. R. H. is 
most anxious to train a large number of officers and men in Transport duties, but he considers this 
can be done most advantageously in Regts and he objects very strongly to handing them over for 
instruction to the Commissariat'. Wolseley accepted that maintaining a central transport body such 
as the Army Service Corps was the cheapest solution but reminded Hartington of the success of 
regimental transport during recent campaigns 'whilst I have never seen one Commt. Transport 
succeed, and have seen it break down upon many occasions' . 
s9 
Decentralisation of supplies was of major importance to Wolseley. He backed Stanhope's 
attempts to reform the system. As has already been noted above Wolseley was no friend of 
Woolwich and therefore noted with approval Stanhope's proposal to build 62 new storehouses 
which would move two-thirds of the stores away from Woolwich. The decentralisation of stores 
was vital to the mobilisation plan; in case of invasion the possible destruction of Woolwich would 
not spell complete disaster, and the siting of the stores for the Aldershot Division between 
Aldershot and Southampton would speed the process of despatching the first Army Corps abroad 
when mobilisation was ordered. The decentralisation process was very slow. In 1897 Methuen 
mobilised the Ist Brigade of the Ist Division at short notice. The force had still to rely on 
Woolwich for stores and equipment and Methuen was appalled to be told by Woolwich in response 
to the mobilisation telegram that the depot would be closed for the next four days. 60 
The mobilisation plan detailed what units would be allocated to each brigade within either 
Army Corps and it stipulated the staff requirements for these units. However, knowing how many 
staff officers of each grade were required was only the first step towards building a staff prepared 
for war. It was apparent that the appointment to command a division, even one of the importance 
59 Wolseley to Hartington, 16 Aug. 1884, WPP PLB/1 
60 Haliburton, p83-4; Bond, Staff College, p174 
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of the Aldershot division, was not a statement that the commander would retain his position on the 
outbreak of war. For example, the Queen approved the appointment of Wood over her son the 
Duke of Connaught to Aldershot in 1888 only on the understanding that 'she was not pledged to 
approving his selection for the command of the first expedition that may be sent abroad'. 61 
Wolseley was adamant that officers appointed to positions of command should retain that 
command in time of war. This was why he pressed so hard for selection. He believed it pointless 
to raise the hopes of any officer by giving him a command above his abilities and then either dash 
them by sacking him when war broke out or entrust the lives of men to his inept command. Had 
Wolseley succeeded in getting his proposals adopted and had the government allocated the funds 
for field training on a large scale 'it seems reasonable to suggest that... Sir Redvers Buller would 
have been eliminated from the list of potential commanders-in-chief while, on the other hand, the 
Duke of Connaught would not have commanded in manoeuvres unless he was to be allowed to 
command in war'. 62 
In the late 1880s the debates over Britain's ability to repel invasion led the Government to 
question the whole framework within which decisions on military and naval planning were made. 
The result was the establishment of the Royal Commission under the former Secretary of State for 
War, Lord Hartington. This Commission which commonly bears Hartington's name focused 
attention on the viability and desirability of introducing the German model of the Chief of the 
Staff's Department into the War Office. In his evidence to the Commission Wolseley began by 
stating that Britain needed such a department 
more than any nation abroad for many reasons, particularly on account of the 
peculiar constitution of our army, and the fact of its being scattered all over the 
world, and of the numerous responsibilities which devolve upon it, and 
consequently the numerous phases of war for which it should be always 
prepared. 63 
The sheer volume of work created by the need to prepare the intelligence and the plans of war for 
the many possible enemies or combination of enemies Britain could face made a Chief of the Staff 
necessary. 
61 Ponsonby to Stanhope, 30 Nov. 1888 in Buckle, Vol. 1,3rd series, p455 
62 Bond, Staff Col-lege, p176 
63 Wolseley's evidence to the Hartington Commission, Q. 197 
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On the subject of how to establish such a department Wolseley was prepared to provide 
details. The functions of the Chief of Staff would correspond closely to the existing functions of 
the Adjutant General excepting those concerned with the discipline of the army. This would free 
the Chief of Staff to be 'the recognised adviser of the Commander-in-Chief, and one of the 
advisers of the Secretary of State, his great function would be the preparation of the army for 
war'. In order to achieve this he would also assume the function of training the army, at present 
within the province of the Commander-in-Chief. 64Wolseley's description of the position and 
functions of the Chief of Staff happened to coincide with the position he himself would like to 
occupy. By removing authority over the discipline of the army from his department Wolseley 
would rid himself of a great mass of petty administrative work, leaving him free to concentrate on 
the areas of military affairs of most interest to him. By removing the supervision of training from 
the Duke of Cambridge, he would be in a position to institute a more modern and relevant system 
of training for war within the British Army. 
The Commission recommended the establishment of a department of the Chief of Staff 
which would include the intelligence division and mobilisation division presently under the aegis of 
the Adjutant General. The Chief of Staff would directly advise the Secretary of State on all matters 
of general military policy including the strength, distribution and mobilisation of the army. The 
department would collect military information, prepare defence schemes for the Empire, prepare 
plans for war, liaise with the Admiralty and generals in command in foreign stations, and report 
annually to the Secretary of State on the military requirements of the Empire. The post of 
Commander-in-Chief would be abolished. Campbell-Bannerman wrote a long dissent to the report 
arguing against the creation of a Chief of Staff on the grounds that it was 'likely to reintroduce, 
perhaps in a worse form, some of the very evils which the organisation of a Council of general 
Officers would be designed to remove'. He wrote to Hartington that 'what I fear is that your new 
Chief of Staff will be virtually a new Pope; and therefore I am against him'. 65 The Cabinet ruled 
against the abolition of the post of Commander-in-Chief while accepting the desirability of a Chief 
64 Ibid. Q202,205 
65 Report of the Hartington Commission, para. 71-72 and the dissent by Campbell-Bannerman; Campbell- 
Bannerman to Hartington, 12 Jan. 1890, Devonshire Papers 340.2225 
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of Staff. At first Wolseley was in favour of the abolition of the post of Commander-in-Chief. He 
wanted the Chief of Staff to be even more powerful than the Commission envisaged; the Chief of 
Staff 'should in fact be the Secretary of State's Military Critic as the Financial Secretary is his 
financial critic'. Given that the Cabinet refused to abolish the post of Commander-in-Chief 
Wolseley changed his mind. Indeed he went further and denied he was ever in favour of the 
abolition of the post telling Ponsonby 
The Duke will not accept the position of Chief of the Staff. Indeed, after being so 
long Commander-in-Chief it would be impossible for him to do so. I still hope the 
office of Commander-in-Chief may not be done away with. You know I am not 
one who would oppose any reform that means progress or the adoption of new 
ideas. But this proposal is to go a step backward. We sorely want a doctor, I 
admit, but Brackenbury and Co. have sent us an executioner. 66 
Wolseley's alarm was caused by the Hartington Commission's recommendation for the 
establishment of a new Army Board on which all members would have equal access to the 
Secretary of State. He believed that this system would be unworkable in practice and would 
remove all authority from the head of the army whether he was to be termed Commander-in-Chief 
or Chief of the Staff. 
The debate assumed some urgency towards the end of 1890 because Wolseley's term of 
office as Adjutant General, already extended once, was about to end. Therefore it was necessary 
to decide whether the new Adjutant General should retain the same title or whether Wolseley's 
proposal, made to the Hartington Commission, that the Adjutant General should be the Chief of 
Staff should be adopted. In April Stanhope had told the Duke of Cambridge that the Cabinet had 
decided that the post of Adjutant General should be filled up without 'the intervention of a Chief of 
the Staff in any form', in other words an additional post was not to be created. The Duke replied 
that he accepted that the Chief of Staff should not be separate from the Adjutant General but 
suggested that the new officer should be termed 'Chief of the Staff and Adjutant General' and 
should exercise the Chief of Staff's duties to the Commander-in-Chief. Stanhope responded that 
the Cabinet would not agree to this proposal. 67 In September Buller wrote to the Duke that he had 
66 Wolseley memo. on the Hartington Commission, 31 March 1890, Stanhope Papers, 0231/1; Wolseley to 
Ponsonby, 10 April 1890 quoted in Buckle, et al Vol. 1,3rd series, pp584-5 
67 Stanhope to Cambridge, 28 April 1890, Stanhope Papers, 0254/3 
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been gazetted as 'Adjutant General to the Forces', the old title, whereas he had thought that he 
would be gazetted 'Adjutant General and Chief Staff Officer of the Forces', the title which he 
preferred. 68 He failed to get his title changed and the position of Chief of the Staff was not created 
permanently in peace in the British Army before the outbreak of the Boer War. Nor did the 
Adjutant General assume the role of Chief of Staff as envisioned by Wolseley: the Commander-in- 
Chief retained control over training until the post was abolished, and mobilisation planning and 
intelligence remained among the many duties of the Adjutant General. 
Wolseley's contribution to the drive towards the creation of a modern army while Adjutant 
General is hard to assess. Certainly Wolseley's proposals did nothing to hamper such a movement 
and indeed did much to accelerate the pace of change. It is probably fair to say that during the 
1880s Wolseley frequently struggled to get his views accepted against the often strident opposition 
of the Duke of Cambridge and the financial parsimony of successive governments. A later chapter 
will examine the extent to which Wolseley sought to further the modernisation of the army when 
he was Commander-in-Chief and free of the opposition of the Duke. 
68 Buller to Cambridge, 20 Sept. 1890 in Verner p359 
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Chapter 6- Imperial Defence 
During the second half of the nineteenth century the British Empire expanded greatly to 
assume responsibility for a wide extent of territories in Africa and Asia. Britain was principally a 
maritime nation whose policy could be defined broadly as the maintenance of the freedom of the 
seas for commerce by the Royal Navy, with its most important strategic coaling stations and bases 
defended by the British Army. The principal route to be guarded was to India, Britain's greatest 
colony, and much of the expansion of the late nineteenth century was directed to securing this 
route. This broad policy was generally accepted and not open to dispute, but opinions differed on 
the best means of securing the integrity of the Empire. ' Wolseley held strong opinions on the 
subject of imperial defence which often differed from those of the politicians. These opinions will 
be examined in this chapter. 
Wolseley neither denied the premise that the navy bore the main burden for imperial 
defence, nor that the army had to accept a subordinate role in this responsibility, other than 
defending India against Russian aggression. 2 What Wolseley did challenge was the political 
approach towards imperial expansion: he believed that insufficient thought was given to the 
burdens placed on the army by the requirement to defend the land bases on the route to India, and 
India itself. He wanted a clearer definition to be made of the priorities of imperial defence to 
identify the main strategic points. Wolseley believed that without such a statement the Empire 
would continue to expand piecemeal without any clear sense of purpose. He saw the occupation of 
Egypt as an example of acceptance of additional responsibilities without prior thought on their 
necessity. Furthermore, governments ignored the effect their actions had on the ability of the army 
1 There is no shortage of books on the subject of imperial policy. Contemporary works include G. S. Clarke, 
Imperial Defence, (London 1898); C. Dilke, Problems of Greater Britain, (London 1890); C. Dilke, The Present 
Position of European Politics, (London 1887); F. Maurice, The Balance of Military Power in Europe, 
(Edinburgh, 1888); S. Wilkinson, The Great Alternative, (London 1894); Wilkinson & Dilke, Imperial 
Defence. More recent works include K. Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England, (Oxford 1970); J. 
Gooch, The Prospect of War, (London 1981); James, Rise and Fall; T. Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa, 
(London 1991); B. Porter, The Lion's Share, (London 1984); R. Robinson & J. Gallagher, Africa and the 
Victorians, (London 1961). There are of course also many works on naval policy. 
2 Canada was the other colony that could only be defended by the army. After 1870 Canada was not viewed as 
vulnerable to invasion. 
132 
to carry out its plans. Wolseley defined the problem as follows: 
We have cut our army coat in accordance with the amount of money which we 
have fixed arbitrarily as to what its cost should be, in utter disregard of the size of 
our body, the proportions of our limbs, or the objects for which any coat at all is 
required .3 
Wolseley believed the solution would be 'a clear statement of our military requirements... laid 
before the people, through Parliament' so that the minimum number of soldiers needed to be 
maintained could be established and that once this was done 'no future Ministry will ever dare to 
leave us without it'. 4 Wolseley's efforts to secure a definition of imperial policy with regard to the 
army will be examined in this chapter. 
Wolseley's opinions on the subject of imperial policy will be approached in the following 
way. The chapter will begin with an analysis of the Eastern Crisis, when Wolseley made his first 
statements on strategic policy, and will then turn to examine Wolseley's opinions on each region of 
interest to imperial defence during the period: South Africa, Egypt and the Sudan, and India. 
Wolseley identified a number of weaknesses in imperial policy and these, and his proposed 
solutions, will be analysed. The chapter will end with Wolseley's efforts to force a statement from 
the government of the main purposes for which the army existed, and will examine Wolseley's 
role in the preparation of the 1888 Stanhope Memorandum and his comments on it. 
Before turning to Wolseley's opinions on the subject of imperial defence it is necessary to 
say a little about how strategic policy was made. In this area the politicians held the upper hand: 
the Cabinet decided the direction of foreign policy and, as will be seen, often even withheld the 
facts from Parliament. The military authorities played no defined role: they were expected to find 
the men required to put the government's policy into effect, they were sometimes invited to give 
their opinions on the best means to be used, but had little influence over whether such a policy was 
desirable. No committee existed in which political, military, and naval authorities could meet with 
equal standing to discuss policy. The military authorities had to be content with the production of 
memoranda for their political masters in the hope that attention would be paid to their opinions. 
This state of affairs led to serious problems during the period, but it was not until the Second Boer 
3 Memo. by Wolseley, 20 Oct. 1883, W032/6705 
4 Wolseley, 'Our Military Requirements' 
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War that the consequences of the lack of civil-military consultation and co-operation became fully 
evident. The events of 1899 will be discussed in a later chapter. 
Wolseley's first contact with the making of policy came in 1876 when he was seconded to 
the India Office at the height of the Bulgarian crisis. In 1875 Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria 
had revolted against Turkish rule. The revolt was crushed with great brutality, and in 1876 
Gladstone began a public campaign to draw attention to the atrocities being committed by the 
Turks in Bulgaria. Russia pledged her support for her fellow Slavs and there was the very real 
danger of a major war breaking out between Russia and Turkey. This would then threaten British 
strategic interests in the Mediterranean if, as seemed likely, Russia should reach Constantinople 
and open the Dardanelles to Russian warships. As Brackenbury expressed it in 1886, 'To acquire 
Constantinople is the traditional policy of Russia. To keep her out of it is the traditional policy of 
England'. 5 Britain needed to keep the Suez Canal open for her commerce with the East, therefore 
it seemed likely that Britain would be dragged into the war. 
Wolseley's initial response to the crisis revealed much about the narrowness of his political 
outlook, and represents an almost diametrically opposite view of the question of war with Russia 
to what he would express later in his career. Almost immediately on arrival at the India Office 
Wolseley produced his first memorandum on the Eastern Crisis. In it he accepted the long-held 
political and military view that 'with the Russians in occupation of the Hellespont... how 
impossible it will be for us, if at war with Russia, to maintain our long lines of communication 
with India, via Egypt, no matter how strong our fleets may be'. He went on to urge the adoption 
of a defensive policy in European Turkey and a vigorous offensive in Asia. 6 It was here that 
Wolseley's political naivety showed itself: Britain had no naval base in the Eastern Mediterranean, 
and Turkey's closure of the Bosphorus to Russian warships was the only means Britain had of 
maintaining the freedom of the Suez Canal for British commerce to India and Australasia. 
Wolseley, however, proposed to abandon Turkey to her own devices while Britain, in alliance 
with Afghanistan, would conduct a campaign against the Russian provinces of Tashkent and 
5 A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe. 1848-1918, (Oxford, 1971), pp 228-255; General Sketch 
of the situation abroad and at home from a military standpoint, Brackenbury, 3 Aug. 1886, WOP W18 
6 Memo. by Wolseley, 10. Nov. 1876, WOP W34 
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Samarkand. The memorandum was clearly unacceptable to Wolseley's political superiors. Sir 
Ralph Thompson wrote to Wolseley that, although Lord Beaconsfield had read the memorandum 
he did not want it circulated to the Cabinet and 'thinks it should be kept as quiet as possible'. 7 
Although this memorandum showed some political naivety, it did demonstrate that 
Wolseley had a clear idea of what was militarily achievable. He held no great opinion on the 
fighting qualities of the Turkish Army and, like many other commentators and observers, was to 
be pleasantly surprised by the vigorous defence Turkey made at Plevna during the war. Wolseley 
recognised that in 1876 Russia's southern provinces were vulnerable to attack since they were 
relatively recent conquests and the construction of strategic railways connecting them with the rest 
of Russia was in the early stages. He suggested that the Crimean War had set Russia back 50 years 
and was convinced that a war in Asia at this point would 'put her back 100 years in her struggle 
for sovereign rule over the whole of Asia'. 8 Wolseley hoped that by demonstrating British power 
in Asia Russia would pose less of a threat to India in the future. The theme of war now while the 
enemy is weak was one to which Wolseley would return when considering the aftermath of the 
First Boer War and operations in the Sudan after the fall of Khartoum. 
In April 1877 the Russo-Turkish war broke out. Wolseley was not a member of the 
Confidential Mobilisation Committee and, as Adrian Preston has pointed out, did not play a major 
role in determining the British response. 9 This was not for lack of trying. In a new memorandum 
on the subject Wolseley now accepted the need to provide support directly for Turkey and 
advocated the stationing of some British troops to help the Turks defend the Bulair lines on the 
Gallipoli peninsula. 10 This was in direct contradiction to Wolseley's usual view of the role of the 
army: at this time and in the future Wolseley would be opposed to the stationing of small bodies of 
British troops abroad for an indefinite period. However, on this occasion he advocated supporting 
Turkey on Gallipoli because he predicted, as did all the other military authorities, that the Russians 
would advance much faster than they in fact did, and that a British expedition to the Balkans would 
7 Thompson to Wolseley, 30 Nov. 1876, WPP 
8 Memo. by Wolseley, 7 May 1877, WOP, W34 
9 Preston, 1879, Introduction 
10 Memo. by Wolseley, 7 May 1877, WOP W34 
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be too late to stop them reaching the outskirts of Constantinople. 
The crux of the matter was the question of whether Britain was prepared to despatch only 
a limited number of troops to boost Turkish defences on Gallipoli, or was ready to engage in a 
major war with Russia. The Cardwell system made it difficult for Britain to adopt the former 
policy, since a limited campaign of uncertain duration would strain the resources of the army, 
whereas the adoption of the latter policy would justify the recall of the Army Reserve and, in 
theory at least, place less of a strain on the army organisation. The government appeared to have 
no clearly thought out approach to the subject. In December 1876 the Duke of Cambridge wrote to 
the Secretary of State, Gathorne Hardy, asking for a policy statement so that military preparations 
could be started. No such statement was forthcoming and indeed the politicians so misunderstood 
the military authorities that they thought them obstructive. As Disraeli complained to the Queen: 
It is they who have opposed every military move, that has been suggested from the 
beginning - Mediterranean garrisons, expeditions to Gallipoli, and so on. What 
they want, and what they have ever tried to bring about, is a great military 
expedition, like the Crimean... I l 
The crucial issue was that Britain could not afford to increase her army by recalling the Army 
Reserve unless war was imminent - it was recalled on 1 April 1878 - but could not undertake 
occupation of foreign territory for unlimited periods of time without severely disrupting the 
efficiency of the home army. 
Wolseley faced a dilemma: he was known to be ambitious but this caused him problems 
when arguing for a war with Russia. He wrote to his brother George, 
I do not dare say this openly, for being a soldier, the curs of England would sneer 
out, oh he wishes for war from personal motives. In my own heart I know this is 
not the case: I wish it because I love my country before all earthly things, and am 
prepared... to... giving up my life for her... 12 
At the same time Wolseley feared the consequences of a land war between Russia and Britain 
because of the vast difference in their military resources. This fear is shown in a memorandum 
Wolseley produced shortly before his appointment as Chief of Staff under Lord Napier for any 
11 Cambridge to Hardy, 5 Dec. 1876, in Verner, p 111; Disraeli to Queen, 22 July 1877, quoted in W. F. 
Moneypenny & G. E. Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli Earl of Beaconsfield, (London, 1920), Vol. VI, 
p154 
12 Wolseley to George Wolseley, in R. Millman, Britain and the Eastern Question 1875-78, (Oxford 1979) 
p383-4; 
136 
British expedition to the Near East. Wolseley's proposed solution was to bring about a grandiose 
scheme of alliances. In this case the projected alliance was even less realistic than acquiring the 
Amir's support for a campaign against Russia in Asia. He now proposed a grand Muslim alliance 
of contingents from all the North African states along with the Turks and Albanians to fight 
alongside half a million British and Canadian volunteers. 13 Wolseley would never have achieved 
this alliance: Britain knew little about the people of North Africa, and apart from holding a 
financial stake in Egypt, had no interests in the region. The only common bond between the Arabs 
of North Africa and Turkey was religion. However, Wolseley might have been able to raise half a 
million men from Britain and Canada: the word 'Jingoism' entered the vocabulary to describe the 
upsurge of patriotic feeling, spurred on in the music halls, at the prospect of a war with Russia. 
The Eastern Crisis was brought to an end by the Congress of Berlin in July 1878. Britain's 
freedom of action had been restricted by her lack of a naval base in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
While the crisis had been in progress the question of a suitable site had been explored. In his 
memorandum of November 1876 Wolseley recommended the acquisition of Crete from Turkey. 
Crete had several good harbours but, as Lintorn Simmons pointed out in his memorandum in April 
1877, these would be difficult to defend. Simmons added that Cyprus and Rhodes were both 
unsuitable as coaling stations because of the small size of their main harbours. Therefore he 
recommended the acquisition of the small island of Scarpanto, 14 which lay between Crete and 
Rhodes. It was 350 miles from Port Said and 600 miles from Malta and had a small land-locked 
harbour which would be easy to defend. His recommendations were ignored. In his journal 
Wolseley noted that in meetings with Lord Beaconsfield Cyprus had often been mentioned but only 
as a reserve proposal to the principal aim of acquiring a base on the eastern seaboard of the 
Mediterranean, preferably Alexandretta or on the Gulf of Iskanderoon. 15 
Wolseley was therefore somewhat surprised to be informed that Turkey had offered 
Cyprus to Britain at the Congress of Berlin, and that he was to be its first British High 
13 Memo. by Wolseley, 30 March 1878, WOP W17 
14 Modern name Kärpathos. 
15 Memo. by Wolseley, 10 Nov. 1876, WOP W34; Memo. on coaling stations at the east of the Mediterranean, 
Lintorn Simmons, 27 April 1877, W033/31; Journal, 19 July 1878, WO147/6 
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Commissioner. It appears that the government had ignored military and naval advice and assumed 
responsibility for an island noted only for its unhealthy climate. The only harbour of any size was 
at Famagusta, and Wolseley learnt that he was expected to turn this into a great coaling station. In 
fact the government knew the limitations of Cyprus but accepted the Turks' offer as being better 
than nothing: the Under-Secretary for the Colonies A. F. Egerton was forced to admit to 
Parliament that 'technically speaking, there is no harbour; but there were three very fair 
anchorages'. 16 Wolseley's journal of the period records the extent of his disgust with government 
policy and his determination to convince the politicians that Britain had been given a useless prize 
for her earlier support of Turkey. Wolseley succeeded in doing this in November 1878 when the 
Secretary of State for War Colonel Stanley and the First Lord of the Admiralty W. H. Smith visited 
Cyprus. Nevertheless Wolseley argued that Cyprus was worth retaining, solely as a place from 
which to obtain transport animals for expeditions in the region. l7 This prediction was proved 
correct when in 1882 transport animals were purchased in Cyprus for the war in Egypt. 
Wolseley was briefly recalled to London from Cyprus before being sent to South Africa to 
restore British supremacy after the Zulus had defeated Lord Chelmsford's force at Isandhlwana. 
Wolseley had strong views on the importance of South Africa for imperial defence. He was also 
fortunate in his dealings with the region, serving there only when the issues were clear-cut, such 
as in 1875 when as High Commissioner he imposed a new constitution on Natal; and in 1879 when 
the Zulus had already been defeated at Ulundi. Therefore Wolseley was absent when issues were 
less straightforward and reputations damaged such as those of Sir Bartle Frere, Chelmsford, 
George Colley, Butler and Buller. Nevertheless Wolseley's reputation cannot escape completely 
untarnished because he did make a number of policy decisions and recommendations which 
complicated matters in the future. 
The 1879 Carnarvon Commission underlined the importance of South Africa in imperial 
defence: 'the Cape route... assumes a far higher degree of importance to the Empire at large, 
being essential to the retention by Great Britain of her possessions in India, Mauritius, Ceylon, 
16 A. F. Egerton to House of Commons, 11 July 1878, Hansard, Third Series, Vol. CCXLI 
17 Journal, 19 July 1878, WO147/6 
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Singapore, China, and even Australasia'. 18 Wolseley agreed totally with this statement and would 
later argue against government policy on Egypt on this basis. Nevertheless Wolseley's settlement 
of Zululand after the war there actually damaged British supremacy in South Africa. His division 
of Zululand into 13 weak provinces has been described by De Kiewiet as an 'act of scuttle'. 
Wolseley himself wrote of the settlement that 'it is based on expediency because no statesman 
unbiased by the colonial avarice for more land must feel how important it is to refrain from adding 
to the already serious and heavy responsibilities of the Empire in South Africa'. 19 This was 
undoubtedly true: one feature of Wolseley's pronouncements on imperial policy was his desire to 
restrict the size of the British forces needed to defend each area. But what Wolseley and the 
government failed to realise in 1879 was that the division of Zululand fundamentally altered the 
balance of power in South Africa. 
While Wolseley was in South Africa he reported that the Boers were agitating against the 
federation created in 1877. Wolseley largely dismissed the strength of the Boer opposition to 
federation, and compounded his mistake by deriding the military strength of the Boers. His 
opinion was that the Boers were 'in some respects inferior to the Zulus' and were cowards who 
'go on playing at soldiers and blustering, knowing in their hearts they would bolt at the sight of the 
first troop of Dragoons they saw'. 20 This sense of complacency was shared by Colley, who 
succeeded Wolseley as Commander-in-Chief in South Africa, and faced the outbreak of the Boer 
War with the same British military establishment in South Africa as Wolseley had recommended at 
the end of the Zulu War. 
Even though Wolseley was scathing about the character of the Boers he recognised the 
importance of the land they lived on. In an important despatch of 13 November 1880 Wolseley 
outlined for the Colonial Secretary Hicks Beach the value of the Transvaal and urged the 
government to arrive at 'a definite line of action and policy'. He described the Transvaal as 'rich 
18 In 1878 £91 million of trade went to or around the Cape compared with £65 million passing through the 
Suez Canal. Robinson & Gallagher, p59-60 
19 Quoted in E. Unterhalter, 'Confronting Imperialism' in A. Duminy & C. Ballard, (eds. ) The An lo-Zulu 
War, (Pietermaritzburg, 1981) p 106; C. W. De Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor in South Africa, (Cambridge, 
1937), p247 
20 Journal, 13 Oct. 1879 &7 Jan. 1880, W0147/7 
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in minerals with gold fields still being discovered;... Any such discovery would soon bring a large 
British population here. The time must eventually arrive when the Boers will be in a small 
minority... '. Therefore until the British commercial presence in the Transvaal grew to a size which 
might assure British supremacy in South Africa, Britain would have to maintain a small military 
presence, of about 2,000 to 3,000 troops, to discourage Boer appeals for independence. 21 These 
appeals led to war in December 1880 when the Boers rose in revolt and invaded Natal. Whereas 
Wolseley might have hoped for the adoption of a definite policy from the Conservative 
government geared towards preserving Britain's position in South Africa, he could expect exactly 
the opposite from the incoming Liberal government whose election pledges, voiced by Gladstone 
during his Midlothian campaign, included granting self-government to the Boers. Consequently the 
Liberal policy was one whereby the military fought to remove the Boers from Natal, culminating 
in the defeat and death of Colley on Majuba Hill in February 1881, whilst secretly negotiating for 
peace through President Brand of the Orange Free State. 22 
Wolseley was never directly consulted on South African policy at this point. The 
government ordered the despatch of reinforcements and appointed Roberts, who was in England at 
the time, to command them. However, government policy prevailed over military requirements 
and Evelyn Wood, in command after Colley's death, was ordered to make what Wolseley would 
forever afterwards describe as an 'ignominious peace'. The Queen also thought that the 
government had given in to the Boers though she later defended Wood's conduct against 
Wolseley's accusations. 23 Wolseley returned to the subject when preparing his autobiography 
when he wrote: 
I feel sure, we should never have relinquished our hold over the Transvaal. If we 
were to have a fight upon the question, how much better it would have been to 
have had it when the Boers possessed no artillery, were only armed with bad 
sporting rifles, had very little ammunition and still less money than in 1899... 24 
Wolseley's argument was that the 1881 settlement had allowed the Boers to remain a strong force 
21 Wolseley to Hicks Beach, 13 Nov. 1879, CAB37/1 
22 See J. Lehmann, The First Boer War, (London 1985) for details of the war. 
23 Ponsonby to Kimberley, 12 March 1881 quoted in Buckle, Vol. 3,2nd Series, p202; Wolseley to Lady 
Wolseley 15 Jan. 1885, WPP W/P 
24 Notes for unpublished autobiography, WPP SSL8 
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capable of challenging British supremacy in South Africa at any time of their choosing. He was 
correct: to strengthen Britain's position the pre-war establishment of four battalions was raised to 
12 infantry battalions and four cavalry regiments. Boer threats of territorial expansion forced 
Britain to restore Cetewayo to the Zulu throne in 1883, and involved the establishment of a group 
of British interests encircling Boer territories for example in Bechuanaland and Rhodesia. In 1884 
the War Office reiterated its belief in the importance of the Cape when urging the government to 
maintain British supremacy by political and commercial means because it was 'impossible, for 
political reasons, to create a Gibraltar out of the Cape Town peninsula'. 25 
Wolseley's belief in the strategic value of South Africa coloured his attitude towards 
British intervention in Egyptian affairs. Britain held a strong financial interest in Egypt along with 
other major European nations, particularly France, and held the majority of shares in the Suez 
Canal Company. Therefore when Arabi raised a revolt against the authority of the Khedive of 
Egypt the British government was forced to take action to save her commercial interests. It 
appears that the government knew that some action needed to be taken, but was indecisive as to 
what should be done, and the extent to which the French and Turkish governments should be 
involved. Perhaps because of its vacillating attitude the government left Parliament in the dark 
over the policy it was pursuing. On 12 July 1882 Sir Wilfred Lawson described the position: 'The 
system has been to ask some Question of a Minister, who declined to give an answer; and then, 
next day, to ask another Question of some other Minister, who again referred to the Minister who 
had before refused to answer'. 26 
Wolseley accepted that Britain had to protect her financial interest and that the freedom of 
the Suez Canal needed safeguarding, but he nevertheless was opposed to British military 
intervention in the area. For example Sir Wilfred Blunt recorded a conversation he had with 
Wolseley in the early summer of 1882: 
He volunteered the information that he had been consulted two or three times 
during the winter with a view to immediate occupation. He assured me, however, 
that nobody would intervene, that the occupation of Egypt would be most 
25 For example, in 1883 the Boers set up two settlements in Bechuanaland which led to the despatch of the 
Bechuanaland Field Force under Warren to expel them in 1884. Robinson & Gallagher, p203; B. Porter, p98 
26 Sir Wilfred Lawson to House of Commons, 12 July 1882, Hansard, Vol. CCLXXIV 
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unpopular with the army, and that he himself should be very sorry to have to go 
there. 27 
It is therefore somewhat ironic that Wolseley's finest hour as a commander should have come 
when he led the British forces against Arabi in the summer of 1882. From the military point of 
view the problem of crushing the revolt presented no insurmountable difficulties and was, like 
many colonial campaigns, one principally of logistical challenges: in this case how to get a large 
body of men from Ismailia to Tel-el-Kebir and then Cairo through the hot August sun. Wolseley 
surpassed himself in command of this force, which swiftly defeated the Egyptians with few British 
losses. 28 
Robinson and Gallagher have argued in their book on Victorian policy that 'the security of 
the routes to the East was one interest with which British cabinets could not afford to gamble. It 
was the sine qua non of the British movement into Egypt'. 29 Wolseley would have disagreed with 
this assessment: he regarded the Cape route as the only one open to Britain in time of war, and 
thought that the occupation of Egypt was undertaken from commercial and financial interest and 
not for imperial defence. He believed that a strong base on Cyprus would be adequate to guard the 
entrance to the Suez Canal without Britain maintaining a garrison in Egypt. Wolseley made his 
opinions clearly known: as early as January 1883 when consulted over the size of the garrison to 
remain in Egypt, Wolseley made a recommendation but added that he would prefer total 
withdrawal. 30 Later he told Hartington in March 1885 that 'Your whole policy from first to last in 
Egypt has been to my mind entirely wrong', and informed Hartington's successor W. H. Smith in 
June 1885 'I long to see us out of Egypt and would rejoice indeed the day I saw the last red coat 
embark to leave the country. Our interest in the country owing to the Suez Canal is very much 
over estimated'. 31 
Wolseley was not alone in regarding the occupation of Egypt as unnecessary to the 
27 W. S. Blunt, Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt, (London 1907) p227 
28 For details of the campaign see F. Maurice, The Military History of the Campaign of 1882 in Egypt, 
(London 1887); and for a critical examination of the campaign see Bond, 'Mr. Gladstone's Invasion of Egypt 
1882' 
29 Robinson & Gallagher, p 159 
30 Granville to Gladstone, 9 Jan. 1883 Gladstone Papers, BM 44175 
31 Wolseley to Hartington, 4 Jan. 1883,20 Feb. 1883,27 Sept. 1884, &9 March 1885, all in Devonshire 
Papers, 340.1307,1334,1535a, 1677; Wolseley to Smith, 29 June 1885, Smith Papers, WO110/3 
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requirements of imperial defence. Sir Randolph Churchill made a speech at Edinburgh on 18 
December 1883 in which he told his audience 'You will be told that Egypt is the high-road to 
India, and that Britain must hold it at all costs. This is a terrible and a widespread delusion... The 
Suez Canal is a commercial route to India, and a good route, too, in time of peace; but it never 
was, and never could be, a military route for Britain in time of war'. The former Liberal 
Chancellor of the Exchequer William Harcourt agreed with Churchill. The British Consul in 
Egypt, Evelyn Baring, also agreed with Wolseley: 'In the event of war, the presence of a British 
garrison in Egypt would probably be a source of weakness rather than of strength'. 32 
Wolseley understood that British troops would have to remain in Egypt until the country 
had been put on a secure financial footing and had built up an army to replace the one he had 
defeated. As he wrote to his wife on the day after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, 'The Khedive will 
have to organise some new military force, for at present he has... none, and his only authority 
rests on our bayonets'. This was echoed by Lord Salisbury in the House of Lords. 33 The problem 
was more serious than even Wolseley realised at the time; the length of the revolt and the previous 
corruption of the Khedive's government meant that Egypt had no true ruling class or institutions of 
government. Therefore the crux of the problem was how to bring about reform and how to 
withdraw the bulk of the British forces. As Evelyn Baring put it, 'it was not sufficiently 
understood that the adoption of one of these policies was wholly destructive of the other'. 34 
Wolseley deplored the consequences of the occupation of Egypt; the retention of a garrison there 
would place a further strain on the organisation of the British Army, it would adversely affect 
Britain's relations with France, and might lead to British involvement in the internal affairs of 
Egypt's satellite the Sudan. 
Before leaving Egypt Wolseley recommended that a garrison of 5,000 men would be 
adequate to guard Egypt. Both the Duke of Cambridge and the Queen opposed this reduction of 
British strength but in the event Wolseley's views prevailed since he was the man on the spot. 
32 Quoted in W. S. Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill, (London 1906) Vol. 1. p280; Hamilton Diary, 1 Jan. 
1888, Vol. 2, p70; Lord Cromer, Modern Egypt, (London 1908) p329 
33 Wolseley to Lady Wolseley, 14 Sept. 1882, WPP W/P; Salisbury to the House of Lords, 26 October 1882, 
Hansard, Vol. CCLXXIV 
34 Cromer, p333 
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Wolseley feared the strain the occupation of Egypt would place on the organisation of the army. In 
December 1884 while he was campaigning in the Sudan Wolseley heard the rumour that the 
British proposals to the conference of the powers on Egypt included a recommendation that British 
troops should remain in occupation of Egypt for an extended period. He recorded his opinion in 
his journal: 
I shall be curious to hear whether any increase to our Army Establishments will be 
made in consequence. It would be to exceed the limit of common sense, if they 
continue to hold Egypt with an Army establishment that had been fixed at about its 
present strength before we had a soldier in this country. 35 
The answer came soon: no more men. The problem was that the government was not prepared to 
state publicly that it would not withdraw from Egypt and to make the corresponding addition to the 
army establishment. It continued international negotiations to create the financial security and 
reforms needed in Egypt before British withdrawal, while inserting clauses giving Britain the right 
of re-entry in the future should the security of the Suez Canal be threatened. Wolseley recognised 
the political problem but urged the adoption of a more pragmatic outlook: 
If in some ten or more years hence we find ourselves in a position to withdraw 
from Egypt, it will be easy to adapt the army organisation, which had been framed 
to meet the greater difficulty, to circumstances that have changed for the good in 
our favour. 
Wolseley had some political support; Campbell-Bannerman wrote to Harcourt on similar lines in 
February 1886.36 It can be argued that until the refusal of the Sultan to sign the Drummond Wolff 
Convention in 1887 there was a chance that Britain would be able to withdraw from Egypt. Once 
these international negotiations failed withdrawal became impossible and the British Army should 
have had its establishments raised to compensate for the retention of eleven and a half battalions in 
Egypt. 
Britain was forced to retain a large garrison in Egypt for another reason. France had never 
forgiven England for advancing into Egypt alone during one of the periodic government crises of 
35 Journal, 22 Dec. 1884, W0147/8 
36 Memo. by Wolseley, 12 Nov. 1885, WPP W/MEM/l; Campbell-Bannerman to Harcourt, 10 Feb. 1886, in 
J. A. Spender, The Life of the Right Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, (London 1923) p101; On 28 April 
1885 Wolseley wrote to the Duke of Cambridge with the suggestion that Wolseley should go to Constantinople 
to negotiate with the Sultan for Turkish troops to garrison Egypt. He 
believed the Sultan would pay more 
attention to the opinions of a military man. 
RA E/i/I 1167 
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the French Third Republic. 37 France proved obstructive during the international conferences on 
the Egyptian debt and there was some suspicion that France would take advantage of a British 
withdrawal from Egypt to enter the country herself. Wolseley argued in a letter to W. H. Smith in 
June 1885 that French displeasure with British policy made the threat of war real. The navy was 
not strong enough to keep France off the coast of England and Ireland and at the same time keep 
the Mediterranean open. Egypt could not be retained 'whilst our navy is barely equal to that of 
France, and when our military establishments are so low that we have the greatest difficulty in 
finding garrisons even for the foreign possessions already ours... ' . 
38 Smith was aware of the 
French threat and told Wolseley not to withdraw his force from Egypt yet because France was 
bringing back a large number of troops from Tonquin via the Suez Canal and had 150,000 men 
stationed near Marseilles. The attitude of France continued to affect British policy: in 1887 
Wolseley wrote to Stanhope that the British garrison could be safely reduced to 3,000 men but 
British officers must remain in control of the native army otherwise 'it lays England open to easy 
defeat by a small force that France could land anywhere on the Delta'. 39 
At the end of 1882 it appeared likely that Britain would be able to avoid taking any 
responsibility for the Sudan. As Gladstone told the House of Commons in November, 'it is in no 
part of the duty incumbent upon us to restore order in that Province'. 40 Events proved otherwise: 
the Mahdi had taken over control over a large area of the southern Sudan in 1881, had called for a 
holy war and planned to march through Egypt to Mecca. The affairs in the Sudan can be divided 
into three periods: the first period being from Tel-el-Kebir to the despatch of Gordon to Khartoum 
in January 1884; the second from then until the despatch of Wolseley's expeditionary force to 
bring Gordon and the Egyptian garrison away from Khartoum; and the last after the fall of 
Khartoum. Wolseley was involved in policy-making in all three periods. For the first he acted 
purely in his professional capacity as Adjutant-General; in the second both as a professional 
37 The Freycinet Government fell on 26 July 1882 when defeated over the vote of credit for an expedition to 
Egypt. 
38 Smith to Wolseley, 5 July 1885, WPP 
39 Wolseley to Stanhope, 17 Feb. 1887, WPP PLB 1; Wolseley directed Ardagh to examine the defences of the 
canal with the view to either blockading 
it if Britain were at war with France, or defending it if at war with 
Russia. Wolseley to Ardagh, 29 Aug. 1887 PRO30/40/2 
40 Gladstone to House of Commons, 2 Nov. 1882, Hansard, Vol. CCLXXIV 
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adviser to the government, through the Duke of Cambridge and the Secretary of State for War 
Hartington, and as a personal friend of Gordon; and lastly as a disappointed commander who had 
failed in his task and needed to restore the situation and to advise on a future policy for the long- 
term defence of Egypt Proper. 
During the first period the problem was to define the frontier of Egypt Proper with regard 
to its ability to defend itself, and to define the extent to which Egypt should control the Sudan or 
whether total abandonment was the best course to follow. It is to the credit of Lord Hartington 
that, unlike so many other Secretaries of State, he actively sought the opinion of his military 
advisers. It is therefore sad to note that the Cabinet paid little heed to the advice tendered and 
ignored both Hartington and the facts and options he laid before them. During 1883 the Dervishes 
grew in strength: in January they captured El Obeid; in October they massacred the Egyptian force 
sent from Suakin to Sinkat; in November they defeated the Egyptian expedition sent to relieve 
Tokar; and also in the same month news reached Cairo of the massacre of the Egyptian army 
under Hicks Pasha at El Obeid. Baring was appointed Consul and Agent-General in Cairo on 11 
September 1883; on 19 November, after all the above listed events had taken place, he 
recommended the abandonment of the Sudan. The question now to be faced was whether the 
whole of the Sudan should be abandoned to the anarchic and fanatic rule of the Mahdi or whether 
Egypt should retain control over the most cultivated parts and if so, how these areas were to be 
defended. 
In an memorandum written in November 1883 Wolseley recommended that Egypt should 
abandon all areas west of the White Nile with the exception of the bend of the Nile from Khartoum 
to Debbeh. Khartoum, Berber, and Suakin should be reinforced by Egyptian troops under the 
command of British officers. These positions were seen as crucial. Khartoum was at the junction 
of the White and Blue Niles and a centre for the trade for the whole of the Sudan; Berber was on 
the bend of the river within reasonable distance of Khartoum and at the start of the desert road to 
Suakin. Suakin itself was a port on the Red Sea which Wolseley and others wished to see built up 
to attract the trade of the area and to counteract the French threat of building a free port on the 
Red Sea. In a letter to Granville, Hartington urged the evacuation of only the western provinces 
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and apparently to have accepted Wolseley's recommendations in toto. 41 
Other officers had different ideas. For example, Charles Wilson wrote a memorandum in 
November 1883 urging the adoption of a more active policy than Wolseley. He wanted to see the 
Mahdi's rebellion crushed and before any withdrawal from Darfur and Kordofan. He also wanted 
to retain control of a wider area than Wolseley, retaining Khartoum, Sennar, the banks of the Nile, 
and the Equatorial Provinces: in other words, abandoning the territory to the west of Khartoum but 
holding on to land to the south, thereby making Khartoum the centre of the new Sudan and not the 
southernmost point as Wolseley recommended. 42 
The government announced on 20 November that the whole of the Sudan would be 
abandoned and on 26 January 1884 Gordon was sent to evacuate the Egyptian garrison from 
Khartoum. The decision then had to be taken on the best defensive position for Egypt Proper. 
Having regard for the political and historical as well as the strategic facts of the situation, 
Wolseley recommended the concentration of troops at Wadi Halfa, (the present day frontier of 
Egypt). Gordon, on the day before his departure, had recommended the same position, and the 
G. O. C. in Egypt, General Stephenson, agreed. Only the Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, Evelyn 
Wood, disagreed, preferring to concentrate troops at Assouan further to the north. 43 It was 
generally agreed to be desirable to hold onto Suakin and a small Anglo-Egyptian force was sent 
under Graham to hold the port against the encroachments of the Mahdi's ally Osman Digna. In 
February and March 1884 Graham won small victories at El Teb and Tamai that did not crush 
Osman Digna but did at least relieve the immediate pressure on the garrison. The failure to crush 
Osman Digna had serious consequences. In May 1883 the idea of the construction of a railway 
from Suakin to Berber to assist the control of Khartoum had been mooted. Wolseley had at first 
been enthusiastic about the project. 44 Later he would become less keen as it appeared clear that the 
government had no strong opinion as to the desirability of building the railway. In fact, it could be 
41 Memo. by Wolseley, 23 Nov. 1883, WOP W31; Hartington to Granville, 23 Nov. 1883 in Robinson & 
Gallagher 
42 Memo. by C. Wilson, Nov. 1883 in Sir Charles M. Watson, The Life of Major-General Sir Charles Wilson, 
(London, 1909), pp247-55 
43 Memo. by Gordon, 25 Jan. 1884; Memo. by Stephenson, 8 Feb. 1884; Memo. by Wood, 11 Feb. 1884, all 
WOP W26 
44 Memo. by Wolseley, 19 May 1883, CAB37/1 
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said that the whole question of the Suakin-Berber railway revealed the desire on the part of the 
Gladstone government to be seen to do something active in the Sudan without actually doing 
much. This was particularly evident after the government refused to countenance the idea of an 
expedition from Suakin to Berber in March 1884. 
The lack of a policy quickly became evident. By sending a British officer to Khartoum the 
British government sent confusing signals to Egypt, the Dervishes, the great powers, and the 
British public about their intentions. As Wolseley pointed out in a memorandum, making Gordon 
the Governor-General of the Sudan 'does not accord with your declared intention of abandoning 
the Sudan'. Furthermore the Queen's Speech had referred to the interior of the Sudan, therefore 
suggesting that the government had changed its mind about total evacuation and now intended to 
retain the eastern Sudan with Khartoum as its capital. He went on to warn 'It is half measures, and 
no policy beyond waiting upon events, that causes us insensibly to drift into war'. 45 In April 
Wolseley again urged the government to define its policy because its wavering put Gordon in a 
very difficult position. Gordon was unlikely to win the support of the tribes surrounding Khartoum 
if they knew they were soon to be abandoned to their fate at the hands of the Mahdi. Without the 
support of these tribes Gordon's position would soon become untenable as he would be unable to 
obtain supplies and his route for withdrawing from Khartoum would be cut. In the middle of April 
all communication with Khartoum was cut and in May the news reached London that Berber had 
fallen. Wolseley was now convinced that Gordon's position had become impossible and that an 
expeditionary force should be sent to relieve him. He prepared a series of memoranda outlining 
how such an expedition could be sent. 46 The battle over the routes is irrelevant to the question of 
policy making but what is important is to consider how the government refused to take Gordon's 
position seriously. Letters between Gladstone and Hartington show that Gladstone was totally 
unable to accept the concept that all communication with Khartoum had been cut off and had been 
intermittent beforehand. He constantly expressed his view that Gordon must obey the orders sent 
45 Memo. by Wolseley, 8 Feb. 1884, WOP W26 
46 Memoranda by Wolseley, 8& 14 April 1884; 9 May 1884; 15,19,24 July 1884, all WOP W26; memo. by 
Hartington for the Cabinet, 15 May 1884 in B. Holland, The Life of SSpencer Compton. 8th Duke of 
Devonshire, (London, 1911), p459 
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to him from Cairo to evacuate. Gladstone held this belief despite the lack of evidence to show that 
Gordon had received the relevant cable. Hartington, however, believed Wolseley and his letters 
show his despair at Gladstone's dilatoriness. For example, he complained to Granville that the 
Cabinet's obsession with the Franchise Bill, which he himself was working on, and the Conference 
of the powers on Egyptian finance meant that he got 'five minutes at the fag end, and was as usual 
put off'. 47 
Once the despatch of an expeditionary force was agreed Wolseley's orders were to 
advance into the Sudan and make arrangements to bring Gordon and Colonel Stewart away from 
Khartoum, but 'when that object has been secured no further offensive operations of any kind are 
to be undertaken'. 48 Khartoum fell on 28th January and on 4 February the news reached London. 
Wolseley telegraphed that he had no instructions on what to do and was amazed to receive the 
reply from Hartington that 'we desire to check the Mahdi's advance in the provinces of the Sudan 
which he has not yet conquered by any means in our power'. Wolseley was initially delighted, 
replying to Hartington that 'you have now as a Government assumed a position in the Sudan that 
will eventually secure peace to Egypt, which your former policy of "scuttle" would not have 
accomplished'. 49 
Wolseley's euphoria was short-lived. His expedition had been sent like a bolt to be fired 
only once for a single purpose and could not be adjusted for any new policy. The situation in the 
Sudan was serious. The fall of Khartoum meant that the Mahdi had more forces under his 
command as well as more ammunition and guns; Wolseley's force on the other hand was near 
breaking point with over half the camels unfit for further service. There appeared little chance that 
Wolseley could even take Matemmeh, a town on the banks of the Nile close to where Wilson had 
boarded Gordon's steamers for the final approach to Khartoum, far less retake Berber which 
would be essential for all future operations. Furthermore the hot weather was beginning in earnest, 
making campaign conditions extremely hazardous, and the Nile was falling, creating serious 
supply difficulties. It became clear that a campaign to retake Khartoum and defeat the Mahdi 
47 Hartington to Granville, 15 July 1884 in Holland, p465-8 
48 Hartington to Wolseley, 9 Oct. 1884, WOP W26 
49 Hartington to Wolseley, 6 Feb. 1885; Wolseley to Hartington, 8 Feb. 1885, WOP W26 
149 
would have to wait for the cool weather in the autumn. This would require keeping a British force 
in the Sudan throughout the summer and then great expenditure in men and money in the autumn. 
The government changed its mind again and ordered Wolseley to withdraw. 
Hartington reported to the Queen that Wolseley 'appears to accept the decision on military 
grounds, though objecting to it on political grounds'. 50 Wolseley had made his opinions about the 
necessity of defeating the Mahdi clear in a letter to the Queen: 'Our honour renders this 
imperative, but as soon as we have settled this false prophet and set up a native Government at 
Khartoum, I am sure the sooner we sever our connection with the Soudan the better'. He was 
under pressure to tell the government that its renewed plans for a railway from Suakin to Berber 
would benefit the conduct of his expedition either that spring or in the autumn. Wolseley refused 
to give the required reply. As he wrote to the Queen the railway would not be ready in time to 
help him but would benefit the future native government he hoped to see established in 
Khartoum. 51 Privately, Wolseley expressed other opinions on the Sudan and here he showed his 
ability to differentiate between the best course of action for his career advancement, a new 
campaign in the Sudan, and the best policy in British interests, 
but as an Englishman fully alive to our military weakness, to the almost 
impossibility of even carrying on the routine duties of peace with our existing 
Army establishments, I look upon the coming campaign with dislike... I cannot 
foresee when this coming war is to end. 52 
At times Wolseley appeared opposed to the retirement of British troops from the Sudan because of 
the indecision over whether and when they would advance again, and the question of the frontier 
of Egypt Proper reasserted itself. Wolseley and Brackenbury were in favour of retaining control of 
the Dongola province, the northernmost of the Sudan provinces, which would leave the options 
open for advance or retreat. If the government was determined to evacuate the Dongola province 
in opposition to all its military advisers then Brackenbury favoured falling back to Assouan 
50 Hartington to Queen, 15 April 1885 in Buckle, Vol. 3,2nd series, p636 
51 Wolseley to Queen, 22 March 1885 in Buckle, ibid., p630-2. The arguments about the railway are complex. 
The railway needed to be built quickly but the decision, to which Wolseley was opposed, to build the railway 
on the standard British gauge of 4'8" 
instead of a narrow gauge meant that it would not be ready in time. 
Wolseley blamed Stanley Clarke for this decision and took his revenge by refusing to recommend him for any 
reward for the Sudan campaign. 
52 Journal 24 Feb. 1885, WO 147/8 
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whereas Buller preferred Wadi Halfa. 53 In March 1886 the troops were withdrawn to Assouan. 
Wolseley strongly held the opinion that until the Mahdi was defeated the British garrison 
in Egypt could never be withdrawn. As has already been noted he believed the acquisition of 
Egypt was unnecessary to British strategic interests. He outlined his views in a letter to his wife 
while still in the Sudan: 
Were I the despotic ruler of England I should be inclined to put in the Turk here, 
paying him a subsidy to rule the country and protect the frontier of Egypt. I should 
prefer spending my millions on fortifying my coaling stations all over the world, 
and in aims that would tend to the consolidation of our great but scattered 
empire. 54 
Wolseley like most other people over-estimated the Mahdi's power after the fall of Khartoum. In 
fact, as Baring put it, the Dervishes were mainly inactive and from the point of view of 
maintaining a large number of British troops for the defence of Egypt, after the battle of Ginniss in 
December 1885 the defence of the southern frontier of Egypt devolved onto the Egyptian army 
anyway. 55 
Egypt was not the only drain on military resources Wolseley deplored; he viewed India as 
a bottomless pit forever demanding more British troops while pursuing a plan of defence Wolseley 
thought was faulty. Wolseley's opinions on the subject developed little from the memoranda he 
had written during the height of the Eastern Crisis. His basic premises were that the events of the 
Second Afghan War had proved that Afghanistan was not the most suitable battleground for a 
major war with Russia, and that Britain was too weak to be able to provide the Indian military 
authorities with the number of soldiers they were demanding. His arguments ran along three lines: 
look elsewhere for suitable areas in which to fight Russia, make alliances with powers also 
opposed to Russian aggrandisement, and tell India once and for all to rely on her own military 
resources. 
During the Pendjeh crisis of 1885 Wolseley privately outlined his plan for war with 
Russia. He wanted India to make an alliance with the Amir, build a railway to Kandahar or 
Girishk, and train the Afghan army and give them Martini-Henrys and ammunition. Then an 
53 Memo. by Wolseley, Brackenbury, and Buller, 11 Feb. 1886, W032/8378 
54 Wolseley to Lady Wolseley, 26 Feb. 1885, WPP W/P 
55 Cromer, Vol. II p60 
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Anglo-Indian force of 20,000 men should be collected at Quetta in early 1886 to fight Russia that 
summer. 56 The immediate crisis was over before Wolseley had the opportunity to present this 
outline to his political superiors but he repeated it in a memorandum for Stanhope in 1889. Here 
he also argued that Britain should make an alliance with the Sultan and use expeditionary forces 
from Britain to strike at the periphery of Russia, for example, from the Black Sea towards the 
Trans-Caspian railway, from the Persian Gulf with the same aim, from the Baltic against the 
Russian capital St Petersburg, and from Vladivostock on the Pacific seaboard. Wolseley's opinion 
was also supported by others at the War Office, such as Brackenbury, who urged the formation of 
an alliance with Turkey to open the Black Sea for a British attack on the Poti-Tiflis-Baku railway 
which would cut Russian communications with Turkestan. 57 Wolseley also advocated forging 
closer relations with Persia. He had first suggested this as early as 1873 when the Shah was 
visiting Britain, but it was only in the late 1880s and the early 1890s that the idea began to be 
taken seriously. 58 Britain, however, had left it too late, and as the British envoy in Teheran 
Drummond Wolff reported, Russia was rapidly gaining influence in Persia. 59 Plans to build a 
strategic railway from India to Persia through Beluchistan in order to defend southern Persia and 
the outlets to the Persian Gulf also came to nothing due to the Amir's obstinacy. 
Roberts was strongly opposed to the policy pursued by Wolseley and Brackenbury: in a 
letter to Chapman he wrote, 
They know nothing about India, and they care nothing. Their object is to have 
everything in their own hands, and if they are able to guide the nation when war 
breaks out with Russia, they will embark on some wild scheme of operations in the 
neighbourhood of the Black Sea, and when they are hopelessly involved they will 
cripple India by indenting upon us for troops and transport. 
In fact Roberts had already heard a rumour in 1888 that Wolseley and Brackenbury were planning 
to ask India what troops she could spare if India went on the defensive and the offensive operations 
were confined to the Caucasus. 60 
56 Journal, 18 April 1885, WO 147/8; Memo. by Wolseley, 25 Aug. 1889, W033/A175 
57 Memorandum by Brackenbury, 19 Aug. 1889, Stanhope Papers, 023 1/1 
58 G. J. Wolseley, 'Our Coming Guest', Blackwoods, Vol. CXIII, No. 692, (June 1873), pp712-21 
59 Memorandum by H. Drummond Wolff, 27 July 1888, WOP W24/19a 
60 Roberts to Brownlow, 9 March 1888, Roberts Papers, N. A. M. 7101-23-100/2; Roberts to Chapman, 1 Feb. 
1889,7101-23-100/6 
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The question of Indian defence appeared insoluble for two reasons: firstly, neither 
Wolseley nor Roberts could find a suitable battleground for a war with Russia and, secondly, the 
increasing demands for troops for India were placing such an unacceptable strain on the home 
army while not safeguarding India, that it seemed likely that India could not actually be defended 
at all. There can be no doubt that the Indian military authorities' favoured area of operations, 
Afghanistan, was unsuitable for prolonged warfare with large bodies of troops. The Amir was 
fiercely independent and there was every likelihood that even if India managed to forge an alliance 
with him, he might change sides during the war. Furthermore the mountainous terrain of 
Afghanistan would force any offensive force to operate in independent columns, all of which 
would be vulnerable to attack. A colonel in the Indian Army, H. B. Hanna, wrote three very 
detailed books which outlined the enormous difficulties Russia would face during an advance 
through Afghanistan, and it was clear that Indian difficulties would be no less extreme. 61 
Wolseley's schemes appeared to have no greater chance of success. Charles Dilke and 
Spenser Wilkinson, in their book Im erial Defence clearly had their doubts. They pointed out that 
the Russian Army was strong in all areas of the Russian empire; for example, the peacetime 
strengths of the Russian Army were 700,000 men in Europe able to defend the Black Sea and 
Baltic, and 100,000 men in the Caucasus; and these numbers would be doubled on mobilisation. 
Furthermore the territory between the Persian Gulf and Russian Armenia, and between the Black 
Sea and the Caspian, was no more suitable for campaigning with a large force than Afghanistan. 
Dilke and Wilkinson also opposed the plans to defend India away from India itself on political 
grounds: Britain had to demonstrate its supremacy in order to retain control over a vast population 
that had already shown its disloyalty to the Crown once in 1857.62 This was also of concern to the 
British politicians and the reason why the Cabinet gave credence to the warnings given by the 
government of India as Russia moved slowly closer to the Afghan frontier, building a strategic 
network of railways as she went. 
61 Col. H. B. Hanna, Can Russia Invade India?, India's Scientific Frontier: Where Is It?, Backwards or 
Forwards? (London 1895-6); Analysis of General Kuropatkin's scheme for the Invasion of India, Grierson & 
Brackenbury, Aug. 1886, WOP W24/16 
62 Wilkinson & Dilke, Imperial Defence, p 107 
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There was yet another question to be considered, whether Britain and India could afford 
the financial and manpower costs of the defence of India, and this matter reached a crisis point in 
1887. The War Office Council decided that India must not depend on more battalions from Britain 
as part of her mobilisation plan, and this decision was transmitted to India by Stanhope in April 
1887.63 India ignored this statement of intent and continued to press for the promise of 
reinforcements in the event of war. Wolseley wrote in a memorandum in August 1889 that India 
could not afford the expansion of the army required by the mobilisation plan and nor could 
Britain. However, Wolseley did add that as a soldier he was in favour of India taking another 
10,000 men from Britain because then the consequent increase in the establishment of the British 
Army would mean a huge increase in the size of the Army Reserve. 64 The politicians, however, 
were determined not to increase the establishment and therefore denied India the promise of 
reinforcements. In 1891 the Indian military authorities were devising a new mobilisation plan and 
Roberts again argued that in the event of war India would require 30,000 soldiers from Britain. 
The India Office attempted to support Roberts on this by stating that even if only 30,000 Russian 
troops crossed the border of India, the British and native armies might prove unequal to the task. 
This statement proved self-defeating; far from supporting the argument for reinforcements from 
Britain, it appeared to admit that India was the bottomless pit for British troops Wolseley had 
always suspected, and still unable to defend her borders. Therefore Roberts's request in 1892 for a 
first-line reinforcement of 30,000 troops in event of war with Russia was met with the reply that in 
the future India must rely on her own resources. 65 
The directive that India must rely on her own resources can be interpreted as a tacit 
admission that Britain's military resources were inadequate to defend the Empire in time of war 
against Russia or France, or, after the Franco-Russian alliance, against both powers at the same 
time. Wolseley had no doubt at all that this was the case. There were three possible solutions, all 
of which had disadvantages and were politically risky. The first was to increase military 
63 Meeting at the War Office, 1 April 1887, WO163 
64 Strategy for the defence of India in a possible war with Russia, Wolseley, 25 Aug. 1889, W033/49 
65 The 1891 Indian Mobilisation Plan called for 697 officers and six complete infantry battalions to be sent 
from Britain to India. Memo. on the Defence of India, India Office, 1891, CAB37/30; I. F. W. Beckett, 'Edward 
Stanhope at the War Office, 1887-92', Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 5, (June 1982), pp 278-307 
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establishments to cover existing commitments. The second was to acknowledge the fact that Britain 
alone could not defend her Empire and to forge alliances with one or more powers. The third was 
to reconsider the whole question of imperial defence, decide the main strategic points to be 
defended, and turn this into a statement of the purposes for which the army existed. 
There can be no doubt that the military establishment needed to be increased. In his annual 
statement to the Secretary of State for War, Hartington, in March 1884, the Duke outlined the 
existing problems: the force in India was 5,000 men under establishment at a time of tension, since 
Russia had just annexed Merv; the Royal Artillery needed 1,000 men to complete its establishment 
following the recent reform; the Fenians were active on the mainland and Ireland was showing 
signs of growing disturbance. To meet the possible crises he wrote, 'with the exception of the 
Guards, we have no really effective Battalions of Infantry at home fit to be at once employed on 
any emergency arising, whether at home or abroad'. 66 The situation was worsened when 
Wolseley led his expeditionary force into the Sudan. The critical point was reached when 
Hartington telegraphed Wolseley on 13 March 1885 asking whether the removal of Graham's 
force from Suakin to India would make any difference to his own operations. Wolseley's response 
was that Britain had no business undertaking two wars at the same time in her weak state. 67 
The establishment did increase in response to the 1885 crisis with the addition of 18,000 
men whereas the occupation of Egypt had led to no significant increase. These increases had to be 
made with great care and justification so that the public would accept the need and provide the 
money. Wolseley analysed the public attitude in a letter to his wife: 'The English people howl for 
the conquest of the Soudan, but if you told them that it means increasing the Army by 21,000 
men, they tear their hair and say all the military authorities must be fools and knaves not to have 
an Army fit to bear the strain'. 68 Wolseley and the government were quite right to suspect the 
degree of public support they held: no sooner had the crisis passed than the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Churchill began the campaign both inside and outside Parliament to reduce naval and 
military expenditure which led to his resignation in December 1886. 
66 Cambridge to Hartington, 1 March 1884, in Verner, p308 
67 Journal, 24 Feb. 1885, WO147/8 
68 Wolseley to Lady Wolseley, 26 Feb. 1885, WPP W/P 
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Wolseley's views on alliances were complex. He appears to have viewed alliances as 
necessary only when Britain was in actual danger of becoming embroiled in a major war. The only 
evidence that Wolseley supported Maurice's proposal that Britain should join the Triple Alliance 
of Germany, Austria, and Italy comes from Maurice himself: 'In the course of conversation with 
me, Lord Wolseley had expressed the view that in the present condition of affairs we have the 
strongest interest in joining those Powers who desire to preserve peace, and in resisting those who 
threaten disturbance'. 69 Given Wolseley's readiness to write memoranda on almost every issue it 
appears strange that no memoranda on the subject of alliances appear in his papers or 
correspondence. Had Wolseley shared Maurice's views then it is extremely likely that he would 
have mentioned joining the Triple Alliance at some stage during the 1887-8 invasion scares. It is 
probably more likely that Wolseley shared Dilke's opinion, 'we have to face the fact that we are 
one of the least popular of the Powers, and that if we alone were attacked no hand would be raised 
in our defence' . 
7° 
The question of determining for what purposes the army existed and what were its 
requirements turned on the basic problem of whether any statement issued should be general, 
covering broad issues of imperial defence, or specific, assigning priorities to named regions. 
Wolseley would probably have preferred the latter. This chapter has argued that Wolseley held 
strong opinions on the question of imperial defence and, unlike most of the politicians, was ready 
to accept that some areas of the Empire, such as South Africa, were of more critical importance 
than others, such as Egypt. The Carnarvon Commission had analysed each area of the Empire and 
assigned defence priorities to each region, and like Wolseley, it had emphasised the importance of 
the Cape. The Commission's report was, however, politically unacceptable partly because 
fulfilment of its recommendations and acknowledgement of its system of priorities reacted against 
the workings of parliamentary democracy, since one party could not remove the freedom of 
69 Maurice, Introduction. 
70 Dilke, Present Position, p284. The opinion of Dilke and of Maurice was that since France threatened Britain 
both at home and in her colonies and Russia threatened India the obvious course to follow was to join the 
Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy. Not only would all three powers join Britain against Russia for 
the security of Europe thereby possibly achieving the protection of India, but Austria and Italy had an equally 
strong desire to control French power 
in the Mediterranean. This last point was achieved by the Mediterranean 
Agreements negotiated by Salisbury in 1889. 
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foreign policy decision making from its successors. 71 The legacy of the Carnarvon Commission 
was the Colonial Defence Committee, which served as a conduit for defence plans for the colonies 
without considering the broader issues of desirability and feasibility of defence. 
Another argument against a statement of specific requirements was that it would be 
inflexible. Salisbury argued in a speech to the House of Lords in May 1888 that a statement of 
military purposes was neither desirable nor possible: 
We are to make ourselves safe, it is said. But safety is not an absolute term. You 
cannot write down so many soldiers and so many sailors are what will make 
England safe. They are what will make England safe against some supposed 
attack; you must know what your enemy is likely to be before you know whether 
your preparations are likely to be sufficient... The question of defence is a 
question which involves not only the War Office and the Admiralty, but the 
Foreign Office as well... Therefore, my Lords, I deprecate the idea that it is 
possible for any Government to lay down an absolute standard of safety. They 
must place the country in such a position that it will be safe against any danger 
which it is reasonably likely to incur. 72 
Salisbury was quite correct to point out the dangers of a specific list of military purposes since, for 
example, any such statement drawn up before 1882 would not have foreseen the requirement to 
maintain a garrison in Egypt. Wolseley appears to have accepted this point in Salisbury's 
argument, and his memoranda demonstrate the desire for a loose and flexible statement of the 
purposes and priorities of the British Army which could serve both as a basis for the distribution of 
the army, and for mobilisation planning. 
Wolseley first produced a list of the purposes of the army in an article he wrote for 
Macmillan's Magazine in 1871. His list reflected the current state of affairs: home defence was the 
main requirement, and India, before the Second Afghan War and Russian advances in Asia, did 
not warrant a section to itself. He showed his political awareness too by remembering the danger 
posed to Belgium, whose integrity was guaranteed by Britain, during the recent Franco-Prussian 
War. Therefore Wolseley added to his list 'the liability of having to send a contingent of 100,000 
men to the continent of Europe to assist an ally'. 73 
71 The freedom to change the angle of foreign policy was an important one. For example, the Liberal 
government reversed the Conservative policy of expansion in the Cape in 1881. In 1885 the Conservative 
government briefly reversed the Liberal government's policy of withdrawal 
from the Sudan. 
72 Salisbury to House of Lords, 14 May 1888, Hansard, Vol. CCCXXVI 
73 Wolseley, 'Our Military Requirements'. Britain was also a guarantor of Portugal through another treaty. 
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By 1875 Wolseley's list of priorities had changed substantially. Home defence remained 
the first priority, but the need to provide a 'depot and a small reserve for the army in India' made 
its first appearance. Perhaps as a result of the Ashanti campaign Wolseley also added the need to 
supply small expeditions against 'savage nations'. 74 In a further memorandum in 1880 Wolseley 
concentrated on the immediate tasks of the home army. It again emphasised that the army must be 
able to form 'the nucleus of an army which in accordance with treaty engagements we might at 
any moment have to land in the Low Countries, or to send abroad to vindicate the honour of the 
nation, or to secure some national aim or object'. 75 This memorandum also reflected Wolseley's 
response to the planned despatch of an expeditionary force during the Eastern Crisis 'to secure 
some national aim', and the importance of upholding the honour of Britain by punishing those, like 
the Afghans and Zulus, who dared to damage the national reputation. The memorandum went on 
to outline the readiness to despatch a force of two complete divisions for the defence of India, an 
idea which would develop into the formation of two or three Army Corps for action anywhere in 
the world. 
Wolseley's memoranda were largely ignored, and the short-term responses, or 'half- 
measures' as Wolseley would have called them, continued. By the time Stanhope became 
Secretary of State for War in 1886 it was obvious that the British Army was at breaking point, and 
that one solution was to give it a statement of purposes for which it existed so that the military 
authorities could use this in order to decide the size of the establishment required and the 
necessary organisation and distribution. The result of prolonged pressure from Wolseley was the 
issue of the Stanhope Memorandum on 8 December 1888. This was circulated only to the Cabinet. 
It was reissued in June 1891 but again was not made public. 
A comparison of the provisions demonstrates the debt Stanhope owed to Wolseley's 
memorandum of 8 June 1888.76 In both, aid to the civil power was made the first priority. On the 
second requirement of the army Stanhope contented himself with the vague phrase 'to find the 
number of men for India which has been fixed by arrangement with the Government of India'. 
74 Memo. by Wolseley, 15 Jan. 1875, WOP W37 
75 Memo. by Wolseley, 16 Oct. 1880, WPP W/W1/1 
76 Memo. by Stanhope, 8 Dec. 1888, Stanhope Papers, 0232/2; Memo. by Wolseley, 8 June 1888, W033/48 
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Wolseley, on the other hand, went further in calling for a fixed establishment of British troops in 
India and the coaling stations of '19,000 effective and well-trained young soldiers'. Stanhope 
placed the provision of men for fortresses and coaling stations under another heading, pledging to 
keep the garrisons at the 'scale now laid down'. 
The fundamental differences between Wolseley's interpretation of military requirements 
and the opinions held by Stanhope appears in the last two headings. Wolseley argued the need to 
provide, exclusive of troops abroad, 'three complete Army Corps and six brigades of Cavalry, all 
being of Regular troops. This field army to be in addition to a large force of Auxiliary troops... '. 
This was to provide for home defence against invasion. In contrast, Stanhope stipulated the ability 
to mobilise two Army Corps of Regulars and one of a combination of Regular and Militia troops. 
Lastly Wolseley proposed the additional provision of two Army Corps, one Cavalry Division, and 
the necessary troops for protection of the base and line of communications for action abroad 
without specifying where this force was likely to be deployed. In contrast Stanhope added 
But it will be distinctly understood that the probability of the employment of the 
Army Corps in the field in any European war is sufficiently improbable to make it 
the primary duty of the military authorities to organise our forces efficiently for 
the defence of the country. 
This reflects the attitude of governments following the omission in 1868 from the preamble to the 
Mutiny Act, which defined the purpose of the army, of the phrase 'the preservation of the balance 
of power in Europe'. 
Wolseley was not satisfied with the Stanhope Memorandum primarily because he had not 
achieved his aim of increasing the size of the home army. He wrote in a memorandum in 
December 1888 that 'The mobilisation scheme of 1886 has so misled the Secretary of State, and it 
is feared the Government also, that it is very much to be regretted we did not in the first instance 
pay over excessive attention to the mobilisation of a manoeuvring army for the defence of England 
against invasion'. Wolseley was arguing that Brackenbury's and Ardagh's plans for home defence, 
which will be covered in the following chapter, were based on what was possible, and not on what 
was necessary. The government had not questioned the numbers outlined in the mobilisation plans 
and had ignored Wolseley's demand for greater resources for home defence. Therefore Wolseley 
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concluded his critique of the Stanhope Memorandum by stating that 
the responsibility for that decision is theirs [the politicians'] exclusively. It is not 
based in any degree on the opinions of the military authorities who wish to place 
on record their unanimous opinion that this country cannot be rendered safe from 
invasion with a smaller mobile force of regular troops than three complete army 
corps and a cavalry division assisted by the auxiliary forces of the Crown ... 
77 
The Stanhope Memorandum has been criticised on other criteria too. Adrian Preston has 
argued that its list of requirements was rejected by the Cabinet because insufficient attention was 
paid to the defence of India. 78 This argument is not supported by the evidence because it is clear 
that by this stage the government was already moving towards the position it made unquestionably 
clear in 1892, that India must rely on her own resources. John Gooch argued that the 
memorandum was 'more suited to the conditions of 1818 than 1888', probably because it largely 
dismissed the possibility of Britain becoming entangled in European politics and possibly a war. 79 
It is much fairer to argue, like Edward Spiers and Howard Baffles, that the Stanhope memorandum 
was primarily a document of its time: it reflected accurately current concerns and issues, such as 
aid to the civil power and home defence, and made no attempt to predict the future direction of 
military and foreign policy. 80 Wolseley did not question the order of requirements laid down for 
the army because it closely followed his own list. His dissatisfaction with Stanhope's work was 
that it had failed to use the evidence supplied by Wolseley to pressurise the government into 
increasing the size of the home establishment. Therefore if the determination of military policy 
was insufficient to convince the government of this need, Wolseley would have to seize whatever 
opportunity he was given in the future to press his case for the expansion of the army. His first 
opportunity came when giving evidence to the Wantage Committee, but his real drive towards a 
solution of the manpower crisis came when Wolseley was Commander-in-Chief. 
In the area of imperial defence Wolseley was ahead of his time. He deplored the effects of 
the lack of clear and intelligible principles underlying government policy. His memoranda mostly 
77 Memo. on the Stanhope Memorandum, Wolseley, 30 Dec. 1888, WPP W/MEM/3 
78 Preston, 1875, p66 
79 J. Gooch, The Plans of War, (London 1974) 
80 Spiers, Late Victorian Army. p61; I. F. W. Beckett, 'Edward Stanhope at the War Office, 1887-92'; Ibid., 'The 
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demonstrate that Wolseley had a clear idea of how the Empire could best be defended, and how 
the army could undertake this requirement. His opinions were, however, largely ignored. Britain 
accepted Cyprus as a base in the Eastern Mediterranean without any evidence on its suitability for 
this role. The occupation of Egypt was made for commercial purposes, and military considerations 
were used only later, against Wolseley's advice, as an argument for the continued British presence 
in Egypt. Robinson and Gallagher have identified a clear policy change of British interests from 
Constantinople to Cairo; 8' Wolseley would have argued that this was not a policy decision but a 
mere reaction to events. It was also ill-conceived and of little value. Wolseley never saw the 
occupation of Egypt as requirement for imperial defence, but this opinion, though shared by a few 
others, was largely ignored. Wolseley was a little more successful in his advocacy of a strong 
British position on South Africa. Successive governments were forced to boost the British presence 
in South Africa after the First Boer War and in 1887 Cape Town was formally acknowledged as 
the principal staging post for reinforcements sent to India in the event of war with Russia. 82 
Nevertheless Wolseley argued that the misconceived policy pursued and evidence of British 
weakness in 1881 led directly to the Second Boer War. While at the War Office Wolseley's 
opinions on the defence of India was generally accepted in Britain but not in India and arguments 
on this subject would continue after Wolseley retired. 
Wolseley did achieve the statement of military purposes he desired through the Stanhope 
Memorandum. It was an unsatisfactory document but it was important at the time as a basis for 
future mobilisation planning and as evidence that a government was prepared to examine the 
question of the purposes of the army which boded well for the future. Nevertheless its immediate 
effect was limited, and it has been suggested that Buller, when giving evidence to the Wantage 
Committee, did not know of the existence of the memorandum. Nor, apparently, did Arnold- 
Forster, whose writings include an appeal for a definition of policy. 
83 
The value of Wolseley's opinions on imperial defence was diminished by the lack of a 
forum in which to make them known. He could only submit his recommendations to the Secretary 
81 Robinson & Gallagher, chapter 8. 
82 James, p251 
83 Beckett, Stanhope Memorandum; Arnold-Forster, War Office. p80 
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of State in the hope that he would distribute Wolseley's memoranda to the Cabinet. Wolseley was 
on occasion consulted directly on issues but he had no power to force them on the government; 
policy making remained the province of the Cabinet alone. Had a forum like the Committee of 
Imperial Defence existed while Wolseley was at the War Office there can be no doubt that 
Wolseley would have been an energetic member whose opinions would have been hard to ignore. 
The result was that Wolseley's arguments that the army was too small to undertake all its 
responsibilities and that these responsibilities should be defined according to the requirements of 
imperial defence were largely ignored until the evidence of the Second Boer War made it very 
clear that the size of the Empire was too large for the army to defend. 
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Chapter 7- Home Defence 
The subject of home defence has already been well covered by historians: Howard Moon 
produced a two volume Ph. D. thesis on the subject, and more recently Norman Longmate and 
Keith Wilson have added to the literature. ' Therefore this chapter will concentrate on those aspects 
of home defence closely connected with Wolseley. Wolseley made home defence a priority 
requirement of the British Army whenever he produced memoranda on the purposes for which the 
army existed. This priority was given official recognition in the 1888 Stanhope Memorandum. 
During this period Wolseley was particularly involved in three issues concerning home defence: 
the first was the controversy over whether to build a tunnel under the English Channel; the second 
was the invasion scares of 1887-8; and the third was the relationship between the War Office and 
the Admiralty over the roles the army and navy should play in the defence of Britain. 
Home defence and the perceived threat of invasion were emotive issues arousing 
widespread public interest. This chapter will examine how Wolseley sometimes led and sometimes 
merely responded to public opinion, and how it affected his actions. It will also become clear that 
home defence was one area in which Wolseley and the Duke of Cambridge were in total 
agreement. Furthermore, on some aspects of the home defence arguments they received political 
support, whereas on others they had to faceI the usual struggle to convince their political masters 
of the vulnerability of Britain to invasion. 
Public awareness of Britain's vulnerability to foreign invasion was not a new issue. 
Excluding Ireland, British soil had not been invaded by troops of a foreign power since Culloden 
in 1746, but the threat of France under Napoleon III in the 1860s had forced the government to 
build a series of forts and gun emplacements on the south coast, the so-called 'Palmerston follies'. 
The sight of the huge conscripted armies of Germany, Austria and France manoeuvring across 
Europe prompted more alarm. On 21 January 1871 the former Prime Minister Lord John Russell 
1 H. Moon, 'The Invasion of the United Kingdom: Public Controversy and Official Planning, 1888-1918', 
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echoed the sentiments printed in the Pall Mall Gazette twelve days earlier that England was open 
to invasion and that a force of 200,000 troops, regular and auxiliary, should be retained in Britain 
to defeat an invader. In May 1871 Lieutenant-Colonel Sir George Chesney published 'The Battle 
of Dorking' in Blackwoods Magazine. Reprinted as a 6d. pamphlet a month later, over 80,000 
copies had been sold by the end of that summer. Chesney's work was only the first, though 
perhaps the best, of the new genre of books on invasion. Ten years later Wolseley's follower Sir 
William Butler published his version of threat facing Britain in The Invasion of England. Like The 
Battle of Dorking it purported to have been written by an old soldier looking back on how easily 
England was defeated and aimed to serve as a warning. In 1897 William Le Queux wrote The 
Great War in England in 1897, with a preface by Wolseley. This was adapted with the 
encouragement of Lord Northcliffe for serialisation in the new popular newspaper the Daily Mail, 
and this version was later issued in book form with a preface by Roberts. 2 
Given the popularity of invasion literature Wolseley had an attentive public to which to 
present his opinions on home defence. The first major threat to Britain's domestic security came 
with the proposal to build a tunnel from Dover to the French coast. Initially there was no 
opposition to the scheme. In 1875 the chairman of the London, Chatham, and Dover Railway, Sir 
Alfred Watkin, introduced a Private Member's Bill in Parliament which proposed the construction 
of a railway tunnel under the English Channel. The French government was consulted and agreed 
to the scheme. Therefore permission was granted by Parliament for the company to begin 
experimental tunnelling and the first shafts were sunk in 1880. 
In December 1881 Wolseley wrote his first memorandum on the Channel tunnel. He 
announced that the construction of the tunnel could 
be fairly described as a measure intended to annihilate all the advantages we have 
hitherto enjoyed from the existence of the "silver streak", for to join England to 
the Continent by a permanent highway, will be to place her under the unfortunate 
condition of having neighbours possessing great standing armies... The 
construction of the tunnel would place us under those same conditions that have 
forced the Powers of Europe to submit to universal service. 3 
2 I. F. Clarke, Voices Prophesying War. 1763-1984 (London, 1970), pp32-65 
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He made the same point in a speech to the debating society of University College London: 
conscription was unnecessary so long as the English Channel remained 'neither bridged over nor 
tunnelled under by a band of speculators'. 4 In this memorandum Wolseley also introduced a theme 
he would refer to again later, the speed with which an enemy could open hostilities. He asked his 
friend Maurice to provide the evidence for this belief. Maurice responded by writing Hostilities 
without Declaration of War in early 1883, which listed the occasions in the past when wars had 
begun without a formal declaration. The production of this pamphlet not only provided the War 
Office with some of the evidence it needed to oppose the tunnel, but also served in the future to 
remind politicians of the speed in which countries could move from peaceful relations to war. 5 
Wolseley was urged by the Duke and Childers to make his hostility to the tunnel known to 
the public. 6 Initially Childers arranged for Wolseley's views to be published by Lord Dunsany in 
an article which appeared in the February 1882 issue of the Nineteenth Century. ' The public 
response was immediate: the windows of the offices of the Channel Tunnel Company were 
smashed by angry Londoners, and in April 1882 a mass petition was organised by the editor of the 
journal Nineteenth Century, James Knowles, and was signed by many important public figures 
including 59 generals and 17 admirals. 8 In Parliament two conflicting points of view quickly 
became apparent. Lord Bradbourne, who had an interest in the tunnel company, drew attention to 
the fact that the France felt no threat from the tunnel and that having agreed with France that the 
scheme was possible, drawing back at this stage gave a clear message to the French 'that we 
thought them dangerous neighbours who were not to be trusted'. Lord Strathnairn introduced an 
issue that Wolseley fully agreed with, the danger of Fenian action against the tunnel given the 
acute disaffection in Ireland in the early 1880s. 9 The government was forced to take action, and it 
set up a Joint Parliamentary Select Committee chaired by Lord Lansdowne to examine the 
arguments. The War Office formed a Military and Scientific Committee under Lieutenant-General 
4 The Times, 24 May 1882 
5 J. F. Maurice, 'Hostilities Without Declaration of War', W033/39 
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Sir Archibald Alison for the same purpose. In April the Board of Trade ordered the Channel 
Tunnel Company to stop boring operations until the War Office committee had reported. 
Wolseley was not made a member of the Scientific Committee. Indeed membership of the 
committee would have been of no benefit to him because it was purely concerned with an 
examination of the means of defending the tunnel. In its report issued on 17 May 1882 the 
committee discussed the matter under two headings: the first, surprise from within, i. e. treachery; 
and secondly, attack from without. The report detailed plans for fortifications, closure or 
temporary obstructions such as a portcullis and closing of the air shafts, explosion by mines or 
charges, and either temporary or permanent flooding of the tunnel. 10 The committee's brief had 
not been to recommend whether or not the tunnel should be constructed, but nevertheless a 
recommendation against the tunnel's construction was implicit in its conclusions. Childers was 
prepared to go even further in his support of Wolseley, and asked Wolseley to prepare another 
memorandum based on the conclusions of the Scientific Committee. He urged Wolseley to 'take 
care that it is sent to the public printers for publication in the shape of an official protest. I am 
quite prepared to put upon it officially that I fully concur in the views therein expressed, having 
already done so on your Confidential minute'. 11 Childers's actions demonstrate the depth of his 
hostility to the tunnel scheme for he was encouraging Wolseley to publicise his opinions at a time 
when the negotiations over Wolseley's appointment as Adjutant General had turned partly on 
Wolseley's use of the press. The difference was, of course, that on this occasion Wolseley had the 
support of both the Duke and the Secretary of State. 
In his memorandum of 16 June 1882 Wolseley described his views on the subject at 
length. While agreeing with the conclusions of the Scientific Committee, he went further into the 
question than the committee's remit had permitted them, and entered into the question of the 
desirability of the tunnel per se. Wolseley's principal objection to the tunnel was that Britain had 
been saved from the cost of maintaining huge standing armies on a Continental scale by having the 
natural protection of a 'great wet ditch' protecting her from aggressive neighbours. As early as 
10 Report of the Military Committee on the Channel Tunnel, 17 May 1882, W033/39 
11 Wilson, p37 
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1871 Wolseley had estimated that it was possible for 100,000 enemy soldiers to land on the 
southern shore of England. 12 Other commentators put the figure for a likely invasion force at 
nearer 40,000. In this memorandum Wolseley argued that the construction of a tunnel would 
reduce the figure for a successful invasion to 20,000. These soldiers would hold the entrance, 
enabling reinforcements to be brought over quickly through the tunnel. Wolseley estimated that 
'the seizing of the tunnel by a coup de main it is in my opinion a very simple operation' provided 
no advance warning had been given. He summed up his fears thus: 
It must be remembered that the works at our end of the tunnel may be surprised by 
men sent through the tunnel itself, without landing a man upon our shores. A 
couple of thousand men might easily come through the tunnel in a train at night, 
avoiding all suspicion by being dressed as ordinary passengers, or passing at 
express speed through the tunnel with the blinds down and fully armed... 13 
In his memorandum on the subject the Duke agreed with Wolseley's views on the threat of a coup 
de main by drawing attention to the fact that the Fenians had in the past attacked Chester Castle, 
and that no guarantee could be given that they would not attack the Dover fortifications to coincide 
with a French attempt on the tunnel. 14 
Despite the support of the Duke and Childers Wolseley still needed to convince the 
parliamentary committee of the dangers of the Channel tunnel scheme. In his evidence before the 
Joint Select Committee Wolseley played a very cunning political game. He pointed out that all the 
precautions recommended by the Scientific Committee would be essential to safeguard the tunnel 
in times of peace but might not be sufficient in time of war. These plans were costly, though no 
estimates had been drawn up. Further expenditure would be essential on a regular basis as 'Dover 
was by no means a first-class fortress; indeed, it could only be put into the third-class category' 
Its armament was out-dated, and its garrison only a fraction of what would be essential to guard 
the mouth of the tunnel. 15 Given the cost of building fortifications for the tunnel itself, 
strengthening the fortifications of Dover Castle, installing new modern armament, building 
barracks for and maintaining a larger force in the garrison, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 
12 Wolseley, 'Our Military Requirements', 
13 Memo. on the Channel Tunnel, 16 June 1882, W033/39 
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government rejected the idea of the construction of a tunnel under the Channel. Indeed, it is more 
likely that the cost of providing security was the principal deciding factor in the rejection of the 
scheme, and not Wolseley's somewhat far-fetched fears of trainloads of French soldiers pretending 
to be civilians passing through the tunnel. 
The Joint Select Committee surprisingly reported in favour of the tunnel yet the committee 
was badly divided on the issue. Only three members were prepared to sign the report, and six 
submitted separate minority reports outlining the reasons for their hostility to the scheme. In July 
1883 the government decided to stop the construction of the tunnel permanently. Alfred Watkin 
was not easily deterred from his great project and made numerous attempts to win support for it. 16 
However Wolseley and his colleagues had created so much doubt on the security of the tunnel that 
no government during the period was prepared to announce to the public that it had dismissed 
military opinion on the vital issue of home defence. 
Before turning to a detailed examination of the invasion scares of the 1880s it is useful to 
outline Wolseley's general views on the subject. He is quite correctly associated with the group of 
military men pressing for an increase in both the quantity and quality of the force that would be 
called upon to repel any invader. But this does not mean that he was not in sympathy with the 
demands of the Navy. Throughout his career, in both articles and speeches, Wolseley claimed that 
if he 'had only one million to spend on defences, I would spend it on our Navy. Nevertheless, 
he as consistently disputed the Navy's claim to be the only defence necessary. In an article written 
for the Queen's Jubilee in 1887 he explained why: 
Every extension of our commerce served and still serves to render the 
concentration of our fleets in the Channel for home protection all the more 
impossible. The loss of one great naval battle there would leave our coasts open to 
easy invasion-18 
16 Watkin reintroduced his Channel Tunnel Bill in 1883 and it was swiftly rejected by 222 votes to 84. 
Subsequent reintroductions met with the same fate, although the majority against the bill fell steadily, until in 
1887 it was defeated by only 76 votes. In 1893 the War Office was again asked for its opinion and the 
Adjutant General, Buller, reported that no military man was in favour of the tunnel. In 1894 Watkin 
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British imperial interests demanded that the Navy should be scattered across the world. 
Commercial interests were undoubtedly just as important since Britain was fast becoming a net 
importer of food; although Wolseley felt that Britain had too many ports to allow an enemy to 
blockade her into submission or starvation. The multitude of tasks facing the Navy in time of war 
made it preferable to have 'two strings to your bow'. 19 For these reasons Wolseley wanted not 
only an army of a size and organisation capable of repelling an invader, but also a ring of 
fortifications round London to relieve the Navy of the task of the defence of the capital. 
The desire to publicise the state of the home army was perhaps the overriding factor 
behind Wolseley's manipulation of events in France to create the invasion scares. In 1886 General 
Boulanger became Minister for War in the French Cabinet and he, and his naval colleague, St 
Aube, made a number of bellicose statements on the strength of France. Brackenbury, the head of 
the Intelligence Department, described Boulanger as 'a type of politico-military adventurer', 
whose actions might prove unpredictable. 20 Either Boulanger would direct his attentions towards 
Germany and agitate for the return of Alsace and Lorraine, or he might remind the French public 
of the humiliation France had encountered at British hands when Britain alone had taken the 
opportunity of one of the periodic Cabinet crises of the Third Republic to crush the Arabi revolt 
and subsequently rule Egypt alone. Germany was strong and Britain was seen as weak, therefore it 
was feared that in order to relieve her internal tensions France might turn against her weak 
neighbour to gain some domestic and international kudos. 
Wolseley agreed with Brackenbury's assessment of Boulanger and used it as a means of 
publicising Britain's vulnerability to invasion. There was no doubt that Wolseley had good grounds 
for concern. For example, in his study of the military situation at home and abroad in August 
1886, Brackenbury concluded that although studies had been made of the coasts and the positions 
lying between them and London 
we are still without any organisation for the assembly, the supply, or the transport 
of our scattered forces; we are still without any comprehensive plan of defence... 
There are points on our coast, within an easy four days' march of London, well 
19 Comments of chairman to the meeting of the Military Society of Ireland, 19 Dec. 1894. 
20 General Sketch of the Situation Abroad and at Home from a Military Standpoint, Brackenbury, 3 Aug. 
1886, W033/46 
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suited for the disembarkation of a large force and absolutely without defensive 
works, while London itself... lies undefended at the mercy of the invader. 21 
This assessment forced Stanhope to allow Wolseley to make plans to remedy the situation. 
Typically, the main stumbling block proved to be obtaining the necessary finance. Ironically it was 
the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord Randolph Churchill, who unwittingly provided 
Wolseley with the assistance he required. In a speech on army and navy expenditure at 
Wolverhampton in June 1887 Churchill drew attention to the fact that Britain was undefended 
despite the vast expenditure on the army and navy. Therefore Wolseley could turn this argument 
around and argue that far from the retrenchment urged by Churchill, public support should be 
mobilised to secure further expenditure. 22 
The Cabinet demanded to know whether the situation was as bad as Churchill had 
portrayed in his speech. In a memorandum on the Wolverhampton speech the War Office was 
forced to admit that 'it is true that none of our fortresses are at present armed in accordance with 
the military requirements of the day'. On Churchill's quotation of Wolseley's comments on the 
state of the artillery it was pointed out that the situation was being remedied slowly. The new 13pr. 
was superior to the field guns of France and Germany, and the 16pr. was only slightly inferior in 
velocity. 23 The delays in ordering modern artillery had been caused largely by the reluctance of 
the artillery to change from muzzle to breech-loaders. A further report by the War Office in 1887 
also highlighted the vulnerability of London. Should an invader invest London then there was only 
four weeks' supply of meat, thirteen weeks' of wheat, and four to five weeks' supply of coal 
within the capital. 24 This was assuming that control of the Thames and the railways had been lost. 
Stanhope set up a consultative committee in 1887 to consider the fortification and 
armament of military and naval ports and Wolseley's evidence to this committee illustrates his 
views on invasion. He assigned the priorities of defence to the ports of Portsmouth and Plymouth, 
followed by the Thames and Cork. The first two ports were named because Wolseley, despite 
what his critics argued, did believe that Britain's first line of defence was her Navy, and these 
21 Ibid. 
22 The Timýs_, 4 June 1887 
23 Report in explanation of statements made in Randolph Churchill's Wolverhampton speech, June 1887, 
CAB37/20 
24 Abstract of the report on the meat, wheat, and coal supply of London, 1887, WOP W18/25 
170 
were the two most important naval and military ports. The Thames was of importance because of 
commerce and public sentiment. It was generally accepted within military circles that any 
perceived threat to London would result in a general panic among the population which could 
contribute to the defeat of Britain. If the Navy was drawn away from the Channel to defend 
London, then the coasts would be so much more vulnerable to invasion. Hence the need for 
fortifications around London to relieve the Navy of this task. The naming of Cork provides 
another illustration of Wolseley's distrust of the Irish. The port needed to be defended to make 
invasion impossible and so that Ireland could supply England with troops for home defence rather 
than calling for troops from England. 
Wolseley's evidence is of interest for other reasons too. Unlike most of the military men 
and commentators he saw the main threat as coming on the east coast between Harwich and 
Southend. When the ring of forts surrounding London was mapped out, the north east was indeed 
covered, but it was generally accepted that the main threat lay on the Sussex coast. It is also 
significant that Wolseley, for all his posturing on the danger of invasion, was forced to admit in 
his evidence that 'it is some time since I read and studied that question; I did know them, but I 
have forgotten the various points where troops could be most easily landed. '25 This means that 
doubt can be cast on the depth of Wolseley's knowledge of the invasion issue, and illustrates the 
degree to which he was forced to rely on the information supplied by colleagues such as 
Brackenbury and Ardagh. 
Wolseley's ignorance of some of the finer points of the invasion issue may be excused by 
an explanation of his position in the War Office at this time. Before the 1888 reorganisation of the 
War Office the Intelligence Department was in the office of the Quartermaster-General. After the 
reorganisation of departments within the War Office, the Intelligence Department was moved from 
the office of the Quartermaster General to that of the Adjutant General. This should have meant 
that Wolseley received more information on intelligence matters but the newly-styled Director of 
Military Intelligence, Brackenbury, reported directly to the Commander-in-Chief. In 1888 the 
25 Report of the Committee to consider the Plans for the Fortification and Armament of our Military and 
Mercantile Ports, 1887, W033/47 
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Mobilisation and Home Defence Section under Ardagh moved into the Adjutant General's 
department where Wolseley would exercise a supervisory role. 26 The official situation was 
therefore somewhat complicated, and some of Wolseley's knowledge of the activities of the 
Intelligence Department resulted from his friendship with Brackenbury rather than official 
notification. This could and did lead to awkwardness. In July 1888 Wolseley was asked by 
Stanhope to brief him on the invasion question but, as Brackenbury pointed out to Grove, he was 
unable to provide Wolseley with all the evidence needed to make his case. In this instance the 
problem centred on a memorandum written by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord George 
Hamilton to the Cabinet, which, being a Cabinet document, was not available for general 
circulation. 27 
Wolseley delegated the task of producing schemes to safeguard Britain from invasion to 
his Assistant Adjutant General, Ardagh who produced the first plan in April 1888. The principal 
mobilisation planning had been undertaken by Brackenbury during 1886 but Wolseley directed 
Ardagh to turn his attention on how best to defend Britain from invasion. In his memorandum 
Ardagh outlined the assignment of all the home defence forces, regular and auxiliary, into three 
Army Corps and three cavalry divisions. Of these Army Corps, two would be entirely composed 
of regulars and the third partly of regulars and partly Militia. Behind these would be three more 
Army Corps of Volunteers. After mobilisation these corps would be distributed by brigades or 
divisions at principal railway junctions between London and the coast so as to be able to 
concentrate rapidly when the line of the enemy march became apparent. Two corps would be in 
Sussex and Kent, and the third near Colchester. The Volunteers would be assembled between the 
regular army and London. 28 
Wolseley was not satisfied with the size of the force to be used for home defence and 
turned to the public for support. In May 1888 Wolseley made a speech at a private dinner held in 
the honour of Sir John Pender. This speech, which was critical of the government, was widely 
26 Memo. on the division of staff and administrative duties of the Army at Headquarters, Wolseley, 31 Dec. 
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reported. The row it caused between Wolseley, the Duke of Cambridge, the Queen and the 
government has been described elsewhere. Despite Salisbury's statement that it would 'be 
absolutely not only insane, but treacherous' to discuss matters of home defence in a public forum, 
Wolseley felt put upon to provide a defence of his conduct in the House of Lords. On 14 May he 
repeated his comments on Britain's vulnerability to invasion in his maiden speech in the Lords. As 
a result of this debate on 29 June the Earl of Wemyss placed a motion on the table for the subject 
to be debated further. Forewarned, Lord George Hamilton sought to brief Salisbury on what 
Hamilton called the 'bogus invasion scare' before the debate began. 29 In this debate the 
controversy between the War Office and the Admiralty centred not on the wider issue of 
responsibility for defence but on the narrower issue of the feasibility of the scheme. It became a 
conflict on the quantity of tonnage required to transport an invading army. Wolseley argued that 
ample shipping was always available in the French Channel ports, whereas Lord George Hamilton 
argued that ships would have to be moved from the Mediterranean ports thereby giving Britain 
ample warning of French intentions and alerting the fleet. The conflict between the two sides was 
further complicated by the fact that Wolseley sat in the House of Lords and Hamilton in the 
Commons. Much to the Salisbury government's relief after the public debate in the House of 
Lords on invasion and the statement by Lord George Hamilton in the Commons the differences of 
opinion between the War Office and the Admiralty were voiced in private. 
Wolseley had publicised his differences with the Admiralty over the feasibility of invasion 
and consequently Stanhope asked the Intelligence Department to prepare a memorandum on the 
subject of a French invasion. In its memorandum of 8 June the Intelligence Department appears to 
have given more credence to Wolseley's figures rather than those supplied by the Admiralty. It 
was estimated that it would take the French nine days to have five corps fully mobilised and 
concentrated on the north west coast of France. However, it was also pointed out that since the 
peace strength of the French Army was about 480,000 men, 100,000 of them could be 
concentrated at the Channel ports without any general mobilisation having been declared. On the 
29 11 May 1888,14 May 1888 Hansard, Vol. CCCXXVI; 29 June 1888, Vol. CCCXXVII; Hamilton to 
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tonnage issue Brackenbury estimated that the requirements were one ton per man, 21h per horse 
and five tons per carriage. Therefore 100,000 men, 10,000 horses and 300 guns would require 
130,000 tons gross. Taking the total gross tonnage of the French mercantile marine, and allowing 
for the fact that only one fifth of it was in home ports at any one time, the tonnage available was 
ample to embark 150,000 men and the requisite number of horses, carriages, and guns in one 
trip. 30 The Admiralty figures of the tonnage required for 75,000 men plus horses, guns and 
carriages were 172,500 tons gross. In reply to the question on where invasion was most likely to 
occur, Brackenbury opted for the Sussex coast and noted that 'I am not aware that the Admiralty 
have undertaken the responsibility of watching the approach of an expedition'. 31 
Wolseley's arguments during the debates in the House of Lords had raised Salisbury's 
suspicions on Britain's vulnerability to invasion and on 29 June Salisbury asked the War Office to 
examine how the French Army would prepare for invasion, to produce complete plans for the 
defence of London and the mobilisation of troops for this purpose, to consider the proposal for the 
creation of a coast defence corps, and to plan for the destruction of railways should the invading 
army gain a firm bridgehead. The Admiralty was asked to produce plans for the rapid mobilisation 
of the reserve fleet to counter the invading force should some disaster have befallen the Navy, and 
to examine the feasibility of removing navigation buoys in the threatened area once the invading 
armada was on its way. 32 
The War Office reacted swiftly and produced an extremely detailed memorandum on the 
effective measures to be taken in case of apprehended invasion. This covered all aspects of 
mobilisation including the raising of more men by calling on former regular and auxiliary soldiers 
to re-enlist, and plans for military control of the railways. 33 On 16 July Ardagh produced another 
memorandum that formed the basis of plans for the defence of London for the rest of the century. 
He outlined three means of strengthening the defence of London: augmenting the Navy; increasing 
the military forces in the area; and erecting works of defence. Cost was a primary concern: 
30 Memo. on a French Invasion, 8 June 1888, WOP W18/38 
31 Memo. by W. J. L. Wharton, Admiralty, 18 June 1888, CAB37/21; Wolseley to Hamilton, 8&9 June 
1888, WPP PLB 1 
32 Memo. on French invasion, 29 June 1888, CAB37/21; 6 Nov. 1888, CAB37/22 
33 Memo. on the defence of England, 6 July 1888, WOP W19 
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Ardagh suggested figures of three million pounds to build and maintain a modern warship, £60 per 
regular soldier per annum, £12 per annum for a Militiaman, and £4 per annum for a Volunteer. 
Therefore he concluded 
that the most economical way of giving adequate security to London is to 
supplement the force of the defenders by permanent works of fortification... [and] 
to acquire at important strategical points around London plots of land of just 
sufficient extent to afford sites for these storm-proof batteries which we have 
described, and upon these sites to carry into execution only the absolute minimum 
of work requisite to give them security against assault by the simplest of all 
physical obstacles -a ditch, and cover against the fire of the enemy by a rampart... 
Two rings of defences were planned: one to cover the outer approaches to London along the North 
Downs to the south, and the high ground north of London, and an inner line corresponding 
approximately with the present South and North Circular Roads. The estimated cost would be 
£480,000, which could be spread over a number of years. 34 
Ardagh's memorandum met with a mixed response. The Admiralty and navalists were 
totally hostile to the idea that the Royal Navy alone could not defend Britain against invasion. But 
Wolseley, Buller, and the Duke all warmly supported Ardagh's scheme, arguing in a series of 
memoranda that while they accepted that the Navy should be the main bulwark against invasion 
'we believe that our naval supremacy may be paralysed if, on account of the insecurity of the 
capital, public opinion demands the retention of our fleets at home as our only security against 
invasion'. Therefore it was essential that 'London must be defended by an active army in the first 
line, and a second line in strong position'. Furthermore the plans must be drawn up quickly since 
'already villas and villages have occupied some of the best points for defence on the great chalk 
ridge', and this problem was only likely to get worse as London's suburbs grew. 35 
Wolseley had successfully raised the spectre of a foreign invasion to force the government 
to take the issue seriously. Useful plans were drawn up for the defence of Britain and London, and 
Stanhope was allocated £600,000 for fixed defences around London. The whole line of 
34 Memo. on the defence of London, 16 July 1888, W033/48 
35 Memo. on the defence of London, 9 Nov. 1888; 12 Nov. 1888; 22 Nov. 1888. All CAB37/20; 21 Nov. 
1888, Stanhope Papers, 0232/2. Two notable military men, Sir Edward Hamley and G. S. Clarke, opposed 
the system of permanent fortifications largely on the grounds of cost. E. Hamley, 'The Defencelessness of 
London', Nineteenth entur , 
Vol. XXIII, No. 135, (April 1888); G. S. Clarke, My Working Life, (London 
1898) p45-6. Wood and Butler also recorded the problems encountered 
in finding suitable sites. Wood, 
MW "hi Man, Vol. II, p188; W. Butler, An Autobiography, (London 1911) p355 
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fortifications was surveyed and plans drawn up for the defence works but few were ever built. 
Those that were built were usually little more than extensions to existing military buildings, for 
example Tilbury Fort and Warley. The long-term legacy of the work of Wolseley and Ardagh was 
the construction of 60 'Stanhope storehouses' which proved of great use during the mobilisation 
for the Boer War. 36 
One feature of the debates over Britain's vulnerability to invasion was the revelation of the 
apparently irreconcilable differences between the Admiralty and the War Office. As Wolseley 
pointed out to the members of the Hartington Commission in 1889: 'The Admiralty, to my 
recollection since I have had anything to do with the War Office, have never conceded anything, 
no matter how small, to US,. 37 The government attempted to rectify the situation by setting up a 
number of inter-departmental committees but these achieved little. For example, the Landing 
Places Committee met eleven times between 1891 and 1894 and served only to exacerbate the 
differences between the Admiralty and the War Office. In 1894 its report concluded that there was 
no need for such a committee to exist since an enemy could not get past the Navy to land on 
Britain's shores. 38 The Joint Naval and Military Committee set up in 1891 met with little more 
success. This attempted to solve the problem of how military and mercantile ports were to be 
defended, and tried to differentiate between the responsibilities of the naval and the military 
commanders of a port or harbour. The general conclusion was that the Navy should be responsible 
for everything that floated, such as torpedo boats, and the Army responsible for fixed defences 
such as shore guns. Nevertheless there was scope for disagreement here too. Wolseley pointed out 
that the interests of the two services could differ when, for example, the naval officer in charge 
saw a need to take his boats out of harbour to assist in a local naval battle thereby leaving the 
defence of the ports wholly reliant on military resources. 39 The issue was never really resolved to 
anyone's satisfaction. 
36 Beckett, 'Stanhope at the War Office' 
37 Evidence given to the Hartington Commission, Q. 77 
38 Correspondence between the Admiralty and the War Office on the invasion issue can be found in 
ADM 1/7046; Report of the Landing Places Committee, 15 Oct. 1894, W033/54. This must provide one of 
the few examples of a committee voting itself out of existence. 
39 Memo. on Instructions to General Officers Commanding for drawing up Schemes of Defence for 
Fortresses, Wolseley, June 1887, ADM1/6888 
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The invasion debates also had another unforeseen consequence: the Navy fought back and 
created its own doctrine of home and imperial defence. Four days after Wolseley's speech on 
invasion in the House of Lords, Vice-Admiral Philip Colomb presented a paper at the Royal 
United Services Institute. He argued that all that was necessary for Britain to be secure from 
invasion was an enlarged Navy. With more ships the fleet would be able to achieve the multitude 
of tasks it would face in time of war as well as defend Britain against invasion. In his opinion the 
role of the Army was to undertake limited operations in naval interests such as the defence of 
coaling stations abroad. This lecture has been viewed by some commentators such as Marder and 
Kennedy as the launching point of the Blue Water school of thought. 40 This school called for large 
battle fleets and a large number of smaller ships to maintain a close blockade of the enemy coast. 
In 1890 A. T. Mahan published The Influence of Sea Power on History and in 1892 The Influence 
of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and the Empire. Both books were well received within 
naval circles. While Wolseley disputed Colomb's theories he believed that 'Mahan's books have 
done the country, and the Navy for that matter too, a world of good'. But he remained wedded to 
his idea that the Army had a greater role to play than that assigned to it by the Navy. 41 
It remains to be seen whether Britain was ever seriously threatened with invasion, or 
whether Wolseley merely exaggerated the threat in an attempt to force the politicians to find a 
solution to the manpower crisis. Despite Boulanger's bellicose statements there appears to be no 
evidence that France produced any plans for an offensive against Britain during the 1880s, 
however, the threat of invasion did affect policy in other areas. For example, in 1888 Salisbury 
wrote to Baring urging caution in Egyptian affairs because the French 
already, I am told, look upon a war with England as the cheapest of the three 
alternatives open to them. They are so unreasonable, and have so much incurable 
hatred of England, that I should dread any very glaring exhibition of our 
sovereignty in Egypt at this moment. 42 
40 A. J. Marder, British Naval Policy 1880-1905 (London 1941); P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British 
Naval Mastery, (London 1983) 
41 Spiers, Late Victorian Army p 229; Wolseley to Maurice, March 1897, in Life of Wolseley p285 
42 Salisbury to Baring, 17 Feb. 1888, in Lady G. Cecil, The Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury (London 
1932), Vol. IV p 95 
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In February 1889 Wolseley endorsed this sentiment, fearing war with France over Egypt because 
Boulanger now headed the new French government. 43 
If, as has been argued in this chapter, Wolseley created the invasion scare in order to 
highlight the manpower crisis within the home army, then there is one area, the auxiliary forces, 
to which Wolseley should have paid more attention than he did. The 1886 mobilisation plan 
assigned a vital role to the Militia, Volunteers, and Yeomanry yet all three branches of the 
auxiliary forces were badly under-officered, below establishment, and ill-equipped. Wolseley was 
well aware of the poor state of the auxiliary forces. He spent time speaking at dinners of Volunteer 
or Militia regiments encouraging them to improve their marksmanship, and to relieve the regulars 
in areas such as signalling. But Wolseley made few further proposals to improve the efficiency of 
the auxiliary forces other than pressing for the money to train the auxiliary forces in the areas they 
would be called upon to defend in case of invasion. He was unsuccessful in this area. The result of 
government and War Office neglect of the auxiliary forces was that until Haldane's reforms the 
auxiliary forces were of very limited use militarily, although they did serve the secondary purpose 
of making soldiering a more acceptable profession within society. "4 
Wolseley achieved a notable success in the area of home defence when he successfully 
agitated against the construction of the Channel tunnel. His victory was largely due to the support 
he received from the Duke, Childers, and the press. Wolseley's role and achievements in the 
invasion scares is far harder to assess. He succeeded in raising public and political awareness of 
Britain's vulnerability to invasion, but it must be admitted that work in this direction had been 
begun by W. T. Stead's article on the Navy in 1884 in the Pall Mall Gazette. 45 Wolseley's 
speeches in the House of Lords did make it impossible for the government to ignore the issue. 
With Stanhope's support Wolseley was able to delegate the task of preparing military defensive 
plans for Britain and London to his able subordinate Ardagh. Yet although Wolseley had raised 
public awareness of the invasion threat the army received little benefit: the home establishment 
was not increased: there was no rush to join the auxiliary forces; and only £600,000 was voted for 
43 Wolseley to Cambridge, 18 Feb. 1889, RA E/1/12394 
44 I. F. W. Beckett, Riflemen Form, (Aldershot 1982); The Amateur Military Tradition, (Manchester 1991) 
45 Kennedy, p178 
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fortifications around London. The Navy, however, benefited greatly: it received £21,500,000 for 
the construction of new ships under the 1889 Naval Defence Act, and a further £30,250,000 in the 
1894 Spencer programme. 46 The invasion debates revealed important differences between the 
military and naval plans for home defence. Despite governmental attempts to draw the two sides 
together, naval and military policy continued on different paths throughout the period Wolseley 
served at the War Office. Indeed the disagreement was so deeply rooted that it was not until the 
eve of the First World War that the army could be sure that the Admiralty would spare the ships 
necessary to transport the British Expeditionary Force to France. 47 
It appears therefore that Wolseley achieved very little in the area of home defence apart 
from blocking the construction of the Channel Tunnel. Home defence would become important 
again while Wolseley was Commander-in-Chief, when pressure was put on the government to 
supply the funds for defensive works, and when, during the Second Boer War, the British Army 
was away in South Africa and Britain lay open to invasion. These issues will be examined in the 
following chapter. 
46 Beckett, 'Stanhope at the War Office' 
47 Committee of Imperial Defence, 114th meeting, 23 Aug. 1911, CAB2/2 
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Chapter 8- Commander-in-Chief 
Wolseley's period as Commander-in-Chief has been the subject of much criticism. His 
contemporaries predicted that his appointment would inaugurate a great period of army reform and 
were greatly disappointed. For example, Buller wrote to Campbell-Bannerman in 1899 that 'the 
old Duke seems to have outstayed Lord Wolseley, who has either got office where he is when he 
is no longer the man he was, or else he was never the man I thought him'. 1 Other contemporaries 
echoed these doubts. Lyttelton suggested that 'Wolseley was not the man he had been', and Amery 
made the point which has been repeated by later commentators that 'unfortunately the appointment 
came some ten years too late'. 2 Wolseley had never been known for his tact and diplomacy and the 
circumstances under which he was appointed as Commander-in-Chief, and the important 
alterations made to that post by the Order in Council of November 1895, led to friction between 
Wolseley, the Secretary of State for War Lord Lansdowne, and the Adjutant General Buller. In 
addition Wolseley was seriously ill early in 1897 and Lyttelton and Brodrick have both drawn 
attention to the difficulties caused by Wolseley's failing memory and frequent absences from the 
War Office. 
In the light of these criticisms Wolseley's period as Commander-in-Chief needs re- 
examination. It is necessary to look at what Wolseley hoped to achieve, what he failed to do, and 
discuss the reasons behind any failure. Wolseley began his term of office on an optimistic note, 
setting out his plans for the future in his first public speech as Commander-in-Chief at a banquet 
given by the Clothworkers' Company in London in November 1895: 
It will be my one great object to make Her Majesty's Army a real fighting 
machine, ready to be used for whatever purpose the nation, through Parliament, 
may require of it. It will be my endeavour to make Her Majesty's Army a career 
for all ranks belonging to it, so that men may feel inducements to enter it, either as 
officers or soldiers, feeling sure that they shall have even-handed justice meted out 
to them, and that the men belonging to the Army, no matter to what rank they 
belong, shall have the same opportunity and the same certainty of advancement, 
1 Buller to Campbell-Bannerman, 5 Jan. 1899, BM 41212 
2 Gen. Sir N. Lyttelton, Eighty Years Soldiering. Politics, Games, (London 1927) p170; Amery, Times 
Hi to Vol. 2, p23 
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provided they bring to their work the ability which would raise them in other 
professions in life. 3 
He went on to place great emphasis on the education of the army, both in military skills and in the 
provision of skills which would be of purpose in civil life. These aims were perhaps predictable 
but naturally needed financial and political support to be put into practice. This chapter will 
examine the degree to which such support was forthcoming. It will end with the outbreak of the 
Second Boer War which will be considered in the following chapter. 
It must be remembered that there was absolutely no guarantee that Wolseley would ever 
succeed the Duke of Cambridge as Commander-in-Chief. After the publication of the Hartington 
Report, with its recommendation of the abolition of the post of Commander-in-Chief, the Duke 
seriously considered resignation. The Queen, however, placated him and the Cabinet ended the 
matter by agreeing not to install a Chief of the Staff as a replacement for the Commander-in-Chief. 
In 1895 circumstances had changed. The Secretary of State for War, Campbell-Bannermen, was 
well aware that the Duke's ability to continue in office was fading and that his Adjutant General, 
Buller, was doing most of the work. Throughout May and June pressure was put on the Duke to 
retire from office. He fought a long and hard battle against it using his family connection with the 
Queen to retain his position. In the event it was the Queen herself, realising that there was no 
political support for the Duke, who persuaded him to retire. 4 
The question of the Duke's successor at first seemed to be a simple one; Campbell- 
Bannerman wanted Buller. Since, to Campbell-Bannerman's surprise, Wolseley had not 
bombarded the War Office with proposals for reform while he was Commander-in-Chief in 
Ireland, Campbell-Bannerman assumed that Wolseley had lost interest in army reform and no 
longer considered himself a serious candidate for the post of Commander-in-Chief of the British 
Army. 5 Roberts was easily dismissed as a candidate because of his lack of knowledge of British 
military affairs. The Duke of Connaught, whom the Queen expected to be appointed, was seen as 
too inexperienced, and given the Duke of Cambridge's abuse of his royal connections while in 
3 The Times, 7 Nov. 1895 
4 Cambridge to Queen, 4 May 1895; Queen to Cambridge, 19 May 1895, both in Verner, p395-6; Buller to 
Campbell-Bannerman, 6 June 1895, BM 41212; Bigge to Campbell-Bannerman, 21 May 1895, BM 41206 
5 Campbell-Bannerman to Wolseley, 25 Nov. 1892, WPP 
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office, there was a general unwillingness in political circles for another royal appointment. 
Therefore on 16 June the Queen telegraphed her private secretary, Sir Arthur Bigge, that she 
approved of Buller's appointment. Shortly afterwards the Liberal government fell from office and 
Salisbury formed a ministry and appointed Lord Lansdowne as the Secretary of State for War. 6 
Wolseley had remained largely unaware of the machinations for the retirement of the Duke 
of Cambridge and the appointment of Buller. It was only in July that he was made fully aware of 
the danger to his future plans and began his battle for the post of Commander-in-Chief. He wrote 
to Ardagh on 12 July, 'The blow nearly stunned me, for to be sent about one's business five years 
earlier than even the ordinary general is retired at, and to be superseded by one of the lieutenants 
whom I myself created, is treatment I never contemplated as possible... There has been some 
intrigue at work that I cannot fathom'. 7 A few days later he wrote to Wood on similar lines, again 
suspecting a conspiracy against him: 
I don't envy the feelings or conscience of the junior comrade who consents at this 
juncture to be put over my head. But then all men do not look at such points of 
honour in the old fashioned fashion that I have always felt for the few men who in 
my early life helped me up some of the difficult rungs of life's ladder. 8 
Wolseley felt that he had been intentionally led to believe that the Duke of Connaught would 
succeed the Duke of Cambridge and this was why Wolseley had accepted the offer of the post of 
ambassador to Germany. He accepted that if the Duke of Connaught became Commander-in-Chief 
he would never then, on the grounds of age, hold that post himself but he accepted that the 
Queen's son held precedence. As he bitterly told Salisbury 'My only object in proposing Berlin 
was to make it easier for you to pass me over had you intended to make H. R. H. the Duke of 
Connaught Commander-in-Chief, having learnt on good authority that I was the main difficulty in 
the way of that arrangement'. 9 
Wolseley felt cheated; he believed he had a right to be Commander-in-Chief. He could 
tolerate the appointment of the Duke of Connaught but not of Buller. Buller himself was aware of 
6 Queen to Bigge, 16 June 1895, Buckle, Vol. 2,3rd series, p519 
7 Wolseley to Ardagh, 5& 12 July 1895, Ardagh Papers, PRO30/40/2 
8 Wolseley to Wood, 11 July 1895, Duke University 
9 Salisbury to Lansdowne, 5 Aug. 1895 in Lord Newton, Lord Lansdowne, (London 1929), p131; Wolseley 
to Salisbury, August 1895, in Life of Wolseley, p277 
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this problem. He wrote to Campbell-Bannerman in June 1895 that 'I feel my appointment to such a 
post would possibly pain Lord Wolseley' , and that his loyalty to Wolseley would cause him to 
refuse any offer of the post. He went on to say 'I think moreover that you may not have quite 
taken into consideration, that I have never really been tried as a head man - personally I am always 
inclined to think myself a better second fiddle than a leader of thought'. 10 Once in office Wolseley 
never forgot what he considered to be Buller's disloyalty in 1895 and this coloured the relations 
between the two men. In order to try and improve matters Buller wrote to Campbell-Bannerman 
asking for a copy of the letter quoted above because Wolseley 'has got it into his head that I had 
plotted against him behind his back, and had tried to supplant him in what he held to be his birth 
right'. Unfortunately for Buller he got the date wrong asking Campbell-Bannerman for a letter 
written in June 1897 instead of 1895 with the result that Campbell-Bannerman could not find the 
letter and Buller could not placate Wolseley. II 
The Queen considered that the fall of the Liberal government was a perfect opportunity for 
her to advance the claims of the Duke of Connaught again. On 4 August Lansdowne wrote to 
Salisbury that it had never occurred to him to consider the Duke of Connaught as a candidate. 12 
On the 6 August Ardagh wrote a memorandum outlining the relative merits of the candidates 
arguing that the Duke of Cambridge favoured Buller because he had less talent than Wolseley: 
He would like to have Buller too because he believes he would not go too fast, and 
would have things as they are, until the Duke of Connaught is ripe to step into his 
shoes: whereas he apprehends that Wolseley would make it evident that the army 
could be successfully commanded, and greatly improved without a Royalty at its 
head. 13 
On the following day Lansdowne wrote to the Queen formally recommending Wolseley for the 
post of Commander-in-Chief. He ignored the Queen's objections that Wolseley had promised to go 
to Berlin and stated categorically that political and military opinion was adamant that the Duke of 
Connaught was too inexperienced for the post. Telegrams continued to pass between the 
government, the Queen, and the Kaiser on the subject until finally on 17 August the Queen 
10 Buller to Campbell-Bannerman, 18 June 1895, BM 41212 
11 Buller to Campbell-Bannerman, 28 June 1899, ibid. ; Lyttelton, p169 
12 Lansdowne to Salisbury, 4 Aug. 1895 in Life of Wolseley, p276 
13 Memo. by Ardagh, 6 Aug. 1895, PRO30/40/13 
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telegraphed Lansdowne 'I sanction Wolseley's appointment, but I do not think it a good one' . 
14 
The appointment was made public on 19 August. 
On 9 August Wolseley had replied to Lansdowne's telegram asking him whether he would 
prefer to be Commander-in-Chief or go to Berlin, that he would prefer to be Commander-in-Chief 
'always assuming that there will be no material alterations in the position. Lansdowne replied the 
following day that there would be changes on the lines of Campbell-Bannerman's statement to the 
House of Commons. 15 The next section of this chapter will tackle the subject of the position of the 
Commander-in-Chief under the new rules and then go on to describe how this affected both the 
relations between Wolseley and Lansdowne and the state of the British Army. 
The principal reason behind the recommendation of the Hartington Commission for the 
abolition of the office of the Commander-in-Chief was that it was felt that the Commander-in- 
Chief had too much power concentrated in his hands, and that he was so overloaded with work 
that important areas such as the preparation of plans of war and of defence were often overlooked. 
This is why Campbell-Bannerman drafted an Order-in-Council reorganising the internal 
departments of the War Office and made these changes public in a speech to the House of 
Commons on 21 June. Under the new rules the Commander-in-Chief's functions would be greatly 
modified. The Commander-in-Chief was to be the 'principal adviser of the Secretary of State' but 
associated with him were to be four other military heads of department each 'directly responsible 
to the Secretary of State'. 16 The Military Secretary and the Director of Intelligence would report to 
the Commander-in-Chief. Responsibility for the discipline of the army was to be given to the 
Adjutant General. All heads of department would meet in a new Army Board under the presidency 
of the Commander-in-Chief to discuss questions raised either by one of the members or by the 
14 Lansdowne to Queen, 7 August 1895 in Buckle, Vol. 2,3rd series, p545-6; further letters between the 
Government and the Queen in Buckle, ibid., p 546-53; Queen to Lansdowne, 17 Aug. 1895 in Newton, p133 
15 Wolseley to Lansdowne, 9 Aug. 1895, Lansdowne to Wolseley, 10 Aug. 1895 both in Newton, p132; 
Campbell-Bannerman speech in House of Commons, 21 June 1895, Hansard, Vol. XXIV 
16 The four heads of department were the Adjutant General, the Quartermaster General, the Inspector 
General of Fortifications, and the Inspector General of Ordnance. 
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Secretary of State. On taking office Lansdowne proposed to follow much the same format laid 
down by Campbell-Bannerman and made this public in the House of Lords on 26 August. '7 
Wolseley was stunned by the proposals put forward by Lansdowne. He was aware that 
with the title of Commander-in-Chief the public would hold him responsible for the efficiency of 
the army and would not understand that the Order in Council had devolved this responsibility to 
the Army Board. Wolseley wrote to Lansdowne suggesting 'a few emendations' which he felt were 
of vital importance. He wanted the phrase 'and shall be responsible for their fighting efficiency' 
inserted in the duties of the Commander-in-Chief. He also recommended a return to the old 
phrasing of the Adjutant General's duties, he 'is charged with the discipline' etc., instead of the 
new phrasing making the Adjutant General responsible for the discipline of the army. 
Remembering the financial battles which had so often thwarted Wolseley's attempts at reform in 
the past he suggested that the Accountant-General should be made a member of the Army Board. '8 
These recommendations seemed quite reasonable since it is evident that the commander of an army 
should be held responsible for the efficiency of that army and not merely be considered the 
administrative head which the practical implementation of the Order in Council would imply. 
As ever when joining battle against the politicians Wolseley sought allies from among his 
friends. He wrote to Wood in September 1895: 
It would be a matter of the first consequence to the army that we soldiers should 
hold together to try to guide the new Order in Council to run in military grooves. 
The one great point I shall make is that, you cannot sever Command from the 
responsibility for fighting efficiency, nor can you hold anyone responsible for the 
latter if he is not made, in some way or another, responsible for the discipline of 
that army... I want to state that the Commander-in-Chief is to be "responsible for 
the fighting efficiency of the army" : and that in detailing the Adjutant General's 
duties we should insert that he is responsible for the maintenance of discipline 
"under the Regulations then in force" or words to that effect. 
He reminded Wood that it was in his and Buller's interests to support Wolseley in this struggle to 
amend the Order in Council because one of them might succeed him as Commander-in-Chief after 
Wolseley's five year term had been completed. 19 In contrast Wolseley's great ally, Ardagh, who 
17 Draft Order in Council relative to the War Department, Campbell-Bannerman, June 1895, W033/56; 
Changes consequent upon the retirement of the HRH the Duke of Cambridge, Lansdowne, 12 Aug. 1895, 
CAB37/40 
18 Wolseley to Lansdowne, Aug. 1895, in Life of Wolseley, p278 
19 Wolseley to Wood, 15 Sept. 1895, Duke University 
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had done so much to secure Wolseley the post of Commander-in-Chief, held a very different 
opinion. He was in favour of a reduction of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and, in a 
memorandum to Lansdowne, urged that 'the Head Quarter Staff collectively under the Adjutant 
General should be empowered to press their views and practically overrule the Commander-in- 
Chief in the War Office Council'. 20 Despite Wolseley's appeals for greater powers Lansdowne 
refused to amend the Order in Council immediately, preferring to wait and see how it operated in 
practice. 
Hamer has quite correctly interpreted the key to the poor relations between Lansdowne 
and Wolseley as the dispute over the meaning of the terms 'limited responsibility' and 'general 
supervision'. 21 Wolseley was adamant that his heads of department should not have direct access 
to the Secretary of State, because this implied 'limited responsibility'. Nor did he feel that he could 
carry out 'general supervision' if he did not always know what his heads of department were 
doing. The drive towards the reform of the army needed a leader, but subjecting the actions of 
individual heads of department to the 'general supervision' of the Commander-in-Chief when 
presiding over meetings of the Army Board put Wolseley in the position of a commentator or a 
referee and not a leader. There was the danger that by the time issues were raised at the Army 
Board one or more heads of department might have already gone too far in a direction which 
suited their purposes but which Wolseley might not view as in the best interests of the efficiency of 
the army as a whole. 
At first Wolseley did his best to circumvent the regulations. He ensured that the heads of 
department knew of his dissatisfaction with the regulations and tried to institute a new procedure 
whereby he would be consulted on the actions of the heads of department before any proposals 
were presented directly by them to the Secretary of State. For example, Wood recalled in his 
autobiography that Wolseley ordered him to address him on any matters he wished to put to the 
Secretary of State. The result was that Lansdowne minuted papers to Wood but received them 
back through Wolseley. 22 Lansdowne detested this practice. The P. U. S. R. H. Knox was well 
20 Memo. on the Commander-in-Chief, Ardagh, 6 Aug. 1895, PRO30/40/13 
21 Hamer, p170 
22 Wood, p251 
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aware of the difficulties created by Wolseley's and Lansdowne's opposing reactions to the Order 
in Council and sought Campbell-Bannerman's advice on the subject. Campbell-Bannerman replied 
that he felt that 'the real difficulty is to combine independence with co-operation'. The Army 
Board was the best solution but 'I suspect the Viscount and the two V. C. 's are rather too many 
lions in one cage'. 23 He was right: personal relations were the key to the whole question. The 
members of the Army Board were at, or near the peak of their careers, had known each other for 
a number of years, and consequently battled for supremacy, scoring against each other rather than 
pulling together to produce an efficient army. 
Wolseley identified another problem in the War Office administration as he complained to 
Butler, then in South Africa: 'We are doing little here: I struggle to get the army into fighting 
efficiency, but it is no easy work under present conditions. More and more the W. O. clerk is 
becoming the real ruler of the army, and views and objects are less and less paid attention to'. 24 
Knox was aware of the problem and told Campbell-Bannerman that the soldiers were very 
'restive, ' seeking greater financial control. He also feared the consequences of poor personal 
relations in the War Office saying that 'Lord Lansdowne is so weak and Mr W[yndham] so 
sympathising that I fear we shall go to the wall'. 25 The battle against the War Office clerk and the 
Finance Department over the expansion of the army and the provision of up to date armament will 
be examined later in this chapter. 
In an article for the National Review in January 1897 Spenser Wilkinson made public the 
damage done to the cause of army reform by the problematic organisation of the War Office. He 
argued that the politicians had selected Wolseley as Commander-in-Chief and then 'put him in a 
strait-waistcoat of a civilian war-office and of a council of his own subordinates. Such conditions 
would paralyse a Napoleon, and if the country cares for its military defences, means will be found 
to untie Lord Wolseley's hands'. Wilkinson believed that the simplest solution would be for 
Wolseley to sign a statement appended to the Estimates each year signalling his agreement with 
23 Campbell-Bannerman to Knox, 2 Jan. 1897, BM 41221 
24 Wolseley to Butler, 8 Feb. 1899, National Library of Ireland, 15,997 
25 Knox to Campbell-Bannerman, 18 Oct. 1899, BM 41221 
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them as the First Sea Lord did in the Admiralty. 26 This was by no means a new proposal and had 
been advocated by others such as Dilke many years before. It was as politically unacceptable now 
as then. Lansdowne refused to accept the premise that his decisions were subject to the approval of 
a non-politician, to him to suggest otherwise would be to undermine parliamentary authority. 
The Queen was also disquieted by stories emanating from the War Office of the 
unworkability of the 1895 Order in Council. In February 1899 she seized the opportunity provided 
by the need to amend the Order in Council when the ordnance factories were brought under 
military control. She suggested to Salisbury that the Order in Council might be changed 'with a 
view of re-establishing the position of the Commander-in-Chief, especially with regard to the 
discipline of the Army... He ought not to be a head of a department, but the Supreme Military 
Chief responsible to the Sovereign (the head of the Army) for its military, as opposed to its civil, 
administration'. In March Bigge wrote to Wolseley that the Queen wished Wolseley to visit 
Salisbury to argue his case. Wolseley did so, but as Salisbury wrote to the Queen on 10 March, 
'Lord Lansdowne appears to have conceded the substance of Lord Wolseley's wish, but to resist as 
to the embodiment of that concession in a change of the Order in Council'. He continued to say 
that Lansdowne considered the matter serious enough to threaten resignation, which Salisbury 
wanted to avoid since there was the danger that Lansdowne's resignation would lead to the 
departure of other Liberal Unionists and to a political crisis. Lansdowne had agreed that Wolseley 
should be consulted on matters of discipline by the Adjutant General but pointed out that in any 
case Wolseley had always been consulted on the most serious cases. In May the 
Queen abandoned 
her campaign but she wrote a memorandum to Lansdowne 'The Queen has been unable to modify 
her views upon this important subject. Her Majesty will, however, no 
longer press these, but 
desires that this memorandum may be officially recorded at the War Office'. 27 This was to prove a 
victory for Wolseley. During the in-fighting between the civil and military side of the 
War Office 
after the disasters of the Boer War Wolseley 
knew that he could depend on royal support on the 
26 H. S. Wilkinson, War and Policy, (New York 1900) p295. This book was a compilation of Wilkinson's 
articles which first appeared 
in the National Review between October 1895 and December 1897. 
27 Queen to Salisbury, 9 Feb. 1899; Wolseley to Queen, 8 March 1899; 
Queen to Salisbury & Salisbury to 
Queen, 10 March 1899; Lansdowne to Salisbury, 23 
March 1899; memo. by Queen, 15 May 1899, all in 
Buckle, Vol. 3,3rd series, pp340-65 
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subject of the responsibilities of the Commander-in-Chief. This dispute will be examined in the 
next chapter. 
Spiers has suggested that 'Lord Wolseley, in effect, largely equated army increase with 
army reform. He believed that the army had already been reformed, that the structure was 
basically sound, and that the home battalions would become efficient if only the necessary 
increases were sanctioned'. 28 There is a good deal of truth in this opinion: Wolseley was firmly 
wedded to the Cardwell principle of maintaining a parity between the number of battalions at home 
and abroad, but he was prepared to put forward proposals to make this system more elastic. The 
opening shot in the renewed campaign to increase the size of the army was fired on 25 January 
1896 by the D. M. I. Major-General Edward Chapman. He wrote a memorandum for Wolseley in 
which he urged Wolseley to undertake a new survey of the military requirements of the Empire 
and the purpose of the army as he had done in June 1888. This had led to the Stanhope 
Memorandum in December of that year. In this memorandum Chapman made a preliminary 
survey of the requirements and concluded that an addition of 12 infantry battalions and more field 
artillery were essential to the provision of two efficient Army Corps. He also pointed out that the 
increase in the size of the army would necessitate the erection of new barracks and store houses 
and the supply of additional equipment. 29 
Wolseley anticipated opposition to these proposals if only on the grounds of cost. 
Therefore he wrote a very comprehensive memorandum in February 1896 setting out the 
reasoning behind his proposals for a major increase to the size of the army. He reminded 
Lansdowne that in 1888 he had asked for an addition of eleven battalions of infantry, seven 
batteries of artillery and other miscellaneous additions totalling an additional 23,000 men to be 
added to the establishment. Little had been done since and 'I am not aware that since June 1888, 
any complete survey of our position as regards the personnel and the establishments generally of 
the Regular Army has been submitted for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government'. 
Wolseley's aim was to set down 'a full view of the extent to which the Regular Army can, and of 
28 Spiers, Army & Society, p229 
29 Chapman to Wolseley, 25 Jan. 1896, M. O. D. Library, Military Policy 57 
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the extent to which it cannot, perform what have been laid down as its duties'. He summarised the 
requirements for garrisons in India and the colonies including Egypt, and concluded that a total of 
102,680 men had to be maintained abroad. The home army was manifestly incapable of meeting 
the demand for trained drafts and had been only able to do so by 'a perpetual series of makeshifts, 
by transfers, by enlarged depots, by bounties, by robbing Peter to pay Paul, by the denudation of 
the home cadres, by a succession of struggles and expedients which combine to keep it in a weak 
and exhausted condition'. The Garrison Artillery had only 36 companies at home to feed 67 
abroad; there were 76 battalions of infantry abroad fed by 65 at home; only the Cavalry and the 
Engineers were able to cope with the demand for drafts. He argued that the home army would be 
fit for home defence when the number of soldiers would be increased by the mobilisation of the 
Volunteers, Militia and Yeomanry but even then the artillery needed ten more batteries. Wolseley 
concluded that eleven new infantry battalions were required to balance the system and, if his 
recommendation to send two more battalions to the Cape was accepted, this number would be 
increased by four. 30 
The actuaries were asked to comment on Wolseley's proposals, and in July 1896 
Lansdowne was informed that they would cost £2 million. Lansdowne therefore asked Wolseley to 
reconsider the number of battalions required and to investigate whether savings could be made in 
other branches of the army. Wolseley replied in October that whereas he was approaching the 
question from the military standpoint - what was needed - Lansdowne was approaching the 
question from the political and financial viewpoint - what Parliament thought the taxpayer would 
accept. He agreed on the need to make savings in other areas of the military establishment and, 
after a careful consideration of the demands on each arm, he recommended the reduction of two 
regiments of cavalry of the line, and a reorganisation of the Horse Artillery which would achieve 
an increase of two batteries but reduce the establishment by 156 men. But he remained adamant 
that the Field Artillery should be increased by a minimum of five batteries, the Garrison Artillery 
by 5,048 men, and the Infantry by 13 battalions. He also raised the controversial question, which 
30 Memo. on the efficiency of the Regular Army, Wolseley, 22 Feb. 1896, W033/56 
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will be discussed later in this chapter, of the desirability of stationing some Guards battalions 
abroad. 31 
The memorandum was referred to the Army Board in December. This meeting showed 
that Wolseley's opinions were respected but not going to be accepted without reservation and 
indeed some opposition. The Board agreed to reduce one rather than two cavalry regiments, but it 
supported Wolseley's proposals on the Garrison Artillery, and agreed with Wolseley's argument 
that a total of 77 battalions were needed at home to feed the 77 abroad. The Board then dismissed 
Wolseley's appeal for an increase to the Horse Artillery and reduced his request for more Field 
Artillery to one battery. The Board recommended that one regiment of the Household Cavalry 
should be reduced and the men split between the remaining two and ignored Wolseley's opposition 
to this proposal. It watered down Wolseley's demand for 13 new infantry battalions by arguing 
that, if two new Guards battalions were raised and three sent abroad, the balance of infantry of the 
line at home and abroad would be reduced to 74 and consequently only 7 new infantry battalions 
would be needed. 32 
At this meeting of the Army Board, the first of any major consequence, its members had 
shown the independence of thought that Campbell-Bannerman and Lansdowne had hoped for when 
they were reorganising the War Office. The production of concrete proposals by a board rather 
than an individual strengthened Lansdowne's hand when approaching the Cabinet with the 
proposals for such a dramatic increase to the army. Consequently the Cabinet was more prepared 
to consider the proposals seriously and on 23 December Lansdowne was able to report back to the 
Army Board that he had succeeded in obtaining an increase of £120,000 to the 1897 Estimates, 
which meant that work on the improvement of the efficiency of the British Army could begin. This 
figure was a long way from the £2 million required to carry out all Wolseley's proposals but it was 
a move in the right direction and even Wolseley must have expected that the fruition of his plans 
would be spread over a number of years. Nevertheless the Army Board was disquieted by 
Lansdowne's report. The Board had planned to order a number of 10" and 9.2" guns to modernise 
31 Memo. on the increase to the establishment, Lansdowne, 10 July 1896; memo. on the increase to the 
army, Wolseley, 30 Oct. 1896, 
both in W032/6357 
32 Meeting of the Army Board, Dec. 1896, W032/6357 
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the armament of the artillery but was informed that no new orders were to be issued although 
existing orders would be filled. This decision would have serious repercussions three years later in 
South Africa. Lyttelton wrote to the P. U. S. that the Army Board accepted the need for financial 
caution over the ordering of armaments but added that 'the Board considers that an increase in the 
personnel of the Army is the most pressing necessity of the moment' and one which the Cabinet 
had largely ignored. 33 
Although the Army Board was prepared to reconsider proposals made by Wolseley and to 
temper them with ideas of its own, the importance of Wolseley's role in the drive towards reform 
is amply illustrated by the events of 1897. By the end of 1896 both Lansdowne and the Cabinet 
had been convinced that substantial increases were needed to the army; the question remained of 
what, when and how much. The onus was therefore on the War Office to maintain the impetus. 
However, early in 1897 Wolseley became seriously ill and was forced to take a long absence from 
the War Office. 34 The burden of his work fell on the Adjutant General, Wood who, despite being 
a long-time ally of Wolseley in the cause of army reform, was manifestly incapable of pressing his 
mentor's proposals with the same drive that Wolseley brought to his battles. By September 
Wolseley was fully recovered and embarked on a tour of Britain where he made some 
inflammatory public speeches on the state of the army, which angered the politicians. The 
strongest of these was at Glasgow where he declared: 
Our Army machinery is overstrained and is out of gear. I speak in the presence of 
many whose technical knowledge will enable them to contradict me if I am wrong, 
when I say that, if a machine which is calculated to manufacture a certain amount 
of stuff annually has some 20 per cent. extra work forced upon it, the machine 
will, sooner or later certainly break down. Yet that is what we are risking with our 
Army... Our Army machinery is no longer able to meet effectively the demands 
now made upon it. 35 
33 Memo. on the strength of the army, Lansdowne, 4 Dec. 1896 in papers submitted to the Royal 
Commission on the military preparations for the War in South Africa, Elgin, c. 1789-92, (1904) XL, XLI, 
XLII; memo. on the increase to the establishment, Lansdowne, 23 Dec. 1897; reply of the Army Board, 29 
Dec. 1896, both in W032/6357 
34 Wolseley contracted a throat infection which was then complicated by an attack of jaundice. Wolseley to 
Cambridge, 15 Jan. 1897, E/l/13220 
35 The es, 23 Sept. 1897 
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Arnold-Forster recalled the outrage of the politicians when reading of this statement and recorded 
his own amazement that the Under Secretary for War, Brodrick, should have signalled his 
agreement with Wolseley's arguments. 36 
In November 1897 Wolseley wrote an interesting memorandum for Lansdowne. It 
contained a tactical error, an overview of the defence requirements of the British Empire, and a 
proposal which altered the basis of the Cardwell system of two battalion regiments. The tactical 
error was that Wolseley based his demands for an increase to the home army on the premise that 
three not two Army Corps should be formed entirely of regular troops, a plan which would require 
75 battalions. Lansdowne promptly pointed out that there was no basis for any discussion of three 
Army Corps, that two was the number that had been accepted since the Stanhope Memorandum 
and that figure was to remain unchanged. In his survey of the requirements of the British Empire, 
Wolseley considered the subject of home defence in greater depth than the previous year. He 
pointed out that in the event of a war with France the two battalions stationed in the Channel 
Islands could not be removed and therefore should be deducted from the number of home 
battalions, and that in his opinion a further six battalions were necessary to defend London, Dublin 
and the southern coast, and therefore 83 battalions were needed at home. Since the increase to the 
Guards had been sanctioned 77 of these 83 battalions would be of the line. But the Colonial 
Defence Committee had asked for an extra battalion for Mauritius and another at Bermuda which 
meant that 81 battalions would be abroad since one was temporarily stationed on Crete. Three of 
the 80 battalions permanently abroad would come from the Guards leaving 77 to come from the 
line. The grand total of battalions needed at home and abroad was 154 whereas the establishment 
was only 142, consequently Wolseley pressed for 12 new battalions of infantry of the line. 
In this memorandum Wolseley proposed a revision of the Cardwell and Childers system 
of the organisation of regiments. He argued that the addition of 12 new battalions would balance 
the existing system and 'will give an opportunity for largely extending the four battalion system 
which already exists in the Rifle Corps and Rifle Brigade. Every additional four battalion regiment 
increases our elasticity and our power of having more battalions abroad than at home'. It would 
36 Arnold-Forster, Army Letters, p5 
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also increase Britain's ability to send a small expeditionary force abroad without calling out the 
Reserves. 37 Lansdowne replied that a Bill was under preparation to add a requirement for some 
reservists to serve abroad in small wars and that he did not therefore consider that part of 
Wolseley's argument valid. 38 The subject of the Army Reserve in this period will be discussed 
later in this chapter. Lansdowne did however give his tentative approval to Wolseley's most 
radical proposal, for the extension of four battalion regiments. He set up a committee of Knox, 
Stopford and Wood to examine the question. The Army Board met on 2 December 1897 to 
consider the matter and while it was in favour of four battalion regiments it urged caution 
remembering the outcry over the establishment of linked battalions almost 20 years earlier. 39 
The approval of the principle of making the new infantry battalions part of existing 
regiments was timely because at the end of 1897 success was in sight. On 2 December Lansdowne 
outlined his proposals for the Cabinet; ten new battalions were to be created and the establishment 
of home battalions increased by 80 men. 40 The Cabinet assented to these proposals and in addition 
approved of the abolition of the stoppage for groceries, the abolition of deferred pay (which 
Wolseley had opposed) and the introduction of a messing allowance and a gratuity of £1 per year 
of service in place of deferred pay, and the introduction of a facility to allow discharged men to 
re-engage without refunding their deferred pay. As Salisbury informed the Queen 'The Army will 
be larger and better paid, and the Cardwell system will be rendered rather more elastic. But the 
Cardwell system remains still there'. 41 
It appeared that now that Parliament had voted an increase of 9,000 men to the army 
covering the additional battalions and the increase of seven batteries to the artillery Wolseley had 
achieved all his aims on the size of the army and had set up a system whereby the extra battalions 
could be absorbed into the organisation of the army with the least dislocation. However, inevitably 
perhaps, the Treasury fought back. Lansdowne wrote a strongly worded memorandum to the 
37 Memo. on the increase to the establishment, Wolseley, 3 Nov. 1897, W032/6357 
38 Memo. on the increase to the establishment, Lansdowne, 3 Nov. 1897, W032/6357 
39 Report of the committee on four battalion regiments, 30 Nov. 1897; meeting of the Army 
Board, 24 Dec. 
1897, both in W032/6357 
40 Outline of army proposals, Lansdowne, 2 Dec. 1897, CAB37/45 
41 Salisbury to Queen, 18 Dec. 1897 in Buckle, Vol. 3,3rd series, pp212-3; Wolseley to Lansdowne, 1897, 
Life of Wov, p308 
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Cabinet commenting on the proposals of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hicks Beach. The 
Chancellor wanted only six new battalions but Lansdowne argued that 'we are committed to the 
principle of equilibrium'. The reduction would be accepted by the War Office if the Colonial 
Secretary was prepared to announce in Parliament that the four battalions over establishment for 
South Africa but at present stationed there could be safely removed. He was quite safe in making 
this proviso knowing that the Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain was highly unlikely to make 
any such statement for reasons to be examined in the following chapter. Lansdowne also noted that 
whereas the Army Board had asked for an addition of 100 men to each battalion of the home 
establishment, Lansdowne had reduced this to 80 and was not prepared to accept the Treasury's 
further reduction to 60. The Treasury also disputed the figures proposed by the War Office on the 
amount of deferred pay; Lansdowne pointed out that the adoption of the Treasury's proposals 
would send soldiers back into civil life with only £5, which was clearly an inadequate figure. 42 To 
Wolseley's dismay the Treasury succeeded in pressing some of its points. On 3 February 1898 
Lansdowne informed the Army Board that recruiting could be opened for six new battalions: the 
decision on which regiments could raise new battalions was to be left to the discretion of the Army 
Board. 43 The establishment of home battalions was to be raised to 800 men, which demonstrated 
that Lansdowne had won over the Treasury on that point. 
The addition of six new battalions of infantry of the line was the end result of the 
protracted battle between the War Office and the Treasury. It was in one sense a defeat for 
Wolseley since it represented a major reduction from the figure of 12 or 13 new battalions asked 
for in his memoranda. But it was a substantial increase and Wolseley was a pragmatist who would 
have expected the Treasury to produce vociferous opposition to his proposals. His proposals on the 
infantry had been halved but he had succeeded in winning a major though gradual augmentation of 
the artillery: for example, in 1897 seven new batteries of Horse Artillery were voted. Despite their 
differences over the interpretation and usefulness of the 1895 Order in Council, and their poor 
opinions of each other, Wolseley and Lansdowne had worked well together 
in the battle to 
42 Note on proposals made by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer on the strength of the army, Lansdowne, 26 
Jan. 1898, CAB37/46 
43 Memo. on increase to establishment, Lansdowne, 3 Feb. 1898, W032/6357 
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increase the size of the army. Indeed Lansdowne was so keen to press his proposals on the Cabinet 
that in February 1898 he again offered his resignation to Salisbury if his Cabinet colleagues would 
not support him. Spiers has argued that Lansdowne moved beyond the wishes of Wolseley and 
Haliburton with the increase of six new battalions to the army but the memoranda quoted above 
show that Wolseley was very much the leader in the battle for the increase. 44 Nevertheless it is 
true that Lansdowne was more forward than Wolseley in securing minor alterations, such as the 
abolition of stoppages, which it was thought would have a beneficial effect on recruitment. 
Recruitment was the next urgent problem facing the War Office. 
The struggle to obtain a sufficient number of recruits to ensure the smooth working and 
the continuation of the short service system before Wolseley became Commander-in-Chief has 
already been discussed in an earlier chapter. It became clear that Wolseley believed that a 
sufficient number of suitable recruits would be forthcoming if the army were better paid. As 
Commander-in-Chief he pressed the same point. At a discussion of the military prize essays at the 
United Services Institute in 1898 Wolseley repeated his earlier opinions: 
I believe that the voluntary system, which has served us so long, will serve us still 
if we only adopt the common-sense idea about an article, viz., that if you want to 
buy an article you have to pay for it... As long as you make the Service popular 
with the people from whom you expect to get recruits you will be able to get as 
many as you want... With regard to the inducements that ought to be held out, I 
think, to a man to enlist, those inducements can be either in the shape of money, 
or they might be in the shape of employment when he leaves the Army. 45 
Lansdowne and Brodrick were to some extent in agreement with Wolseley's views. Brodrick noted 
during the debate on the Estimates in February 1898 that the army was forced to compete for men 
with the more popular Navy and that paying the soldier the same as the men were paid at 
Agincourt meant that the best men avoided the army. Lansdowne pointed out that the army sought 
30,000 recruits annually, the Militia 35,000, the Volunteers and Yeomanry 42,000, and the Navy 
15,000 and that therefore 'it is clear that we are severely taxing the recruiting capacity of the 
country' . 
46 Therefore the War Office had to reconsider how it could compete with these other 
services for the best men. 
44 Lansdowne to Salisbury, 2 Feb. 1898 in Newton, p149; Spiers, Army & Society, p225 
45 JR Vol. 41, (1898), pp25-45 
46 H_, Vol. XXXVI, 25 Feb. 1898; memo. on army proposals, Lansdowne, 2 Dec. 1897, CAB37/45 
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Lansdowne dismissed Wolseley's appeal to increase the basic pay of the soldier. He 
argued that if the pay of the home army was increased then pressure would be brought to increase 
the pay of the soldier in India which would further strain the already stretched purses of the Indian 
taxpayer and be politically dangerous. In January 1898 Lansdowne suggested that an increase in 
the number of three year enlistments might provide a temporary solution to the recruiting crisis, as 
it had done in the Foot Guards in the 1880s. The Army Board replied that since these men would 
be ineligible for foreign service they should be considered supernumerary to the establishment. 47 It 
is apparent that Lansdowne was seeking a temporary solution to a fundamental problem for 
political reasons. Having secured a major increase to the army he needed to be able to announce in 
Parliament that the men had been found. He appeared to be less concerned with the efficiency or 
usefulness of these men, it was numbers that counted. In contrast the Army Board could see little 
point in a large number of three year enlistments. These soldiers would be ineligible for foreign 
service and would therefore not assist with the difficulties caused by the need to send large 
numbers of drafts to the army abroad. Nor would most of these men be efficient in time to be of 
any use in small wars which was again a major concern of the War Office. Therefore the Army 
Board placed more emphasis on the agreement to increase the establishment of all home battalions. 
By May 1898 Lansdowne was made aware that a major recruiting crisis existed in the 
artillery, particularly in the Garrison Artillery. The Garrison Artillery was an unpopular arm of 
the service; the men were isolated in small garrisons spread throughout Great Britain and the 
Empire and faced little chance of seeing action. The problem of finding recruits was by no means 
a new one; since its separation from the Field Artillery in 1887 it had been under establishment in 
virtually every year. In 1898 this had reached crisis point when it was nearly 400 men under 
establishment. To rectify the situation Lansdowne wrote to Wolseley explaining that two 
expedients had been suggested to him, an example of how he received advice from his heads of 
department without prior reference to Wolseley. These expedients were that either cavalry 
47 Ibid.; memo. on short service, Lansdowne, 12 Jan. 1898; meeting of the Army Board, 24 Jan. 1898, both 
in W032/6892 
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reservists should be encouraged to join the artillery, or that a special force of highly paid men 
should be recruited on long service specifically for garrison work. 48 
Wolseley's response was predictable. The cavalry reserve was needed for mobilisation and 
was not available for garrison work, and recruitment for the Garrison Artillery was poor because 
men expected financial compensation for the tedium of their work. He was particularly hostile to 
the proposal to raise a special long service force because 'I am against all attempts to revert to 
long service, and I gather that the germ of these proposals is of such a nature'. 49 Nearly 30 years 
after the introduction of short service and despite its confirmation in the report of the Wantage 
Committee Wolseley was still suspicious of any attempts to undermine the sanctity of the Cardwell 
system of short service. Wolseley also argued that the army had been subjected to a short period of 
intense reform and needed rest and was against any further 'experiments. This is an example of 
the reformer turning conservative, as his predecessor had when similarly faced with a large 
number of radical proposals. Brodrick commented to Lansdowne that Wolseley appeared to have 
misunderstood the proposals. Wolseley believed that men were efficient up to 12 years service and 
therefore Brodrick could see no reason for Wolseley's opposition to the idea that these 12 years 
should be spent entirely in the colours under special terms of enlistment. 50 The Army Board was 
also prepared to discuss the question of the raising of a veteran corps of 5,000 men for the 
Garrison Artillery whereas Wolseley was isolated in his total opposition to the scheme. In a last 
ditch attempt to thwart the scheme Wolseley reminded Lansdowne that he had seen veteran corps 
in action in Canada back in the 1860s and had not been impressed. 51 But Wolseley forgot that the 
men to be recruited under Lansdowne's and the Army Board's scheme would be only between 30 
and 40 years of age and still fit enough for the undemanding work of maintaining garrison 
fortresses. Wolseley did, however, make the valid point that the proposals were contrary to the 
government's attempts of the last 30 years to reduce the size of the pension list. The scheme was 
48 Lansdowne to Wolseley, 16 May 1898, W032/6768 
49 Wolseley to P. U. S., 7 June 1898, W032/6768 
50 Brodrick to Lansdowne, 13 June 1898 
51 Meeting of the Army Board, 7 July 1898; Brodrick to Lansdowne, 18 July 1898; Wolseley to Lansdowne, 
28 July 1898, all in W032/6768 
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not put into practice and by 1899 the deficit in the Garrison Artillery establishment had risen to 
549 men. 
The question of the quality of recruits before 1895 has already been discussed in a 
previous chapter. It was soon apparent that the increase to the army of six battalions made the 
existing problems worse. At the end of 1898 Lansdowne reported to the Cabinet that three new 
battalions had been raised and three more were being recruited. He added that although many 
specials had been enlisted most reached the standard within a few months. Nevertheless he felt 'it 
cannot, however, be pretended that the present rate of progress is such to relieve us of anxiety as 
to the possibility of filling the enlarged cadres of the Army on the terms we now offer'. 52 
Wolseley felt more anxiety than Lansdowne. For public consumption he remained an optimist 
writing to Dilke that the British Army was in a good state and had 'the power of striking a blow 
abroad with far greater readiness than we ever had'. 53 In private he was a pessimist, telling Butler 
that recruitment was in an appalling state: 'over one third are below even the low physical 
standard laid down for recruits. In fact at this moment over one half of the Home army are unfit to 
carry a pack or do a week's -I might perhaps say a day's hard work in the field'. 54 Wolseley 
could see no solution to this critical situation other than a substantial increase in pay. He was 
supported in this opinion by the Army Board. 
One solution to the War Office's difficulty in finding enough efficient soldiers to serve 
abroad was to utilise the Guards. The proposal to send the Guards abroad had first been proposed 
by Stanhope in July 1891 when the War Office faced the urgent problem of finding replacements 
for the three battalions demanded by and sent to India. Stanhope proposed to increase the size of 
the Brigade of Guards by adding a battalion to the Coldstream Guards, and merging the single 
battalion Cameron Highlanders with the Scots Guards to form a third battalion. The Guards would 
then be composed of nine battalions, three of which would serve on the Mediterranean stations and 
be relieved every three years. 55 The opposition to this proposal was vociferous. Former 
52 Memo. on increase to army and recruitment, Lansdowne, 13 Dec. 1898, CAB37/48 
53 Wolseley to Dilke, 1 Feb. 1899, Dilke Papers, BM 43916 
54 Wolseley to Butler, 8 Feb. 1899, Dublin, 15,997 
55 Meeting of the War Office Council, 31 May 1891, WO163/4; Stanhope to Queen, 31 July 1891, Stanhope 
Papers, 0250/4 
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Guardsmen and the Queen's Private Secretary Sir Henry Ponsonby refused to contemplate sending 
the Guards out of Britain during peace arguing that abroad they could not fulfil their function as 
the 'Queen's Guards'. The Queen herself opposed the idea of abolishing the Cameron Highlanders 
by making them the third battalion of the Scots Guards. 56 The debate continued into the next 
government and Campbell-Bannerman reluctantly abandoned both of Stanhope's proposals in 
1893. The opposition to the proposals was too strong and Campbell-Bannerman lost the support of 
his superior Rosebery who argued that 'Europe might think we were coming to our last gasp when 
we send the Guards out of England... ' . 
57 
Wolseley had not been involved in the debate since he was then serving as Commander-in- 
Chief in Ireland. Wolseley had an equivocal opinion of the Guards. On the one hand he saw them 
as a bastion of conservatism and a visible manifestation of all that was wrong with the opinions of 
that great defender of the Guards, the Duke of Cambridge. On the other hand he had been 
impressed by the performance of Guardsmen in Egypt and on the Khartoum expedition and 
recognised that, despite their infatuation with totally impractical fighting dress, they were 
exceedingly good troops in action. Once he became Commander-in-Chief Wolseley realised that 
the War Office was at the 'last gasp' when it came to finding efficient men for service abroad and 
consequently in 1896 he revived the scheme for sending the Guards abroad in peace. He wrote to 
the Duke of Connaught in November 1896 that the subject of the Guards 'has long been a hobby 
of mine', and that by adding the two battalions to the Guards according to Stanhope's scheme, the 
Guards would be in a better position to be called upon for small wars. He proposed sending three 
battalions of Guards to form the peace garrison of Gibraltar. 58 He repeated this argument in a 
letter to the Queen's Private Secretary, Sir Arthur Bigge in January 1897: 'If it becomes known in 
the Army that this addition to the Army was prevented because a certain set of Guards' officers 
56 Ponsonby to Brodrick, 2 Aug. 1891, Stanhope Papers, 0250/4; meeting of the War Office Council, 6 
Nov. 1891, WO163/4; Stanhope to Queen, 10 Nov. 1891,0250/4; Stanhope to Salisbury, 14 Dec. 1891, 
Salisbury Papers 
57 Campbell-Bannerman to Queen, 3 Nov. 1892, Campbell-Bannerman Papers, BM 41206; Queen to 
Campbell-Bannerman, 22 Dec. 1892 in Wilson, CB, p174; Campbell-Bannerman to G. J. Campbell, 23 Jan. 
1893, BM 41233; Campbell-Bannerman to Harcourt, Feb. 1893 in Spender, p127; Rosebery to Campbell- 
Bannerman, 4 Feb. 1893, BM 41226; undated memo. on the question of the Brigade of Guards being sent on 
colonial duty, Cambridge, in Verner, pp412-4 
58 Wolseley to Connaught, Nov. 1896 in Life of Wolseley, p311 
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objected to all foreign service in peace, it would be in future practically impossible to give them a 
share in all our little wars as it has always been my endeavour to do'. 59 Somewhat surprisingly 
given the strength of his opposition to the scheme when proposed before, the Duke of Cambridge 
wrote to Wolseley signalling his acceptance that the Guards must be prepared 'to make this slight 
sacrifice to their individual comforts and convenience' in order to benefit the efficiency of the 
army in general. 60 With the support of the Duke of Cambridge, royal and political opposition fell 
away, the opinions of Guards officers were ignored, and the Guards were sent to Gibraltar. 
An earlier chapter has argued that Wolseley wholeheartedly supported the concept of the 
Army Reserve, and had put forward many proposals to ensure its size and regular training. He had 
been opposed to proposals made in 1881 by Childers and later by Stanhope, with the support of 
the Duke of Cambridge, that the men of the Army Reserve should be made liable for recall for 
small wars during the first year of reserve service. This debate was rekindled by Buller in June 
1895 shortly before Wolseley's appointment as Commander-in-Chief. Buller argued that 'the main 
blot on our military system is the failure of the Reserve to support our forces on the outbreak of a 
small war'. He argued for an alteration in the terms of enlistment so that all soldiers would be 
liable to be recalled to the colours during the first nine months of their service in the Army 
Reserve. This, he claimed, would provide 16,000 trained men immediately. 61 The subject of 
giving the government the power to recall men to the colours for small wars was discussed at a 
meeting of the Army Board in February 1896. The Army Board was favourable to the suggestion 
and only the Under Secretary of State, Brodrick, aired doubts as to the wisdom of offending 
employers. Wolseley appeared to have ignored the fact that a major revision of the Army Reserve 
was under discussion, and instead focused his attention on the minutiae of how the Reserve could 
be used for small wars. 62 
The terms of the recall for service in the Reserve Forces Act of 1882 meant a general call 
up irrespective of where most men were needed. To this end a move was made to amend Section 
59 Wolseley to Bigge, 7 Jan. 1897 in Buckle, Vol. 3,3rd series, pp116-7 
60 Wolseley to Cambridge, 17 Nov. 1896, Cambridge to Wolseley, 19 Nov. 1896 both in Verner, pp414-5 
61 Memo. by Buller, 1 June 1895, W032/8719; the same wording was used by Lansdowne in a memo. on 
23 March 1896. W032/6720 
62 Meeting of the Army Board, 14 Feb. 1896, W0163/4b 
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14 of the Act which stipulated that a Reserve man could be appointed to any corps but could only 
be transferred to another branch of service either with his agreement or on a temporary 
attachment. In February 1896 Wolseley argued that the men should only be recalled to the units 
with which they had served before. This move was a little surprising given that while a 
commander in the field Wolseley had not shown the least interest in esprit de corps and had taken 
men from wherever necessary to fill his expeditionary force with experienced men. A month later, 
in March, Wolseley changed his tune. He had discovered that if the recall to service was made by 
classes then the Army Service Corps would be short of 650 men and the cavalry 4,000 in excess. 
Therefore Wolseley now favoured an amendment of Section 14. The Deputy Judge Advocate 
General reported to the Army Board that a wholesale batch of 'temporary attachments' to other 
branches, which Wolseley had originally suggested, would be against the spirit of the law. After 
the question was discussed thoroughly at the Board meeting Wolseley withdrew his support for an 
amendment of Section 14.63 
Nevertheless, the government went ahead with its plans to amend the Reserve Forces Act 
to add the liability for recall during the first year of Reserve service, and to gain the power to send 
men where they were required. Lansdowne outlined the reasons why these measures were 
necessary: 
If ordered on active service, the battalion, which should consist of 1,057 men of 
fighting age and efficiency, would have only about 450 men qualified for 
service... Returns have been compiled which prove that if men, during their first 
year in the Reserve are more liable to recall to the Colours for war or warlike 
expeditions, we shall, at any moment, be ready to send on service a perfect force 
of 20,000, which is considered the maximum required for circumstances which 
would not admit of the Reserve, as a whole, being called out. M 
The Bill was presented to Parliament in the 1896 Session and was rejected. Wolseley suggested to 
the Inspector-General of the Auxiliary Forces that the military MPs had opposed the measure as 
being destructive of regimental spirit since it meant posting men to strange corps. Wolseley 
proposed to get over this difficulty by inserting a clause stipulating that men should only be posted 
to their own corps but Wolseley would then offer them a bounty to volunteer for the units where 
63 Ibid. and Meeting of the Army Board, 2 March 1896, W0163/4b 
64 Memo. on the draft Bill to amend the Reserve Forces Act, 1882,23 March 1896, W033/56 
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they were most needed. This would be only a temporary expedient to tide the Army over the 
period before which men enlisted under the amended terms were joining the Army Reserve in 
large numbers. Until then he supported the measure whereby soldiers in the Reserve who had 
enlisted before the amended Act was passed would be compensated by an additional 2d. a day 
during the period of their liability for service. 65 
Given Wolseley's active participation in these measures, the debate that followed seems 
extraordinary. In November 1897 as discussed earlier, Wolseley had written to Lansdowne calling 
for an increase of 12 battalions to the Army. Included in his long list of reasons why the increase 
was essential Wolseley wrote 'If given, it will enable us to meet the third demand on our Army, 
that namely, of being abler to send a small force abroad without the help of the Reserve'. 66 
Lansdowne replied with some puzzlement since he had thought that the whole point of the Reserve 
Forces Bill that had been drawn up was to make reservists liable for service during their first year 
in Reserve and that therefore there was no question of sending home battalions abroad to fight a 
war without them being strengthened by the addition of some reservists. Wolseley's reply stunned 
Lansdowne: 
The proposal to bring a Bill last Session of Parliament to make the Army Reserve 
in their first year of service liable to be recalled to the Colours for service for 
which they were not originally intended, was not proposed by any military adviser 
of the Secretary of State. When the proposal was discussed by the Army Board, it 
was felt that the men to be made liable during the first year of their Reserve 
service for further service in the Ranks, should be only liable to such recall, in the 
event of war or of imminent war. 67 
While it is true that most of the impulse towards amending the Reserve Forces Act came from the 
civil side of the War Office, all questions relating to the subject were discussed thoroughly at the 
meetings of the Army Board which Wolseley attended. These discussions show that Wolseley 
appeared to have forsaken his argument that a sufficient number of volunteers from the Army 
Reserve would continue to offer their services for small wars. The amended Reserve Forces Act 
containing a liability for foreign service was passed in the 1898 Session of Parliament. Under the 
terms of the Act 5,000 reservists were offered additional pay if they volunteered to be liable for 
65 Memo. on the Army Reserve, 14 October 1896, W032/6720 
66 Memo. by Wolseley, 3 Nov. 1897, W032/6357 
67 Memo. by Lansdowne, 5 Nov. 1897; memo. by Wolseley, 13 Nov. 1897; both W032/6357 
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recall to the colours in the event of a small war. 68 This was the proposal first put forward by 
Stanhope in 1892 which had been rejected by the Duke of Cambridge. 
One other point of importance with regard to the Army Reserve must be made: the 
increase of additional battalions to the army actually had the effect of decreasing the size of the 
Reserve. Not only did the influx of young untrained men into the ranks necessitate the retention of 
experienced soldiers to train them and provide a solid backbone to the new battalions, but the 
military authorities went further and recalled some men from the Reserve to add support. This 
latter move was very controversial. The crucial discussion took place in a meeting of the Army 
Board in January 1898. Lansdowne took the lead by suggesting that men would be needed from 
the Reserve during the next two or three years to lessen the strain of the overall increase in the 
size of the army coupled with the demand from India for additional drafts. Wolseley put forward a 
proposal to invite infantry reservists who had at least two years Reserve service remaining to 
rejoin the colours for service in the particular regiments to be strengthened, but he was not at all 
happy about this, particularly if the numbers to be invited and the period of their extended services 
were to be unlimited. He professed to believe that a sufficient number of recruits would be 
forthcoming so as to make the recall of reservists unnecessary, but was prepared to accept the 
arguments of his colleagues that the immediate requirement was for trained men and not a large 
number of raw recruits. He gave his assent to the proposal to use the Reserve for this purpose only 
when Lansdowne convinced him that 'this recall of men from the Reserve must be regarded as a 
purely temporary expedient to meet a temporary demand'. 69 The result was that the size of the 
First Class Army Reserve fell from nearly 71,000 in 1897 to just over 62,000 in 1899. 
This fall in the size of the Army Reserve made the situation far more serious than it had 
been in 1891, when, as described above, the army would already have encountered great 
difficulties in conducting a war of any length or complication with the Reserve at its existing size. 
Wolseley attempted to bring home the seriousness of the worsening situation in a memorandum to 
Lansdowne in January 1899 when he pointed out that, if after mobilisation, two Army Corps were 
68 Spiers, _Late 
Victorian Army p62 
69 Meeting of the Army Board, 6 Jan. 1898, W0163/4b 
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sent abroad then 33,371 Army Reservists would be needed to complete the infantry battalions to 
their war establishment of 1,103 men. This meant that only 22 battalions of the 54 in the two 
Army Corps could be completed using their own reservists; the other battalions would have to 
borrow men from elsewhere. This would leave only 12,330 line reservists at home to replace 
casualties. It was estimated that approximately ten men per battalion per month would reach the 
age to be drafted abroad. If a draft of 2,000 men was sent out two months after the embarkation of 
the field force to each of the 50 battalions in the two Army Corps, ignoring the needs of the four 
battalions on the line of communications, then 10,000 men would be required, leaving only 2,032 
Guards and 298 line reservists to make up the next draft. Therefore Wolseley emphasised the fact 
that after a period of four months the Militia would have to be embodied. 70 Lansdowne was not 
convinced that the situation was that serious and replied that there was a 'liberal surplus' of 
reserves for drafts. 7' It thus appears that Wolseley was unable to raise the Army Reserve to the 
size necessary for it to fulfil the dual functions as substitute and supplement to the home 
establishment, owing to circumstances over which he had little control. 
As Commander-in-Chief Wolseley continued his struggle to ensure that only the best men 
were selected for the higher ranks of the army and for staff appointments. In January 1896 
Wolseley wrote to the P. U. S. that he had decided that 'I shall refuse to recommend any colonel for 
promotion whom I do not believe to be fit to command troops in the field as a Major General... 
This disposes of the question of "seniority versus efficiency". ' He outlined his plans to continue 
the reduction in the General Officers' List which he felt was 'encumbered by useless and 
inefficient men some of whom are now employed. Wolseley announced his intention to write to 
eight of the worst senior officers on the half-pay list to inform them that they had no chance of 
further employment and should retire from the army. 72 Wolseley wrote to the Commander-in- 
Chief in India, Sir George White, asking for his recommendations of suitable men for rapid 
advancement so that officers serving in India would have the same chance of promotion as those 
70 Memo. by Wolseley, 7 Jan. 1899; memo. by Stopford, 4 Jan. 1899. Both in Elgin Documents 
71 Lansdowne to Wolseley, 17 Jan. 1899, Elgin Documents 
72 Memo. on selection, Wolseley, 21 Jan. 1896, W032/6297 
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officers serving at home. 73 Wolseley's drive in this area earned him some admiration and some 
criticism. He met with the approval of Lansdowne who wrote to Salisbury that Wolseley was 
'determined to get rid of incompetent senior officers, and we are now very particular not only as 
to the colonels, but as to the seconds in command of regiments. I fancy that in many quarters he is 
already attacked as "ruthless". t 74 Ruthless or not, Wolseley was adamant that this process was 
essential for the good of the army despite the opposition he met from within the War Office. 
The Promotion Board had been set up in 1890 to make recommendations on appointments 
and to temper the overwhelming influence of the Commander-in-Chief. At the time Wolseley had 
approved of this, but now he was Commander-in-Chief his belief in his own sense of justice and 
ability to choose the right men was so strong that he saw little necessity for a Board to make 
recommendations for him. Grove wrote a memorandum in October 1896 correcting Wolseley's 
opinions on the means of promotion. He proposed that in future all promotions to the rank of 
Major General would be by selection but insisted that these would be made by the Promotion 
Board and not by Wolseley alone. 75 In fact neither Grove nor Wolseley succeeded in their aim of 
securing these appointments by selection immediately. The opposition of officers hoping for or 
expecting promotion ensured that the War Office had to move more cautiously in the direction of 
pure selection than Wolseley wanted. A War Office committee on selection reported at the end of 
1897 recommending that in 1898 one quarter of the promotions to the rank of Major General 
should be made by seniority, in 1899 one fifth and from 1900 all promotions to be by selection 
only. 76 
During the late 1890s the men who would hold high appointments during the First World 
War were passing through the Staff College. It has already been noted previously that Wolseley 
had little interest in the Staff College itself beyond encouraging young promising officers to sit the 
examination, and employing its graduates on his campaigns. Eight out of the 32 places open 
annually were allocated by nomination, and in 1896 Wolseley used his position to nominate 
73 Wolseley to White, Oct. 1896 in Life of Wolseley, p284 
74 Lansdowne to Salisbury, 29 Oct. 1896, Salisbury Papers 
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Douglas Haig, who had failed the examination in 1893, but who then went on to pass out 
successfully and give useful service in South Africa during the Boer War, and later commanded 
the British Army on the Western Front during the First World War. 77 
An earlier chapter described the unsuccessful attempts of the military authorities to seek 
political and financial permission to hold regular large-scale manoeuvres. When Wolseley became 
Commander-in-Chief little had changed in this area and manoeuvres were still little more than 
expanded inspections. For example in September 1896 Wolseley visited Aldershot to inspect 23 
battalions on manoeuvres there, and he was reasonably impressed by the standard of training he 
saw there; but immediately after this, he made an unexpected visit to the exercises held by the 
South Eastern Command at Dover, where he was less impressed by the troops, drawing attention 
to the 'want of tactical training in many squadrons and companies'. It therefore appeared that 
when Wolseley's presence was expected, as at Aldershot, preparations could be made to such a 
degree as to conceal weaknesses in training, but unexpected visits, which met with the approval of 
the military correspondent of The Times, produced different results. 78 After this experience 
Wolseley again stepped up the pressure on the political authorities to find the finance and, 
crucially, the space, for large-scale manoeuvres. In 1898 he was successful when the War Office 
purchased a large area of Salisbury Plain for manoeuvres; nevertheless, the political side of the 
War Office initially withheld permission for large-scale manoeuvres in 1898, demanding a delay 
on financial grounds till 1899. Wolseley fought back, and in August and September the cavalry 
held some exercises: the last fortnight in August was devoted to various drills of all arms, and in 
the first week in September large-scale manoeuvres were held for the first time since 1872. 
Wolseley wrote a very detailed memorandum for Lansdowne on the manoeuvres. 79 These 
had been organised on the lines of two Army Corps with brigades of cavalry, one commanded by 
the Duke of Connaught and one by Buller, manoeuvring against each other. He pointed out that 
the preliminary drill period was essential because the men forming each Army Corps came from 
different parts of the United Kingdom and had to be concentrated in one area and given time to 
77 T. Travers, The Killing Ground, (London 1987) p8 
78 The Timu, 26 Sept. 1896 
79 Report on the manoeuvres of 1898, Wolseley, 27 Oct. 1898, W0279/4 
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learn to work together. In addition the units of the Militia had to be worked into the whole Corps. 
Wolseley added that in the event of mobilisation for a war abroad this preliminary period of 
concentration and training would need to be repeated before embarkation. 
Wolseley stated that the organisation of the manoeuvres meant that 'it would be optimistic 
to say that the fullest tactical value was obtained from each day's operation'. The shortage of 
water on Salisbury Plain and the difficulties encountered in obtaining and utilising large amounts 
of civilian transport to augment that provided by regiments and Army Service Corps meant that at 
the end of each day's manoeuvres the men were marched off to pre-prepared camps. In an article 
for Blackwood's Magazine Colonel Grierson argued that these problems could have been 
circumvented had the organisation of the manoeuvres been altered so that each day's operations 
had followed on naturally from the previous day's by leaving outposts in contact with the opposing 
force freeing the rest of the soldiers to march back to their camps. Had this been done, Grierson 
argued, the manoeuvres would have corresponded more closely with the realities of campaigning 
and have had more tactical value. 80 
Wolseley pointed out another reason for the unsatisfactory organisation of the manoeuvres 
which seemed rather weak: 
Long days and nights out of bed seriously affect the recruiting of a voluntary 
army, and we cannot afford to ignore that fact. To work our men during 
manoeuvres, as is often done abroad, would necessitate a far greater pressure upon 
our young soldiers than those responsible for the recruiting of our volunteer army 
can venture to impose, during peace, upon the Rank and File... 
Basically Wolseley was arguing that despite the shortness of period of the manoeuvres the strain 
would be too great for the army because the men were too young to march the long distances 
required during manoeuvres and any complaints from soldiers taking part would adversely affect 
recruitment. In other words the army was too young to be trained properly and there was no easy 
solution to this problem since the kind of men Wolseley really wanted to recruit were not 
interested in enlisting. 
80 Col. J. M. Grierson, 'The Salisbury Manoeuvres' in Blackwood's, Vol. CLXIV, No. 997, (Nov. 1898) 
pp676-81 
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Wolseley made many other comments of importance; 'the extent of front covered by each 
force was on occasions remarkable, and at times excessive'. This would not have mattered had the 
staff been better at their jobs but Wolseley noted that there was a tendency to deploy troops too 
soon, and that 'full advantage was seldom taken of the conformation of the ground to conceal the 
advance of attacking columns'. Therefore the intentions of each force should have been obvious to 
its opponents long before action was resumed; except that Wolseley also noted that scouting and 
reconnaissances were poorly undertaken. This was a particular weakness of the cavalry and 
Wolseley made many suggestions on how the cavalry could balance its twin duties of 
reconnaissance for the whole force, and concentration for its own fighting requirements. The 
performance of the artillery and engineers met with general approval. 
Wolseley was impressed by the performance of the infantry soldiers despite their youth but 
he was rather less pleased with the performance of their commanding officers. He noted that the 
formations had frequently been faulty, with the men being exposed to artillery fire, and open order 
was often adopted either too early or too late when attacking; and the use of the ground was poor. 
Wolseley was disappointed by the use of machine guns and noted that 'to collect machine guns 
together and employ them as batteries is a mistaken use of the weapon'. Furthermore the machine 
gun was viewed by Wolseley as primarily a weapon of defence and the commanders had been too 
willing to bring machine guns into action regardless of whether the circumstances demanded their 
use. 
Despite his criticisms Wolseley was generally satisfied with the state of the army as 
revealed by the manoeuvres and concluded his report: 
While these manoeuvres have brought out mistakes they have shown indubitably 
the immense strides which the Army has made of recent years; the increased 
efficiency of the Staff, the keenness, the interest in, and the increased knowledge 
of, their profession displayed by our regimental officers, the tact and educated 
intelligence of our Warrant and non-commissioned officers, and the improved 
discipline, good conduct and endurance of our young rank and file have been the 
prominent and most gratifying features in the manoeuvres of 1898. 
A year later Wolseley's opinion would be subjected to closer investigation after the early events of 
the Boer War. 
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It has already been noted that when presenting his proposals for the substantial increase in 
the size of the army Wolseley presented an overview of the military requirements of the Empire. 
His suspicion that such an assessment had not been made since 1888 had been confirmed earlier by 
Salisbury who, in 1895, set up the Cabinet Defence Committee under the presidency of the Duke 
of Devonshire expressly for the purpose. The aim of this committee was to introduce an element 
of co-operation between the demands of the War Office, Admiralty, India Office, Foreign Office 
and Colonial Office on imperial defence. The committee would be composed of the responsible 
ministers with the presence of their principal advisers. Unfortunately Admiralty opposition to the 
plan meant that whilst the committee was established the membership was restricted only to 
Cabinet members and it achieved little. 81 Wolseley was therefore left free to involve himself in 
imperial strategy; his previous interest in this subject has been examined in an earlier chapter. As 
Commander-in-Chief he was forced to reconsider his opinions on three areas of previous interest, 
India, Egypt, and home defence. 
Wolseley accepted that India held a central position in the British Empire, but he deplored 
the demands it made on the home army. Now that his rival Roberts had left India for command in 
Ireland Wolseley no longer needed to fear that his opinions on Indian defence would be easily 
dismissed as evidence of professional rivalry. In 1896 Wolseley was given the opportunity to state 
his views on the effect India had on the military requirements of the Empire when he was invited 
to give evidence to the Royal Commission on the Military and Civil Expenditure of India. He 
argued that the need to send so many drafts annually to India was 'a serious inconvenience to our 
military organisation' and affected recruitment adversely. He made the dramatic statement that 
since 'our Army was really a great reserve for the Army in India' India should therefore pay for 
' everything connected with the Army'. A survey should be undertaken to estimate how many 
troops were maintained solely for Indian purposes. This would include the garrisons of colonies 
such as Mauritius and Aden which were staging posts on the sea route to India and of little value 
81 J. A. S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy, (London 1964) p18; The Joint Naval and Military 
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otherwise to the Empire, and the training and pay of men raised to supply the drafts to, and the 
establishment of the British Army in India. This proposal was so politically unacceptable that little 
comment was made on it. 
More controversially Wolseley went on to make criticisms of the performance of native 
soldiers in India, which he based on his experiences during the Indian Mutiny. His comment 'We 
should not like to put our Indian troops in front of European soldiers. I should not like to fight 
France or Germany or any other army with Indian troops' aroused outrage both in Britain and in 
India. 82 The Times reprinted extracts from the Indian newspaper The Pioneer which were highly 
critical of Wolseley. The Queen was also furious with Wolseley's criticism of her Indian troops. 
Wolseley replied defending his evidence, 'He would never flatter the native soldier by allowing 
him to think himself the equal of the British soldier as a fighting man. Lord Wolseley thinks it 
would be highly dangerous to the Empire to do So'. 83 The Queen recognised that British rule in 
India rested on the foundation that the native was inferior to the British and therefore did not press 
her case nor did she ask for a public apology from Wolseley. 
It has already been shown that Wolseley held ambivalent opinions on Egypt's value as a 
British possession. The threat of the Dervishes to Egypt's southern frontier was a constant concern 
to the British consul in Cairo, Evelyn Baring, later Lord Cromer, who frequently requested 
permission from the Foreign Office to undertake limited campaigns to strengthen Egypt's position 
on the southern frontier against encroachments by the Dervishes. By 1896 the government was 
prepared to permit Cromer to send an army 'as far - and no further - than we can [go] without any 
undue effort on the part of Egypt'. 84 In his book on his period of office in Egypt Cromer claimed 
that the advance in the Sudan 'was dubbed a "Foreign Office War"... The War Office assumed no 
responsibility, and issued no orders'. 85 This statement needs re-examination. It was unlikely that 
Wolseley's opinions would have been ignored since although the Sirdar, Kitchener, had served as 
82 Royal Commission on the Military and Civil Expenditure of India; Wolseley's evidence was reported in 
The Times, 30 July 1896 
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an intelligence officer during the 1885 campaign, Wolseley had greater experience of the terrain 
and the problems likely to be encountered. The government did consult Wolseley on 12 March 
1896 when it held a Cabinet to decide the future policy towards the Sudan. Wolseley 
recommended that an initial demonstration should be made of Egyptian power either by an 
advance to Akasheh, 30 miles beyond Egyptian positions at Sarras, or a move towards Abu 
Hamed on the Nile, both with the ultimate aim of re-occupying the province of Dongola. The 
Cabinet agreed to this plan but decided that it should be a purely Egyptian advance and that the 
British commander in Egypt, General Knowles, should play no part beyond the provision of 
supplies. On 15 March the Cabinet gave Cromer and Kitchener the total authority to accept orders 
only from the Foreign Office and towards the end of March Cromer announced his intention to 
treat War Office directives 'not as instructions, but simply as the views of Her Majesty's 
Government's military advisers, for careful consideration'. 86 Wolseley attempted in vain to force a 
War Office liaison officer onto Kitchener. 
It seemed at this stage that the advance into the Sudan was to be a 'Foreign Office War' 
because of the anomalous position held by Egypt within the Empire; it was not a colony nor a 
formally acknowledged area of suzerainty, it was a country under British occupation for mainly 
financial reasons. In May Wolseley reacted strongly to the isolation of the War Office from any 
control over the campaign. He wrote to Lansdowne that 'unless you desire it, or in the case of 
some evident necessity for doing so, I do not propose, in the future, to criticise Sir Herbert 
Kitchener's arrangements, or to call attention to any measures which may appear to me to entail 
avoidable risk'. Lansdowne felt this statement was going too far in the direction of abandoning all 
responsibility for the campaign. He told the Cabinet that while he supported Wolseley's argument 
that the War Office should not be held responsible for any mistakes made in the Sudan he had told 
Wolseley that he must keep abreast of events because inevitably should a disaster occur the British 
Army would be called upon to rescue the Egyptian army. 87 
86 Sanderson, p244-5 
87 Wolseley to Lansdowne, 10 May 1896; memo. on the Sudan, Lansdowne, 12 May 1896, both in 
CAB37/41 
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In March 1896 Lansdowne had informed Salisbury that in the opinion of his military 
advisers although Kitchener had won a victory at Firket 'it affords no evidence whatever as to the 
fitness of the fellaheen regiments to meet Dervishes under conditions equally favourable to both'. 88 
Wolseley had cleverly used Lansdowne to create some doubt in the Cabinet's mind as to whether 
the Egyptian army alone could re-conquer the Sudan. The reconquest of the Sudan was now 
official policy since rumours had been heard that a French force under Captain Marchand was 
marching across Africa from the west to establish a French position on the Upper Nile. Wolseley 
made the most of the opportunity presented by the Egyptian setback at Berber in October 1897 
pressing both Lansdowne and the Queen to request the immediate despatch of British troops to the 
Sudan. Lansdowne wrote to Salisbury that 'Lord Wolseley, assures me that in spite of our 
"overdrawn account" of battalions abroad, we could, for such an enterprise as this, lay our hands 
on the 8 battalions which would be wanted. The assumption of course is that we should get them 
back in a very short time. 89 In June Cromer had argued that British troops were not needed in the 
Sudan and should not be used because of the climate, but during November and December this 
view was reconsidered in the light of the tenuous hold the Egyptian army had on Berber and the 
rumours that the Khalifa was amassing a large army at Omdurman. Therefore Kitchener pressed 
Cromer to request more troops which he did on 31 December 1897. Cromer feared that this would 
mean the relinquishment of Egyptian and Foreign Office control over the campaign and put the 
War Office in control. However Wolseley tactfully suggested that Kitchener should retain overall 
command, despite the fact that Wolseley had sent General Grenfell to take over the command of 
the British garrison in Egypt expressly because he had Egyptian experience and would be able to 
supersede Kitchener should the circumstances dictate. 90 
During January 1898 negotiations took place on the question of how many British troops 
should be sent to take part in the final advance on Khartoum. Wolseley pressed for the despatch of 
eight British battalions, a cavalry regiment on war strength and field batteries. Lansdowne decided 
that four battalions would be sufficient and accordingly telegraphed the G. O. C. Egypt that these 
88 Lansdowne to Salisbury, 18 March 1896, Salisbury Papers 
89 Lansdowne to Salisbury, 20 Oct. 1897; Lansdowne to Salisbury, 28 Dec. 1897, both in Salisbury Papers 
90 Cromer to Lansdowne, June 1897 in Newton, p147; Wolseley to Lansdowne, 5 Jan. 1898, W032/6380 
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troops would be sent so that four British battalions could be placed at Kitchener's disposal. 
Grenfell replied that this number would be sufficient to enable Kitchener to hold his present 
position but that the War Office should be prepared to send three more battalions and cavalry and 
artillery for the advance on Metemmeh. 91 In the event eight British battalions and a regiment of 
cavalry took part in the battle of Omdurman in September 1898. 
In general Wolseley and Lansdowne were in agreement on how to handle the Sudan 
campaign but one point of dispute presaged more serious problems of communication on foreign 
policy issues. In January 1898 Wood told Wolseley that he was concerned that British troops 
earmarked for the future garrison of Khartoum would be quartered in an unhealthy area. This was 
the first Wolseley had heard of this proposal to use British troops to garrison Khartoum and wrote 
to Lansdowne objecting that he had not been informed. Lansdowne replied with an apology saying 
that he had not thought it necessary to consult the Commander-in-Chief since British troops would 
remain in Khartoum only for a short period, and that he had only consulted the Treasury on the 
matter because of the cost of retaining British troops there. 92 This provides evidence that Wolseley 
was not always consulted on the effect a foreign policy decision might have on military policy, and 
these lapses of communication would become more marked on the issue of South Africa, which 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
The subject of home defence was always of great interest to Wolseley but during this 
period much of the work on the subject was being done by the Joint Naval and Military 
Committee. For example, Wolseley was not invited to comment as Commander-in-Chief on the 
allocation of the defence portion of the 1897 Army Services Loan but only as a member of the 
committee. This loan was granted to improve the mercantile harbours, military ports and naval 
bases, and commercial ports in Britain, and fortresses and coaling stations abroad. 93 Wolseley 
made few comments on the allocation of resources but signalled his approval that at last something 
91 Lansdowne to Grenfell & Grenfell to Lansdowne, 5 Jan. 1898, W0331151; Wolseley to Kitchener, 14 
April 1898, Kitchener Papers, PRO30/57/10 
92 Wood to Wolseley, 3 Jan. 1898; Wolseley to P. U. S., 3 Jan. 1898; Lansdowne to Wolseley, 4 Jan. 1898, 
all in W032/6380 
93 Memo. by the military members of the Joint Naval and Military Council on the defence portion of the 
Army Services Loan, 1897, W032/6256 
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was being done to remedy the defenceless state of the Empire he had publicised during the late 
1880s. 
The outbreak of the Boer War in October 1899 forced Britain to send the majority of her 
fighting regiments to South Africa. There was great alarm that France and Russia might take 
advantage of Britain's defenceless state and make war. In 1899 the French Foreign Minister 
Delcasse visited St Petersburg, and in 1900 the French and Russian chiefs of staff met and agreed 
that in certain eventualities Russia would support France in the event of a war with Britain. Only 
one division of British troops had been despatched from India to South Africa, though a quantity of 
equipment was also sent, so there was less concern over the Russian threat to India. Nevertheless, 
the secret service was ordered to be on guard for any hint of Russian preparations. 94 The threat 
from France was seen as far more serious. In a memorandum from T. H. Sanderson of the Foreign 
Office to Salisbury in December 1899 it was reported that Colonel Dawson, the military attache in 
Paris, and Sir E. Monson, the ambassador, were concerned that war was imminent and that 'the 
idea of a war with England would be popular with the army and with many influential classes', 
and that war could only be averted by Britain being in such a strong position as to make such a 
venture extremely hazardous. 95 Two days later Salisbury asked the Duke of Devonshire, as 
president of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, to set up an interdepartmental committee to 
report 'on the hypothesis that we are to have a French war next October'. 96 Throughout the early 
part of 1900 the Duke of Devonshire battled with the conflicting views on the feasibility of a 
French invasion put forward by the Admiralty and the War Office just as he had done so over 
fifteen years earlier when as Lord Hartington he had been Secretary of State for War. 
In a memorandum dated 29 December 1899 and reissued on 3 January 1900 Wolseley 
responded to the threat of a war with France in a typical fashion: he proposed an immediate 
augmentation to the army. His aim was to create two Regular and one Militia Army Corps 
separate from the troops required for South Africa. Wolseley made detailed proposals as to how 
94 March 1900, P. R. O. HD3/114 
95 T. H. Sanderson to Salisbury, 13 Dec. 1899, quoted in G. P. Gooch & H. W. Temperley, British 
Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914, (London 1926) 
96 Salisbury to Devonshire, 15 Dec. 1899, Devonshire Papers 340.2808 
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many new battalions should be created, 32, and how the men should be recruited, and these 
proposals will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. What is of relevance here is 
the fact that the government was prepared to mobilise 32 battalions of the Militia against invasion 
despite Wolseley's argument that the Militia would in no way be capable of repelling the elite of 
the French Army. 97 This state of affairs was the natural result of the years during which Wolseley 
had unsuccessfully battled for funds to allow the auxiliary forces to be trained on the ground they 
would have to defend. Unlike the situation during the invasion scares of the 1880s, Wolseley and 
the government were quite correct to be alarmed at the prospect of war with France: in July 1900 
the D. M. I., Ardagh, informed Wolseley that during the previous two years there had been three 
French projects for the invasion of Britain in response to the Fashoda crisis. 98 
Wolseley's term of office as Commander-in-Chief did not inaugurate a great era of rapid 
reform. There can be little doubt that his position had been significantly weakened by the 
alterations made to his post but it was unjust of Wolseley to place the blame for his failures solely 
on these changes. His personality led to frequent clashes with Lansdowne and the members of the 
Army Board which weakened the cause of reform. Had he been more willing to work with his 
colleagues rather than to insist that he should have pre-eminence over them more could have been 
achieved. Furthermore his ill-health was a significant factor which Wolseley chose to ignore in his 
comments on his term of office. Nevertheless there were some important developments; after 
years of struggling against the parsimony of Parliament and the Treasury Wolseley had succeeded 
in winning a large increase in the size of the army. It was not as large as he wanted but signalled 
nonetheless political acceptance that such an increase was needed. Wolseley opposed piecemeal 
changes which served only to provide short-term remedies to long-standing problems. This is why 
he disagreed with the Army Board on the methods of recruitment for the Garrison Artillery and 
the abolition of deferred pay; he realised that the only solution to recruitment was a substantial 
increase in the basic pay of the soldier but failed to convince the politicians of this. Wolseley 
97 Memo. on the threat from France, Wolseley, 29 Dec. 1899, CAB37/51; Memo. on the need to increase 
the army, Wolseley, 3 Jan. 1900, W032/6360 
98 Memo. on a French Invasion, Ardagh, 11 July 1900, Ardagh Papers, PR030/40/14. The Intelligence 
Department also drew up plans for action in the event of a war with France in 1898. This involved a major 
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succeeded in bringing about the large-scale Salisbury manoeuvres which led to the closer 
examination of the tactical training of the army and to the recommendations for improvement. 
It would be unfair to attempt to assess whether the British Army was significantly better in 
1899 than in 1895 because major reforms of the army could only be made over a period of time 
and the five year term of office was barely enough to make a start in this direction. Wolseley had 
the ideas but was unable to carry them out largely due to his own personal failings. Nevertheless 
war must be seen as the ultimate test of the efficiency of the army and the next chapter will assess 
how the army Wolseley had struggled to reform over a 30 year period could cope with the 
demands of a major war. 
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Chapter 9- The Test of War 
The diplomatic relationship between the British colonies of Natal and Cape Colony and the 
Boer republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free State had been regulated by the London 
Convention of 1884. Under the terms of the Convention the republics were placed under British 
suzerainty; they were free to conduct their own internal affairs, but their relations with foreign 
powers were subject to British control. The expansion of the diamond and gold mining industries 
in the 1880s led to a great influx of British settlers into the Transvaal, the so-called Uitlanders. By 
the early 1890s they were agitating for the franchise to be granted to them by the Boers. In 
December 1895 Doctor L. S. Jameson led a band of colonists into the Transvaal in an attempt to 
force a settlement of the franchise question. This raid, although a failure, set in motion a train of 
events which would lead to the outbreak of the Second Boer War in October 1899. 
The politicians in London and South Africa struggled to find a diplomatic solution to the 
franchise question without resorting to war. In South Africa Sir Alfred Milner, High 
Commissioner since 1897, pursued an aggressive policy towards the Transvaal which made war 
more likely. Although in 1899 a section of the British public, led by the Liberal press, was hostile 
to a war in South Africa, other newspapers, particularly The Times, The Morning Post and The 
Daily News were jingoistic. ' They argued that the Boers would not put up much of a fight, and 
that the reformed British Army was ready to fight any enemy anywhere in the world and win. This 
opinion is illustrated by an article which appeared anonymously in the August 1899 issue of 
Blackwood's Magazine: 
The idea is very prevalent in this country that war with the Transvaal means a 
terrible and bloody struggle - that such a conflict would severely tax British 
military resources, that it could not be concluded without a vast expenditure of 
money, and that it must necessarily demand consummate leadership to bring to a 
successful issue. For this view there appears to be no adequate justification. 2 
1 T. Pakenham, The Boer War, (London, 1979) p84; See also H. S. Wilkinson, The Lessons of the War, 
(London, 1900) which was a compilation of articles by Wilkinson published in The London Letter during the 
war. 
2 C. E. Callwell, 'A Boer War: the Military Aspect' in Blackwoods, Vol. CLXVI, (August 1899) p259-65. 
Authorship confirmed by the Wellesley Index. It was perhaps fortunate for Callwell's career as an 
intelligence officer and author of many books on military subjects that this article did appear anonymously. 
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In the circumstances it is not altogether surprising that the despatch of the First Army Corps to 
South Africa in October 1899 appeared to the public to signal the start of a great colonial 
adventure, and a chance to avenge the 1881 defeat at the hands of the Boers at Majuba. 
The early reverses suffered by the British Army, particularly the events of Black Week in 
December 1899, came as a great shock to late Victorian society. Although Britain eventually 
overcame the Boers, it took until 1902 for the war to reach a final settlement despite the fact that 
the early military objectives had all been attained by the end of 1900. There seemed to be a need 
to find a scapegoat, someone to blame for these disasters, and the role of the Commander-in- 
Chief, Wolseley, came under close scrutiny. The suspicion that Wolseley should accept a large 
measure of the blame was given credence by the report of the Elgin Commission set up to examine 
the preparations for the war. The points on which the commission criticised Wolseley's 
performance will be examined in detail in this chapter. 
This chapter will not attempt to re-examine the causes of the Boer War, nor will it reassess 
the performance of the British Army in that war since these subjects have been covered 
exhaustively elsewhere. 3 It will concentrate on the role played by Wolseley in the years 
immediately before the outbreak of the war, concentrating on the months preceding the despatch of 
the First Army Corps to South Africa in 1899. It will examine the extent to which diplomacy and 
military policy did, or did not, interact during this period, and how and why Wolseley urged 
greater military preparations while largely ignorant of the state of diplomacy. The chapter will 
then turn to analyse which aspects of the British performance in South Africa reflected on the 
reforms Wolseley had pressed for throughout his career at the War Office. The last topic to be 
examined will be the state of civil-military relations as revealed by the war, particularly the 
problems of the position of the Commander-in-Chief under the terms of the 1895 Order in 
Council. 
Before turning to the events preceding the despatch of the First Army Corps it is 
worthwhile to examine Wolseley's own attitude towards the Boers. Wolseley had travelled through 
3 For example, Pakenham; Amery, Times History; J. F. Maurice, The Official History of the War in South 
Africa, (London, 1906); W. B. Pemberton, Battles of the Boer War, (London, 1981) 
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the Transvaal in September and October 1879 when he was High Commissioner and Commander- 
in-Chief in South Africa and he had not been impressed by what he had seen. He had commented 
that 'the Boer is in some respects far inferior to the Zulu, and the most ignorant & bigotted [sic] 
& small-minded of white men'. In January 1880 when Wolseley heard that the Boers were 
concentrating near Potchefstroon to agitate against the South African Federation he described them 
as 'poor silly creatures they go on playing at soldiers & blustering, knowing in their hearts they 
would bolt at the sight of the first troop of our Dragoons they saw'. He was determined that 'the 
Union Jack would fly over the Transvaal as long as the sun shone, and that the Vaal would flow 
backwards ere the British would withdraw'. 4 Majuba proved Wolseley wrong, and he never 
forgave Wood for concluding a peace treaty with the Boers before seeking revenge for the British 
defeat. Wolseley's attitude towards the Boers changed while he was Commander-in-Chief of the 
British Army. He was aware that, after the Jameson Raid, the Boers had begun to order vast 
stocks of rifles and ammunition, were purchasing the most modern artillery guns from Krupps and 
Creuzot, and encouraging former artillery men from the German Army to settle in the Transvaal. 
Therefore, while expressing his confidence in public that the British Army would defeat the Boers 
with ease, in private he showed more concern: for example, he wrote to the Duke of Cambridge in 
September 1899 'if this war comes off it will be the most serious war England has ever had, when 
the size of our Army to be engaged and the distance of the seat of war from England are taken 
into consideration'. 5 This anxiety had been uppermost in Wolseley's mind while urging military 
preparations in support of diplomacy throughout the critical months of 1899. 
The Elgin Commission placed the blame for the tardy preparations for the Boer War 
squarely on Wolseley's shoulders. The report stated that 'the general impression to be derived 
from the whole circumstances must be that the special function of the Commander-in-Chief, under 
the Order in Council of 1895, viz.: "the preparation of schemes of offensive and defensive 
operations", was not exercised on this occasion in any systematic fashion'. It continued in the 
same vein to suggest that 'it is perhaps not altogether remarkable under the circumstances above 
t Journal, 13 Oct. 1879 &7 Jan. 1880, W0147/7 
5 Wolseley to Cambridge, 12 Sept. 1899 in Verner, p421 
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described that no plan of campaign ever existed for operations in South Africa'. 6 The government 
claimed that it had not been informed of the strength of the Boer forces nor of their likely tactics. 
The government's implicit argument was that had this strength been known diplomacy would not 
have been allowed to break down, the ultimatum would not have been issued and war would not 
have followed. Wolseley's defence was basically that he had never been informed of the state of 
diplomacy, and the information he did receive was inadequate for the preparation of plans of 
offence and defence. 
The report raised a number of questions about Wolseley's role in the crisis which led to 
the outbreak of the Boer War. Firstly, was it true that the government did not know the strength of 
the Boers? Secondly, why did it appear that no plans for operations in South Africa had been 
drawn up? Thirdly, to what extent did the government take Wolseley into their confidence? And 
lastly, what effect did these circumstances have on the early outcome of the war? 
On the first question - did the government know the strength of the Boers - the answer has 
to be that it did. In 1896 the D. M .I., Ardagh, wrote a detailed memorandum on the forces of the 
Transvaal and Orange Free State. This memorandum was the first issue of Military Notes on the 
Dutch Republics, a copy of which was sent to the G. O. C. in South Africa, and was reissued in 
June 1899. In this memorandum Ardagh used the latest almanac of the Transvaal to estimate the 
number of burghers liable for military duty, and gave the total as 25,457 men. To this total he 
added the burghers of the Orange Free State, which was at present neutral, because he was 
convinced that they would join their northern brethren against a British force. He also noted that 
former artillery men from Germany were being encouraged to settle in the Transvaal and that 
they, in addition to other foreign sympathisers, would bring the total force Britain might have to 
face to 48,000. Ardagh commented on possible strategy: since 1880, towns had become 'decisive 
strategical points' as industry, particularly gold mining, had grown. Therefore he believed that the 
occupation of Johannesburg, Pretoria and the Rand would deliver the whole country to British 
control. Ardagh also noted that the demand for mules exceeded the supply and that therefore any 
large-scale advance would have to use the railways as the main line of communication. Since the 
6 Elgin Commission, paras. 45-6 
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railway from Natal into the Transvaal passed through mountainous country it would be preferable 
to make the main line of advance along the Cape-Transvaal railway which, though far longer and 
passing through the Orange Free State, covered terrain far more suitable for military action.? 
This memorandum was extremely important because it laid the groundwork for all further 
strategic discussions. It is known that Wolseley did pass this memorandum to Lansdowne, and that 
it was subsequently seen by Salisbury. The evidence for this comes from the correspondence 
between Lansdowne and Salisbury when, on 21 April 1897, Salisbury confessed to Lansdowne 
that 'I am astonished at reading the recommendations of Sir J. Ardagh'. 8 Both Wolseley and 
Ardagh argued that the military could not make adequate preparations for either the defence of 
Cape Colony or Natal, or for offensive operations against the Transvaal, until the diplomats and 
politicians had decided on the attitude to be adopted towards the Orange Free State through whose 
territory the ideal route from the Cape lay. Furthermore Ardagh and Wolseley had asked for a 
decision to be made on the possibility of blockading the Portuguese port of Lourenco Marques, 
through which most of the Boer imports of armaments were made. Since the Boers were importing 
vast quantities of the most modern armaments from Germany, this was a serious concern and both 
military men were prepared to risk a war with Portugal, which had negligible military resources, 
in order to stop the imports. Salisbury and Lansdowne felt that the military were attempting to 
meddle in purely diplomatic matters, and the indignation expressed in 1897 may go some way to 
explaining why in 1899 the military were left so much in the dark about the state of diplomacy. 
The civil-military relations of these years bear a marked resemblance to the military-naval 
relations of the late 1880s when the invasion question was under discussion. Then, as in 1899, the 
different parties misunderstood each other's arguments and co-operation was minimal. The 
position should have been better in 1899 because the Cabinet Defence Committee was in 
existence. This committee, however, was quite incapable of reconciling the differences of policy 
and requirements between the Colonial Office, the War Office, and the Cabinet. Therefore 
7 Memo. on the Transvaal Boers from a military point of view, Ardagh, Oct. 1896, Ardagh Papers, 
PRO30/40/ 14 
8 Lansdowne to Salisbury, 9 April 1897, Salisbury Papers; Salisbury to Lansdowne, 21 April 1897 in 
Newton, p145 
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personal relationships assumed a great significance, with unfortunate consequences. The previous 
chapter commented on the often poor relations between Wolseley and Lansdowne, and it is clear 
that this relationship deteriorated further during the South African crisis. Another figure has to be 
added to the equation, the Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, who at one time appeared to 
support Wolseley's calls for preparations to be made for war, and at other times to support the 
Cabinet's and Lansdowne's policy of waiting on events. 9 Given all these circumstances it is not 
surprising that military, political and diplomatic policies were not in harmony in 1899. 
In his evidence to the Elgin Commission Lansdowne claimed that 'I cannot call to mind 
any proposal on the part of the Commander-in-Chief for a large strengthening of our position in 
South Africa as an antidote to the Boer preparations'. He dismissed Wolseley's 1896 request for 
two additional battalions to be sent out to South Africa as part of a general scheme for the 
redistribution of the British Army abroad and a part of the wider proposal to increase the size of 
the home establishment. Lansdowne claimed that Wolseley had been silent on the subject of South 
Africa between 1896 and June 1899.10 This was manifestly untrue; Wolseley had been active 
during this period in seeking defensive plans from the officers in command in Natal and in Cape 
Colony. He had also written a memorandum to the P. U. S. on 20 April 1898 drawing his attention 
to Milner's recent communications on the danger posed by the Boer preparations. Wolseley had 
asked for reinforcements on that occasion to make the force there complete in all arms. Beyond 
this Wolseley had no need to request the despatch of more men to South Africa since the 
diplomatic situation appeared to be reasonably quiet and war likely only in the long term. The 
situation changed in June 1899 after the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference to reach a 
settlement between the Boers and the British over the franchise question. The events between June 
and the despatch of the First Army Corps in October will be examined later in this chapter. 
The question of the apparent lack of plans of operations for South Africa should be 
considered in two parts; what preparations and plans were being drawn up in South Africa by the 
9 For more on Chamberlain's opinions see A. N. Porter, The Origins of the South African War, (Manchester 
1980) 
10 Elgin Commission, Q. 21219,21289 
11 Wolseley to P. U. S., 20 April 1898 in Elgin Documents. 
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commanding officers on the spot, and what plans were being drawn up in the War Office. It must 
be remembered that it was common practice to leave defensive planning in the colonies to the 
officers in charge in the area, and for the War Office to approve or amend the plans when sent for 
their consideration. It was not the role of the War Office to draw up detailed plans without the 
information available to the men on the spot. In 1896 the G. O. C. in South Africa, Lieutenant- 
General Goodenough had sent plans to the War Office. In his memorandum he expressed most 
concern about the lines of communication and made suggestions on the numbers of men required 
to defend the vital road bridges over the Orange River and the railway junctions in the northern 
Cape Colony. His plan of defence for Natal also emphasised the protection of the lines of 
communication, particularly guarding Van Renen's Pass through the Biggarsburg from the Orange 
Free State into Natal. 12 Goodenough's plans were approved by Lansdowne in September 1897. 
At the end of 1898 Wolseley was sufficiently concerned by the growth of Boer armaments 
to set up a committee at the War Office to draw up a list of questions on South African defence to 
be answered by the new G. O. C., Wolseley's friend, Butler. 13 Butler was undoubtedly not the man 
for the job; he was known in public to sympathise with the underdog whether it was the Irish 
against their English overlords, the Egyptian fighting to retain their independence from European 
financial interests, or the Boers seeking to retain their independence from the British yoke. Given 
Butler's attitude, there was little chance that he would respond favourably to the letter from the 
War Office. He wrote in his autobiography of his opinion at the time: 'I have full reason to think 
now that even at that time a section of people, including several prominent persons in the War 
Office, were at work to bring that war about at an early date'. 14 After much prodding, Butler sent 
a defence plan to the War Office in June 1899. This stressed that, in the event of war, the northern 
triangle of Natal could not be held against Boer forces. The main thrust of Butler's argument was 
that the authorities in Britain were underestimating the probable consequences of a war with the 
Transvaal. He believed that the Orange Free State would be drawn into the fight, and that British 
12 Memo. on the defence of South Africa, Goodenough, 30 Sept. 1896, W032/6369; Goodenough to 
Ardagh, 14 July 1897, Elgin Documents 
13 Stopford, AAG to Wolseley, 9 Dec. 1898; Stopford to Butler, 21 Dec. 1898, both in W032/6369 
14 Butler, p385 
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lines of communication would be threatened in the rear by a rising of the Cape Boers and the 
native tribes in Basutoland, Pondoland, and the Transkei. Butler was unhappy in his position in 
South Africa, and the War Office was none too pleased by his dilatoriness in sending a reply to its 
letter. On 4 July Butler resigned his post and was replaced by General Symons. 15 
There can be no doubt that Buller was sent out to South Africa with the First Army Corps 
before a final decision had been reached on what it should do. He told the Elgin Commission, 
'there were no instructions, and I went out with a force based on the understanding that I was 
going to do a definite thing. The Commission blamed Wolseley for this unsatisfactory state of 
affairs, but it is clear that Lansdowne and the government were at fault on this question. If war is 
an extension of diplomacy by other means then it is essential that the military should know the 
state of diplomacy when drawing up their plans. In this case it was vital that the military should be 
informed as to the likely attitude to be adopted by the Orange Free State. Without this information 
detailed plans could not be drawn up for a campaign from either Natal or the Cape Colony. If the 
Orange Free State was to remain neutral then forces would still have to be stationed on the 
northern frontiers of the Cape to guard against any sabotage of the road bridges over the Orange 
River and the major railway junctions in the Cape by sympathisers with the Transvaal. The bulk of 
British forces would be despatched to Natal and use the passes through the Drakensburg to enter 
the Transvaal. The problems faced by crossing mountainous terrain would be different from those 
faced by the open country of the Orange Free State and the force would have to be composed with 
this in mind. If the Orange Free State was to join the Transvaal, then the British faced the option 
of either advancing from Natal or along the route favoured by Ardagh, from the Cape. With the 
Orange Free State hostile it would seem likely that the main force would advance from the Cape, 
but a substantial force would be required to hold the passes into Natal against large Boer raiding 
parties. Troops could not be switched between the Cape and Natal at short notice; no railway 
existed running through British territory linking the two colonies, and the sea conditions at the port 
of Durban were often such as to delay considerably any embarkation or disembarkation of men 
15 Plan for the defence of South Africa, Butler, 14 June 1899, W032/6369; Pakenham, p76 
16 Elgin Commission, Q. 15402 
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and supplies. Therefore, if Wolseley was to fulfil his role in providing plans of defensive and 
offensive as laid down in the 1895 Order in Council, he had to receive notice from the politicians 
of the definite attitude of the Orange Free State. 
In his first major memorandum on the immediate preparations for war on 8 June 1899, 
which will be referred to in greater detail later, Wolseley was under the impression that the 
Orange Free State would remain neutral since it was hosting the Bloemfontein Conference, which 
had opened on 31 May to discuss the franchise question. Given the state of current diplomacy, 
Wolseley recommended the adoption of the Natal route. He urged the collection of supplies at the 
Cape, in case the political situation changed, and at Pietermaritzburg in Natal. 17 It is interesting to 
note in the light of the later controversy over why Ladysmith was selected as the main base in 
Natal, that Wolseley at this stage selected Pietermaritzburg as the main supply dump. Also in June, 
Buller was informed that should it be necessary to despatch a British expeditionary force to South 
Africa, as seemed likely since the Bloemfontein Conference had broken up without agreement on 5 
June, he would be appointed to the command. Buller was in favour of the railway route through 
the Orange Free State but Lansdowne refused to agree to this. 18 On 6 July, when Lansdowne and 
Buller met for the second time, Buller urged a decision to be taken on the Orange Free State but 
was again informed by Lansdowne that the Orange Free State must not be forced to take sides. 
The following day Wolseley pressed for a decision on this question without success. On 17 August 
Wolseley wrote to Lansdowne that, 'I do not see all the telegrams that pass between the Colonial 
Office and Sir A. Milner, but from those I have read I gather he is anxious about the weakness of 
the military force we now have in South Africa'. Wolseley shared Milner's fears about the 
possibility of a Dutch rising in the Cape and supported Milner's request for the despatch of two 
infantry battalions to the Cape to guard against this. From what he did know of the state of 
diplomacy, Wolseley formed the opinion that the Natal route would be used and that 10,000 men 
would be required in Natal urgently to prevent the Boers from talking the initiative and capturing 
Ladysmith and the northern triangle of Natal. He was strengthened in this belief by the 
17 Memo. on the military strength in South Africa, Wolseley, 8 June 1899, CAB37/50 
18 G. Powell, Buller: A Scapegoat, (London, 1994) p116-120; Col. Everett, A. A. G. Intelligence to 
Wolseley, 3 July 1899, WO 32/6369 
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communication from Bloemfontein on 28 August that the Orange Free State would uphold its 
neutrality in any war between Britain and the Transvaal. 19 
The day before this communication was received in London Lansdowne and Wolseley had 
met to discuss the desirability of sending further reinforcements to South Africa. Wolseley was 
informed that 'you ought to be in utrumqueparatus, with a plan for each contingency'. 20 Neither 
Wolseley nor Buller were satisfied with this complete disregard for the demands of offensive and 
defensive planning, and on 5 September Buller, with Wolseley's support, wrote a clearly worded 
memorandum to Salisbury. In this Buller argued that 'there must be some period at which the 
military and the diplomatic or political forces are brought into line, and in my view, this ought to 
be before action is determined on - or in other words, before the diplomat proceeds to an 
ultimatum the military should be in a position to enforce it'. The military could not be ready 
because 'I have never yet had the route fixed'. On the same day Wolseley had voiced similar 
concerns to Lansdowne: 
The Government are acting without complete knowledge of what the military can 
do, while the military authorities on their side are equally without full knowledge 
of what the Government expects them to do; nor are they given authority to make 
such antecedent preparations as will enable them to act with the least possible 
delay. 21 
Vital time had been lost, and Wolseley urged a delay in the break of relations between the 
Transvaal and Britain for at least five or six weeks to collect a substantial force in Natal. On 16 
September Wolseley suggested that the choice of routes should be left to Buller and that he would 
probably choose to advance through the Orange Free State. 22 At last Lansdowne accepted the need 
for a definite decision and informed the Cabinet on 25 September that this decision must be taken 
now and that the recent pronouncements of the president of the Orange Free State, Steyn, 
suggested that the State would be hostile. Lansdowne concluded, 'after all that has taken place, the 
Orange Free State will scarcely have a right to complain if it has to choose between treatment as 
19 Buller to Lansdowne, 6 July 1899, Wolseley to Lansdowne, 7 July 1899, Wolseley to Lansdowne, 17 
Aug. 1899, Lansdowne to Wolseley, 20 Aug. 1899, Wolseley to Lansdowne, 24 Aug. 1899, all in 
CAB37/50 
20 'Prepared for both'. Lansdowne to Wolseley, 27 Aug. 1899, CAB37/50 
21 Buller to Salisbury, 5 Sept. 1899, Wolseley to Lansdowne, 5 Sept. 1899, both in CAB 37/50; Buller to 
Wolseley, 7 Sept. 1899, Buller Papers, Devon Record Office, 2065M/SS4/14 
22 Wolseley to Lansdowne, 16 Sept. 1899, Elgin Documents 
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an open adversary and an explicit undertaking of neutrality'. 23 Two days later the Orange Free 
State concluded an alliance with the Transvaal. Wolseley told the Elgin Commission that 'I find 
that even as late as 28 September 1899 I asked the government - that is, the Secretary of State - 
officially to be informed of the intentions of the Orange Free State, and I cannot remember having 
24 ever received any positive reply upon that point'. 
The Elgin Commission accepted without question Lansdowne's assertion that Wolseley had 
not based his various memoranda calling for the despatch of reinforcements to South Africa on the 
intelligence reports that he, Wolseley, had received. 25 These requests were numerous and, 
although it is true that Wolseley did not refer explicitly to intelligence reports in his memoranda, it 
should have been clear to Lansdowne that Wolseley had some justification for his demands. For 
example, in February 1896, when outlining his proposals for a substantial increase to the size of 
the home army, Wolseley had urged the despatch of two additional battalions to the garrison of 
South Africa as part of the general army scheme being drawn up. In November Wolseley's request 
was given strength by Chamberlain who drew the attention of the Cabinet to the increase in the 
purchase of arms by the Boers and asked for the doubling of the number of troops stationed in 
South Africa to 10,000 men. The motives of both men were to show the Boers that Britain was 
serious about upholding the terms of the 1884 London Convention, and to warn them not to go too 
far in their drive towards complete independence. However, Chamberlain was not prepared to 
press his case if such an increase to the South African establishment would require either more 
men in the army or more money. 26 
Throughout 1897 and 1898 intelligence reports urged that more men be sent to South 
Africa but the government did not accept that war was likely in the immediate future. Besides 
there were no men to spare; the army was being increased dramatically at the time and efficient 
soldiers were required to train the recruits, and in 1898 Britain had to supply troops both for the 
Sudan campaign and the Cretan emergency. Nevertheless, in a memorandum in April 1898, 
23 Memo. on South Africa, Lansdowne, 25 Sept. 1899, CAB37/51 
24 Elgin Commission, Q. 8703 
25 Elgin Commission, Q. 21289 
26 Memo. on the efficiency of the Regular Army, Wolseley, 22 Feb. 1896, W033/56; Memo. on South 
Africa, Chamberlain, 10 Nov. 1896, CAB37/43 
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Wolseley made a proposal which could have been adopted by the government with little risk. He 
drew attention to the fact that no number of men in South Africa could defend the British colonies 
unless they were mobile and well supplied. To this end Wolseley suggested the accumulation of 
supplies, stores and transport for one regiment of cavalry, four batteries of artillery, 120 mounted 
infantry, and one battalion of infantry at Ladysmith. He also wanted the purchase of mules to 
begin since a vast number would be required and the Boers would be competing for the limited 
supply "27 The government refused to adopt these moderate proposals and this refusal demonstrated 
its misunderstanding of the likely nature of war in South Africa and of the necessity for any 
offensive force to be highly mobile. 
The failure of the Bloemfontein Conference made war more likely and consequently 
Wolseley urged immediate preparation with increasing urgency. These preparations fall into four 
overlapping categories: proposals to force the Boers back to the negotiating table; the secret 
collection of men and stores in South Africa to facilitate the defence of Natal and the Cape without 
damaging the process of diplomacy; overtly sending more men to South Africa to prevent the 
initiative passing to the Boers in the event of war; and, finally, the mobilisation and despatch of 
the First Army Corps from England. Lansdowne's general attitude towards the proposals of his 
military colleagues deserves attention. He had obtained a large sum of money for the expansion of 
the army in 1897 and had obtained a Military Loan for various military works. Consequently he 
was unwilling to ask the Cabinet for more money to pay for preparations for a war which might 
never occur. Furthermore he misunderstood the thinking behind the requests for reinforcements. 
He told the Elgin Commission, 'I am not a soldier, but I have never heard of sending out 
reinforcements to a country which might become a theatre of war merely in order that the 
reinforcements might successfully defend themselves against attack; they are sent there, I imagine, 
for the purpose of securing something or somebody'. 28 It appears, therefore, that even after the 
war Lansdowne failed to realise the weakness of the British forces in Natal and Cape Colony, and 
their inability to defend British territory against Boer incursions without reinforcements. 
27 Memo. on South Africa, Wolseley, 20 April 1898, Elgin Documents 
28 Elgin Commission, Q. 21170 
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On 8 June, three days after the last indecisive meeting of the Bloemfontein Conference, 
Wolseley wrote a memorandum for Lansdowne on the military strength in South Africa. He 
anticipated that, in the event of war, Britain would have to send the entire First Army Corps, one 
cavalry division, one battalion of mounted infantry, and four infantry battalions for the lines of 
communication. He proposed the immediate mobilisation of the First Army Corps on Salisbury 
Plain without calling out the Army Reserve because 'it might probably wake up the Transvaal to 
the fact that England was at last serious, and by doing so prevent war altogether'. Wolseley did 
not believe this mobilisation would precipitate a war since neither the Boers nor the British would 
take the field until October when there would be sufficient grazing for animals. In addition 
Wolseley urged other measures which could be done more or less in secret without damaging 
diplomatic negotiations, such as the despatch of three companies of the Army Service Corps, and 
three field companies of Royal Engineers to strengthen the weak areas in the South African 
establishment. In addition he argued that the purchase and collection of large quantities of supplies 
and mules should be sanctioned immediately. 29 The Cabinet was shown Wolseley's memorandum, 
and on 20 June Salisbury reported to the Queen that the Cabinet had 'resolved that the moment 
had not come for sending reinforcements; but that for the present quieter preparations should be 
pushed forward'. In July the War Office sent more artillery, engineers and departmental corps to 
South Africa; Butler was authorised to purchase mules for transport, and special service officers 
were sent out to raise companies of men in South Africa to defend specific locations. On 7 July 
Wolseley again repeated his proposal for the mobilisation of the Army Corps on Salisbury Plain 
and requested a Vote of Credit for the purchase of supplies but he failed to achieve either of these 
things. 30 
On 13 July the Commander-in-Chief's committee to consider questions relating to 
operations in South Africa began its meetings. 31 This committee served two basic functions: 
29 Memo. on the military strength in South Africa, Wolseley, 8 June 1899, CAB37/50 
30 Salisbury to Queen, 20 June, 1899, in Buckle, Vol. 3,3rd series, p384; Wolseley to Lansdowne, 7 July 
1899, CAB37/50 
31 This committee was established on 13 July 1899 as the Commander-in-Chief's committee to consider 
questions relating to operations 
in South Africa. The membership was wider than that of the Army Board. 
On 11 September it was renamed the proceedings of the Army Board for mobilisation purposes, still with a 
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firstly, it facilitated communications between the departments in the War Office to a greater extent 
than Wolseley felt could be achieved by the Army Board though the membership of the committee 
was similar; and, secondly, Wolseley could use the committee to present Lansdowne with definite 
proposals which, by demonstrating that they had the support of the whole military side of the War 
Office, would carry more strength than proposals made by Wolseley alone. The principal issue 
facing the committee was how to get as many men as possible into South Africa in the period 
before the government would accept the need for the mobilisation and despatch of the First Army 
Corps. 
On 18 July the committee met to examine Lansdowne's proposal to reinforce South Africa 
immediately by taking a brigade from India. The committee reported that it was 'unanimously of 
opinion that the whole force should be sent from home'. 32 Given Wolseley's poor opinion of the 
quality of troops in India based on his experiences of over forty years previously it is hardly 
surprising that he denigrated any suggestion for their use in South Africa. He told Lansdowne that 
the men would come from India 'sodden with drink, fever, and venereal'. Furthermore Wolseley 
remembered that it had been two British battalions returning from India, 60th Rifles and the 92nd, 
who had lost Majuba. 33 Lansdowne, on the other had, had been Viceroy just before becoming 
Secretary of State for War and believed that the British Army in India was thoroughly reformed 
and as capable of sustaining a defence against Boer raids before the main British force arrived as 
reinforcements from Britain would be. In August the committee added a further argument against 
the use of Indian troops - India could not spare them. Wolseley was on solid ground with this 
argument: throughout the 1880s India had increased its demand for British battalions and drafts, 
usually to the detriment of the efficiency of the home army, but now it appeared that India had 
troops to spare. In fact the Viceroy had, on 7 July, only offered the service of these troops until 
the end of the year. This, Wolseley's committee argued, was a pointless gesture since once the 
time spent at sea was deducted from this period, the force from India would serve in South Africa 
wide membership. On 11 June 1900 the committee was abolished and the 
Army Board took over its 
functions. W0163/612 
32 Meetings of the Commander-in-Chief's committee, 18 & 21 July, 31 Aug. 1899, WO163/612 
33 Wolseley to Lansdowne, 2 Aug. 1899 in Elgin Documents 
231 
for only two and a half months, which was an insufficient period to weigh against the cost of their 
transportation. In August Wolseley put forward yet another argument against the use of troops 
from India: 'We are quite able to supply all that is or may be required from home, and it would 
create an impression that our home army was so inefficient that we could not find from it the small 
numbers required for South Africa'. 34 
The opposition to Lansdowne's proposal was so strong that the decision on whether to 
accept the Viceroy's offer was postponed. Nevertheless Wolseley continued to press for the 
immediate despatch of reinforcements to South Africa, in particular to Natal. In a memorandum on 
17 August he urged the immediate despatch of an infantry division, a cavalry regiment, and two 
brigade divisions of artillery, which totalled 10,000 men. 35 In reply Lansdowne pointed out that 
Chamberlain believed that the political position in South Africa was improving and that the 
immediate necessity for reinforcements had passed, but that nevertheless Lansdowne accepted the 
figure of 10,000 men for Natal's defence. These, he repeated, should come from India because, 
should Orange Free State prove hostile, the entire Army Corps could advance from the Cape 
secure in the knowledge that a division from outside the Army Corps was defending Natal, and 
would therefore not need to be split. Wolseley's reply referred to his ignorance of the state of 
diplomacy: 
Your note of the 20th is written in so hopeful a spirit of peace in South Africa that 
I assume the Cabinet has information on the subject not known to the press. To 
judge of the matters there from the daily papers, it would seem that every 
preparation is being made by Mr. Kruger for war, and that he is striving to force a 
war policy upon the Orange Free State also... At this moment we are not locally 
prepared for war in South Africa, so that if it comes upon us under present 
circumstances we shall surrender the initiative to Kruger. 36 
Wolseley had informed Lansdowne that there would be a gap of three or four months between the 
date when the Army Corps was mobilised and when it could start its campaign in South Africa. 
The Cabinet had been informed of this fact in early August but appeared to disregard its possible 
consequences. 
34 Wolseley to Lansdowne, 24 Aug. 1899, CAB37/50. India did not get its division back by the end of 1899 
because it had become besieged in Ladysmith. 
35 Wolseley to Lansdowne, 17 Aug. 1899, CAB37/50 
36 Lansdowne to Wolseley, 20 Aug. 1899, Wolseley to Lansdowne, 24 Aug. 1899, both in CAB37/50 
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In September events sped up. On 5 September the Transvaal Government had withdrawn 
its proposal of 22 August to offer the five year franchise conditionally. The Cabinet Council met 
on 8 September and sent its refusal to accept this to the Transvaal on the same day. It also ordered 
the Viceroy to despatch troops to South Africa. Wolseley had been left ignorant of these 
negotiations and on 8 and 28 September he urged Lansdowne 'postpone by diplomacy for one 
month at least any overt act of hostility on the part of the Transvaal'. He informed the government 
in no uncertain terms that 'we have lost time, ' and that he and his colleagues had already worked 
out the details of what force was required and its commanders. On 8 September he recommended 
General White to be second in command to Buller, with General Hunter as the Chief of Staff. He 
pointed out that although the staff and generals selected to command divisions and brigades had 
been decided the men concerned had not been informed that they might be sent to South Africa. 37 
Not only were there an insufficient number of men in Natal for its defence but delays in 
obtaining sanction for the purchase of mules made the existing force immobile. As Wolseley 
complained to Ardagh on 23 September: 
I have had officers there some weeks ready to buy but could not induce a Cabinet 
composed of men who are as ignorant, one and all of war and its requirements or 
how to carry it on as I am of abstruse theology. I am sick of urging a set of foolish 
men, whom by the by I can only approach through Lansdowne, for he takes care 
that I have no access to them, to buy the mule wagons and harnesses we shall want 
for war, but to no purpose. 38 
The Cabinet had now given Wolseley permission to spend £64,000 on specified items but he 
believed this was too little too late. Lansdowne agreed with Wolseley's concern over how to find a 
sufficient number of mules so quickly, he complained to Salisbury 'will no one invent a "motor 
mule"? ' 39 The fears of the military that time had run out were to be realised; on 27 September the 
Transvaal forces were called out, but it was not until 7 October that the Army Reserve was 
mobilised and Buller did not leave till a week later, after the Boers had entered Natal. 
The events of Black Week, when the Boers invested Ladysmith, Kimberley, and 
Mafeking, were a major shock to the British public. The Elgin Commission examined all relevant 
37 Pakenham, p91; Wolseley to Lansdowne, 8 Sept. 1899, CAB37/50; Wolseley to Lansdowne, 28 Sept. 
1899, Elgin Documents 
38 Wolseley to Ardagh, 23 Sept. 1899, Ardagh Papers, PR030/40/3 
39 Lansdowne to Salisbury, 1 Sept. 1899, Salisbury Papers 
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witnesses on the question of how the siege of Ladysmith had occurred and attempted to discover 
who made the decision to base a large number of troops in such an unsuitable location. Ladysmith 
was situated on the main railway running through Natal but because it was situated in a hollow it 
was an unsuitable location for a sustained defence against the Boers. Wolseley realised this from 
the start and told the Commission 'no one ever thought that the [British] troops would occupy 
Ladysmith. The district in front of Ladysmith is called Biggarsburg, a very strong position'. 40 
Natal was difficult to defend because its northern apex was surrounded by Boer territory on both 
sides. The Governor of Natal, Sir William Hely-Hutchinson was adamant that all of Natal should 
be defended since the voluntary abandonment of any territory, particularly the strategic coal fields 
at Dundee, could trigger a native uprising. Wolseley accepted the validity of these arguments, and 
was therefore content to accept the proposals from Natal for the stationing of limited numbers of 
troops at Dundee and Glencoe, and for the accumulation of stores for these men at Ladysmith. 
However, he did not believe that if the Boers invaded in any great numbers that the Biggarsburg 
positions could be held. If they could not be held, then he expected the British forces to fall back 
on Colenso and behind the Tugela River where the terrain was more suitable for sustained 
defensive operations. 41 
Butler had suggested much the same tactics in his defence plan of June 1899, but his 
successor General Symons had accepted Hely-Hutchinson's arguments and left troops at Dundee 
even when it was clear that the Boers were about to invade. In The Times History of the War L. S. 
Amery suggested that 'the keystone to the whole scheme was the assumption that Sir G. White 
could hold his own in Natal for an indefinite length of time. That assumption gave way at the very 
outset and the great army corps had to be broken up to stop the gap which the scheme 
overlooked'. 42 Amery was incorrect in suggesting that an oversight had been made by British 
military planners; Wolseley had consistently urged that the troops should fall back on the Tugela 
as soon as the Boer opposition became too strong to maintain the forward positions. White had 
been left in charge of British forces in Natal after Symons's death at the battle of Talana and 
40 Elgin Commission, Q. 8875,8862-72 
41 Pakenham, p 147 
42 Amery, Times History, p103 & 466 
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should have withdrawn the troops to the Tugela. White told the Elgin Commission he had not done 
so because he did not know if any defensive positions had been prepared behind the Tugela. 43 It 
can be argued that even with this doubt it would have been better for White to have withdrawn his 
division rather than be besieged in Ladysmith which was so obviously unsuitable for defence. 
Wolseley's description of White's predicament shows his lack of sympathy: White made 'the 
infernal mistake of allowing himself to be cut off' .' 
The next section of this chapter will examine aspects of the Boer War relevant to 
Wolseley. In The Times History Amery commented that 'Lord Wolseley, who throughout his 
career at the War Office had devoted his special care to mobilisation, could be well satisfied with 
the result of his work'. 45 Wolseley was, and in a memorandum in January 1900 he wrote: 
I have no hesitation in saying that no army has ever left our shores composed of 
finer soldiers than those of which our army now in South Africa consists. All are 
seasoned men. There are no recruits or youths under 20 years of age among them. 
Had we not possessed the Army Reserve... it would have been impossible to have 
sent to South Africa the Regular Army now serving there... Some weak points 
have been discovered and they will be at once rectified; but although this is the 
first time we have ever called out our whole Army Reserve we have every reason 
to be satisfied with the rapidity and ease with which this mobilisation of our army 
was effected. 46 
Mobilisation did progress smoothly in the early months of the war. On 20 October the first 
infantry transports sailed with the First Army Corps. On 11 November the 5th Infantry Division 
was mobilised after Buller had sent Gatacre's division to Natal once it was clear that telegraph 
communications with the Indian Division under General White had been cut, and Ladysmith was 
besieged. This mobilisation of one division was less than Wolseley had hoped for; in his 
memorandum of 3 November he had urged the mobilisation of the whole Second Army Corps. 
However, the difficulties encountered in supplying the men with uniforms and equipment coupled 
with the government's reluctance to send more troops to South Africa than it thought necessary 
meant that mobilisation continued by division. 47 The 6th Division was mobilised on 11 December 
43 Elgin Commission, Q. 14767 
44 Wolseley to George Wolseley, 23 Nov. 1899, Duke University 
45 Amery, Times History, p 113 
46 Memo. on the war in South Africa, Wolseley, 30 Jan. 1900, CAB37/51 
47 Memo. on the war in South Africa, Lansdowne, 30 Oct. 1899, CAB37/51; memo. on the Boer War, 
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and the 7th two days later. By then the War Office was facing a serious problem: it was running 
out of trained soldiers. 
As early as 30 September Wolseley had pointed out to Lansdowne that, once the troops 
under orders for South Africa had embarked, there would be only 38'/2 battalions of the Foot 
Guards and infantry of the line, and 36 batteries of artillery left in Britain and that therefore 
immediate steps had to be taken to strengthen the home army. He pointed out that 'our Army 
organisation provides for the contingency now before us: 37 Militia battalions should be called 
out to compensate for the absence of 37 line battalions in South Africa, the remaining cavalry 
regiments and artillery batteries should be raised to war establishment, and no further drafts sent to 
battalions serving abroad other than in South Africa. Lansdowne agreed with these proposals 
although there was some dispute as to the exact number of Militia battalions to be called out. 48 
Any organisation, however perfectly functioning, could only be stretched so far. By the 
end of 1899 it was clear that Britain was running out of troops while the demands for men from 
South Africa showed no signs of diminishing. Furthermore there was also the danger that either 
France or Russia or both countries might seize the opportunity given by Britain's absorption in the 
war in South Africa to attack British interests. The fear of French action formed the background to 
Wolseley's proposals put to the Defence Committee of the Cabinet at the end of December 1899 
and expanded on in a memorandum written on 29 December and reissued with minor amendments 
on 3 January 1900. He reminded the Cabinet that in 1888 it had been decided that the minimum 
force for home defence had been settled as two regular Army Corps and further one composed of 
the Militia, and that therefore in addition to the force then in South Africa Britain needed 42,500 
men and 1,270 officers. These Wolseley proposed to find by bringing back more battalions from 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Ceylon and Halifax, raising more recruits and encouraging former 
soldiers to re-enlist. He pointed out that according to the March 1896 estimate of the number of 
discharged soldiers in the United Kingdom there were 287,000 men under the age of 44 of whom 
Wolseley thought 170,000 would be of fighting age. 49 
48 Wolseley to Lansdowne, 30 Sept. 1899, Lansdowne to Wolseley, 12 Oct. 1899, Wolseley to Lansdowne, 
30 Oct. 1899, Wolseley to P. U. S., 31 Oct. 1899, Lansdowne to Wolseley, 31 Oct. 1899, all in W032/6359 
49 Wolseley to Lansdowne, 29 Dec. 1899, CAB37/51; Wolseley to Lansdowne, 3 Jan. 1900, W032/6360 
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These proposals were of such a serious nature that Lansdowne thought that it was essential 
to explore their practicability before presenting them to the Cabinet. He believed that the proposals 
needed to be considered under two headings: what should be the permanent increase to the size of 
the army; and what immediate steps were necessary for the war in South Africa. 50 The Military 
Secretary, Grove, thought that the main problem would be to find a sufficient number of officers, 
and that the solution might be to offer a number of one year commissions and to take Marine 
officers into the army. The Adjutant General, Wood, thought that a large bounty would need to be 
offered to obtain the men. He was convinced that the Militia would be sufficiently trained to repel 
invasion in October which was generally accepted as the most likely time for such an enterprise to 
be launched by France. The Quartermaster General reported that housing such a vast number of 
men would be virtually impossible. The Director General of Ordnance, Brackenbury, commented 
in detail on the stores of equipment and clothing and pointed out that ordnance would be a major 
problem unless orders were placed immediately. 51 Having received these responses, Lansdowne 
replied to Wolseley's memorandum on 17 January. He suggested that Wolseley was over- 
optimistic on the numbers of old soldiers who would come forward, and argued that 'the difficulty 
of getting officers for 32 new battalions would, I believe, be prohibitory'. Therefore existing 
resources must be depended on for the present war. He accepted the need to increase the size of 
the army permanently by 12 battalions, and proposed raising them by a combination of raw 
recruits and veterans. However, Wolseley's recommendations for urgent increases in the cavalry, 
engineers, and departmental troops would be put into practice immediately. The Defence 
Committee of the Cabinet approved Lansdowne's proposals on 20 January. 52 
Wolseley was unhappy at the way the Cabinet had treated his recommendations. He 
pointed out that once the 7th Division had left only 23 battalions would remain, and this figure 
plus the 12 battalions to be raised and the three already sanctioned gave a total of 38; 'I take it 
therefore that I am justified in assuming that this number represents what the Defence Committee 
50 Lansdowne to Clarke, 6 Jan. 1900, W032/6360 
51 Memo. by Grove, 6 Jan., memo. by Wood, 8 Jan., memo. by Brackenbury, 9 Jan., memo. by Clarke, 9 
Jan. 1900 all in W032/6360 
52 Lansdowne to Wolseley, 17 Jan. 1900, CAB37/52; meeting of the defence committee, 20 Jan., 1900, 
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consider necessary for safety' . 
53 Wolseley wanted to ensure that, should France successfully 
invade Britain, he had written confirmation that the Cabinet had considered that Britain was 
adequately defended, against the contrary opinion of the Commander-in-Chief. On 27 January 
Lansdowne informed Wolseley again that the Cabinet refused to sanction the raising of the 21 new 
battalions Wolseley wanted, but was prepared to raise more veterans for one year's service for 
home defence. These were called the Royal Reserve Battalions and approved by the Queen in 
February. Wolseley threatened to resign over the question of the number of battalions to be raised 
but was persuaded not to by his colleagues and Lansdowne. 54 
In June 1899 Wolseley had suggested the use of a fertile source of possible soldiers, the 
colonies, and he had advocated asking the Australian colonies and New Zealand for contingents of 
men. In July and September these colonies offered their services. Initially, apart from Wolseley, 
the War Office was lukewarm about these men who it was thought would not be trained or 
amenable to discipline. Wolseley wanted them because he predicted the need for irregular troops 
who could guard the lines of communication, thereby releasing British battalions for the fighting, 
and to act as mounted infantry, of which large numbers would be required to cover the veldt. 55 In 
the event contingents from the colonies did serve in South Africa and their services were 
welcomed by the authorities there though their expense was not. 
A further source of troops was the existing Volunteer movement. Wolseley had had little 
to do with the Volunteer movement directly during his career at the War Office, but he had been a 
great publicist for it, making numerous speeches to various Volunteer units. He did not consider 
that their training made them adequate to face a determined enemy but accepted their role as the 
third line of defence against invasion after the Navy and the regular army. The terms governing 
the Volunteer movement subjected them to service only at home, but nevertheless the patriotism of 
some commanding officers, such as Colonel E. Balfour of the London Scottish and Colonel H. 
53 Memo. on the strength of the British Army, Wolseley, 23 Jan. 1900, W032/6360 
54 Memo. on the establishment, Lansdowne, 27 Jan. 1900, ibid.; Wolseley to Lansdowne, 11 Feb. 1900, 
Maurice Papers, 2/2/46; Bigge to Wolseley, 17 Feb. 1900, Lansdowne to Queen, 29 Jan. 1900, both in 
Buckle, Vol. 3,3rd series, pp489-90,470-1 
55 Memo. on the military strength in South Africa, Wolseley, 8 June 1899, CAB37/50; Amery, Times 
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Vincent of the Queen's Westminsters, led to them offering the War Office the services of their 
regiments abroad. Initially the Inspector-General of the Auxiliary Forces, Major-General Kelly- 
Kenny and the Adjutant General, Evelyn Wood, refused to accept the Volunteers for service in 
South Africa. The events of Black Week in December forced the authorities in the War Office to 
change their opinions and Wolseley was particularly keen to use the Volunteers abroad. 
On 15 December the Lord Mayor of London, Sir Alfred Newton offered to raise the 1st 
City of London Volunteers on a scheme devised by Colonel C. G. Boxhill. Lansdowne signalled 
his agreement and Wolseley gave Newton unofficial permission to proceed with the raising of a 
contingent of 1,000 men. These were formed into one infantry battalion, two mounted infantry 
companies and one horse artillery battery. They were despatched to South Africa in January 1900 
and a further draft was sent In July. Other measures for utilising the Volunteers were put into 
practice. Service companies were formed to join the Army Reserve to serve at home but able to 
proceed to South Africa if needed. Volunteer engineer and medical units were also encouraged to 
offer their services. In the case of the medical corps they released doctors of the Army Medical 
Staff Corps for service in South Africa where they were very urgently needed. The Volunteers 
arrived in South Africa after Kimberley and Ladysmith had been relieved but did take part in the 
advance on Pretoria and fought two actions at Doornkop and Diamond Hill. Their efficiency was 
praised by their commander Major-General Smith-Dorrien. 56 
The Yeomanry was probably the weakest branch of the British military system. It was 
under-manned and under-trained and little attention had been paid towards improving this state of 
affairs. On 16 December Buller sent a telegram after the battle of Colenso asking for 8,000 
mounted men to be sent to South Africa urgently. No large units of mounted infantry existed in the 
British Army so Lansdowne proposed to create a new body, the Imperial Yeomanry out of existing 
Yeomanry regiments and to recruit able horsemen from the general public. Wolseley disagreed 
with this proposal, and on 28 December wrote to the P. U. S.: 
I am very anxious to supply the GOC in 
accustomed to some sort of discipline; but 
pick up any civilians who will volunteer to 
South Africa with 8000 trained men 
o go to the highways and byways and 
go to South Africa quite regardless of 
56 Beckett, Riflemen Form, p211-14 
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whether they have ever learnt even the rudiments of discipline, and to form these 
into companies or battalions... is, according to my knowledge of war, a dangerous 
experiment. 
Lansdowne replied that Wolseley was exaggerating the problem since Wood had drawn up a list of 
strict qualifications for membership of the Imperial Yeomanry. Wolseley claimed that he had no 
previous knowledge of the scheme, but there is evidence to suggest that he had seen Wood's 
minute of 23 December giving details of the recruitment and organisation of the Imperial 
Yeomanry. 57 The Imperial Yeomanry served efficiently on the lines of communication, thereby 
releasing more regulars for service at the front, but their horsemastership was appalling, and many 
horses suffered under their care. 
Britain not only suffered from a shortage of men with which to fight a major war far from 
home but was also desperately short of equipment. Wolseley's concern with the state of British 
armaments, equipment and uniforms had been spasmodic throughout his career. He had been 
instrumental in winning the soldier a practical fighting dress but had shown little interest in the 
quantity of such uniforms held in store. In April 1899 provision had been made for the supply of 
40,000 sets of khaki drill. In August the medical authorities recommended serge as the most 
suitable for use in South Africa. This late change meant a shortage of uniforms for the divisions 
which followed the First Army Corps to South Africa. Wolseley cannot be blamed for this 
shortfall particularly since demand rapidly outgrew previously predicted wartime requirements. 
The British Army was also woefully short of rifle ammunition during the war. No one person 
could be blamed for this state of affairs since part of the problem was caused by the decision of the 
1899 Hague Conference to ban the use of Dum Dum bullets; consequently the 66 million bullets of 
this type in British reserves could not be sent to South Africa. 58 
On the question of armaments, particularly the provision of heavy guns, Wolseley had 
spoken on the subject of Britain's obsolete artillery in the late 1880s during the invasion scares. 
There is little evidence to suggest that he showed much interest in the subject later. As 
Commander-in-Chief Wolseley was far more concerned with obtaining an increase in the size of 
57 Wolseley to P. U. S., 28 Dec. 1899, Lansdowne to Wolseley, 30 Dec. 1899, memo. on the Yeomanry, 
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the army than in equipping it with the most modern armament, particularly the new quick-firing 
guns. When Brackenbury was appointed Director General of Ordnance early in 1899 he was asked 
by Lansdowne to undertake a thorough survey of British armaments. Events overtook 
Brackenbury's project, but on 15 December he wrote a detailed memorandum for Wolseley 
explaining the existing stores and what the ordnance factories and trade could produce. The picture 
showed the extent to which the provision of modern armaments had been neglected over the years. 
Brackenbury concluded, 'the above is, I submit, sufficient to prove that we are attempting to 
maintain the largest Empire the world has ever seen with armaments and reserves that would be 
insufficient for a third class military Power'. 59 The result was that many orders were placed for 
heavy guns, ammunition, gun carriages, etc., with the ordnance factories, trade, and abroad. 
These orders would not be filled for some time especially since the order books of foreign 
manufacturers Krupps and Creuzot were already full. In order to avoid such a critical state of 
affairs recurring in the future an interdepartmental committee was set up under Sir Francis 
Mowatt, Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, to examine Britain's future requirements and ability 
to fulfil them. 60 The main discussion and practical application of the recommendations of this 
committee occurred after Wolseley had left the War Office. 
The following section of this chapter will examine which aspects of the conduct of the 
British Army in the Boer War reflected on Wolseley. It will not go into detail of the battles fought 
nor of the performance of individual brigades beyond what is needed to illustrate various points 
concerning Wolseley. Firstly the performance of the staff officers will be examined, followed by 
some comments on the fighting performance of the British soldier. 
The staff appointed to commands in the Boer War should have been the best staff sent on 
any British expedition since most had been through the Staff College. But contemporary 
commentators had little to say in praise of the staff or the senior regimental officers, for example, 
Amery commented that 
59 Proceedings of the mobilisation committee, 14 Dec. 1899, WO163/612; memo. on the Ordnance Branch, 
Brackenbury, 15 Dec. 1899, Elgin Documents; Wolseley to Lansdowne, 29 Dec. 1899, CAB37/51; memo. 
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The course of the war showed that among our generals were to be found a few 
leaders of boldness, tactical insight and organising power, and it had brought to 
the front many more who at its outbreak were unknown junior officers. But it also 
revealed the fact that many of our generals, who had risen simply by seniority, 
were nothing more than rather aged regimental officers. 61 
This opinion was shared by Wolseley. While a commander in the field he had encouraged the rise 
of able junior officers above their less efficient seniors. In the War Office he had been at the 
forefront of the campaign for the introduction of selection to senior regimental positions and staff 
appointments. Wolseley had achieved some success in this area, as revealed in the previous 
chapter, but the new provisions had had too little time to take effect before the outbreak of war. 
Major Cairns who had served under Buller argued that: 'One after another have the pets of 
the War Office, the men arrogantly styling themselves "of the modern school", proved their 
hopeless incapacity for the leadership of troops in the field; time and again have the very men to 
whose hands has been entrusted the training of the British army for war, shown that they who are 
unfit to command are unfit to train'. 62This implied a direct criticism of Wolseley and the men 
whose careers he had nurtured at the War Office. It is often difficult to determine exactly who 
appointed certain officers but, nevertheless, some of Wolseley's choices can be identified, and it is 
also of interest to compare the staff structure set up in peacetime with the staff organisation sent to 
war. The weakness of the staff had serious consequences; Roberts sacked five generals, six 
cavalry brigadiers, one infantry brigadier, five commanding officers of cavalry regiments and four 
commanding officers of infantry battalions. 63 
The first senior officer to be considered must be Buller as the commander of the First 
Army Corps. Buller had performed well in the Aldershot command to which he had been 
appointed in October 1898 and had issued many memoranda on tactics while there. It is not clear 
whether Wolseley put Buller's name forward for the command of the First Army Corps to 
Lansdowne or whether it was the other way round. It may have been assumed that, because the 
majority of units forming the First Army Corps were stationed at Aldershot, the appointment of its 
peacetime commander for war was apparently obvious. But Buller was not the man for the job and 
61 Amery, Times History, pp37-8 
62 Capt. W. E. Cairns, The Absent-Minded War, (London 1900) p11 
63 Elgin Commission, Q. 10520 
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he did not want it. Lyttelton, who was present at a meeting at the War Office between Wolseley 
and Buller, noted that Buller had 'expressed very strong objections to accepting the command, said 
he was sick of South Africa, and if he was forced to go out would come away as soon as he 
could' .M Given Buller's state of mind Wolseley should have looked for an alternative commander, 
but Britain appeared to be so short of able men that he would have had difficulties doing this. 
Despite the shortcomings of Buller's performance in South Africa, Wolseley remained faithful to 
his friend. Wolseley knew nothing of the scheming between Roberts and Lansdowne which 
increased in tempo after Buller's repeated failures to relieve Ladysmith and the controversial 
telegram recommending its surrender. Therefore, when Roberts's appointment was made public on 
18 December, it came as a complete shock to Wolseley, and he thought that Buller would and 
ought to resign immediately. 65 Buller, however, knew his own weaknesses and accepted that he 
could probably perform better when in command only in Natal, leaving Roberts to follow the line 
of campaign originally proposed by Buller from the Cape. 
When the composition of the staff for the expeditionary force was being drawn up 
Wolseley had advocated the appointments of certain men. For example, he wrote to Buller in 
September strongly recommending the services of Sir George White as Buller's second in 
command. Later Wolseley was so angry with White after he had failed to remove his division from 
Ladysmith in time that he recommended to Lansdowne that White should be removed from his 
command, but Lansdowne declined to do this. 66 Once Buller was forced to go to White's rescue in 
Natal, Methuen was left in charge of the advance on Kimberley. Neither Wolseley nor Lansdowne 
thought Methuen capable of 'an almost independent command', and Wolseley advocated sending 
Grenfell from his command in Malta to South Africa. Lansdowne favoured Kitchener, but noted in 
a letter to Salisbury that Wolseley 'doubted S. Africa being big enough for Buller and Kitchener, 
64 Lyttelton, p200-1 
65 Roberts to Lansdowne, 25 April 1897, asking for the South African command, Newton, p146; Roberts to 
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both being "masterful men". '67 Lyttelton drew up the list of the staff for the expeditionary force. 
He excluded Gatacre, whose performance in the Sudan had not impressed Lyttelton, but Wolseley 
included him. Gatacre was sacked and sent home by Roberts after Reddesburg for his failures in 
command. The justice of this action lies outside the scope of this thesis but it is interesting to note 
that Lord Esher told the King in 1903 that Gatacre had never been given the opportunity, which 
should have been afforded to a senior staff officer, to state his case to Roberts at the time. 68 
Arnold-Forster commented that 'much would have been gained if the higher commands 
were assigned in peace to those likely to exercise them in war'. 69 This was clearly not the case, 
and Wolseley must bear much of the blame. Because of the constant updating of mobilisation 
arrangements lists of staff for the First Army Corps were in existence at the War Office, and the 
officers concerned mostly held the positions in peace that they were intended to occupy in war. 
But as Lyttelton noted, 'Wolseley had a liking for what may be called "fancy" brigades, Scotch, 
Irish and Light Infantry, consequently few brigades went out as they stood'. 70 The consequences 
were predictably disastrous, and much delay in the progress of the field force must have been 
caused by the time needed for the new staff organisation to learn to work together. In his evidence 
to the Elgin Commission, General Hildyard said that 'he believed that the brigade which he 
commanded [the 2nd] was the only one which went out as a brigade and had been trained as a 
brigade at Aldershot under its old commander before its embarkation, and said that much 
advantage was derived from this fact'. 71 There was no justification for Wolseley's interference in 
previously made arrangements other than his arrogant belief that he knew the best structure for the 
British Army and its best senior officers. 
During 1900 Wolseley played a less active role in the War Office side of the war in South 
Africa. Part of the reason for this may be his increasing ill-health, but part must be assumed to be 
his anger at the appointment of Roberts. When it became clear that Buller was not performing as 
67 Lansdowne to Salisbury, 3&8 Nov. 1899, Salisbury Papers 
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well as expected Wolseley offered his services as a commander in the field, but there was no 
chance that this would be accepted given Wolseley's position in London and his health. He was 
furious that Roberts, who was a year older than him, was considered fit for active command. He 
remained critical of Roberts's performance, particularly the delay caused in the main advance by 
Roberts's and Kitchener's reorganisation of the transport service. While Roberts was on his way 
home to succeed Wolseley as Commander-in-Chief Wolseley wrote to his brother George: 'the 
war in South Africa is said to be over, but the fighting is certainly not over, & our friend little 
Bobs is bound to be found out as a charlatan sooner or later in all that relates to this war'. 72 
Roberts returned to great public accolade whereas Wolseley was subjected to press criticism for 
the failures of the War Office before and during the war. 
The tactics employed by the British Army during the Boer War have been the subject of 
much criticism, which can be found elsewhere. 73 Many of the weaknesses revealed by the war had 
previously been highlighted in Wolseley's report on the 1898 Salisbury manoeuvres, such as the 
lack of correct use of ground for concealment in the attack and failures to bring artillery to bear at 
the most appropriate moment. The performance of the cavalry led to a long debate and the details 
of this can also be found elsewhere. 74 It is however worthy of note that, despite Wolseley's 
general lack of interest in tactical doctrine during his career, he had supported two advances of 
importance in the Boer War. One was the use of night marches to bring the offensive force close 
to the defender without being seen. He had been successful in this area at the battle of Tel-el-Kebir 
in 1882. Subsequently the British Army had no experience of night marches in war and due to 
concern about the fitness of the young soldiers and the stress night operations might have on 
cavalry horses little practice had been made in peacetime except by Wood. In the Drill Book of 
1896 Wolseley had encouraged the use of night marches but to little avail. Consequently the night 
march by Methuen's force on the Boer positions at Modder River was almost as much of an 
innovation as Wolseley's march in Egypt; but in this case with different results. 75 
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The Boer War demonstrated the usefulness of mounted infantry and, as has already been 
described in an earlier chapter, Wolseley was a great advocate of this arm. During the war 
discussions were re-opened at the War Office on the subject of how to secure a permanent body of 
mounted infantrymen in the army. Both Wolseley and Lansdowne proposed to institute a system 
whereby one company within each infantry battalion would be of mounted infantry. Wood 
disagreed, and in a memorandum in July 1900 argued that such a system would be impossible to 
maintain on foreign stations because of the lack of space and climate suitable for horses. Wood 
suggested that each battalion should be increased in size by 140 men to form a separate company 
so that the bayonet strength would not be reduced. Colonel Lake, the Assistant Quartermaster 
General, agreed with Wood. Therefore Wolseley reduced his proposal to battalions stationed at 
home, Egypt and Cyprus although he was keen to consult the Indian authorities on the possibility 
of setting up a similar scheme there. Lansdowne concluded that further discussions were needed 
and that a special committee should consider the question. This committee reported after Wolseley 
had left the War Office. 76 
While Wolseley was in the War Office in the 1880s he had given a great deal of support to 
the Intelligence Branch. He had been instrumental in securing the post of head of the department 
for Brackenbury and in securing increased funds for its expansion. Despite Wolseley's support, the 
Intelligence Department remained short of funds; nevertheless, it functioned remarkably well in 
the circumstances. It provided accurate assessments of the strength of the Boer armies, the number 
and type of their armaments and the intentions of their leaders. Lack of funds meant, however, 
that few maps had been made of South Africa, particularly of the area of the main British advance 
and this did have a detrimental effect on the performance of the army. Few senior officers in 
South Africa realised the importance of accurate intelligence, but under Roberts a Field 
Intelligence Department was set up which later remained as a permanent part of British staff 
organisation for war. 77 
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At the end of September 1900 Wolseley was informed that Roberts had been chosen as his 
successor as Commander-in-Chief. By then Wolseley was keen to retire, as is clear from the letter 
he wrote to Lansdowne on the subject: 
Of course I shall willingly do what may be considered best for Her Majesty's 
Service in the matter of staying on for a few weeks longer. But I think it would be 
more in accordance with custom and would certainly be more agreeable to me to 
fix the date when I am to retire, say, either the end of November or December, I 
don't care which. I should not like to stay on by the week. 78 
He had not enjoyed his period of office and believed strongly that the politicians had made his 
position untenable in peacetime and were unjustly blaming him for the early reverses of the Boer 
War. Wolseley's imminent retirement re-opened the debate on the position of the Commander-in- 
Chief and the Queen encouraged Wolseley to set out his case in a memorandum for Salisbury. 
Wolseley argued that the Commander-in-Chief 'has neither the supreme control exercised by the 
Secretary of State, nor the administrative functions now conferred on those below him. Between 
the Ministerial Head on the one hand and the Departmental Heads on the other, he has been 
crushed out, and the Secretary of State has become the actual Commander-in-Chief of the army'. 
Wolseley concluded that either the Order in Council of 1895 should be rescinded and 'the army be 
again placed under a Military Commander, who shall be responsible for its discipline and military 
training and efficiency', or the post should be abolished since 'it is now merely a high sounding 
title, with no real responsibility attached to it, and answers no useful military purpose'. 79 
Lansdowne retaliated with a strongly worded memorandum in which he listed the 
functions the Order in Council had placed on the Commander-in-Chief. He noted that: 
It is remarkable that in his account of the duties which he has been performing 
during the last five years, the Commander-in-Chief has omitted all reference to 
mobilisation, to the preparation of schemes of offensive and defensive operations, 
as well as the important duties to the Department of the Director of Military 
Intelligence, who, with the Military Secretary, is placed in direct subordination to 
the Commander-in-Chief. 80 
Lansdowne's argument was that had Wolseley performed all the functions of the Commander-in- 
Chief his time would have been so filled that it would have been impossible for him to do more. 
78 Wolseley to Lansdowne, 30 Sept. 1900, Maurice Papers, 2/2/47 
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He was keen to draw attention to the above-quoted duty of the Commander-in-Chief because this 
formed the basis for the politicians' argument that the military had not informed them on the 
strength of the Boers prior to the outbreak of the war. The Under Secretary, Brodrick, was also 
drawn into the argument. He reduced his comments on Wolseley's memorandum to the level of 
personal criticism. He alleged that while Wolseley had been seriously ill in January 1897 he had 
found sufficient energy to work on his biography of Marlborough, and that on his return to the 
War Office his attention to business had been 'spasmodic' and much of his work had devolved to 
the Adjutant General. 81 
Roberts was alarmed about the weakness of the functions assigned to the post he was about 
to occupy, particularly since he had held a much stronger position when Commander-in-Chief in 
India. At the end of December 1900 he wrote a memorandum on the subject which showed that he 
was broadly in agreement with Wolseley. 82 The result was that the government appointed a 
committee under the chairmanship of Clinton Dawkins, a member of the Administrative Reform 
Association, to examine the whole organisation of the War Office and the committee reported in 
May 1901. It found that the War Office suffered from confusion in administration between the 
civil and military side, and that there was an absence of clearly defined individual responsibility. 
The bulk of its recommendations were incorporated in the Order in Council of 4 November 1901 
which gave the Commander-in-Chief responsibility for discipline, training, mobilisation and staff 
planning; the Adjutant General was placed under him. Although the report did criticise Wolseley's 
preparation of offensive and defensive plans, it was nevertheless a clear victory for Wolseley's 
side of the dispute on the functions of the Commander-in-Chief. 83 The terms of the 1901 Order in 
Council became subject to criticism later, and the Esher Committee completely re-organised the 
War Office and abolished the post of Commander-in-Chief in 1904. 
Although the report of the Dawkins Committee was published the general public was made 
more aware of the arguments between the military and civil sides of the War Office by the debates 
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which took place in the House of Lords on 4 and 5 March 1901. The Earl of Camperdown 
arranged Wolseley's defence and urged him to be cautious in making a direct attack on a member 
of the government. In the first debate Wolseley was moderate in his speech whereas Lansdowne 
replied that 'he thought the main cause of our non-success at the beginning was not the lack of 
powers of the Commander-in-Chief, but the fitful exercise of those powers. 84 Camperdown wrote 
to Wolseley after this debate, 'I believe that L. was entirely misled by your not making any attack 
on him or on the Government, which shows how wise it was on your part to abstain from any 
mention of them in your first speech. He expected an attack, and could not help firing off his 
counter attack'. 85 Wolseley's moderation in refraining from a direct attack on Lansdowne or the 
Cabinet must have made it easier for the government to adopt the proposals of the Dawkins 
Committee without a loss of face. 
The Elgin Commission had been unjustly critical of Wolseley's role in the preparations for 
the war in South Africa. The government had known the state of Boer armaments before the 1899 
crisis, but both the government and the War Office were taken by surprise by the Boers' tenacity 
and fighting ability. The events between June and October 1899 demonstrate the depth of distrust 
between the politicians and the military. The Cabinet so feared that the proposals emanating from 
the War Office would make war more likely that it both deprived Wolseley of the resources he 
believed vital for the defence of the British colonies in South Africa, and left him so ignorant of 
diplomatic negotiations that Wolseley had too little information on which to base offensive plans of 
operation. The blame for the early reverses of the war must be shared by the Cabinet, for not 
sending reinforcements in time and not settling the question of the attitude of the Orange Free 
State; the local authorities in South Africa for attempting to defend too much with too few 
resources, leading to the sieges of Kimberley and Mafeking; and the generals on the spot whose 
failures led to the siege of Ladysmith and the consequent disruption of Buller's plan of campaign. 
Wolseley must be criticised for not backing up his numerous memoranda with details from the 
intelligence reports he had received. Wolseley had underestimated the British military resources 
84 4&5 March 1901, Hansard, Vol. XC, 4th series 
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necessary to defeat the Boers but then Britain had never embarked on a war on that scale so far 
from base before, and Wolseley had no precedent to guide him. 
Other aspects of the war show Wolseley in a worse light. He selected the generals in 
command of divisions and brigades and his choices were often wrong. He had had the overall 
responsibility for training the British Army since 1895, yet there was room for a vast improvement 
in British tactics. Wolseley had shown too little interest in the stores of equipment and armaments, 
which were found to be desperately lacking even for a war of a smaller size and duration. He had 
concentrated instead on increasing the size of the home establishment and for this at least he must 
be praised since, although Britain was running out of men late in 1899, the reservoir of men would 
have been far smaller had Wolseley not fought so hard for the additional battalions and for the 
maintenance of the Army Reserve. 
The Boer War cost over £200 million and required the services of 256,340 officers and 
men of the regular army, 109,048 auxiliaries, 30,633 from the colonies, and 50-60,000 men raised 
in South Africa. 86 It appeared to mark the end of an era; reforms in the British Army had been 
made since 1870 but in 1900 it was clear that many more were to be needed before Britain could 
face a continental army with confidence. It called into question the value of the reforms made 
since 1870 and, therefore, implicitly challenged Wolseley's achievements as an army reformer. 
The justice of these statements forms the theme of the conclusion. 
86 Spiers, Late Victorian Army, p312 
250 
Conclusion 
During the Crimean War the government had been forced to resort to a number of 
emergency expedients to increase the size of the army, including the lowering of physical 
standards for recruits, the employment of eleven Militia regiments in the Mediterranean, the 
voluntary transfer of approximately 30,000 militiamen to the colours, and the enlistment of foreign 
legions. ' The situation at the end of 1900 presented a similar picture. The lowering of physical 
standards for recruits had begun before the outbreak of the Second Boer War with the enlistment 
of 'specials'. During the war the services of 32 Militia regiments was proposed, a special law was 
passed to enable the Volunteers to serve abroad voluntarily, and contingents were sent to South 
Africa from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Therefore it is quite understandable to view the 
thirty year period between the Cardwell reforms and the Boer War as a period when the British 
Army failed to develop into an efficient and effective military force. By extension this suggests 
that Wolseley was a failure, that he did not reform the army, that the army on his retirement from 
the War Office was in as bad a state as when he had joined it in 1871. 
This is not, however, the best approach to the subject. A final analysis of Wolseley's 
career at the War Office must address three fundamental questions: did Wolseley succeed in 
putting across his views but fail to have them acted upon because his methods were at fault? Was 
Wolseley less successful at the War Office than he had hoped to be, but set the agenda for the 
future? Or did Wolseley's presence have any effect at all on the reform of the British Army? 
Wolseley joined the War Office full of enthusiasm for army reform as the Cardwell system was 
being put into practice. Wolseley was never a root and branch reformer ready to rebuild the 
British Army from top to bottom; he believed that such thorough reform was no longer necessary: 
Cardwell had given the army a new organisation, and Wolseley's task was to make it work. 
Chapters 3 and 4 have shown that throughout his career Wolseley would provide a stout defence of 
the system as evidence accumulated to reveal its fundamental 
flaws. He justified his conduct by 
1 B. Bond, 'Prelude to the Cardwell Reforms, 1858-1868', in J. R. U. S. I. Vol. CVI, No. 622, (May 1961) 
pp229-41 
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arguing that the system had never been able to function as its creator intended, and that if the 
government was prepared to provide the finance to increase the number of battalions at home to 
balance them with those abroad then all would be well. Wolseley fought this battle unremittingly 
and was finally successful. Unfortunately the substantial increase in the size of the army came too 
late in Wolseley's career and too close to the outbreak of the Boer War to determine whether the 
increase could have solved the problem of the ineffectiveness of the home army. 
For all but the final years of Wolseley's career at the War Office he battled against the 
unswerving conservatism of his superior the Duke of Cambridge. In order to reform the army in 
the direction he desired, Wolseley frequently undermined the authority of the Duke by appealing 
directly to the public and his political masters. Wolseley fought the Duke to ensure that the British 
Army was as modern as possible and capable of facing a variety of enemies anywhere in the 
world, and this was the subject of chapter 5. He achieved many successes at the time and 
frequently prepared the ground for further improvements in the future. He chaired the committee 
which recommended the adoption of a more practical working uniform for the army and, despite 
his limited interest in tactics, proved an ardent supporter of machine guns and mounted infantry. 
Wolseley had rather less success in other areas: the Duke resisted all attempts to modernise the 
drill book, and though revisions were made Wolseley was never satisfied that the army was being 
adequately trained for the modern battlefield. Wolseley struggled to secure the adoption of a 
system of selection for all higher regimental and staff appointments against the Duke's opposition. 
The creation of the Promotion Board in 1890 marked a success for Wolseley but despite its 
existence personal preference, whether the Duke's or Wolseley's, continued to play an 
unjustifiably important role in promotion till the end of the century. As Adjutant General Wolseley 
was instrumental in overseeing the preparation of feasible mobilisation plans, and this was an area 
which functioned faultlessly in and after October 1899. Wolseley was also a supporter of the 
Intelligence Department, providing it with capable heads. 
Wolseley gained a reputation as a political officer. This was partly because he allied 
himself with Cardwell against the majority of the officer corps, and partly because his appointment 
as Adjutant General had been 
forced upon the Duke by the politicians. Yet Wolseley despised the 
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politicians for what he viewed as their placing party politics over national interests, and their 
parsimony. He believed that financial retrenchment damaged the efficiency of the home army and 
highlighted some areas in which lack of finance made the most impact: the number of battalions at 
home was not raised to compensate for the increase in those abroad; even had the establishment 
been increased there was no guarantee that sufficient recruits would come forward to enlist in such 
a poorly paid army; and finance and the lack of land meant that large scale manoeuvres, essential 
to train all levels of the army, were not held regularly to the detriment of the army's efficiency in 
the field. 
Wolseley also believed that politicians fundamentally misunderstood the capabilities and 
requirements of the army. Chapters 6 and 7 have argued that Wolseley, more than most of his 
contemporaries, realised that the Empire was overextended: Egypt should not have been retained, 
policy on Indian defence was fundamentally flawed, and insufficient attention was paid to Britain's 
vulnerability to invasion. Wolseley pressed the government for a statement of the purposes for 
which the army existed. His efforts were rewarded by the Stanhope Memorandum but he was 
never totally satisfied with it. At no point did the divergence between military and political interest 
become more apparent than in the years leading up to the outbreak of the Second Boer War. 
Chapter 9 has argued that Wolseley was unfairly blamed for the early reverses suffered in that 
war. The war provided the shock that Wolseley felt Britain needed. He wrote to General Sir 
Edward Hutton in 1902, 
Everyone is delighted that the war is over and I hope it may result in inducing 
those who rule England to set our Army and Navy in good order. They have had 
heaps of warning to do so for many years backed by those who were best entitled 
to advise them, but politicians are the same all over the world. They will spend 
nothing in peace, and when war comes try to throw all the blame for 
unpreparedness upon the soldiers and sailors who have been vainly trying to make 
them spend money on those two fine services. 2 
After Wolseley's retirement from the War Office many of his opinions were more widely 
accepted: there was a major reappraisal of Britain's strategic interests and a reorganisation of her 
military and naval resources, and the Committee of Imperial Defence was set up with the intention 
of achieving greater co-operation between the politicians and their military advisers. 
2 Wolseley to Hutton, 5 June 1902, in Muenger, p132 
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Wolseley entered the War Office full of energy and enthusiasm for army reform and left it 
a bitterly disappointed man. A great deal of the blame for this rests on Wolseley himself: his 
ambition, competitiveness, and intolerance of opposing opinions. There was a rivalry between 
Wolseley and Roberts which centred around Wolseley's defence of the Cardwell system. Whereas 
Roberts argued that the efficiency of the army was being sacrificed to create an Army Reserve, 
Wolseley believed that India's greed for soldiers, which denuded the home cadres of virtually all 
their trained men, was to blame. Chapter 3 has shown that Wolseley was ready to accept the idea 
that India did need troops for a longer period of service than laid down by Cardwell and Childers, 
and had he not seen Roberts as a threat to his own position he might have been more willing to 
make his opinions public. Wolseley's clashes with the Duke were justified on the grounds that the 
Duke, if given a free hand, would have thwarted all efforts towards the modernisation of the 
British Army. But Wolseley's conduct towards Lansdowne has little justification. Chapter 8 has 
shown that Wolseley was a disappointment as Commander-in-Chief and that Wolseley's 
resentment at the redrawing of his area of responsibilities angered and depressed him so much that 
his lack of sympathy with Lansdowne damaged the cause of reform during these years. More 
needs to be written on Lansdowne's period as Secretary of State for War, 3 but there is ample 
evidence to suggest that had Wolseley's personality been more amenable towards politicians the 
two men would have made great advances in the cause of army reform. Lansdowne was better 
able than many of his predecessors to request additions to the Estimates, and obtained sanction for 
a substantial increase to the establishment, and a loan for military works. Yet Wolseley never 
showed the slightest gratitude. 
Chapter 2 examined how Wolseley brought the cause of army reform into the public 
forum. His use of publicity was highly controversial and he received many reprimands from the 
Duke and Secretaries of State for War. Yet Wolseley was justified in his conduct: as Amery 
wrote, 
An army which is absolutely subordinate to the civil power, which is a mere 
instrument of the national will, can only be efficient if the nation is determined to 
3 The Lansdowne papers are still closed to researchers. 
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insist upon efficiency. It is absurd to blame the Army for not having the military 
interests of the nation at heart if the nation itself is indifferent to those interests. 
Wolseley achieved limited successes in his use of publicity: backed by the public, he played a 
prominent role in blocking the construction of the Channel Tunnel, and he manipulated the 
perception of the state of French politics in order to create invasion scares in 1887-8: this arousal 
of public opinion led to a minor increase in army expenditure but a major increase in naval 
construction. Wolseley also attempted to make the army more popular within society in the hope 
that better educated men would enlist. There is little evidence to show any great success in this 
particular area while Wolseley was at the War Office, but, nevertheless, the ease of recruitment 
for the Imperial Yeomanry during the Boer War and the flood of recruits in August 1914 
demonstrate that Wolseley had finally got the message across that military service was socially 
acceptable. 
Wolseley left the War Office a disappointed man because he believed that he could have 
done more to reform the army. The obstacles to his success had been virtually insurmountable and 
yet until ill health undermined his abilities he had battled unremittingly for the cause of army 
reform. His greatest achievement was to prepare the ground for further reforms and to suggest the 
directions they should take once the public and politicians accepted the necessity. Therefore Lord 
Midleton, who had been Secretary of State for War as Brodrick from 1900 to 1903, was quite 
correct when he wrote to Evelyn Wood in 1918 that 'When history is written I feel that the Army 
of Mons will be ascribed to Lord Wolseley, yourself and his other comrades, who first broke 
down the old gang... ' .4 Whatever 
his faults and failings, it must be concluded that Wolseley was 
the leading reformer at the War Office in the last thirty years of the nineteenth century and that 
without his efforts the British Army in 1900 would have been even less prepared to meet the 
challenge of the war in South Africa. 
4 Midleton to Wood, 16 Feb. 1918, Wood Papers, Duke University 
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Appendix I- Outline of Sir Garnet Wolseley's Career 
4 June 1833 Garnet Wolseley born in Ireland the eldest of seven children. Son of an 
army officer. 
12 March 1852 Commissioned as an Ensign into the 12th East Suffolk Regiment. 
13 April 1852 Transfers to 80th Staffordshire Regiment. 
1852-3 Fights in the Second Burmese War. Wounded. Mentioned in despatches. 
16 May 1853 Promoted to Lieutenant in the 90th Perthshire Light Infantry. 
15 November 1854 Leaves for Crimean War. Temporary appointment as Acting Engineer 
before Sebastopol. Wounded several times and loses the sight of his right 
eye. Appointed D. A. Q. M. G. on the staff of the Light Infantry. Mentioned 
several times in despatches. 
16 January 1855 Promoted to Captain. 
Autumn 1856 Returns to England and stationed at Aldershot and Chatham. 
April 1857 Sent to India with regiment. Indian Mutiny. Present at the siege and 
capture of Lucknow. Then D. A. Q. M. G. to Hope Grant's division. 
Frequent mentions in despatches. 
24 March 1858 Promoted to Major. 
26 April 1859 Promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel. 
1860 Second Chinese War. D. A. Q. M. G. on staff of Hope Grant. Present at all 
engagements. 
December 1861 Leaves for Canada as Assistant Quartermaster-General. 
Late 1862 Visits Lee's headquarters during the American Civil War. 
1865 Made Commandant of La Prairie training school, near Montreal. 
5 June 1865 Promoted to Colonel. 
September 1867 Appointed Deputy Quartermaster-General. 
1868 Receives two months leave. Returns to England and marries Louisa 
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Erskine. 
1870 Commands the Red River Expedition to Fort Garry. Made a Knight of 
St Michael and St George. 
October 1870 Returns to England. 
1 May 1871 Appointed Assistant Adjutant General. 
October 1871 Chief of the Staff to Sir Charles Staveley at manoeuvres. 
October 1872 On the staff of Sir John Michael at manoeuvres. 
September 1873 Leaves England to command the Ashanti Campaign. 
February 1874 Reaches Kumasi. 
March 1874 Returns to England. Receives Grand Cross of the Order of St Michael 
and St George, and the KCB. Parliament makes a grant of £25,000. 
Promoted to Major-General, backdated to 6 March 1868. 
1 April 1874 Appointed Inspector-General of the Auxiliary Forces. 
February 1875 Appointed High Commissioner in Natal. 
October 1875 Resumes appointment as Inspector-General of the Auxiliary Forces. 
October 1876 Seconded to Council of the Secretary of State for India. 
25 March 1878 Promoted to Lieutenant-General. 
July 1878 Appointed High Commissioner for Cyprus. 
April 1879 Recalled to England. 
June 1879 Appointed High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief of Natal and 
the Transvaal. Captures Cetewayo. End of Zulu War. 
November 1879 Sekukuni Campaign. 
May 1880 Returns to England. 
1 July 1880 Appointed Quartermaster General. 
1 April 1882 Appointed Adjutant General. 
July 1882 Appointed to command expedition to Egypt. 
September 1882 Tel-el-Kebir. Receives thanks of both Houses of Parliament. Awarded 
GCB and GCMG. Raised to peerage. 
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18 November 1882 Promoted to General. 
1883 Accompanies the Duke and Duchess of Edinburgh to Russia for the 
coronation of Tsar Alexander III. 
1884 Appointed to command the Sudan expedition to rescue Gordon in 
Khartoum. 
February 1885 Khartoum falls and Gordon killed. 
April 1885 Returns to England. Raised to Viscountcy. 
1886 Represents the Queen at the Jubilee of Kaiser William I. 
1889 Visits the battlefields of the Franco-Prussian War. 
1 October 1890 Appointed Commander-in-Chief of Ireland. 
Summer 1894 Visits the Crimean battlefields. 
26 May 1894 Made a Field-Marshal. 
1 November 1895 Appointed Commander-in-Chief of the British Army. 
30 November 1900 Retires from the British Army. 
1910 Announces accession of King Edward VII to courts of Austria, Roumania, 
Serbia, Greece, and Turkey. 
26 March 1913 Dies in France. Buried in England in St Paul's Cathedral. 
Publications 
1. Books 
Narrative of the War in China, (1862) 
The Soldier's Pocket Book for Field Service, 5 editions, (1869-89) 
The Field Pocket Book for Auxiliary Forces, (1873) 
The Use of Railroads in War, Pamphlet, (1873) 
The Life of John Ist Duke of Marlborough (1650-1702), 2 Vols. (1894) 
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The Decline and Fall of Napoleon, (1895) 
The Story of a Soldier's Life, 2 Vols. (1903) 
2. Articles 
'A Month's Visit to Confederate Headquarters', Blackwoods, Vol. XCIII, No. 568, (Jan. 1863) 
pp 1-29 
'Narrative of the Red River Expedition - Parts 1-3, Blackwoods, Vols. 108-109, (Dec. 1870-Feb. 
1871) 
'Our Military Requirements', Macmillans, Vol. XXIII, (April 1871) pp 524-36 
'Our Autumn Manoeuvres', Blackwoods, Vol. CXII, No. 685, (Nov. 1872) pp 627-44 
'Our Coming Guest', Blackwoods, Vol. CXIII, No. 692, (June 1873) pp 712-21 
'Army Reform', Macmillans, Vol. XXXV, (April 1877), pp 496-504 
'France as a Military Power in 1870 and in 1878', Nineteenth Century, Vol. III, No. XI, (Jan. 
1878) pp 1-21 
'Military Staff Systems Abroad and in England', Macmillans, Vol. XXXVII, (Feb. 1878), 
pp 323-335 
'England as a Military Power in 1854 and in 1878', Nineteenth Century, Vol. III, No. 13 (March 
1878) pp 433-56 
'Letter from Cyprus', Macmillans, Vol. XXXIX, (Nov. 1878), p 96 
'Long and Short Service', Nineteenth Century, Vol. IX, No. 49, (March 1881) pp 558-72 
'General Lee', Macmillans, Vol. LV, (March 1887), pp 321-31 
'Courage', Fortnightly Review Vol. XLIV, No. 260, (August 1888) pp 279-92 
'Military Genius', Fortnightly Review Vol. XLIV, No. 261, (Sept. 1888) pp 297-312 
'The Negro as a Soldier', Fortnightly Review Vol. XLIV, No. 264, (Dec. 1888) pp 689-703 
'War', Fortnightly Review Vol. XLV, No. 265, (Jan. 1888) pp 1-17 
'Is a Soldier's Life Worth Living? ', Fortnightly Review Vol. XLV, No. 269, (May 1889) 
pp 597-609 
'The French Revolution and War', Fortnightly Review Vol. LV, No. 270, (June 1889) pp 780-91 
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'An English View of the Civil War', North American Review, Vol. CXLIX, No. 391-7, 
(June-Dec. 1889) 
'The Standing Army of Great Britain', Harpers New Monthly Magazine, Vol. LXXX, No. 477, 
(Feb. 1890) pp 331-47 
'The Study of War', United Services Magazine, Vol. 2, (1890) pp 481-93 
'General Sherman', United Services Magazine, Vol. 3, (1891) 
'General Forrest', United Services Magazine, Vol. 5, (1892) 
'Memoir of Sir Hope Grant', United Services Magazine, Vol. 7, No. 774, (1893) p777 
'War and Civilisation, United Services Magazine, Vol. 15, (1897) 
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Appendix II - The Civil Side of the War Office 
Date Secretary of State Under-Secretary Financial Permanent 
Secretary Under-Secretary 
1871 E. Cardwell Lord Northbrook J. C. Vivian Lieut-Gen Sir E. 
Lugard 
1872 H. Campbell J. C. Vivian 
1873 Marquis of 
Lansdowne 
1874 H. Campbell- 
Bannerman 
1875 G. Gathorne Hardy Earl of Pembroke Capt. F. A. Stanley 
1876 Earl of Cadogan 
1878 Lieut. -Col. R. J. 
Loyd-Lindsay 
1879 Col. F. A. Stanley Viscount Bury R. W. Thompson 
1881 H. C. E. Childers Earl of Morley H. Campbell- 
Bannerman 
Dec. 1882 Marquis of A. D. Hayter 
Hartington 
June 1885 - Feb. W. H. Smith Viscount Bury H. Stafford 
1886 Northcote 
Feb. - Aug. 1886 H. Campbell- 
Bannerman 
Aug. 1886 - Jan. W. H. Smith Lord Harris W. F. Brodrick 
1887 
1887 E. Stanhope 
1890 Earl Brownlow 
1892 H. Campbell- Lord Sandhurst W. Woodall 
Bannerman 
1895 Marquis of W. F. Brodrick J. Powell A. L. Haliburton 
Lansdowne Williamson 
1897 R. H. Knox 
1898 G. Wyndham 
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Lieut. -Gen. Sir 
R. Airey 
General G. J. 
Wolseley 
Lieut. -Gen. 






Maj. -Gen. F. P. 
Haines 
Maj. -Gen. C. H. 
Ellice 
Inspector- Director of 
General of Ordnance 
Recruiting 
Maj. -Gen. C. A. Maj. -Gen. Sir 
Edwards H. Storks 
Maj. -Gen. 
R. C. H. Taylor 
Maj. -Gen. D. Maj. -Gen. E. A. 
Lysons Whitmore 
Lieut. -Gen. G. J. Maj. -Gen. E. G. 
Wolseley Bulwer 
Maj. -Gen. A. 
Alison 
Lieut. -Gen. 
J. M. Adye 
Lieut. -Gen. A. J. 
Herbert 
H. R. Brand Col. A. S. 
Cameron 
General A. J. G. C. Dawnay Maj. -Gen. H. 
Herbert Brackenbury 
Maj. -Gen. R. H. Maj. -Gen. R. H. S. Northcote 
Buller Biddulph 
Lieut. -Gen. R. 
Biddulph 
Maj. -Gen. J. H. Post abolished 
Rocke 
Lieut. -Gen. Lieut. -Gen. Maj. -Gen. E. F. 
T. D. Baker W. H. A. Chapman 
Feilding 
Lieut. -Gen. E. 
Wood 
Lieut. -Gen. E. Lieut. -Gen. E. F. 
Markham Chapman 





G. S. White 





Lieut. -Col. Lord Maj. -Gen. P. L. 
Eustace MacDougall 
Lieut. -Gen. H. 
Brackenbury 
Source: The Army Lists: 1870-1900 
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Appendix III - Short Biographies 
Secretaries of State for War Prime Ministers 
Dec. 1868 - Feb. 1874 Edward Cardwell William Gladstone 
Feb. 1874 - March 1878 Gathorne Hardy Benjamin Disraeli 
April 1878 - April 1880 Col. F. A. Stanley 
April 1880 - Dec. 1882 Hugh Childers William Gladstone 
Dec. 1882 - June 1885 Marquess of Hartington 
June 1885 - Feb. 1886 W. H. Smith Marquess of Salisbury 
Feb. - Aug. 1886 Henry Campbell-Bannerman William Gladstone 
Aug. 1886 - Jan. 1887 W. H. Smith Marquess of Salisbury 
Jan. 1887 - Aug. 1892 Edward Stanhope 
Aug. 1892 - June 1895 Henry Campbell-Bannerman Earl of Rosebery 
June 1895 - Nov. 1900 Marquess of Lansdowne Marquess of Salisbury 
Principal Characters 
Adye, John (1819-1900), brigade major of artillery in Turkey, 1854; served at defence of 
Cawnpore, 1857; Deputy Adjutant General of artillery in India, 1863-6; Governor of Military 
Academy, Woolwich, 1875; Chief of Staff under Wolseley in Egypt, 1882; Governor of Gibraltar, 
1882-6. 
Alison, Archibald, (1826-1907), served at Sebastopol, 1855; wounded in second relief of 
Lucknow, 1857; served in Ashanti War, 1873-4; commanded Highland Brigade at Tel-el-Kebir, 
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1882; commanded force in Egypt, 1883; in command of Aldershot division, 1883-8; member of 
India Council, 1889-99. 
Ardagh, John, (1840-1907), Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General for intelligence at War 
Office, 1876; sent to Constantinople to report on its defence, 1876; reported on Montenegrin and 
Bulgarian defences; at Congress of Berlin, 1878; British commissioner for delimitation of Turco- 
Greek frontier, 1881; in charge of Intelligence Department, Egypt, 1882; restored Alexandria 
after its bombardment; present at battles of Tel-el-Kebir and El Teb; Commandant at Cairo during 
Gordon relief expedition, 1884; Assistant Adjutant General for defence at War Office, 1887; 
Private Secretary to Viceroy, 1888-94; Director of Military Intelligence, 1896-1901. 
Arnold-Forster, Hugh, (1855-1909), secretary of Imperial Federation League and advocate of 
naval efficiency, 1884; Unionist MP, 1892-1909; wrote much on army questions, 1892-1900; 
Secretary of the Admiralty, 1900; Secretary of State for War, 1903-5; reorganised War Office. 
Baring, Evelyn, first earl of Cromer (1841-1917), went out to Cairo as first British commissioner 
of Caisse de la Dette created to deal with liabilities of Khedive Ismail, 1877; resigned, 1879; on 
deposition of Ismail and succession of Tewfik appointed British controller in Egypt, 1879; 
financial member of Viceroy's council, 1880-83; British agent and consul-general in Egypt, 1883- 
1907; created Baron Cromer, 1892; viscount, 1899; earl, 1901. 
Bigge, Arthur, (1840-193 1), assistant private secretary to Queen Victoria, 1880-95; private 
secretary, 1895-1901. 
Brackenbury, Henry (1837-1914), accompanied Wolseley to Ashanti, 1873, Cyprus, 1878, 
Zululand, 1879, and Egypt, 1884; Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General and head of 
Intelligence Department, 1886-91; Military Member of Viceroy's Council, 1891-96; Director 
General of Ordnance, 1899-1902. 
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Brodrick, St John, ninth Viscount Midleton (1856-1942), Conservative MP 1880-1906; Financial 
Secretary at War Office, 1886-92; Under Secretary for War, 1895-98; Under Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs, 1898-1900; Secretary of State for War, 1900-03. 
Buller, Redvers (1839-1908), accompanied Wolseley on Red River expedition, 1870; chief 
intelligence officer on Ashanti campaign, 1873-4; commanded Frontier Light Horse in Sixth Kaffir 
War in South Africa, 1878-9; VC, June 1879; Chief of Staff to Wood in South Africa, 1881; chief 
of intelligence staff in Egypt, 1882; commanded first infantry brigade at El Teb and Tamai under 
Sir Gerald Graham, 1884; Chief of Staff in Gordon relief expedition, 1884; Adjutant General, 
1890-97; Aldershot command, 1898; Commander-in-Chief, Boer War, 1899; commander in 
Natal, 1900. 
Butler, William (1838-1910), accompanied Wolseley on Red River expedition, 1870; Ashanti 
campaign, 1873-4; special service in Natal, 1875; served in Zulu war, 1879; Egypt campaign, 
1882; in charge of provision of boats for Gordon relief expedition, 1884; commanded garrison at 
Alexandria, 1890; in command of brigade at Aldershot, 1893; transferred to South East district, 
1896; commanded troops in South Africa, 1898-99; command of Western district, 1899-1905. 
Cambridge, Duke of (1819-1904), commanded division in Crimea and present at Alma and 
Inkerman, 1854; General Commanding in Chief 1856-87; Commander-in-Chief, 1887-1895. 
Campbell-Bannerman, Henry (1836-1908), MP, 1868-1908; Financial Secretary to War Office, 
1871-74 and 1880-82; Secretary to the Admiralty, 1882-84; Chief Secretary for Ireland, 1884-85; 
Secretary of State for War, Feb. -June 1886; in favour of Home Rule; Secretary of State for War, 
1892-95; Prime Minister, 1906-08. 
Cardwell, Edward (1813-1886), MP; Secretary of State for War, 1868-74. 
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Chapman, Edward (1840-1926), Military Secretary to Commander-in-Chief India, 1881-5-. 
Quartermaster General India, 1885-9; Director of Military Intelligence, 1891-6; G. O. C. Scotland, 
1896-1901 
Childers, Hugh (1827-1896), MP; First Lord of the Admiralty, 1868; Secretary of State for War, 
1880-82; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1882-85. 
Colley, George (1835-1881), lieutenant-colonel in Ashanti campaign, 1873-74; visited Natal and 
the Transvaal, 1875; Secretary to the Viceroy, 1876; Chief of Staff in Zulu war, 1879; major- 
general and governor of Natal, 1880; killed at Majuba Hill in Jan. 1881. 
Connaught, Duke of, (1850-1942), third son of Queen Victoria; commanded 1st brigade in 
Egypt, 1882; commanded in Bombay, 1886-90; Portsmouth command, 1890-93; Aldershot, 1893- 
98; Ireland, 1900-04. 
Dilke, Charles (1843-1911), MP 1868-86 and 1892-1911; radical and prolific author particularly 
on social reform and military subjects. 
Esher, Viscount (1852-1930), private secretary to Hartington, 1878-85; Liberal MP, 1880-85; 
member of Elgin Commission, 1902; chairman of War Office Reconstruction Committee, 1903- 
04. 
Gathorne-Hardy, Gathorne, first earl of Cranbrook (1814-1906), MP; Secretary of State for 
War, 1874-78; Secretary for India, 1878. 
Gordon, Charles (1833-1885), served in Crimean war, 1855; served in Chinese war, 1860-62; 
appointed to command Chinese 
forces against the Taipings, 1863-4; governor of equatorial 
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provinces (Egypt), 1874-76; governor-general of the Sudan and equatorial provinces, 1877; 
succeeded in ending slave trade in region; secretary to Viceroy, 1880; sent to Sudan to bring out 
Khartoum garrison, 1884; besieged in Khartoum and murdered in Jan. 1885. 
Haliburton, Arthur (1832-1907), joined commissariat department of British Army, 1855; served 
in Crimea and Canada; civilian assistant director of supplies and transports, 1869; director, 1879; 
Permanent Under Secretary for war, 1895-97. 
Hamley, Edward (1824-1893), served in Crimea, 1854; professor of military history at Sandhurst, 
1859-64; published Operations of War (1866); member of Council for Military Education, 1866- 
70; commandant of staff college, 1870-77; commanded division in Egypt, 1882, later embroiled in 
argument with Wolseley of role played by the division; MP 1885 and 1886-93; active in home 
defence debates. 
Hartington, Marquess (1833-1908), MP 1857-91; Under Secretary of State for War, 1863; 
Secretary of State for War, 1866; Chief Secretary for Ireland, 1870-74; Secretary of State for 
India, 1880-82; Secretary of State for War, 1882-85; opposed Home Rule; chairman of Royal 
Commission on administration of military and naval departments, 1888-90; succeeded father as 
Duke of Devonshire, 1892; chairman of Cabinet Defence Committee, 1895-1900. 
Lansdowne, Marquess (1845-1927), Under Secretary of State for War, 1872-74; Under Secretary 
for India, 1880; Governor-general of Canada, 1883-88; Viceroy of India, 1888-94; Secretary of 
State for War, 1895-1900; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1900-05. 
MacDougall, Patrick (1819-1894), served in Canada, 1844-54; superintendent of studies at 
Sandhurst, 1854-58; served in Crimea, 1854-55; Adjutant General of Canadian Militia, 1865-69; 
Deputy Inspector-general of auxiliary forces at War Office, 1871; head of Intelligence Branch, 
1873-78. 
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Maurice, John (1841-1912), served in Ashanti, South Africa, Egypt, and the Sudan under 
Wolseley; professor of military art and history at Staff College, 1885; commanded artillery, 
Woolwich district, 1895; prolific writer on military subjects and edited first two volumes of 
official History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902 (1906-07). 
Ponsonby, Henry (1825-1895), served in the Crimea; Private Secretary to Queen Victoria, 1870- 
95. 
Roberts, Frederick (1832-1914), served in Indian Mutiny, 1857; won VC in 1858; Assistant 
Quartermaster General on Abyssinian expedition, 1867-68; Quartermaster General of army in 
India, 1875; commander of Punjab Frontier Force, 1878; commanded force in Afghan war, 1878- 
80; Commander-in-Chief of Madras Army, 1880; Commander-in-Chief in India, 1885-93; 
Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, 1895-99; appointed to supreme command in South Africa, 1900; 
Commander-in-Chief of British Army, 1900-05. 
Smith, William Henry (1825-1891), MP; First Lord of Admiralty, 1877; Secretary of State for 
War, June 1885-Feb. 1886 and Aug. 1886-Jan. 1887; First Lord of Treasury and leader of House 
of Commons, 1886. 
Stanhope, Edward (1840-1893), MP; Under Secretary of State for India, 1878-80; President of 
Board of Trade, 1885; Colonial Secretary, 1886; Secretary of State for War, 1887-92. 
Stanley, Frederick, sixteenth earl of Derby (1841-1908), in Grenadier Guards, 1858-65; 
Conservative MP, 1865-1886; Secretary of State for War, 1878-80; Colonial Secretary, 1885-6; 
succeeded to earldom, 1893. 
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Wilkinson, Spenser (1853-1937), active military historian and journalist; leader writer, 
Manchester Guardian, 1882-92; Morning Post, 1895-1914; Chichele professor of military history, 
Oxford, 1909-23. 
Wood, Evelyn (1838-1919), entered navy, 1854; transferred to army during Crimean War; won 
VC in Indian Mutiny; special service officer under Wolseley in Ashanti campaign, 1873-74; 
served in Zulu War, 1878-79; sent to Natal in 1881 to oversee settlement with Boers after war; 
served under Wolseley in Egypt, 1882; first British Sirdar of Egyptian Army, 1882; Eastern 
command, 1886; Aldershot command, 1889; Quartermaster General, 1893-97; Adjutant General 
1897-1900 
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Appendix IV - Establishments and Recruitment 
Year Cavalry R. A. 1 R. E. Foot Infantry 
Guards 
1875 Establishment 16,060 34,458 5,627 5,633 116,727 
Home 12,075 19,418 4,020 5,633 49,957 
Recruitment 2,281 4,513 475 571 12,057 
1877 Establishment 16,547 35,294 5,698 5,853 118,704 
Home 11,754 18,458 4,023 5,853 54,568 
Recruitment ------ ------- ------ ----- ------3 
1879 Establishment 16,203 35,106 6,001 5,940 120,359 
Home 11,344 17,990 3,743 5,940 50,915 
Recruitment 
1881 Establishment 15,903 33,630 5,568 5,990 119,235 
Home 10,929 15,951 3,703 5,990 49,136 
Recruitment 1,388 3,863 402 618 19,175 
1883 Establishment 15,657 33,007 5,625 5,697 124,021 
Home 9,905 15,897 3,821 5,697 54,294 
Recruitment 3,036 4,022 565 1,727 22,464 
1885 Establishment 15,951 31,908 5,701 6,232 119,583 
Home 9,312 15,512 3,378 5,913 48,914 
Recruitment 3,519 5,754 1,138 1,104 26,711 
1887 Establishment 18,122 34,267 6,272 5,861 133,906 
Home 11,315 16,769 4,509 5,861 57,459 
Recruitment 2,769 4,974 1,005 1,266 19,626 
1889 Establishment 17,851 35,128 6,764 5,691 135,404 
Home 11,316 17,827 5,116 5,691 56,420 
Recruitment 2,551 5,569 945 1,207 17,702 
1891 Establishment 17,600 35,557 7,305 5,517 133,557 
Home 11,139 17,533 5,350 4,900 58,551 





























1 The figures for the Artillery are the totals of the Royal Horse Artillery, the Field Artillery, the Garrison 
Artillery, and the Mountain Artillery. 
2 These figures are the total of all branches of the British Army, including those branches not listed here. 
3 The breakdown of the recruitment figures for 1877 and 1879 was not found in the Reports of the Inspector 
General for Recruiting. 
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Date Cavalry R. A. R. E. Foot Infantry Total 
Guards 
1893 Establishment 18,780 36,611 7,530 6,111 135,293 217,789 
Home 12,113 18,231 5,449 6,111 58,632 107,904 
Recruitment 3,086 5,645 661 1,101 23,266 35,195 
1895 Establishment 18,356 37,236 7,591 5,948 138,897 222,151 
Home 11,095 17,358 5,476 5,948 60,098 107,810 
Recruitment 2,387 4,552 915 1,173 19,153 29,583 
1897 Establishment 18,406 37,013 7,829 5,851 136,965 220,869 
Home 10,582 16,223 5,555 5,851 54,371 100,641 
Recruitment 2,426 6,357 817 2,062 21,037 35,015 
1899 Establishment 18,102 39,423 7,975 7,249 141,332 231,851 
Home 10,378 17,572 5,351 6,275 58,791 106,686 
Recruitment 4,793 7,152 1,402 2,155 22,741 42,700 
Source: General Annual Returns of the Army: c. 1633 (1876) XLIII, c. 2170 (1878) XLVII, c. 2731 
(1880) XLII, c. 3405 (1882) XXXVIII, c. 4184 (1884) XLVIII, c. 4829 (1886) XL, c. 5531 (1888) 
LXVI, c. 6196 (1890) XLIII, c. 6722 (1892) L, c. 7483 (1894) LIII, c. 8225 (1896) LI, c. 8982 
(1898) LIV, c. 9426 (1900) LIII; Reports of the Inspector General of Recruiting: c. 1435 (1876) 
XV, c. 1945 (1878) XIX, c. 2241 (1878-9) XV, c. 3169 (1882) XVI c. 3911 (1884) XVII, c. 4677 
(1886) XIII, c. 5302 (1888) XIX, c. 5953 (1890) XIX, c. 6597 (1892) XX, c. 7291 (1893-4) XVI, 
c. 7980 (1896) XVIII, c. 8770 (1898) XIII cd. 110 (1900) X 
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